RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE IN FRANCE: AN ANALYSIS FROM A MUSLIM WOMAN'S PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT

Religious intolerance is when an assembly (e.g., a general public, religious group, non-religious group) explicitly refuses or that is incepting of any religious forthcoming, persons or beliefs on any religious grounds. It includes public declarations that some other religion is incorrect and not acceptable, any action to restrict or limit the free respect of any religion, through to actual oppression of that religion or its believers. In short, it means unwilling to tolerate other people's beliefs, views, rights, etc.

The countries and cultures of Europe have always been diverse and various in their ethnic, religious and social conformation. The opening of borders, globalization of markets and manufacture, worldwide migration and new communication technologies mean that this trend will continue, even if democratic and extremist forces on the right to continue in their attempts to stir up hostility and summon citizens against any acceptance of cultural heterogeneity.

As a continent of very many different countries, languages and cultures; Europe by its very nature is different. It is a place where people from different cultural, ethnic and religious backgrounds, men and women with different sexual orientations, individuals with and without physical and mental disabilities pursuing widely differing lifestyles and inhabiting different economic milieu all live together. So diversity is both a detail and a mission to be trailed for the future.

The future of Europe depends not only on the acceptance of diversity but also on the quality of amalgamation of heterogeneous groups, and that in turn is a question of being familiar with their equality. Whether people from different social groups succeed to live together peacefully as equals or find their cohabitation charged with
conflict will depend on the willingness of the main groups and majorities to treat others as equals and join in them and on their general attitude to diversity.

How does one deal with the intolerance of religions? The UN HCR has taken upon themselves the Charter of the United Nations that is of the dignity and equality characteristic of all human beings, and that all Member States have vowed themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization to promote and reassure universal respect for and compliance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without discrepancy as to race, sex, language or religion.

In this study, the researcher concentrates on France, solely, to illuminate the possible causes for quantifiable and/or ideological support to terror in that society, and additionally indicates how these trends may be obvious or possible throughout Western societies. As in recent years, the word "Muslim" has become tantamount with terror in the daily lexes of France and other Western societies; this thesis reveals that terrorism is not a spontaneous or stand-alone problem. Terror and other forms of extremism in France whether coming up or imaginary mark an end form of the true problem: social exclusion, or alienation, or isolation of French Muslims. French society's Republican values of liberty, equality, and community make no distinction for such character factors as ethnicity and religion. This study focused on the French headscarf ban, burqini ban, etc., with its goal of promoting integration.

This thesis demonstrates that the wearing of headscarves by Muslim girls in French society was demonstrated as a challenge to French identity and the tradition of laicite, or secularism. These ideas, and others dominant to French-ness, are seen in the French polity as threatening, as well as a graphical representation to the threat modeled by the inflow of Muslim immigrants and their failure to integrate. This thesis concludes by representing that issues such as racism, Islamaphobia, and social alienation or omission are the vehicles that radical Islamists prey upon to find potential jihadists. If the headscarf ban and other bans is politicized by the major Muslim community, the bans ultimately might prove counterproductive resulting in reduced amalgamation in public schools, more segregation, and a radicalized Muslim community intimidating to the Western traditions that France holds so dear.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

After a concentrated period of five years, today is the day: writing this memo of appreciations is the finishing touch of my thesis. It has been a period of intense education for me, not only in the scientific ground, but also on a personal level. Writing this thesis has had a big effect on me. I would like to reflect on the people who have supported and helped me so much all the way through this period.

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Making my parents proud has always been one of my ultimate agendas, and I believe with this thesis, I have accomplished it. My sisters; Ayan Ali and Leila Ali, who have been there for moral support and have helped me on my research topic. Similarly, my greatest appreciation to my soul mate, my best friend, my husband who had always kept me in his prayers, love and patience throughout the completion of this thesis.

Suad Ismail Ali
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Background of the Study

France is predominantly a landmass territory in Western Europe, which borders Belgium and Luxembourg in the north, Germany, Switzerland and Italy in the east, the Mediterranean Sea in the south, Spain in the south west, the Atlantic Ocean in the west and the English Channel in the north-west. France is a country where freedom of religion and freedom of thought are pronounced by virtue of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen.¹ The Republic is based on the principle of laïcité (or "freedom of conscience") enforced by the 1880s Jules Ferry laws² and the 1905 French law on the Separation of the Churches and the State.³ Roman Catholicism, the religion of a majority of French people, is no longer the state religion that it was

¹ THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND CITIZEN art. 10 (1789) (Fr.), ("No one may be disturbed on account of his opinions, even religious ones, as long as the manifestation of such opinions does not interfere with the established Law and Order."). The Declaration has been incorporated into the current Constitution of France. 1958 CONST.pmbl.(Fr.), at http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/anglais/the institutions/founding texts/the declaration of the human rights/the declaration of the human rights.202 40.html, (last visited 20 March 2017).


before the 1789 Revolution and during the course of the numerous, non-republican regimes of the 19th century.

Major religions practiced in France include Catholic Christianity, Islam, Judaism, various branches of Protestantism, Hinduism, Russian Orthodoxy, Armenian Christianity, and Sikhism among others, making it a multi-confessional country. Islam is the second-most broadly declared religion in France behind Catholic Christianity by number of believers. With an estimated total of 5 to 10 percent of the national population, France has the largest number of Muslims in Western Europe. The widespread of Muslims in France belong to the Sunni denomination.

The massive majority of French Muslims are of immigrant origin, while an estimated 100,000 are converts to Islam of aboriginal ethnic French background. The French overseas region of Mayotte has a majority Muslim population. While millions in France continue to attend religious services frequently, the overall level of compliance is considerably lower than in the past. According to the Euro-barometer Poll conducted in 2010, 27% of French citizens responded that "they believe there is a God", 33% answered that "they believe there is some sort of spirit or life force", and 40% answered that "they do not believe there is any sort of spirit, God, or life force". This makes France one of the most secular countries in the world.

Over a period of centuries, France has transitioned from having a state church, to being neutral on religion and valuing religious freedom, to being loyally secular and against religious expression. Recent restrictions such as a ban on wearing hijabs, forcing people to eat pork etc., on religious appearance appear to be a violation of the country's constitution. The 1905 Law protects the freedom of individuals to choose, change and practice one's religion.


The way Muslim minorities live in France is being disturbed by several acts of intolerance towards them and the perception of terrorism. These affects large communities in France and make it difficult for them to live along with other nationals. These acts of intolerance will be further explained in the upcoming chapters of this study. This thesis study will prove that the minorities that are largely of a Muslim community cannot live and roam amongst the French nationals due to the rising of religion intolerance specifically Islam. Unless they abide by the French rules within the Islamic perimeter. The researcher's aim in this study is to provide solutions for potential problems involving the recent intolerance against minorities specifically Islam in France and that the negative perception of Muslims should not be used against them.

1.2 Hypotheses of the Study

In order for any study to be successfully carried out, the issue under investigation (the phenomenon) has to be identified and all focus placed on it. To achieve this, the following hypotheses were formulated. This study will test the hypothesis that intolerance to minority religions is rising in France and it disturbs the way minorities live in France. The outcome of this study will show how France is rapidly increasing discrimination, intolerance towards minorities and promoting public hate speeches by not condemning them.

Hypotheses: Intolerance to minority religions is rising in France and it disturbs the way minorities live in France.

1.3 Statement of the Problems

Freedom of religion or belief is inherently linked to freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of association and assembly, as well as to other human rights and vital freedoms all of which contribute towards the structure of diverse, open-minded, and self-governing societies.

In order to study the changing profile of Muslims in Europe, this author has reviewed information to identify the degree to which a European country has developed as a society of inclusion or exclusion, and then to determine the degree to which Muslims are successfully integrated into that society. While this problem of integration or assimilation affects much of Europe, this study will focus on France. The Netherlands, Germany, and France have all passed legislation perceived as hostile to Muslim groups or communities within the society. As a result, citizens of minority ethnicities or religions, especially Muslims, feel alienated. Amongst these three countries, France is particularly interesting because of the historic imperial interplay between North Africa and Metropolitan France. France has, in recent years, enacted significant pieces of public law and immigration legislation that Muslims consider hostile. This legislation and the tension that it both reflects and creates have inspired voluminous media and academic attention, which form the basis of this study.

Other European countries look to France as a model for Muslim integration, for better or worse. This thesis will deal with the debate on French identity and immigration by situating the contemporary discourse within its historical and cultural contexts. In order to understand better the issues of Muslim alienation within France, one must understand French history, to include the role of North Africa and North Africans, race relations, and Islam in modern French society. The French ideal of laïcité, or secularism, is a bedrock of French Republican identity and a legacy of the Age of Reason and the Revolution. In 1989, that ideal was tested when a French headmaster expelled a Muslim student for wearing her headscarf in the classroom. In the subsequent litigation, which pitted laïcité against religious freedom, the courts, whose arguments primarily centered on which symbols were permissible, ruled that symbols were permitted so long as they were not worn or displayed with the goal of "pressure, provocation, proselytism, or propaganda."

The terrorist bombings of 1995 in the Paris Metro as well as the events of September 11, 2001, in New York and Washington, led to a rise of Islamaphobia.

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throughout the West. The perception that Muslims were invading France deepened Republican fears that the foundational principles of French Republican identity were under siege. The headscarf, or hijab, became a symbol of a cultural clash. The public sentiment led the French President, Jacques Chirac, to establish an independent commission in January 2004 to research the modern interpretation of ideas and the implementation of contemporary secularism in French society, or "to reflect upon the modern application of laicité."

After four months of testimonies and investigations, this commission, led by the French politician and former ombudsman of the French Republic Bernard Stasi, a first generation Frenchman of Mexican and Italian heritage, recommended twenty-five measures to the French leadership. Mr. Chirac chose only one of these measures to take before the Parliament. On March 3, 2004, the French Senate approved the law "prohibiting the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols in public elementary and secondary schools." Polls at the time demonstrate that approximately 60 percent to 70 percent of the French population supported the ban. This thesis will assess the ban's impact on the French, including France's Muslim minority. In this connection, one must also explore:

1. What does it mean to be "French," and furthermore, how does being "French" pertain to questions of peace, security, and defense?
2. How has the concept of citizenship and nationhood evolved in France?
3. What developments have occurred within French society since the imposition of the ban?

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12 Jeruriyah, Brian Q & A: Muslim Headscarves, op.cit.
4. How do persons who feel victimized or segregated react within French society?

5. What are the broader implications of the French experience within Europe, and benefit to French society?

The importance of this topic and its relevance to the issues of politics, society, and security will have utility for policymakers within the U.S. Department of State and U.S. European Command as they advise and assist European countries and even, perhaps, cooperate with the European Union in matters of vital, mutual interest. At present, Europe struggles to assimilate growing Muslim immigrant populations, as well as to prepare for European Union expansion into Southeastern Europe, which encompasses Bosnia with its significant Muslim population. There remains additionally, and the possible entrance of the first European Muslim country, Turkey.

The question of Muslim assimilation affects all levels of European governance, as communities as small as hamlets and as large as the European Union are and will continue to develop policies that strive to promote fair and equitable immigration as well as successful integration of immigrant populations. These policies must meet the challenge of "Old European" nationalism, xenophobia, and anti-Muslim/anti-immigrant racism. The findings and recommendations in this thesis may have further application for additional research into controlling the rise of ideological support to terror as well as spontaneous terrorism within both Europe and the United States.

Given the rising trend of religious intolerance in France, this study will explore the issue and provide an answer to the following research question: Is intolerance to minority religions on the rise in France? What are the long term socio political consequences of religious intolerance in France? What are the causes of religion intolerance in France? What kind of effects of religion intolerance will it have towards minorities? What are the possibilities of reducing religion intolerance in France? Which areas in the French government authorities lack awareness about this issue? And finally, what kind of solutions can the minorities take upon themselves to live freely and happily amongst people in France?
1.4 The Solutions and the Aims and Means to Achieve the Objectives

This study will attempt to:

1. Find out whether or not if such thing is called religion intolerance.
2. Find out if it's true that the French people are negative to Islam because of the current situation.
3. Find out whether minorities can find solutions to adjust their lives.
4. Find out whether minorities can live freely and happily in France.
5. Find out if this study can prove that unnecessary problems won't come your way if you're a minority.

1.5 Scope and Limitations of the Study

This research focuses on Islam, the perception on how Islam is viewed and what is currently happening in France with the conclusion of materials from newspapers, e-books, and the internet that discuss about the current on-going affairs in France. This study was conducted in 6 years and the period covered that data were used in this research is five years' time. The data collected in this study are based on the United Nations declarations and resolutions on religious intolerance, Laicite theory, the 1905 Law, books on different kinds of French Law, popular incidents that occurred in France, e-books, and the resolutions that are adopted by the General Assembly will be mentioned by the researcher in this thesis. One of the limitations that the researcher faced is the political instability in the region prevented the researcher to conduct the research in the manner in which it could have been conducted i.e., to be in France physically. The researcher is a mother to a new born baby which prevents her from travelling to France. France now has stricter border immigration and is more likely to deny Muslims from entering the country. Therefore, the researcher could not interview the victims that are faced with the difficulties that come with religion intolerance. The researcher does not speak French so it limits her to a certain degree her research capabilities. In addition, some of the articles were biased leaving the researcher research availability on Judaism limited. Jewish scholars focused more on the good side of their religion, giving little or no attention to their bad side.
Nevertheless, the negative responses of the propaganda against Muslims were somewhat racist and difficult to figure out which article/newspaper were reporting the truth.

1.6 Expectations of the Study

The expected outcome of this study will be to bring awareness on the topic of religion intolerance in France and to know what has caused this, what can be done to stop further religious oppression in the country, and how can we, as humans, learn from this unfortunate issue. This research aims to improve France's policy of secularism, or lakite, in order to help it specifically accommodate its Muslim population. In addition, the United Nations has a declaration on religious intolerance that should be adopted or used by all countries to maintain peace and calm especially France. Freedom of religion in France is guaranteed by the constitutional rights set forth in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen.

To try to be more objective regarding the UN declarations, the researcher of this thesis will try to compare and analyze whether the French legislation and practices are in line with or conform to the ‘Reasonable Accommodation’ concept/principle as appears in the Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination based on Religion or Belief.

1.7 The Structure of the Thesis

This study is divided into five chapters as follows:

Chapter 1 introduces the topic of research and presents the research questions and objectives about religious intolerance in France. The Introduction will focus on the foundation of the debate including the differences between integration and assimilation, the various manifestations of racism, and why France was chosen as a case study.

Chapter 2 talks about the related literature and studies after the thorough and in-depth search done by the researcher. This will also present the synthesis of the art,
theoretical and conceptual framework to fully understand the research to be done and
lastly the definition of terms for better comprehension of the study.

Chapter 3 is a review of related literature based on the events that happened in
France on religious intolerance. "What Does It Mean To Be French?," will focus on
the history of French nationalism and the evolution of secularism in France through
the Second World War and that conflicts' immediate aftermath Analytic views have
also been written to further explain what the researcher found.

Chapter 4 "Integration or Segregation" will concentrate on the origins,
deliberations and recommendations of the Stasi Commission, and more importantly,
the results of the subsequent legislation. The study will draw on empirical data since
2003. This data will include statistics on school enrollment, as well as findings from
large E.U., Rand, and Pew Surveys. Additionally it will include evidence taken from
interviews with French citizens from various backgrounds, religions, ethnicities, and
economic statuses carried out by the researcher.

Chapter 5 is the chapter that this dissertation has aimed to do two things. First,
to demonstrate that laTicite is not, in its current form, able to accommodate its Muslim
population due to a lack, or in the case of state control an exploitation of, its three core
elements: national cohesion, unity and integration; equality and neutrality; and state
control and the public/private divide. Second, to show ways in which the policy of
lakite can be improved in each of these elements to better accommodate its Muslim
population by comparing it to moderate secularism such as Britain. Third, to analyze
the official UN documents and **Reasonable Accommodation** concept in France.

Chapter 6 is the final chapter in this thesis study that shows the summary of
findings, conclusions and recommendations of why Intolerance to religion is
increasing in France and what are the steps and solutions that can be done to make
minorities live a happy life in France. The chapter will suggest the consequences of
these actions if they continue on their present track and concludes with
recommendations for E.U. policy makers to broaden the efforts to integrate the
Western world's growing Muslim community.
1.8 Terms and Definitions

This study will discuss many terms that require definition, not the least of which is, what is a Muslim? In modern media and political parlance, Muslims are seen as a group, the newest of Europe's ethnicities. Unfortunately, this is misleading because the homogenization and stereotyping of Muslims, as any "outsider" group, often provokes collective fear. Like Christianity, Islam comes in many forms that often reflect very different cultural nuances. For example, Muslims from Indonesia distinguish themselves from Muslims in the Middle East.

For the purpose of this study, the researcher will refer to the Muslim community in France as a single entity. This is primarily because the origin of the preponderance of French Muslims is North Africa generally, and Algeria specifically. The terms "assimilation" and "integration" will also be used throughout this thesis. Although both terms generally refer to the amalgamation of parts into a whole, the delineation of these two terms will be crucial to our understanding of the current social dynamics and policies in France and throughout Europe. For the purpose of this thesis, integration will refer to the combination of races and peoples within a given society. Those being integrated will retain their existing cultural and/or religious identity in the new context of their adopted society. Assimilation also refers to a grouping of persons into a larger society; however, unlike integration, assimilation, as a process, generates a new identity for those being assimilated. The basic divergence between the two terms is a variation in retaining an existing identity or adopting the identity of the new society.

Racism will also be a key factor to this research. Although "race" is a biological category, it is as much a political and social construct that will be discussed in this research. In modern, Western societies, the term "race" precisely captures the socioeconomic status, culture, and genes of a given group of persons. Race-conscious societies, such as those found in France, the United States, and most Western nations, limit their prevention of racism, because it perpetuates the ideas of differences between races. Three significant levels of racism exist within French and most Western societies: institutionalized, personally mediated, and internalized. Institutionalized racism is defined as differential access, based on race, to the goods,
services, and opportunities within a given society. Personally mediated racism is simply prejudice and discrimination against a group of people. Prejudice manifests itself in assumptions about the group at issue, while discrimination is marked by differential actions towards that group. Last, internalized racism is an acceptance by those stigmatized that they or their peers are lesser persons and/or have lower intrinsic worth.\(^\text{13}\)

Chapter 2
Review of Related Literature and Studies

This chapter shows the literature and studies relating to the theory Laicite, the 1905 Law, Citizenship and France's immigrants and finally minority languages. This chapter is carried out thoroughly and in-depth search completed by the researcher. This will also shows the combination of the theoretical and conceptual framework to fully understand the theories and how the researcher used it to prove that minorities cannot live freely due to religious intolerance in France.

2.1.1 The Overview

The term laicite has been recycled, from the end of the 19th century on, to distinguish the freedom of public institutions, particularly primary schools, from the impact of the Catholic Church in countries where it had taken its influence, in the context of a secularization process.\(^{14}\) Today, the notion covers other religious activities as well. In France, laicite has molded the relation between religion and the State through magnifying a separation between them.\(^{15}\) This separation has been conceivable thanks to the existence of a legislation that has moderately succeeded in drawing the lines for both sides. And so laicite in theory has been found to be unsuited with laicite in practice. How laicite has been confronted over the past years and how the State has responded towards the influence of religion are major concerns.

So in this study, the researcher will answer the questions about whether laicite is an inflexible or an active concept in view of the challenges facing the State. This study starts with a definition of laicite, touches historical facts about its evolution, highlights the challenges that it has faced, classifies the new laicite forms before finishing on its capacity to adapt to societal developments.


\(^{15}\) Ibid.
2.1.2 Definition of Lakite

Many academics tend to use the term lakite and secularization interchangeably in their workings about the place of religion and the relationship between state and religion. In fact the two terms hold different classifications concerning the connection between religion and state. Though in English, the term secularization is used to define the relationship between them, the French word lalcalcite is used also in English to state to the unique separation between religious institutions and the state. According to Olivier Roy\textsuperscript{16} "the two terms are unrelated. On the one hand, secularization is "a social phenomenon that does not require a political implementation" and is not "anti-religious and anti-clerical, and so the place is well-defined by the people themselves". On the other, laicite is "a political choice that defines the place of religion in an authoritarian, legal manner", and so it is "decreed by the state which organizes public space". Roy adds that it is "a body of laws before being a system of thought".\textsuperscript{17} Moreover, the two terms are contrasted in this way "à la différence du processus de secularisation mouvement qui s'inscrit sur une longue duree, lalcalcite releve plutot d'unevolonte de la politique etatique qui definit a la fois les institutions et une vie sociale conforme a ses principes".\textsuperscript{18} In this view, secularization is a social process that has developed over a long period of time, while lakite requires a political decision on the state level. "The historian Jean Bauberot has argued that "lakite was the result of a condition in which the state had to destabilize religious institutions, mainly Catholic, to assert its authority and ensure democratic liberties, whereas secularization should be viewed as a cultural transformation that has taken place mostly in countries with a Protestant culture".\textsuperscript{19}


\textsuperscript{19} Bauberot Jean, "La"(cite 1905-2005, entre passion et raison", Le Seuil, Paris, 2004.)
2.1.3 Evolution of laicité

Laicité is venerated as a principle that protects state (and hence public) neutrality, but observing the details of its historical development reveals flaws in its disguise of impartiality. Although laicité circles around secularism, the notion was developed as the result of hundreds of years of religious brawl among Christian groups in France, and is therefore a specific response to the Christian religious tradition and political notions that were fictitious in the same fire. In addition, laicité has more to do with Christianity than is obvious at first glimpse. Despite a noticeable decline in active Christian practice among Europeans in modern times, recent polls specify that there is a still a somewhat high level of belief, demonstrating that Europeans are still “passively Christian” in large numbers. However, whether one is passionately or inertly Christian tends to make little difference under laicité, purely because the Christian assumption is that “faith is a matter of ‘belief’ and therefore about ‘thought’.”

In the aboriginal Christian tradition of Europe, strong belief does not need the public expression of faith, and so secularism has operated well to nullify tensions between religious and secular forces in society. Laicité, therefore, is companionable with Christian forms of organized religion accurately because they do not entail public expression of faith. Not necessarily so for the imported faiths of immigrants, notably Islam and Sikhism, which to unpredictable degrees of interpretation encourage or need public rituals and external symbols of faith.

Much like Orthodox Jews (who were once maltreated in Europe for exactly the same religious irregularities), Muslims normally believe that faith demands not only thought, but specific action as well, and therein lies the major conflict between laicité and Islam. "Europeans are generally willing to grant people the right to practice religion in private," Jyette Klausen notes, "but are less comfortable with public displays of faith" of the sort found in Islam. Four of the five pillars of Islam; shahada (profession of faith), Salah (ritual prayer), sawm 10 (fasting during Ramadan), and hajj (ritual pilgrimage to Mecca); along with other "public ritual

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21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.
practices" such as the animal sacrifice of the Eid al-Adha holiday, hinders Islam an observable quality that Europeans are wary of. Such noticeable expressions of faith simply lies "outside the template" of planned Christian religion, in its comfortably contained form, "performed inside a familiar sacred place once a week, with teachings intended to guide private life".

Unfamiliar clothing, beards, and veils increase the sensation that Islam is weird and bizarre. "The headscarf and the mosque are not objectively more visible than the nun's habit and the cathedral," writes John Bowen, "but they are subjectively shocking because they are new, foreign." The French, who are even more sensitive to explicit religious expression because of their history and tradition of laicite, have a strong reaction when Muslims insist on emphasizing a different public religious identity. The tug of war between the public faith of Islam and the private faith of laicite is figurative of what it means to be Muslim in France today, where the multifaceted sensitivities of personal belief are influenced by an extensive assortment of factors that are sometimes detached from purely spiritual fears.

2.1.4 Challenges confronting Laicite

Since the 1970s, immigration infiltrated the community and political spheres as a social problem of ethnic/cultural relations. From "guest-workers", factors of production, "immigrants came to be perceived as objects of political controversy defined in terms of citizenship and identity". The deliberation about laicite started in the school. The school system is described as a sanctuary for

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24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

protecting the French laicite. The new diagnoses linked to the threats against laicite begun in school 27 In 1989, two girls in Creil came to class wearing Muslim scarves.

This elevated a legal challenge to laicite as there are no school uniforms in French state schools, and it was unclear whether there was a clear rule stopping pupils from wearing religious symbols. 28 “Since the republican school was conceived as a microcosm of republican political society: within its walls, children would learn to become citizens, a shared public identity that transcend their local, cultural and religious affiliations”. 29 Subsequently, any religious sign is taken as a threat to the accuracy of the educational system, which is hypothetical to be neutral, and of course a threat to the ideals of the Republic.

The legislation of 15 of March 2004 overturned the 1905 approach to laicite; as a replacement for being an abstract principle of State neutrality. It was transformed into an identity principle; as a replacement for being outstanding cases of proselytism, according to the 1989 State Council’s decision, the outlawing became the common law. 30 As a result of this law, laicite is no longer a substance of the place of religion and its relationship with the State, but somewhat it is a matter of the French identity. 31 This has moved the discussion about laicite from its being discriminating against religious minorities to a national matter that alarms every French.

1. The Challenge of Multiculturalism

In France, multiculturalism is looked down upon because it is alleged to highlight particularistic and divisive identities that intimidate the unified French identity. It is assumed that associating laicite with multiculturalism and the acknowledgement of "identites collectives" is the prominence of the religious identities, and this prominence will lead to the "fragmentation of the society and pose


28 Hoffman Bruce, "Is Europe Soft on Terrorism?," Foreign Policy No. 115 (Summer 1999): 62-76.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.
a threat to liberty since the radical religious people will keep making more pressure.”

In the French method concerning the cultural diversity, individuals are to abide by the body of the nation; they have to abide by the national values. This model is frequently denoted to as assimilationist because it does not disclose the other’s difference of cultural particularism.33

In the 1970s, the notion of assimilation was confronted because it was found that the State did not have the right to remove the regional or ethnic differences. As a result, the term "integration" was introduced to discuss an "open process" in which the fundamental values of French society have to be conserved, but without suffering total repudiation of the immigrants' original culture.34 The proficiency of integration measures is to some extent doubtful, as politicians on the Left and on the Right keep encouraging policies which are contradictory: integrating on the one hand and control on the other.35 Since lakite has been also supplementary with the national identity as the researcher has mentioned earlier, it is imperiled since there some minorities which have disputed the national history and all the notorious matters during the period of the French colonization. Some of these cultural minorities which come from French-colonized countries increase other issues besides the one related to religion. And so, multiculturalism in this perspective is seen as a threat to the universal values of enlightenment that was at the root of all the encroachment in France.36

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33 Archick Kristin. (Coordinator), op.cit.
34 Ibid, p. 21.
2. The Challenge of Religious Groups

The diversity inside the religious groups carries up the issues of the contradiction between the State's position created on the constitution which entails it to intervene in the religious matters "l'ordre privé, and the right of the small religious groups to equality.\textsuperscript{37} For example, in Islam women are not considered as equal to men, however, men and women are equal conferring to the French values. Therefore, should the State interfere in matters relating to internal religious issues? If the State is to be involved directly in such delicate issues for a reason or another, the social pressure is intensifying up to push the State to enforce equality between men and women\textsuperscript{38}

Moreover, the issues of the sections in France comes to the surface whenever the debate about lakite starts, even when the attention is, as it the case most of the time, directed to Islam as an issue of disagreement. The sections are weighed in the same manner like the deep-seated and dangerous groups which tend to be violent. The test is that as long as the sections do not bear a resemblance to any of the known monotheistic religions or Buddhism or Hinduism, they remain unrecognized by the State.\textsuperscript{39} Thus, the question is whether the State should interfere on one side to guarantee that equality is established to all religious groups and on the other, to regulate the groups classified as dangerous (like the sections and the extremist groups). When these two disagreeing issues are addressed to the State in order to resolve them, it is provoked with the Law of 1905, separation between the State and the Church and the neutrality of the State in regard to internal religious affairs.\textsuperscript{40} In

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\textsuperscript{37} Cesari Jocelyn. Ed, Ibid.
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\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
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other words Olivier Roy adds that "the phenomenon of sects is troubling to the French society, and the temptation to legislate against them is as strong as in the case of Islam" 41

The challenge is to bestow a place to religions in the public area without running the risk of any of them becoming hegemonic and recuperating their institutional authority on individual's conscience. While the formation of lakite limits religion to the private area, the headscarf affair elevated the issue of social dimension of religion and confirmed that religion and the immediate society are far more complicatedly interrelated.42

In amidst of the current changes in the demographic surface in the French society, changes related to the rising influence of religious minorities on the one hand on their own members and on the other, on the State itself, which should be neutral towards religion. Since the sections are obtaining a place in France, the State is in a position of either legislating laws against them or obliging them within the French society. But the question is who is to be recognized, so some benchmarks are developed to legalize the sections. Once more, the State is facing the challenge of determining which section can be deliberated as eligible for its 'respect global de l'ordre public'.43 Moreover, the debate goes even more in relation to religion. Which religion is well-defined as a religion by the State? To this end, the State has to include or exclude some religious groups. In both cases, it jeopardies losing its impartiality, a value treasured by the constitution.

To illustrate the previous point, the secular State has no competency when it comes to evaluating the validity of doctrine. In the case of the Church of Scientology in 1997, the ruling of the court was based on the fact that freedom of belief is one of the vital elements of French public liberties expressed in Article of the 1789 Declaration of Human and Citizens' Rights and that article 1 of the Separation

41 Nielsen, Jorgen, op.cit., p. 81.
42 Archick Kristin, (Coordinator), op.cit.
Law ensures freedom of conscience and beliefs subject to observance of public order, and considering article 9 of the European Commission.  

Convention identifying religious freedom for all persons. The ruling stated that "there is thus no point in wondering whether the Church of Scientology constitutes a sect or a religion, as freedom of belief is absolute, that to the extent a religion can be defined by coincidence of two elements, an objective element, the existence of a community, even a small one, and a subjective element shared faith, the Church of Scientology can claim the title of a religion and develop its activities in all freedom, within the framework of the existing laws, including its missionary activities, or even those of proselytism".

The Commission Stasi published a report on 11 of December 2003 in which it suggested the interdiction of religious signs in public schools as well as the fight against urban and social discrimination against racism and anti-Semitism, the appointment of Muslim chaplain in public institutions such as hospitals, prisons and the military and the creation of new public holidays. Only the first suggestion was finally implemented with 15 March 2004 and became a law.

Yet, this law has been criticized over the compatibility of such ban with European Convention on Human Rights. However official republicans point out to a number of decisions by the European Court of Human Rights which has acknowledged that a state like Turkey which is the only other state in Europe may have a legitimate interest in conserving a secular public sphere. Moreover, the

44 THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND CITIZEN art. 10 (1789) (Fr.), at http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/anglais/the_institutions/founding_texts/the_declaration_of_the_human_rights/the_declaration_of_the_human_rights.20240.html ("No one may be disturbed on account of his opinions, even religious ones, as long as the manifestation of such opinions does not interfere with the established Law and Order."). The Declaration has been incorporated into the current Constitution of France. 1958 CONST. pmbl. (Fr.). (last visited 26 September 2014).


46 Ibid.

French State responded towards the increasing challenge of Islam by appointing a committee at the initiative of the Ministry of the Interior and Religions and chaired by Jean-Pierre Machelon who made a report in 2006. He came up with a plot to enable local authorities to make direct grants for construction of buildings for religious purposes within their boundaries.\textsuperscript{48}

Given the challenges fronting the State, newl aicite politics developed around two main issues. On one hand, it concentrated on the fight against collective ethnic and religious identities, what is referred to as communautarisme. On the other, counter arguments underlined the anti-discrimination agenda and used ideas such as 'Islamophobia' to define the new context. The subject of gender equality seemed to be at the intersection of both lines of this debate.\textsuperscript{49}

2.1.5 Forms of Lakites
As an outcome of the controversies about laicite and the deviations that have taken place in the French society; flow of immigrants with different cultural heritages and religions, the French State has found itself in a position where it requests to make decisions and reply to the rights of the religious groups. Two types of laicite have urbanized throughout past years; the 'soft' laicite and the 'strict' laicite. The contrasts between the two shows the degree to which is laicite being challenged in the French society. "Many of the supporters of 'soft' laicite blame the supporters of the 'strict' form of trying to make secularist laicite the 'state religion' in France".\textsuperscript{50} In fact, Olivier Roy says that laicite is heading to becoming a dogma.\textsuperscript{51} A few protectors of 'soft' laicite also lament that the 'strict' version tends to sterilize the society of all cultural diversity and to shred public school students of all individuality.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{48} Viorst Milton, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{50} Fetzer Joel and Christopher Soper, \textit{Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 24-32.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
In her book Critical Republicanism - The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy, Cecile Laborde exposes the ongoing debate about laïcité and identifies two versions of tolerant republican laïcité towards the case for allowing religious signs in the schools. The first version, secular laïcité, it might be an appealing ideal, but on no reasonable interpretation does it command that school children's right to wear religious clothing be restricted. The second version of tolerant republican challenge goes beyond, and casts doubts on the laïcité ideal itself (2008). She also adds in her disparagement of the tolerant laïcité the following:

"As separation is no more than a historical myth, and the French public sphere is far from neutral in the sense that contextual fairness demands that privileges historically granted to Catholics be extended to minority religions such as Islam. Tolerant republicanism, therefore, substitutes pragmatic even-handedness between religious groups to abstentionist neutrality, and allows for the recognition of collective religious identities in the public sphere".53

In addition to the two versions of tolerant republican laïcité, comes official republican ideal of laïcité, according to which, republican equality is best promoted through preservation of secular nature of public sphere and non-interference by the state in religious matters. Lastly, "critical republicans in contrast to both official and tolerant republicans; explicitly confront this complex question and believe that answering it would go a long way towards addressing the legitimate grievances of Muslims in relation to the existing practices of European State".54 “Critical republicans tend to be fairly tolerant of the religious expression of ordinary citizens, but they adopt a less tolerant stance towards display of religious allegiance or support by the state institutions”.55

All in all, there are three attitudes that can be clear in relation to laïcité. "Some, advocating an 'open laïcité ', are concerned with the free exercise of religion,


55 Ibid.
but are also tempered by a revision of the 1905 law".\textsuperscript{56} Those favoring a laicite in movement' are delicate to social and religious change, but remain faithful to the history of the secular ideal. Lastly, "the more militant laics defend the French republican model by denouncing the dangers of 'communautarisme' and calling for the strengthening of the 1905 law".\textsuperscript{57}

Therefore, in my opinion; laicite has stumbled upon great challenges stemming mostly from the claims by the cultural and religious minorities. These minorities, and precisely, Muslims, have merely required that their rights to freedom of belief and expression be guaranteed by laicite, but as a replacement for granting them their rights, they have been limited to more restrictions in expressing these rights. Oddly, their requests have been assessed to be a threat to laicite and, of course, to the national identity. There is no doubt that laicite has changed over the past years; an open form has come to existence as a result of the unproductivity in the process of identifying the religious groups' rights. More than one hundred years has passed since the 1905 Law, and the sections and other religious groups are still pursuing the State's recognition.

Though laicite requires the State to be neutral in matters of religion as they belong to the private area (l'ordre privé), it has virtually failed to control the State's intervention in the internal affairs of the religious groups. As a result, laicite as a concept is inflexible given the State's practices towards the religious groups, but again it is vigorous regarding the controversies about it; different trends of laicite soft or open. Therefore, in theory, it is vigorous, but in practice, it is inflexible.

2.2 The 1905 law

The 1905 law disestablishing the Roman Catholic Church as the state religion of France bans discrimination on the grounds of religion.\textsuperscript{58} It also allows the state to provide funding and tax relief for approved religious organizations. In order to benefit from this, religions must have a single representative body. Central or local governments own and maintain religious buildings constructed before the 1905 law separating religion and state. The government partially funded the establishment of the country's oldest Islamic house of worship, the Paris Grand Mosque, in 1926. In Alsace and Moselle, special laws allow the local governments to provide support for the building of religious edifices, and the followers of the Jewish, Lutheran, Reformed and Roman Catholic faiths can opt to allocate part of their income tax to their religious organization. A 2001 About-Picard law allows for the closure of religious cults under certain circumstances.\textsuperscript{59}

The 2000 Besson law obliges local authorities to set up stopping places for Roma and travelling people.\textsuperscript{60} The law was renewed in 2004. This law is the basis for access of the community to social, health and education services. It was followed by a strengthening of penalties for the unlawful occupation of non-designated land by the travelling community.


2.2.1 Legal Framework

The constitution provides that France "shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law" regardless of their religion and shall respect all beliefs. A law passed in 1905 provides for the separation of church and state and guarantees the free exercise of religious worship except in the interest of maintaining the public order.\(^{61}\)

The law, as well as international and European covenants which carry the force of law in France, protect the freedom of individuals to choose, change, and practice their religion. Interference with the freedom of religion is subject to criminal penalties, including a fine of 1,500 euros ($1,825) and imprisonment of one month. Individuals who are defendants in a trial may challenge the constitutionality of any law they say impedes their freedom of religion. Although not required by law, religious groups may apply for tax-exempt status and register to gain official recognition. The law defines two categories under which religious groups may register: associations of worship, which are exempt from taxes; and cultural associations, which normally are not exempt.\(^{62}\)

Associations in either category are subject to controls by the state to ensure fiscal responsibility. An association of worship may organize only religious activities, defined as liturgical services and practices. Although not tax-exempt, a cultural association may engage in profit-making activity and receive government subsidies for its cultural and educational operations. Religious groups normally register under both of these categories. For example, Mormons perform religious activities through their association of worship and operate a school through their cultural association.


Religious groups must apply at the local prefecture to be recognized as an association of worship and receive tax-exempt status. In order to qualify, the group's sole purpose must be the practice of religion, which may include religious training and the construction of buildings serving the religious group. Among excluded activities are those purely cultural, social, or humanitarian in nature. The government does not tax associations of worship on donations they receive. If the prefecture determines an association is not in conformity with the law, however, the government may change the association's status and require it to pay taxes at a rate of 60 percent on future and past donations until it regains tax-exempt status. According to the Ministry of Interior, approximately 109 Protestant, 100 Catholic, 50 Jehovah's Witnesses, 30 Muslim, and 15 Jewish associations have tax-exempt status.63

The law prohibits covering one's face in public places, including public transportation, government buildings, and other public spaces such as restaurants and movie theaters. If the police encounter someone in a public space wearing a face covering such as a mask or burqa, they are legally required to ask the individual to remove it to verify the individual's identity. Police officials may not remove it themselves. If an individual refuses to remove the garment, police may take the person to the local police station to verify his or her identity. An individual, however, may not be questioned or held for more than four hours.

Refusal to remove the face-covering garment after being instructed to do so by a police official carries a maximum fine of 150 euros ($182) or attendance at a citizenship course. Individuals who coerce another person to cover his or her face on account of gender by threat, violence, force, or abuse of power or authority, are subject to a fine of 30,000 euros ($36,500) and can receive a sentence of up to one year in prison. The fine and sentence are doubled if the victim is a minor.64 According to the law, the government may not directly finance religious groups to build new mosques, churches, synagogues, or temples. The government may, however, provide loan


64 Ibid.
guarantees or lease property to groups at advantageous rates. It also exempts places of worship from property taxes. The government may fund cultural associations with a religious connection. There are three French territories in which the 1905 law does not apply. Because Alsace-Lorraine was part of the German Empire during the passage of the 1905 law, members of Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, and Jewish groups there may choose to allocate a portion of their income tax to their religious group.  

Local governments may also provide financial support for building religious edifices. French Guyana, which is governed under the colonial laws of Charles X (1824-1830), may provide subsidies to the Catholic Church (Ed, 2005). The French Overseas Departments and Territories, which include island territories in the Atlantic, Caribbean, Pacific, and Indian Oceans, and several sub-Antarctic islands as well as a claim in Antarctica, are also not subject to the 1905 law and may provide funding for religious groups within their territories. Public schools are secular. The law prohibits public school employees and students from wearing conspicuous religious symbols, including the Muslim headscarf, Jewish skullcap, Sikh turban, and large Christian crosses. Religious instruction is not provided in public schools, except in the territories of Alsace Lorraine, French Guyana, and French Overseas Departments and Territories. Facts about religious groups, however, are taught as part of the history

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65 Boyer Alain, op.cit., p.14-16.


Parents who wish their children to wear religious symbols or to be given religious instruction in school may homeschool or send their children to a private school.\textsuperscript{68}

Homeschooling and private schools must conform to the educational standards established for public schools. By law, the government subsidizes private schools, including those affiliated with religious organizations. In 98 percent of private schools, in accordance with the law, the government pays the teacher's salaries provided the school accepts all children regardless of an individual child's religious affiliation. Anti-defamation laws prohibit racially or religiously motivated attacks. For violent crimes the penalties are increased when the offense is committed because of the victim's actual or perceived membership or non-membership in a given religious group.

The government may expel non-citizens for inciting discrimination, hatred, or violence against a specific person or group of persons based on religion. Missionaries from countries not exempted from entry visa requirements must obtain a three-month tourist visa before traveling to the country. All missionaries who wish to remain longer than 90 days must obtain long-duration visas before entering the country. Upon arrival, missionaries must provide a letter from their sponsoring religious group to apply with the local prefecture for a temporary residence card. The law states "detained persons have the right to freedom of opinion, conscience, and religion. They can practice the religion of their choice ... without other limits than those imposed by the security needs and good order of the institution."\textsuperscript{69}

2.3 Citizenship and France's New Immigrants

France grants the automatic right to French citizenship to all children born in France, but the right is conditional for the children of foreign nationals, who must be living in France when they apply for citizenship at age 18 and have lived in France for at least five years after age 11. There is a special identity card for these children until

\textsuperscript{68} Safran William, op.cit., pp. 98-112.

\textsuperscript{69} Kastoryano Riva, Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrants in France and Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 28-34.
they reach adulthood, which allows them to travel in some other European countries. Foreign nationals can apply for citizenship if they have been living in France for five years, or for two years if they have successfully completed two years of higher education in France, or immediately if they have the right special skills to offer.”

The French government actively recruited immigrants until 1974 on account of labor shortages. Immigrants were meant to be temporary guest workers, returning home and being replaced by others. But the right to French nationality granted to citizens of the colonies made it difficult for the authorities to send them home. The National Office of Immigration was set up in 1946 to organize immigration, but employers continued to recruit undocumented immigrants for lower salaries. By the 1960s over three-quarters of immigrants were 'clandestine'. From 1974 some illegal immigrants were deported. In January 1994 the Central Directorate for Immigration Control was set up to control immigration and the employment of immigrants.71

Assimilation policy for legal immigrants largely failed in the 1960s and 1970s and the government adopted a policy of integration from the mid-1980s, supporting minority community cultural organizations. From 2003 policy reverted to assimilation with new immigrants required to attend courses on French language and culture in order to qualify for residence permits. Government funding switched from minority cultural associations to the assimilation courses. See note 72 supra.

The 1881 law on the press freedom prohibits libel and slander and defamatory speech and writing against a group of people. The 1972 Pleven law extended this ban to racist speech and writing against individuals, and created the offences of incitement to hatred or racial violence and of discrimination. The 1990 Gayssot law bans Holocaust denial. From 2001 the Labor Code bans direct and indirect discrimination in recruitment, training, pay and promotion, and dismissal. The burden of proof was altered so that the victim must present evidence of the likelihood of discrimination but does not have to prove it.

The 2003 Lellouche law increases the severity with which racist and anti-Semitic offences are judged, but indirect discrimination is not taken into account in the Criminal Code. France created a High Authority against Discrimination and for

70 Kastoryano, Riva, Ibid.
71 Ibid., p. 11.
Equality in December 2004. The new Labour Code, Lellouche law and High Authority bring French law into compliance with the European Union (EU) directives against racial discrimination and discrimination in employment. As of end-2005 most jobs in the public services, state owned companies and regulated professions were not open to non-EU nationals.\textsuperscript{72}

2.4 Minority languages

France is one of the most centralized of European states. Education, the law and public administration are all conducted in standard French. Minority languages are taught in school, but mostly as an optional extra subject. Bilingual education was introduced in the 1990s in Alsace and Lorraine, in Brittany and Corsica, initiated by private associations, taken up by regional governments and then supported by central government. The 1951 Deixonne Act, 1975 Haby Act, 1994 Toublon Act, 1995 regulations on regional languages, and the 2002 regulations on bilingual education provide the basis for the teaching of regional languages.\textsuperscript{73}

The 2001 law creating a Conseill\'{e} acadernique des langues regionales was put into effect through the establishment of 19 Academies of regional languages at universities in the regions concerned, one each for Basque, Catalan, Corsu, Alsatian and Platt; two for Breton; four for Creole; and eight for Occitan. In December 2006, the French National Assembly rejected an amendment for the constitutional recognition of regional languages. Article 2 of the constitution, which states that 'the language of the Republic is French' (and which was only introduced in 1992 prior to the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty) has constituted an obstacle to the ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (signed in 1999). The Constitutional Court found that some of the articles of the Charter would give specific


rights to minority/regional language speakers, and were therefore not compatible with the French Constitution.

The French Ministry of Culture and Communication recognizes 14 distinct minority languages and two minority language groups in metropolitan France, and 47 minority languages in the French overseas territories. The 14 distinct languages are: Western Flemish (extreme north-west), Alsatian, Francique (north-east), Franco-Provençal (south central), Corsican (Corsica), Catalan (south), Basque (south-west) and Breton (north-west), Maghrebi Arabic, Western Armenian, Berber, Romani, Judeo-Spanish and Yiddish. There are 10 recognized languages: Picard, Norman, Gallo (north-west), Walloon, Champenois (north), Poitevin, Saintongeais, Burgundian (north central), Franc-Comtois, and Lorrain (north-east).

There are six recognized Oc languages: Limousin, Auvergnat (south central), Vivaro-Alpin, and Provençal (south east), Languedocien (south) and Gascon (south-west). In addition there are four variants of French Creole in the French regions of Guadeloupe, Martinique, French Guyana and Reunion; four variants of Anglo-Portuguese Creole and six Amer-Indian languages in French Guyana; 28 Melanesian languages in New Caledonia; seven Polynesian languages in French Polynesia; two Malayo-Polynesian languages in Wallis and Futuna; and two Bantu languages in Mayotte.\textsuperscript{74}

\textbf{Sub-Conclusion}

In the light of the societal developments in the French society, laicite has encountered great challenges stemming mainly from the claims by the cultural and religious minorities. These minorities, and in particular, Muslims, have simply demanded that their rights to freedom of belief and expression be guaranteed by laicite, but instead of granting them their rights, they have been confined to more restrictions in expressing these rights. Ironically, their requests have been estimated to be a threat to laicite and, of course, to the national identity. There is no doubt that laicite has evolved over the past years; an open form has come to existence as a result

\textsuperscript{74} Marshall, D. Bruce, op.cit., pp. 63-72.
of the stagnation in the process of recognizing the religious groups' rights. More than one hundred years have passed since the 1905 Law, and the sects and other religious groups are still seeking the State's recognition. Though laicite requires the State to be neutral in matters of religion as they belong to the private domain, it has practically failed to curb the State's intervention in the internal affairs of the religious groups.
Chapter 3
Issues relating to Religions and Factors Increasing the Intolerance of Religions in France

In this chapter, the researcher analyzes both the official documents, doctrine, speeches, quotes and laws about religious intolerance in France. Theories of international relations and human rights will be mentioned below.

3.1.1 Banning the Hijab (Muslim headscarves)

Muslim women wear a scarf around their head, covering their hair, neck and throat. It is worn by teenage and adult Muslim women for their protection and to display modesty. This is different from an expression of religious affiliation, like a Christian would wear a cross or crucifix. The Quran says that it is an obligatory act for devoted Muslim girl/women who is of age. In some countries, women wear the niqab just to cover or protect their faces from pollution, dust, sand and extreme heat. In the mid 1990's, religious freedom in France was restricted by a law which outlawed religious proselytizing by persons of all faiths. The French law on secularity and conspicuous religious symbols in schools bans wearing conspicuous religious symbols in French public (e.g., government-operated) primary and secondary schools. The law is an amendment to the French Code of Education that expands principles founded in existing French law, especially the constitutional requirement of laïcité: the separation of state and religious activities. The French Minister of Education strictly interpreted this law as prohibiting the wearing of the Hijabs. This prohibition,

according to the public, shows lack of understanding of the Hijab. The Hijab is meant
to be a display of modesty and humility.

The Minister of Education controlled and ordered the expulsions of all female
students who wore the Hijab in schools in 2005. No action was taking by the French
government against Roman Catholic students who wear a crucifix, Protestant students
wearing a cross, Sikh male students wearing a turban, or Jewish male students wearing
a yarmulke (skullcap). The selective application of the French law against religious
proselytizing has further alienated the Muslim community in France.

3.1.2 Banning Burkinis in France

On August 26 2016, the French Council of State, France's highest
administrative court, overturned the ban and ruled that mayors do not have the right to
ban burkinis. The ruling was in response to a challenge that had been filed against
the ban imposed by the mayor of Villeneuve-Loubet. The ban joins an already existing
French ban on the burqa, a full body covering that covers the lower face and has a

76 French law on secularity and conspicuous religious symbols in schools bans
wearing conspicuous religious symbols in French public (e.g., government-operated)
primary and secondary schools. LOI n° 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en
application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant
une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics
as https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2004/3/15/MENX0400001L/texte
(see https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2004/3/15/2004-228/jo/texte
(last visited 15 December 2016).


78 LOI n° 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage
dans l'espace public (1) Loi n° 2010-1192. — Travaux préparatoires: Assemblée
nationale : Projet de loi n° 2520 ; Rapport de M. Jean-Paul Garraud, au nom de la
commission des lois, n° 2648 ; Rapport d'information de Mme Berengère Poletti, au
nom de la délégation aux droits des femmes, n° 2646 ; Discussion les 6 et 7 juillet
2010 et adoption le 13 juillet 2010 (TA n° 524). Sénat : Projet de loi adopté par
l'Assemblée nationale, n° 675 (2009-2010) ; Rapport de M. François-Noël Buffet, au
nom de la commission des lois, n° 699 (2009-2010) ; Rapport d'information de Mme
meshed cloth over the eyes, and a niqab, which is identical except that a veil covers the lower face and the eyes are uncovered. The ban went into effect in April 2011, and mandates fines of 150 euros (165 dollars). Burgas, niqabs, headscarves and other "conspicuous religious symbols" were banned in French schools in 2004. The issue has sparked a worldwide media frenzy. In France, Prime Minister Manuel Valls declared that he supported banning burkinis.

Clothing is similarly important to the French. There is a "connection between the correct physical appearance in public and personal dignity," which is so strong that comments about clothing choices will even seep into academic writing and political news. Bowen cites the example of a French principal describing two different Muslim women. One was "not very religious," wore casual clothes that were stylish and a bit revealing, and was described using very expressive gestures, as "the principal throws out her hands in an expansive manner, giving a sense of liberty and movement".

The other was more devout, veiled, described as "very strict, much closed," and the principal's body language reflected the rigidity that was her impression of the second woman. Bowen notes that something significant is seen in "the relative sexually open or closed quality" of clothing. Strange or "closed" clothing is actually seen as an aggression of sorts. "It is an assault," pronounced one French woman, describing her reaction to another woman in the subway dressed all in black, forcing

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80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.
herself upon the world, "with her expression all frozen". Describing her reaction to Muslims in particular, the same woman said, "it was that they were throwing their difference right at me, that they had these principles, and were making me notice them".

Another of a French lady commented, "They are showing off their Islam; that shocks me". The concept of French identity, for all its universal claims, remains rooted deep in custom and culture, and a significant portion of the population has yet to accept the increasingly multiethnic makeup of the nation. "Put simply," as Craig Smith notes, "being French, for many people, remains a baguette-and-beret affair". And Muslims do not necessarily wish to be included in this identity either, as one Muslim girl from the banlieues illustrates:

"French people think that "to integrate"—and how I hate that word—you must drink wine and be like them, you have to lose your traditions, your religion, your values, and take on theirs. Either you assimilate ... or you are perpetually an immigrant and an integriste [fundamentalist]. But excuse me, I have never drunk wine, it is not in my culture, and I am not about to! I do not feel French..."

In the researcher's opinion, since the ban is not illegal; it is inherently Islamophobic. Firstly, its purpose is to deliberately discriminate a minority group: Muslim women. Secondly, it's a violation on women's rights. It's not only a violation of religious freedom, but also on women's rights and thus a feminist issue which needs all women to speak up if they truly consider themselves a feminist. Thirdly, patrolling the beaches in search of burqinis and harassing Muslim women is turning France in exactly what they're against; a morality police like Iran and Saudi Arabia. Fourth, the right to practice your religion freely is one of the basic values of liberalism and the articles of every human rights convention. Lastly, the burqini ban stands for religious intolerance.

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82 Bowen John R, Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
Also, Under the Declaration on the Elimination of all forms of Intolerance and Discrimination based on Religion or Belief; Article 2 states that No one shall be subject to discrimination by any State, institution, groups of persons, or person on the grounds of religion or other beliefs. So, the burqini ban violates this article hence why it is not illegal.

Nevertheless, France's highest administrative court found bans on the garment, which have been initiated by several French towns, amount to a violation of fundamental liberties. Judges found there was insufficient reason to believe the swimsuits pose a risk to public order, despite claims from right-wing politicians that burkinis are a "provocation" which could cause religious and political tensions. The State Council (Conseil d'Etat) was specifically examining laws brought in by the commune of Villeneuve-Loubet but its verdict sets a legal precedent for France. In their ruling, three senior judges said the ban "has dealt a serious and clearly illegal blow to fundamental liberties such as the freedom of movement, freedom of conscience and personal liberty." They found that no evidence produced in favour of the prohibition proved a risk to public order was being caused by "the outfits worn by some people to go swimming".

The original ban was challenged by the Human Rights League (LDH) and Collective against Islamophobia in France (CCIF), who took the case to the State Council. In a statement, the LDH welcomed the verdict but said it will not resolve the "ridiculous debate that has made France the laughing stock of the world". However, At least 30 cities, resorts and communes have implemented bans on modest swimwear this summer and many more are believed to be considering the same bans. The bans have since spread, sparking fierce debate about France's secular values, women's rights and religious freedom.

All in all, the researcher stresses that these bans do nothing to increase public safety but do a lot to promote public humiliation.

3.1.3 Religious Conflict in the Workplace

A Religious conflicts at workplace survey has reported that religious conflict in workplaces, in France, is becoming more and more significant and it is increasingly the source of conflicts in offices. A study, published by the Observatory
for Religion in the Workplace and the Randstad Institute, the number of religious conflicts in the workplace has doubled in the past year. Between 2014-2015, it found there was a doubling of the number of people who claimed they'd seen religious-based conflict at work, from 3 per cent to 6 per cent. This is a worrying trend and must be tackled with to reverse this negative trend. Otherwise, there could be a sociopolitical problems in France in the long term.

This figure had doubled among managers who personally have to deal with this conflict. The data found the number of managers confronted by religious conflict grew from 12 per cent last year to 23 per cent in 2017. According to the study, the rise in religious conflicts is a result from a change in employees' attitudes. "Employees are less hesitant about making requests to their superiors in line with their beliefs and religious practices," the study said, which also found sources of conflict included wearing of religious symbols (by 17 per cent of respondents) and dislike about colleagues requesting time off for religious holidays (19 per cent).

In 2010, the wearing of the full Muslim face veil, known as the niqab or burqa was banned in public places and back in 2004 the law on secularity and conspicuous religious symbols in schools was passed prohibiting the wearing or open display of religious symbols in all French schools. Arguments over whether veils can


be worn in the workplace are not uncommon in France, and in November 2013 an appeal court in France upheld the decision by a Paris nursery school to sack an assistant who refused to take off her veil at work.\textsuperscript{89} Actions such as these will further alienate Muslim women and may create an opportunity for extremists to spread their hate messages.

According to Randstad report,\textsuperscript{9°} the problem of conflicts ranged from "accusations of racism and discrimination", to "questioning the authenticity of the firm or the manager to constrain religious practice and the refusal to talk", the report said.

The researcher mentions "Reasonable Accommodation" in chapter 5 to further explain the concept relating to workplace.

\subsection*{3.1.4 Anti-Semitism: Jews Fleeing France}

France has the largest Jewish population in Europe and the third largest Jewish population in the world. In 2015, there was a deadly attack on kosher supermarket in Paris by a French jihadist, which left four Jewish citizens dead. Following this attack, a record of 15,000 French Jews would be migrating to Israel this year, fearing rising Anti-Semitism Europe.\textsuperscript{91} This figure doubles the number who left France for Israel in 2016.

Jewish Agency statistics projected that the number of French Jews preparing to make Aliyah (immigration) to Israel was on course to reach record levels of around 10,000 even before 2016's attack. The number of Jews leaving France for Israel has mounted abruptly since 2012, when four people were killed in an attack on a Jewish school in Toulouse by another Islamist extremist.\textsuperscript{92}

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item Ibid.
\item Ibid.
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A number of 7,000 French immigrants arrived in Israel in 2014, more than twice the 3,300 who came the previous year and an increase credited to increasing levels of hostility Jews in France. The largest mass movement of Jews since the formation of Israel in 1948. Therefore, this states that France is not very accepting of Jewish people even though they are increasing in population.

3.2 Factors that Contribute to a Rise in Religious Intolerance

This research is based on an interview and survey-based case study of an Islamic lycee, a Catholic lycee, and two public lycees in the Ile-de-France region of France.

3.2.1 Terrorist Attacks

Like other European nations, France has a long and complicated relationship with the Muslim world and its own immigrant population, many of whom have been in the country for generations. French Muslims are highly diverse, and some are secular while others are observant. A Nov. 13, 2015 string of terrorist attacks across Paris that killed 129 people has again raised concerns across French society about jihadist violence and ISIS-inspired domestic terrorism. The tragedy comes in the wake of several other attacks in France in 2015, including an attack on an American-owned chemical factory near Lyon in June 2015 and two in January 2015, when 12 people were murdered at the satirical news outlet Charlie Hebdo and then, days later, four hostages were killed at a kosher supermarket. By law, the French government is prohibited from asking about or keeping data on its citizens' race and religion.

A 2015 report from the Pew Research Center indicates that 7.5% of French residents are of Muslim descent, but does not indicate their degree of religiosity. However, a 2007 Brookings Institution book, Integrating Islam (Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse, 2006), estimated there were 5 million French residents of Muslim heritage, approximately 7.8% of the country's population at that time (64.1 million). The authors, Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse, estimate that the rate of self-affiliation of French residents of Muslim descent with Islam was approximately the same as for French people of Catholic heritage with Catholicism, 66%. This would indicate that 3.3 million French residents were to some degree observant Muslims in that year, or 5.1% of the population.

There are different kinds of French Muslims residing in France. Some are born and raised in France that happen to be Muslims. Second, the ethnically French that are Muslims. Third, people that converted to Islam. Fourth, people that immigrated to France a long time ago. Fifth, those who came to France as a migrant

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95 Ibid.
worker. Finally, the refugees that seek asylum from countries such as Syria, Somalia, Afghanistan, Tunisia, Eritrea, etc. France is a victim of terrorism and they are afraid that if they accept Muslims from anywhere, it will add more problems to their already existing terrorism problems and destroy their image as a touristic country. Nevertheless, French society is more tolerant of religious mockery and satire than some other Western nations.

3.2.2 Education in Schools

France does not offer religious education in public schools (Islam in schools). The state tolerates the discussion of religion in courses devoted to other topics. It would be virtually impossible, i.e., to not talk about Islam when discussing about the seventh century conquest of the Arabian Peninsula, or Christianity when talking about the European art. But it does not permit either the teaching of or about religion.

3.23 The Media

The media play a major role in the rise of religious intolerance. The impact that news journalists, TV programs, Magazines, etc. have on society is massive. Take for instance, the Charlie Hebdo attacks. The extremists took high offense to the cartoon drawing of Prophet Muhammad that prompted the deadliest attack i.e., the gun shooting by Charlie Hebdo. France has witnessed over the past century. The Media play important role in portraying Muslims as terrorists. The exposure to the news stories which are anti-Muslim in nature drove people's attitudes and perception that Muslims are violent.

Journalists can make a difference by actively seeking out positive stories about Muslim Americans. Also, when reporting Islam-related terrorist attacks, the news reporters should talk with French Muslims about their opposition to such actions. French Muslims can help erase negative stereotypes by speaking out and being more visible in their communities.

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96 Clarke S., Powell, R., & Savulescu J, op.cit., p. 22.
3.2.4 Government Accountability

The French authorities have been called out for their insufficient efforts to control the growing trend of discrimination in the country; a position endorsed by Pierre Tartakowsky, the president of France's Human Rights League (LDH). The commissioner expressed concern over the plight of asylum seekers, and said France needs to be "more generous and show more solidarity" with Syrian refugees. "France has shown limited and controlled generosity, welcoming a mere 500 Syrians a year, compared to Germany, which has welcomed 10,000 Syrians a year," Henry noted.97

The commissioner has asked officials to implement durable housing solutions for refugees, and to protect migrants from intensified attacks by local right-wing groups. The relationship between France and its Roma population has long been tense, and harsh government policy has further estranged the already-marginalized community. The commissioner said he was shocked during his 2014 trip to France to realize that many Roma children in the southern city of Marseille were not enrolled in school, and underlined the need for authorities to guarantee Roma access to health care, education, and social benefits, and to combat widespread prejudice against them.

The French ban on face covering is an act prohibiting concealment of the face in public space") is an act of parliament passed by the Senate of France on 14 September 2010,98 resulting in the ban on the wearing of face-covering headgear,

97 Jenkins Brian Michael, op.cit, p. 11.
including masks, helmets, balaclavas, niqabs and other veils covering the face in public places, except under specified circumstances. The ban also applies to the burqa, a full-body covering, if it covers the face. Consequently, full body costumes and Zentais (skin-tight garments covering entire body) were banned. The bill had previously been passed by the National Assembly of France on 13 July 2010.

The key argument supporting this proposal is that face-coverings prevent the clear identification of a person, which is both a security risk, and a social hindrance within a society which relies on facial recognition and expression in communication. The key argument against the ban is that it infringes on individual freedoms.

3.2.5 National Response

The French government needs to launch "a national action plan to defend human rights". A report published in 2014 by the French Jewish Community Protection Services claims that anti-Semitic attacks in France doubled between 2013 and 2014, and that 51 percent of racist attacks in France in 2014 were against Jews, despite Jews representing less than 1% of the French population. The number of attacks against Muslims climbed in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo shootings, with 116 incidents in two weeks, together with attacks targeting mosques.

France is in need for better coordination between community workers and public officials. France already has an abundant of resources and astounding network of community organizations," said Tartakowsky, but what is lacking is political coordination. French officials have rushed to find solutions to France's racism problem following the 2016 terror attacks, and have applied short-term measures instead of getting to the root of the problem.

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3.3 Solutions to Prevent an Increase in Religious Intolerance

Religious intolerance is a problem fueled by many sources, but solutions to address each facet individually are how this cabinet can slowly tackle this issue until it no longer exists and no longer poses a threat to either France, or the European Union.

3.3.1 Anti-Extremism

"In an Internet video in September 2007 Abu Yahya al-Libi (Al Arabiya News, 2012), a prominent al-Qaeda leader, mockingly gave the West six tips to wage ideological warfare: highlight the views of jihadists who renounce violence; publicize stories about jihadist atrocities against Muslims; enlist Muslim religious leaders to denounce jihadists as heretics; back Islamic movements that emphasize politics over jihad; discredit and neutralize jihadist ideologues; and play up personal or doctrinal disputes among jihadists. These would indeed be good starting-points."

The extremist (Abu Yahya al-Libi) who attended the Dublin meeting in 2007, who found they had a lot in common in terms of broken families and the negative effects of globalization, stated that another factor of modernism helped bring them back from the brink. Access to discussions, variant interpretations and debates over doctrine on the Internet was a major help, and they asked experts to promote these kinds of websites. Freedom of speech online undermines culturally assumed certainties which can be bad for religions but can also help undermine the certainties of extremists. Hence we return to our question in chapter one when we point out that bringing back religious certainty also brings back other problems.

3.3.2 Good Governance

Fundamentalism is a form of a religion, especially Islam or Protestant Christianity, which upholds belief in the strict, literal interpretation of scriptures. Good governance is likely to promote social cohesion and tolerance, and therefore limit the spread of religious fundamentalism. Good practices should include:

1. The promotion of human rights
2. The closing of Faith Schools

\(^{100}\) Jenkins Brian Michael, op.cit., p. 11.
3. Removing religion-specific legal rights
4. Education
5. Raising awareness of the threat of fundamentalism growing
6. Support of gay tolerance (to show up the immorality of fundamentalists)
7. A secular government and public space, where no religion can enforce its doctrine and laws on other people. In other words: multicultural democracy
8. Public ads showing that not all Muslims are bad. This can make a positive outlook on the good Muslims residing in France and in Europe. Children will learn to stop hate and treat kindness to other people.

3.3.3 Government Support & Policies

The French government made efforts to promote religious and interfaith understanding. The government fought racist, anti-Semitic, and anti-Muslim acts through public awareness campaigns and by reassuring discussions among local officials, police, and citizen groups. Government leaders, along with representatives from the Jewish community, the Paris and Marseilles grand mosques, the Protestant Federation, and the Conference of Bishops, publicly condemned racist and other foul's of violence's. The government regularly prosecuted anti-Muslim, anti-Semitic, and other similar crimes. Prosecutors were ordered to seek maximum punishments for hate crimes and to appeal systematically sentences not considered adequate.

3.3.4 Improvements and Positive Developments in Respect for Religious Freedom

When Aïcha Tabbakhe, a French nurse, went to fill out the forms in October 2015 for her children's school dinners in her small town outside Paris, she was puzzled. The box she would usually tick to say that her Muslim children didn't eat pork wasn't there. "Confused, I called the town hall and I was bluntly told: 'From now on, that's the way it is,'" she said. "Pork or nothing."


After many years of French controversies over headscarves, pork has become the new obstacle in the country's uneasy debate over the place of Islam. Politicians are using pork at school dinners to instill what it means to be French. As a result, vicious court battles and political tiffs have exploded as protesters warn those controversial menu changes are sending a message to Muslim or Jewish children that to be truly French, they must eat pork.

Tabbakhe's home town of Chilly-Mazarin (a town of about 20,000 people in L'Essonne), which nudges up against Orly airport to the south of Paris. This was one of the several runs by rightwing mayors to publicize they will scrap pork-free options in school canteens in the name of secularism. For 30 years, that home town has provided non-pork alternatives to Muslim and Jewish children. But that has stopped. On days when the menu features dishes such as roast pork with mustard and courgette gratin, or Strasbourg sausage and organic lentils, or ham pasta bake, children whose families don't eat pork for religious reasons will be offered nothing but the side dishes. The mayor, Jean-Paul Beneytou, says this is a commonsense way to preserve public sector "neutrality". But many parents and teachers call it a deliberate stigmatization of Islam that is cruel to children by playing politics with school lunches.

"It's the impact on the children that has been the hardest," says Tabbakhe. 1"3 "My four-year-old daughter is too young to understand that she doesn't eat pork. It's not something she's aware of and it's not something we talk about. What am I supposed to tell her now? We tried to subtly tell her we didn't eat pork at home. But she thought 'pork' was a type of dessert. She said, 'Yes, I do eat it, it's delicious.' That would be funny if it wasn't such an awful situation. She is totally confused and has picked up on the atmosphere. She's crying at school and says she doesn't want to eat at the canteen. My nine-year-old son went door to door with a parents' association petition against this and got lots of signatures from non-Muslim parents who were upset. He said to me, 'Don't worry, Mum, I won't eat it.' He shouldn't have to be worrying about this. School is supposed to be about learning and living together, not about this. Now my nine-year-old is starting to ask, 'Why am I different?'

Tabbakhe takes off her headscarf every morning to go to work because by law, French public-sector workers, including hospital staff, must be seen as neutral.

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103 Kramer Jane, Ibid.
and cannot show religious belief with an outward symbol. "That is the law, so I do it. But this isn't the law," she says.

In the past eight months, decisions by some right wing mayors to end pork-free school meals with the full support of the former president Sarkozy have sparked outrage, petitions and court battles. School canteens in France are run by town halls, which are free to make their own rules. Unlike in the UK, French state schools do not offer halal or kosher meat. Muslim or Jewish children who stay for lunch eat the same meat as everyone else. But on days where pork is served, a large number of town halls offer substitutes, such as a turkey sausage. Other towns offer vegetarian options. There has never been a big movement to demand halal or kosher meat in France children who eat only halal or kosher either go home for lunch or attend private faith schools. But now controversy has gripped France.

3.3.5 Controversy about Food Served in Schools

At the heart of the row over pork is the French principle of secularism, or laïcité, and whether it has been twisted for political gain. The French republic is built on a strict separation of church and state, intended to foster equality for all private beliefs. In theory, the state is neutral in terms of religion and allows everyone the freedom to practice their faith as long as there is no threat to public order. Since January's terrorist attacks in 2015 which French Islamic extremists left 17 dead after the shootings at the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo and a kosher supermarket in Paris.


105 Kramer Jane, op.cit, pp. 59-71.

106 Ibid.
Paris; lakite has been repeatedly used by political parties as a catch-all answer to society's ills.

After the attacks, the socialist prime minister, Manuel Valls\textsuperscript{107} said secularism was now "the only issue that matters". Since then, the word has been used so often as a mantra by the government and politicians that a panel of linguists recently voted it "word of the year". Once a rallying cry of the left, secularism has now been appropriated by the right, and even the far-right Front National, as part of a debate on national identity, used to rail against anything seen as not French, and particularly to target and exclude Islam from the public sphere. It is a principle meant to protect pluralism, but the sociologist Francois Dubet recently warned that "talking about secularism has now become a way to claim a white Christian France, where everyone shares the same values and traditions, a way to say we don't want Muslims".\textsuperscript{108}

"Nowhere does French secularism declare that people must eat the same, dress the same, drink the same," says Valentine Zuber, a historian of religion and international relations at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes in Paris. "That is a distortion of the principle of laicite." She warns that secularism has come to be used as a principle of exclusion to somehow save France from cultural mixing, "when that is not what it means at all".

Pork is the latest front in Europe's culture wars. One local head teacher, who doesn't want to be named, says: "Secularism is not about pork. It is about respecting others' religion; it is not about saying 'no more religion'. The ban on pork-free meals is extremely difficult for me and my teachers. School is about teaching children to respect each other, regardless of difference. This has demolished our teaching of that in class."


\textsuperscript{108} Stephanie Giry, op.cit., p. 17.
"My eight-year-old son told me: 'Mummy, the mayor wants me to eat pork,'" says Amina Ben Bouzian, a childminder. Beneytou, the mayor, says there will be no negative impact on children. "We serve pork three times a month. I don't think this will perturb the health of a child." He says he took the decision in the interests of "living together", that it is important that everyone be served "the same" food and not be set apart by being offered a different meal.

Earlier in 2015, when another Sarkozy-backed mayor, Gilles Platret, scrapped pork-free options in the Burgundy town of Chalon-sur-Sabne, the Muslim Judicial Defense League took him to court. The group's lawyer, Karim Achoui, says: "A child would be extremely traumatized if a pork cutlet was served to him and he was obliged to eat it after he has been repeatedly told from a young age that it is forbidden food."

"I'm not an enemy of religion, but religious belief is private and the public service should be secular and neutral," Platret says. "We welcome all children. We don't force them to eat what they don't want to eat. We don't oblige any Muslim child to eat pork. When a child doesn't eat a dish, whether for religious reasons or not, the dinner ladies watch out for that child and give them more of whatever else is on the menu; the starter or vegetables, so they don't go hungry."

Nicolas Sarkozy, fully backs the scrapping of pork-free school dinner options in the name of secularism. "If you want your children to have eating habits based on religion, go to a private faith school," he said on French TV.

The rightwing senator Francois Grosdidier has warned: "When you force a child to eat a dish that contravenes their religious or cultural beliefs, the child doesn't eat it. You are depriving that child of food for political reasons." The socialist education minister, Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, who was born into a Muslim family in rural Morocco before moving to France aged four, has denounced the scrapping of pork-free options as "a way to ban certain children from accessing the canteen."

It is not the first time pork has been used to make a political point in France. In 2010, there was controversy over extreme-right groups' attempts to hold

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109 Jenkins Brian Michael, op.cit, p.23.
1 Clarke, S., Powell, R., & Savulescu J, op.cit, pp. 7-13.
111 Kramer Jane, op.cit, pp. 59-71.
"pork and wine aperitifs", which they deliberately planned to stage near Muslim places of worship before authorities banned them. A so-called "republican aperitif", with tables laden with sausage and wine, was held in central Paris by extreme-right groups saying they were against halal meat and wanted to defend secularism.

In September, as Muslims celebrated Eid al-Adha, the festival of sacrifice, the Front National mayor of Hayangeen Moselle, Fabien Engelmann, tweeted pictures of himself petting sheep he said had been rescued from the Muslim celebrations and were being taken to an animal sanctuary. For hardliners on the French right, meat is politics. In the last presidential election campaign in 2012, as Nicolas Sarkozy battled to remain president before losing to the socialist Francois Hollande, he deliberately stoked fears about the Islamisation of the nation's dinner plates. He seized on a row begun by Le Pen over whether halal meat was being sold on the wider market to unsuspecting non-Muslim consumers. The row started when Le Pen wrongly claimed that 100% of meat in the Paris region was halal.

This was not Nicolas Sarkozy's only venture into divisive identity politics. He recently said that, "in the name of secularism", there should be a ban on the Muslim headscarf being worn by students at universities, a comment that again sparked criticism in his own party. In 2004, France banned girls from wearing veils in state schools and all other religious symbols, such as crosses or turbans. But recent cases of girls being turned away for wearing long black skirts have exposed tensions over discrimination and schools going further than the law. In 2016, a 15-year-old girl was twice banned from class in Charleville-Mezieres for wearing a long black skirt

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112 Kramer Jane, Ibid.

considered to be too "ostentatiously" religious, sparking the hashtag #JePorteMaJupeCommeJeVeux ("I wear my skirt as I please").

According to the CCIF Islamophobia watchdog, at least 130 students have been turned away from class since 2014 for outfits deemed too openly religious mainly long black skirts. Its spokesman, Yasser Louati, says: "This showed a hysteria targeting Muslims, which is not good for society as a whole." He says of the pork school meals issue: "It is a deliberate new policy taken by the right to keep up public debate around national identity issues in France. I was born and raised here, and until recently I had never heard of a problem with different school meal options for Muslim and Jewish children who don't eat pork."

Back in Chilly-Mazarin, Anouar Brikin who works in construction and was born in Nice is pondering what to tell his two daughters, aged six and nine, about how to deal with the end of pork-free meals in the canteen. "I’ll have to explain all this in a way that is not shocking to them," he says. "Until now, they've always just eaten normally with their friends, but now they will have to put up their hand and say: 'No, we can't eat the same thing.' We're not even asking for halal. Parents just want their children to eat a meal that is not pork."

Sub-conclusion

France has a long and complicated relationship with the Muslim world and its own immigrant population, many of whom have been in the country for generations. French Muslims are highly diverse, and some are secular while others are observant. France is the most secular country in the world on the most secular continent. Any kind of religion in the public sphere is suspect, because French secularism was won by opposing the Catholic Church. People fought to liberate themselves from religion. As long as France continues to have terrorist attacks, French laws will never be lenient to Muslims residing in France and touristic Muslim because of this perception that all Muslims are terrorists. French society is more tolerant of religious mockery and satire than some other Western nations. Charlie Hebdo's fierce independence has long attracted admiration and criticism, as does its relentless

114 Keaton Trica Danielle, op.cit, p. 11.
115 Kramer Jane, op.cit, pp. 59-71.
pursuit of politicians and public figures who abused the public trust. France has suffered two major terrorist attacks in recent years, both carried out by home-grown Islamist extremists. As long as there is a wrong perception on how Muslims and Islam is, it will continue to destroy the perception of Muslims living in France.
Chapter 4
Integration or Segregation

Introduction

This chapter will concentrate on the origins, deliberations and recommendations of the Stasi Commission, and more importantly, the results of the subsequent legislation. The study will draw on empirical data since 2003. These data will include statistics on school enrollment, as well as findings from large E.U., Rand, and Pew Surveys. Additionally it will include evidence taken from reports by French citizens from various backgrounds, religions, ethnicities, and economic statuses.

4.1 The Overview

The Muslim population in France is a prominent and permanent fixture, which continues to expand. Current demographics indicate that by 2017, Europe's Muslim population might double, whereas Europe's non-Muslim population is projected to fall by at least 3.5 percent. The majority of European Muslims will reside in France.\footnote{Timothy M. Savage, "Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing," \textit{The Washington Quarterly}, Vol. 27, No. 3 (October, 2004): 28.} For this reason, the current challenge to French society how to integrate or assimilate its Muslims and accommodate Islam will only become more crucial.\footnote{Nezar Al-Sayyad and Manuel Castells, eds., \textit{Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture, and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization}, (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002); Bruce Bawer, \textit{While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying the West from Within}, (New York: Doubleday Press, 2006); Cheryl Benard, \textit{Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies}, (Rand Corporation, 2006); Claire Berlinski, \textit{Menace in Europe: Why the Continent's Crisis is America's, Too}, (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2006); John R. Bowen, \textit{Why the French Don't Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space}, (Princeton:}
parliamentary democracy, the Fifth Republic has turned increasingly to legislation to manage the friction caused by the growth of the Muslim population. The 2004 ban on headscarves in French schools is the most controversial measure.\textsuperscript{18} The real question is whether such measures promote Muslim integration by forcing Muslims to accept the historic secularism of the Republic, or whether they are measures designed to exclude Muslims. Furthermore, if France is an inclusive and tolerant society, then are such laws as the hijab ban fundamentally un-French? Integration is a process through which immigrants move into a culture and adopt its norms, conventions and way of

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18 Although the headscarf ban is the first significant legislation that is allegedly anti-Muslim, the French courts have been used to prosecute Muslims for practices such as Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) and abbatage clandestine, or ritual animal slaughter. These prosecutions were the result of arrests made due to violations in French criminal laws. For example, Muslims conducting FGM on their daughters were prosecuted under Article 312-3 of the Penal Code (Exercising violence against or seriously assaulting a child under 15). French criminal laws that have been used to challenge Muslim rituals include those such as concerning intentional or negligent assault, the unlicensed practice of medicine, cruelty to animals, etc. For more information, see the U.S. State Department report, at http://www.state.gov/g/wi/rls/rep/9304.htm, (last visited 15 November 2017). More information is also, at http://www.murdoch.edu.au/e-law/issues/v9n3/spencer93/text.html#4.20Legal%20Interventions%20-%20Legislation%20and%20Child%20Protection, (last visited 15 November 2017).
That is not to say that integrating newcomers are required to relinquish all of their own customs or identities. But the government and society expect that immigrants and their children will understand and accept particular practices such as speaking French and, more importantly, obey the laws of the land. French law mandates the separation of church and state, just as official secularism forms part of the French Republican values. As the second chapter of this showed when the French Republic defined laïcité, as a fundamental principle, the national school system, along with the army of the Republic, was expected to propagate this ideal. The French school system of that period put into practice "the clear distinction between church and state." Today, when these Third-Republic-versus-the-Church conflicts are less prominent, school headmasters sit dutifully at the gates of school grounds to ensure young Muslims remove their head coverings before entering the state-controlled facilities. The Moroccan-born French scholar of Islam, Rachid Benzine, believes the French concept of secularism fails to understand the new challenges of cultural and religious diversity. "The problem is whether France can accept that former colonial subjects can be French." He writes, Can an Arab really be French? We have a common past of conflict. We are unable to forgive each other. The wound of the Algerian conflict has not healed. So it's hard to live together and create a common project." 

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119 In this connection we also must establish what integration is not. One cannot determine levels of integration by reviewing statistics on hate crime. Although racial and racist rhetoric often precipitates or accompanies these crimes, there are a myriad of factors not necessarily related to the integration of a given population into a broader society at play. Integration is also not related to the number of mosques constructed or the percentage of the population that claims to be Muslim. These statistics capture only the religious beliefs of a people and are not indicative of levels of integration.

120 Cesari Jocelyn, op.cit,

4.2 The Stasi Commission and the Rise of Islamaphobia

In 2002, as a result of recent media coverage of violence in schools, the president of the French National Assembly convened a commission to study "religious symbols in schools." Shortly thereafter, President Chirac appointed the Stasi Commission, which was given a significantly wider scope of laicite throughout society. The Stasi Commission named after its chief researcher, Bernard Stasi, consisted of school officials, academics, politicians, businesspersons, and civil servants from all religious affiliations, political opinions, and national origins. The far-reaching Stasi Commission interviewed hundreds of citizens, reviewed French law, and took testimony from members of all social strata in order to determine the state of secularism within French society. Throughout 2002 and 2003, anti-Islamic fundamentalism was on the rise within French society in response to what many French citizens saw as a "France-wide strategy pursued by fundamentalist groups who use public schools as their battleground." Fears of Islamic terrorists had been growing throughout France for more than a decade.

In December of 1994, the Algerian terrorist organization, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), brazenly hijacked an Air France plane with the intention of blowing it up over Paris or flying it into the Eiffel Tower. Although French Special Forces troops eventually boarded the jet and killed all four Algerian hijackers, the event resulted in

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123 Ibid.

124 Ibid, “Fundamentalism,” in this context, refers specifically to openly religious Muslims; the connotation associates terrorism with fundamentalism and, thus, establishes fundamentalism as a threat to the Republic

125 The war in Algeria and the history of colonialism in Northern Africa had developed a fear of Islam; however, this fear was markedly heightened in the recent history with the aforementioned Islamic terror attacks in Europe and the United States. For more information on the debate of secularism versus Islamism in French colonies, see Michael W. Doyle’s, Empires (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1986), FL 8.
the death of three passengers and widespread international media attention. Coverage of the event led to a European-wide fear that Islamic terrorists would destroy a plane over Paris. On July 25, 1995, four GIA members, all French citizens, bombed the Paris Metro in an apparent attempt to dissuade the French government and its constituents from supporting the government in Algeria. These showy attacks by Islamic extremists in the heart of Paris led the French body politic to rethink its support of the regime in Algiers. Additionally, the French population began to worry about their Muslim neighbors. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, further fueled this developing fear of Muslim immigrants in France.

"A spectra is haunting Europe. This spectra of Islam and Islamic 'terrorism' around the time of the attack on the Twin Towers in New York: Islam and Muslims had generally had a bad press in the West well before that time, but that tragedy has dramatically worsened the situation."128 "Islamophobia" is the term that many authors use to describe non-Muslims' fear of Muslims as fanatics or terrorists destined to cause violence within society. Within France, Islamophobia was stoked in the 1980s and 1990s by the actions of the GIA and other North African terror organizations; this phobia drastically increased in the latter half of the 1990s and the early years of the new century as terrorists touting Islamic extremism brazenly attacked both physical targets and persons throughout the Western society.

The September 11 attacks in the United States and the murder of Theo Van Gogh in Holland took their place in the French psyche alongside the GIA attacks inside the borders of France in the 1990s as still more and more terrifying Islamic terrorism.129 In this connection, many French citizens began to realize that the failure

127 Ibid.
129 For more information on the Van Gogh murder and recent Islamic attacks within Europe see Ian Buruma's, *Murder in Amsterdam: The Death of Theo Van Gogh and the Limits of Tolerance* (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2006), p. 10 and
of French society to integrate an ever-expanding Muslim immigrant population would continue to have significant repercussions in and for the country. Thus the Stasi Commission began its labor throughout the Republic to determine the extent and health of lakite as well as such far-reaching and more difficult questions as the successes and failures of immigration policies, integration, assimilation, nationality laws, religious holidays, and so on.

After four months of public hearings, travel, and research, the Commission endorsed a report with twenty-five different measures, including a ban on all conspicuous religious symbols in public schools. Of the twenty-five recommendations, President Chirac chose to implement only the ban on religious symbols.  

Commission member Patrick Weil said:

"After we heard the evidence, we concluded that we faced a difficult choice with respect to young Muslim girls wearing the headscarf in state schools. Either we left the situation as it was, and thus supported a situation that denied freedom of choice to those, a very large majority, who do not want to wear the headscarf; or we endorsed a law that removed freedom of choice from those who do want to wear it. We decided to give freedom of choice to the former during the time they were in school, while the latter retain all their freedom for life outside school. Complete freedom of choice was, unfortunately, not an offer. This was less a choice between freedom and restriction than a choice between freedoms; our commission was responsible for advising on how such freedoms should both be guaranteed and limited in the best interests of all."

The Commission studied the reasons that young Muslims wear the veil; however, they also heard testimony from those young women who choose not to cover their heads. The Commission found that in the two to three years before they began their work, a trend had surfaced within many schools. In schools where some girls wore the scarf and others did not, there was "strong pressure on the latter to 'conform'.

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Bruce Bawer’s While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying the West from Within (New York: Doubleday Press, 2006), p. 4.


131 Ibid.
This daily pressure takes different forms, from insults to violence." 132 The Commission members also received testimony from Muslim men who had paid to transfer their daughters from public schools to private, Catholic schools in order to alleviate the pressure on their daughters to cover.133 Commission members believed they found a clear majority of schoolgirls who did not wear the hijab; thus the commission recommended its removal from school grounds.

The goal of the Commission's findings and President Jacques Chirac's decision was to limit social exclusion. The underlying belief held that such laws as the headscarf ban advance the integration of a population. When he announced the implementation of the ban, Chirac said, "I refuse to take France in that direction,"134 meaning communautarism; or the situation when ethnic or religious groups segregate themselves and form their own individual states within a state. The French had legislated integration in the recent past, arguably with good results. As sociologist Abdelmalek Sayad135 wrote in "The Suffering of the Immigrant,"136 French laws of decades ago created a situation that promoted the integration of Algerians.

Although these Algerians could not have applied for citizenship individually, when they were automatically granted nationality in France, they were "discreetly satisfied" that their citizenship was "imposed by law." He further wrote:

"French nationality occurred by itself, as a constraint collectively imposed: it is a condition shared by all, not by the result of individual or voluntary acts. Despite protestations of all sorts that are the "right thing to proclaim," despite the guilt or simple unease that continues to be felt by the naturalized, this "forced" naturalization

132 Patrick Weil, op.cit.
133 Ibid.
135 Abdelmalek Sayad is a renowned sociologist and author. The above quoted work as well as his others is referenced by numerous scholars that this author encountered during research for this project.
finally produces something like a satisfaction which, for a whole series of reasons, asks to remain secret and, sometimes, resigned to”.  

This discourse of social exclusion and inclusion continued after the Commission findings were announced and later implemented. Although rallies and protests began throughout Europe and the Middle East as Muslim women demanded the right to wear the veil, many more women supported the law.  

As one interviewer found, fifteen year-old Siham said that she believed that "some teachers would not see beyond the scarf and judge us. It's best if we have to take it off." Rama Kourouma, a French Muslim high school student said with a smile that "faith is in the heart" and agreed that religion should not be propounded in school through symbols.  

French social scientist Jonathan Laurence said, "The ban can thus be seen as part of a larger effort to reduce the further development of certain religious inclinations and to prevent the potential development of dual loyalties among France's Muslim population; a development that the government fears is being stoked by transnational pressures.

4.3 Effects of the Law on Contemporary French Society

Determining the post-implementation impacts of the ban on society in France in these initial years is a task that poses particular challenges to the researcher. This study focuses on the direct impact as can be measured in institutions of education and

137 Patrick Weil, op.cit.

138 According to a poll in the 2004 Economist article "France Divided over Headscarf Ban," at http://economist.com/, (last visited 9 February 2017); while only 42 percent of the Muslim population in France supported the ban, 49 percent of Muslim women supported it.


the impacts on public opinion. For one thing, the ban is in its infancy, so only the most immediate effects are in evidence now. For another thing, while students of similar social questions in America readily can look to records of incidents, enrollments, suspensions, expulsions, and other school and public sources, French law prohibits any identification of its citizens on the basis of national origin, race, or religion, which means that the records are incomplete for such an inquiry. Nonetheless, some evidence does support some initial conclusions about the ban.

### Age Differences in Opinions About a Ban on Full Veils

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Pew Research Center Q59 Et Q59fra.

### Ideological Differences in Opinions About Full Veil Ban

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U.S. respondents were asked if they consider themselves conservative, moderate or liberal. In Europe, they were asked to place themselves on a left-right spectrum.

Pew Research Center Q59 Et Q59fra.

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141 The last census in France to include religious affiliation was administered in 1872. Stephanie Giry, op.cit., p. 89.
Overall so far, the headscarf ban seems to have had little impact on the society. It has been enduringly popular. Every political party has endorsed the ban, and according to a recent Pew survey, 75 percent of French citizens support the ban. Most tellingly, no Muslim group in France has opposed the ban. Not even the Organization of Islamic Organizations of France (UOIF), the Muslim organization with the most prominence among the urban, poorer (and presumably more radicalized) populations, has requested a repeal of the law. Andree Feillard, an Indonesian who resides in France, wrote that "statistics indicate that about 80 percent of Muslim women in France do not wear headscarves. Hence, only 20 percent wear headscarves." In the same article, Syafiq Hasyim, the Deputy Director for the International Centre for Islam and Pluralism, was quoted to the effect that the majority of Muslim figures in

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143 U.S. Embassy Political Officer, April 4, 2007.
144 Ibid.
French society believe the headscarf is not an important religious matter.\textsuperscript{145} Statements such as these may demonstrate a level of Europeanization or French influence on the Islam practiced in France.

The researcher also believes that wearing a headscarf does not signify anything. It's merely just a devotion to the religion and to cover the hair so that men won't see it. Just how the Jews wear the cap on the head. Wearing headscarf does not show violence in any kind. Some figures still oppose the law, though they support the French legal and political system. Rachid Hamoudi, the UOIF leader and director of a mosque in Lille, said "The law is unfair to Muslims, but we've put it behind us."\textsuperscript{146} Statements like that of Mr. Hamoudican be interpreted several ways indifference, apathy, disgust, or potentially as a sign of acceptance of a democratic decision. In other words, all dissent about the ban does not correlate directly with fundamentalist or radical or terroristic agendas. Statistics from schools in France since the ban reveal the minimal effects of the headscarf restriction even on the realm in which it was supposed to matter, namely the French education system. A political officer at the United States Embassy in Paris\textsuperscript{147} stated "that no significant change has occurred in suspensions or expulsions related to the wearing of religious symbols in French public schools". The officer focuses his daily attention on the Muslim dynamic within French society, and he stated that, in the course of his work, he had interviewed many Parisian headmasters and found no significant problems with the implementation of the ban. He also stated that during his daily perusal of local media outlets since the ban, he had been unable to find a substantial amount of media coverage of any incidents involving a suspension or expulsion.\textsuperscript{48}


\textsuperscript{146} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{147} Information garnered through interviews available for public information with one of the Political Advisors to the US Ambassador to France, and US Military officers assigned to US Embassy, Paris, who interface with Parisian society on a daily basis.

\textsuperscript{148} US Embassy Political Officer stated on April 4, 2007.
Trica Keaton adds, "Even more striking are the results of a survey reported by Le Monde, which showed that 91 percent of teachers polled had never been confronted by a 'veiled' student in the schools where they teach, while a reported 65 percent had never seen a 'veiled' girl in their class in their career. And yet 76 percent of teachers polled favored the law."\textsuperscript{149} No currently available information on enrollment rates at public schools suggests any significant change in enrollments that one might ascribe to the headscarf ban. Private school enrollment in France has increased slightly since 2004.\textsuperscript{150} Unfortunately, French law prohibits determining the nationality of these new private school students. The most meaningful source from which conclusions might be drawn are requests for private, Muslim school construction and/or openings. In France, all schools, public or private, are subject to monitoring of curriculum in accordance with the national curriculum and safety regulations, as well as administrator and teacher certification. These tenets of French law exist to promote equality in education regardless of religious affiliation."

In 2003, the Lycee Averroes High School, the first approved Muslim school, opened in Lille, with a local Muslim teacher serving as the headmistress. Ms. Sylvie Taleb now covers her head at school, although she had not previously covered during

\textsuperscript{149} Trica Danielle Keaton, Muslim Girls and the Other France: Race, Identity Politics, and Social Exclusion. (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2006), Pg, 181. As the term "veiled" in the above survey can be mistranslated to include various forms of head coverings, in this context, it is considered to include any form of Islamic headdress.

\textsuperscript{150} Private schools in France primarily consist of Catholic institutions that receive state funding. These schools incorporate students of all religions. Most importantly for the purpose of this argument is successive information specific to Muslim schools that, although also open to students of any religion, currently host a predominance if not exclusive, Muslim student population.

her seventeen years of experience teaching at a local Catholic school. This mosque-housed school and the habit of such a response grew out of the mosque's 1994 efforts to educate Muslim girls who had been expelled for wearing headscarves in public schools that had implemented their own bans before the law went nationwide. The school applied for and received permissions to open in 2003. Non-Muslim students are welcome to apply, and the language of instruction is French. To date only three Muslim schools have opened in France, while the central government has processed an additional four requests for the creation of Muslim schools. The records do not suggest the existence of a significant number of illegal, private schools along the lines of the forerunner to the Lille school of the 1990s.

In other words, the evidence shows that most Muslim students are remaining in French public schools, despite the headscarf ban. They are neither segregated nor self-segregating. Moreover, the longer these students remain in the French schools, the likelier they are to integrate into French society. They will bring their elders closer to the French mainstream, and their children will be even more fluent in French and, hopefully, inculcated with French values.

If youth are the key to generational integration and the school system is the secular means to this end, then the rise of les flutes cabas is one indication of how some young Muslims are attempting to integrate despite resistance from their local Muslim communities. Les flutes cabas, or "shopping bag girls," are young Muslim French women who always carry a small bag or makeup kit with them. As they depart their Muslim neighborhood they wear their traditional garb with a head covering, but underneath they have on western-style clothing. Thus, they can remove their "armor" when they depart their Muslim neighborhood in the public-housing projects and enter "proper" France. In this way, they maintain a presence in both worlds. To be sure,


this double-existence is not integration, although it may be a step on the way. The true
test of integration for many of these young Muslims will come after their school years,
when they no longer will have the "safety net" of a French law to protect them if they
choose to remove their scarves. Ultimately, they will have to negotiate for themselves
some kind of resolution, though the question remains whether they will find any
compromises in tradition-minded families.

At the same time, those who choose to wear the hijab face the same conundrum
vis-à-vis non-Muslim France: will conventional, traditional French co-workers support
a woman's decision to cover her hair according to her beliefs? Will they view the
headscarf as a symbol of the woman opposed by a backwards-looking fanatical
tradition? Or will they ostracize their peer for being too plainly un-French? Will young
Muslim women be forced to choose between proudly displaying their religious beliefs
or a professional life in the French workforce?155

4.4 Racism Counters Integration

As we have seen, the "received" French history of Muslim immigration depicts
Muslims moving from North Africa to serve as les tiralilleurs, or conscripts to the
French Army during the two world wars, as well as Muslim immigrants into
continental France to serve as laborers in post-war reconstruction. Much debate has
centered on the "sudden" appearance of "second-generation immigrants" in the 1980s,
even though race has been a prominent factor in the French psyche for centuries. 156
The "sudden" appearance of these immigrants in contemporary France is a product of
the "structured exclusion"157 of Muslim immigrants in (and by) French society in the
previous three to five decades. As French society introduced immigrant populations,
these immigrants were relegated to suburbs throughout the major metropolitan areas of

155 Amara Fadela, Ibid.
156 Sue Peabody and Tyler Stovall, eds., op.cit., pp, 4-5.
157 This term is used by Trica Keaton as a chapter title.
the country.\textsuperscript{158} Such names as Clichy-Sous-Bois and Argenteuil are today synonymous with the impoverished housing projects that are scattered across the banlieues, those working-class suburbs of major cities, including Paris, that are primarily constituted of working- and lower-class immigrant families.\textsuperscript{159}

Additionally, the preponderance of these banlieues is not actively patrolled by the police. In fact, the police are almost entirely reactive, turning up in these areas only to apply heavy-handed tactics to suppress violence.\textsuperscript{160} Openly separate (and unequal) law enforcement makes just one example of the "structured exclusion" that keeps untold French Muslims from feeling entirely at home in France. This "structured exclusion" is a "metaphor for hypocrisy" in communities where youth are taught Republican values and égalité in their "exclusive" multi-story slums of the "outer city," while the children of the Francais de souche remain in their idyllic French urban or rural lives.\textsuperscript{161} Francais de souche, or those French citizens with a native-French lineage, often refer to themselves as the Francais esjustes, or true French. As noted above, French legislation, steeped in universal Republican values, prevents any reference to race or ethnicity in bureaucratic matters, census, etc. However, colorblind French society is supposed to be, race is of signal concern in contemporary life for the people in and around these racialized communities.\textsuperscript{162}

\textsuperscript{158} The deplorable housing known as bidonvilles, shantytowns, and later banlieues is vividly described by Abdelmalek Sayad, the renowned sociologist and author in his study L'immigration (1991).

\textsuperscript{159} The city of Paris and its environs house one-third of the French Muslim population. The immense cost of living in the city pushes most lower-class and many working-class citizens, disproportionately immigrants, beyond the Peripheries, or periphery road that surrounds the city. The majority of these areas surrounding Paris are included in the government's 751 zones sensibles, or sensitive zones. These areas are infamous for crime and many were flashpoints in the November 2005 riots.


\textsuperscript{161} Keaton Trica Danielle, op.cited, pp. 58-59.

\textsuperscript{162} As Peabody and Stovall state, the reluctance of the French authorities' to address race only serves to reinforce its centrality and validity as a category of analysis. Peabody and Tyler Stovall, eds, p.17.
In Paris in 1997, people regularly saw street graffiti with racist phrases such as "Islam equals AIDS," underscoring the existence among some of a view of Muslims as a "large group of undesirables." This situation was thrust to the forefront of the "true" Frenchmen's consciousness when, in the summer of 2005, French and international media aired the story of the "Affaire des incendies." These accounts not only reported the deadly apartment fires that killed numerous low-income sub-Saharan immigrant squatters as they perished inside condemned residential structures, but they also thrust into the public spotlight the profound social inequalities that immigrants, particularly Muslims, face in France today.

In France, the unemployment rate among Muslims is generally double that of non-Muslims. In addition, comparatively low educational achievement and, subsequently, inadequate skill levels. This might be a product of appropriation and reluctance to allow women to achieve educational goals; creates a uniquely low level of workforce participation by Muslim women in particular. In France, the "face of crime" is increasingly young, and Muslim. Media coverage of "Islamic terrorists" and

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163 Sue Peabody and Tyler Stovall, eds., op.cit, pp.4-5, 207.
164 op.cit.
165 Pew Research Foundation, op.cit, p.23.
police shows that mirror the U.S. television series, "Cops," only further stoke the flames of fear and segregation. 166

As a New York Times article in April of 2016 articulated, racism in employment is endemic in the country, with persons having names of Arabic or African origin 50 percent less likely to receive a job than someone named Francois or Nathalie. 167 That same New York Times article described the conditions in the suburbs of Paris as well as the racism and brutality of police as providing the tinder for an inevitable explosion. In late March 2007, at the Gare du Nord, a major transfer point in the public transportation station in France that connects rail to metro, as well as a primary stop on the line to the Charles de Gaulle International Airport; a young, Muslim Frenchman without a ticket was stopped by the ATP, the local transportation police. Approximately three hours and fifteen minutes later, 100 youths responded to this "affront to their immigrant brother" by rioting and burning ticket machines and key infrastructure. The authorities responded in force to control the violence, which resulted in the arrest of nine immigrant youths. 168 To some observers, two Frances exist: the first is "democratic and dynamic"; the second, "old, conservative, and xenophobic." 169 But can either France really accommodate the French Muslims?

4.5 Islam and Islamaphobia in French Politics

As Trica Keaton highlights, the choice for those who love France is "not to fall back on reactivism, or to retreat from reason, or even to lock ourselves into some form of fixed identity politics. It means that a strategy has to be found to include your `other' children in the nation, without reducing them to an outdated identity of Frenchness, or ethnic absolutism." 170 Ideas like Dr. Keaton's have spawned such groups as SOS Racisme and Collecte fégalite, organizations that exist to counter racism and xenophobia. These fears underlie the current political shift to the right in

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166 Keaton Trica Danielle, op.cit., p. 68.
167 Ibid.
168 Ibid.
170 Ibid.
France, however, and surely figured in the May 2007 former presidential election victory of Nicholas Sarkozy. The extreme right party in France, the National Front, led by former French paratrooper and Algeria veteran Jean-Marie Le Pen, has recently experienced unprecedented growth in membership and support. This rightward shift in mainstream politics has been dubbed by some the "Le Pen Effect."\(^1\)

Political rhetoric has increased in volume and stridency in regard to restrictions on immigration and an increased emphasis on national interests both domestically and in EU policy debates.\(^2\) Even though they affirm the efficacy of integration in public, many Frenchmen believe that European and Islamic values are not only incompatible but directly challenge one another. These Europeans see Muslims as challenge to their collective identity, traditional values, and public policies. Such cultural and religious distinctions as the wearing of the hijab and other Muslim accoutrements; the requirement for halal foods; seemingly ubiquitous mosque construction; Islam in schools; and demands for Muslim burial rites all serve to divide the French community. Further, the perceived lack of women's rights in Muslim families, church-state relations, and Islam's compatibility with democracy dominate political discourse.\(^3\) It is an uneasy national conversation. As political leaders and candidates attempt to resolve and reconcile these issues, Muslim leaders might serve as a part of the political process to promote understanding. Politically, the French Muslim community is involved in national life, however underrepresented they are in all institutions of the nation and society. Despite the French government's attempts to develop and foster Muslim groups to represent the community, 23 percent of French Muslim citizens are not registered to vote, compared to 7 percent of the French population at large.

A recent International Crisis Group study found that the political under representation and social disengagement of French Muslims should raise concerns in France, lest the void be filled with random violence or religious radicalism.\(^4\) In 2004, the French Parliament received its first, openly Muslim members, two of 908 members

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\(^1\) Sue Peabody and Tyler Stovall, eds., op.cit., pp.4-5, 223.


\(^3\) Ibid.

\(^4\) Stephanie Giry, op.cit., p.97.
since the independence of Algeria and the departure of the Algerian representatives. This minimal representation, coupled with the fact that only 2.4 percent of all local elected officials are of North African origin, shows that, despite the large numbers of Muslims in France, they have yet to organize politically and make their voice or voices heard as members of the French polity. It is important to remember that the French Muslim population does not speak with a single voice, particularly on matters of integration. Jytte Klausen, a European scholar who focuses on Muslim immigrants and societies within Europe, examined the public opinion on secularism in France. She highlighted three types of Muslims within French society: the Voluntarist, the Secular Integrationist, and the Neo-Orthodox.

She found that the Voluntarists: those who believe that Muslims should not join or attempt to join the French mainstream and that this separation is compatible with French society accounted for 30 percent of those surveyed. Some 60 percent of French Muslims fell into the category of Secular Integrationists, who believe French Muslims should join the French mainstream and are compatible with French society and values. Only 10 percent of those surveyed voiced the Neo-Orthodox belief that French Muslims should stay out of the mainstream and are not compatible with French society. If Klausen’s findings are accurate and 90 percent of French Muslims generally support the French program of secularism or integration, then one must ask why the debate about integrating Muslims even exists within France. Indeed, a recent Pew survey found that large percentages of both the general public (74 percent) and the Muslim minority population (72 percent) feel there is no conflict between living in modern France and serving Allah as a devout Muslim. Stephanie Giry, in her October 2006Foreign Affairs article, wrote: "The French must drop the assumption that the only 'good' Muslims eat saucisson [sausage/pork] with their red wine." 

\[^{175}\text{Stephanie Giry, Ibid.}\]
\[^{176}\text{Jytte Klausen, op.cit., p. 95.}\]
\[^{177}\text{Weil Patrick, op.cit., p. 3.}\]
\[^{178}\text{Ibid.}\]
\[^{179}\text{Ibid.}\]
\[^{180}\text{Stephanie Giry, op.cit., p. 58.}\]
Many scholars believe that either a rise in Islamophobia has caused a Muslim backlash, or the Muslim failure to integrate has caused Islamophobia. Zachary Shore of the University of California, Berkeley, and the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, wrote that "Pan-Islamism is rising in part because young Muslims feel excluded from European society as well as from their parents' country of birth."\(^{181}\) This type of social isolation and Muslim self-encapsulation promotes a further inward turn of French Muslims. Polls demonstrate that in 2001, Muslim identification was stronger than in 1994, with the percentage of "believing and practicing" Muslims increased by 25 percent.\(^{182}\) Reports of increased fundamentalism only serve to further French fears of these "others."\(^{183}\) The Pew Foundation's findings do not support the idea of an overabundance of radical Islamists within France. Sixty-four percent of French Muslims stated that violence against civilian targets to defend Islam was "unjustified."\(^{184}\) At the same time, France also has one of the highest rates of inter-marriage between Muslims and traditional Europeans in Europe (in 1990, 20 percent to 30 percent of Algerian women below the age of 35 had married a Frenchman of non-Islamic background),\(^{185}\) which attests to a daily kind of integration and mutual acceptance of the most normal and normalizing sort.

Despite this normalizing force, a Sorbonne professor who heads the Observatoire des Discriminations, a French think tank that focuses on workplace discrimination, found that a job applicant with a name of North African origin was six times less likely to get an interview than an applicant whose name sounded Franco-French. In fact, the study further found that out of six factors being studied, only one

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\(^{182}\) Timothy M. Savage, op.cit., p. 151.


\(^{184}\) Ibid, p. 4.

\(^{185}\) Stephanie Giry, op.cit., p. 20.
physical or mental disability was more detrimental than being of African heritage.\textsuperscript{186} On March 23, 2007, the French Parliament adopted the final version of a law against marital violence within France. The law also included raising the legal marriage age to 18 years old (from 15) for girls, the same minimum age as for boys in the country, and a provision that makes the rape of a spouse or common-law spouse illegal. On the surface, the law appears benevolent and supportive of women in France. However, the law also places marriage to foreigners under stricter controls. Statistically in France, from 1999 to 2003, the number of French citizens marrying foreigners increased 62 percent, and out of 45,000 marriages, one in three were considered mixed marriages.\textsuperscript{187} Legislation such as the 2003 headscarf ban, and the March 2007 law tightening marriages to foreigners give Muslims the perception that they are being further discriminated against.

4.6 The Threat: A Sense of Alienation

As the cleavages within the society grow, the fear of Islamophobia increases among Frenchmen, while Europhobia increases among immigrants. A recent Le Parisien article asked citizens questions on social unrest due to ethnic turmoil. The article reported that 86 percent of those queried feared unrest would break out again, and 82 percent indicated that they had little hope that government efforts to fight high unemployment and racial violence would prove effective.\textsuperscript{188} In June 2005, as Minister of the Interior, Nicholas Sarkozy visited the "sensitive zone" of La Courneuve outside

\begin{footnote}{\textsuperscript{186}Stephanie Giry, op.cit., p. 94.}
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\begin{footnote}{\textsuperscript{187}Loi no. 2010-769 du 9 juillet 2010, relative aux violences faites specifiquement au femmes, aux violences au sein des couples et aux incidences de ces dernieres sur les enfants, legifrance, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr [File: Les autrestexteslegislatifs et reglementaires]). The Law creates a new Title XIV in the Civil Code entitled "Protection Measures for Victims of Violence" (id. art. 1). Although it protects both sexes, the Law is primarily designed to help women and children who are victims of domestic violence. It contains civil and criminal provisions.}
\end{footnote}

\begin{footnote}{\textsuperscript{188}Ibid.}
\end{footnote}
of Paris. While there, he pledged to clean the racially, or scum, off the streets of France with a Karcher, the well-known industrial hose used for street cleaning and graffiti removal. Such comments may create more schisms. As William Safran, a political scientist, wrote in 1986, "Low economic status, the alien culture, and the persistence of racism stimulate Muslim immigrants to turn to their countries of origins and maintain their culture while fully expecting to remain where they are."\(^{189}\) This is seen by many Frenchmen as a type of double allegiance,\(^ {190}\) although the phenomenon may speak more to the bifurcated lives of many French Muslims, who live their own version of the "shopping bag girls' endless costume party.

On the one hand, a recent Pew Survey on global attitudes demonstrated that 91 percent of Muslims in France have a positive view of Christians, while the opposite is true of Muslims in Muslim countries. The same survey found that 93 percent of Muslims in France have little to no confidence in Osama bin Laden; 64 percent believe suicide bombings are never justified, while 16 percent said they are sometimes justified, and 19 percent stated that suicide bombings are rarely justified.\(^ {191}\) Against this statistical backdrop, one is hardly surprised to learn that 89 percent of French Muslims see Islamic extremism as threat to their society and way of life.\(^ {192}\)

On the other hand, there remains the 9 percent of Muslims who hold unfavorable opinions of Christians, the 7 percent who believe in bin Laden, and the 36 percent who think that suicide bombings are justified in certain situations (and will say as much to a pollster). They constitute a small, yet potentially extremely lethal segment part of the social landscape in France. As the European Union's Centre for Monitoring Xenophobia and Racism stated in a recent report, extremists result from a

\(^ {189}\) William Safran, op.cit., p. 111.

\(^ {190}\) Ibid., p.88.

\(^ {191}\) Andrew Kohut, op.cit., p. 3.
lack of a sense of belonging, and contemporary European Muslims’ sense of belonging could be eroded, risking alienation. That alienation is the real danger to Western societies, as it may lead to acts of terror.

Chapter 5
UN Official Documents and Concept

This dissertation has aimed to do two things. First, to demonstrate that laicite is not, in its current form, able to accommodate its Muslim population due to a lack, or in the case of state control an exploitation of, its three core elements: national cohesion, unity and integration; equality and neutrality; and state control and the public/private divide. Second, to show ways in which the policy of laicite can be improved in each of these elements to better accommodate its Muslim population by comparing it to moderate secularism such as Britain. Third, to analyze the official UN documents and “Reasonable Accommodation” concept in France.

5.1 UN Declarations

The fundamental principles and laws of the French Republic state in their preamble that "[t]he French People solemnly affirm the laws and rights of man and the citizen set down in the Declaration of Rights of 1789 and the fundamental principles recognized by the laws of the Republic. 194 Article 2 of the 1958 French Constitution states that "France is a Republic, indivisible, secular, democratic and social. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race, or religion. It shall respect all beliefs." While for many years the Catholic Church was accorded certain privileges and state support, in 1946, secularism or laicite was officially adopted in France as a constitutional principle.195

194 1958 CONST. pmbl. (France), cited in FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF: A WORLD REPORT, Pg, 294-95 (Kevin Boyle & Juliet Sheen eds. 1997) [hereinafter FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF].

195 The 1790 Decree by the National Assembly stated that the Assembly respected religion and was linked to the Roman Catholic Church (which was the only religion supported by public funds) and that the Assembly could not and ought not to debate a motion on the Catholic religion that would continue to receive the customary ecclesiastical privileges. It was only in 1905 that article 2 of the Laws of Separation
Across the EU the view on religious dress and symbols varies. France could be considered as a country, which has controversial approaches to religious dress and symbols. In 2010, a law (The French ban on Face Covering) in France was imposed stating that nobody can wear clothing with the intent to conceal one's face, or one must pay a fine of 150 euro. Belgium has also banned full-face veils since July 2011, meanwhile in the Canton Ticino, a southern region of Switzerland, full-face veils are banned as well. In addition, several other European nations such as Italy and Spain, which have specific towns and cities, ban veils cover the face as well. In many of the cases involving religious dress and symbols, people defend themselves through the Article 9 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom:

**ARTICLE 9**

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.

2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

formally ended the privileged position held by the Catholic Church stating that "[t]he Republic does not recognize, remunerate or subsidize any religion." See FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF, Ibid., 194, The 1905 laws were the result of a complex compromise between the Catholic Church and other religious and non-religious groups. Note, however, that in the regional departments of Bas-Rhin, HautRhin, and Moselle, certain pre-1905 regulations continue to distinguish between recognized (Catholic Church, Lutheran Church of the Augsburg Confession, Reformed Church, and Judaism) and non-recognized religions (Islam, Orthodoxy, certain independent Protestant churches, and various new religious movements).
The European Convention on Human Rights assures freedom of religion embracing also the right to practice religious beliefs in both public and private areas. This protection is also guaranteed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief with the addition of freedom of conscience and thought.

In Article 5 of Declaration on the Elimination of all forms of Intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief states that:
Every child shall enjoy the right to have access to education in the matter of religion or belief in accordance with the wishes of his parents or legal guidance and shall not be compelled to receive teaching on religion or belief against the wishes of his parents or legal guardians.

Therefore, not allowing certain children to come into the school canteens by serving pork in public schools violates Article 5.

In the researcher's opinion, since the ban is not illegal; it is inherently Islamophobic. Firstly, its purpose is to deliberately discriminate a minority group: Muslim women. Secondly, it's a violation on women's rights. It's not only a violation of religious freedom, but also on women's rights and thus a feminist issue which needs all women to speak up if they truly consider themselves a feminist. Thirdly, patrolling the beaches in search of burqinis and harassing Muslim women is turning France in exactly what they're against; a morality police like Iran and Saudi Arabia. Fourth, the right to practice your religion freely is one of the basic values of liberalism and the articles of every human rights convention. Lastly, the burqini ban stands for religious intolerance

Also, 'under the Declaration on the Elimination of all forms of Intolerance and Discrimination based on Religion or Belief; Article 2 states that 'No one shall be subject to discrimination by any State, institution, groups of persons, or person on the grounds of religion or other beliefs." So, the burqini ban violates this article hence why it is not illegal.
5.2 National Cohesion, Unity and Integration

France's policy of laïcité or radical secularism allowed a national Muslim council to be created in order to help maintain unity between French and Muslim inhabitants, but this council has had little influence. Furthermore, France's policy of integration focuses too much on similarity as the principal idea behind national cohesion and not enough importance is given to individual differences. This has led to exclusion and religious minority community segregation thus signifying a lack of national cohesion, unity, and integration.

5.3 Equality and Neutrality

France's policy of laïcité attempts to create a neutral and equal public sphere but this has paradoxically led to certain forms of discrimination and has not disestablished the many noticeable Catholic privileges. This therefore suggests a lack of equality and neutrality.

5.4 State Control and Public/Private Divide

France's policy of laïcité can be considered as one-sided exclusion in which the state exploits its control over its citizens by strongly interfering in religious affairs without allowing religion the same courtesy. This is not the best way to accommodate France's relatively new religious minorities including its Muslim inhabitants.

5.5 Reasonable Accommodation

One way of taking into account different religious identities in the professional context is the technique of reasonable accommodation, a legal concept which was first
developed in the US within the framework of religious diversity management and the right to equality. Faced with social reality that some people were disadvantaged on the grounds of certain characteristics such as age, disability, religious beliefs, etc. The idea emerged that perhaps the environment should be adapted to the needs of individuals so as to provide each and every person equal access to employment, services, education or other activities.

Therefore, reasonable accommodation aims at relaxing generally applicable rules in order to guarantee a more substantive equality in which the specificities of everyone are taken into account. With respect to religious diversity management in the workplace, religious reasonable accommodation offers the possibility of obtaining the adjustment of certain rules, practices or policies that are applicable to all employees but the effects of which lead to a disadvantage on the basis of religion. Hence, there is a close link between the concept of reasonable accommodation and the concept of indirect discrimination.

The adjustment of practices which do not take the religious beliefs of certain employees into account takes away the restriction of employee's religious freedom by allowing for different but still "reasonable treatment". Thus, there exist two justifications for granting reasonable accommodations on the basis of religion in the employment context: on the one hand, the right to freedom of religion and, on the other hand, the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of religion. France is the European country which in terms of comparison is most interesting because it lies at the opposite end of the spectrum from the US. Ingrained in its very history, France


197 Ibid., p. 3.

198 See, for example, Institutional Accommodation and the Citizen: Legal and Political Interaction in a Pluralist Society, Trends in social cohesion No. 21 (Council of Europe Publishing, 2009).
advocates a "militant secularism" and seems to close itself off from any recognition of religious specificities.\textsuperscript{199}

In Reasonable document, paragraph 52, Reasonable accommodation in the workplace suggests that: "In many institutions, a more or less appropriate infrastructure already exists or is in the process of development. Accommodating religious or belief-related diversity in the workplace has become a standard practice in many public institutions and private companies. One example is respect for specific dietary needs originating from religious prescripts or other conscience-based reasons. Workplace canteens frequently provide halal or kosher food and offer vegetarian meals, and in many cases this is appreciated even by employees who have not requested such options for religious reasons. In the lights of the paragraph above, France do not allow food choices to be served in majority of the public schools. The researcher mentioned about the food being only pork in majority of the public schools in the previous chapters.

The United Nations upholds the right to free expression of religious belief in articles and 18 and 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights while article 2 forbids discrimination on the basis of religion. Article 18 also allows for the freedom to change religion. The Declaration is not legally binding, however the United States chose in 1998 to pass the International Religious Freedom Act, creating the Commission on International Religious Freedom, and mandating that the United States government take action against any country found to violate the religious freedoms outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The European Convention on Human Rights, which is legally binding on all European Union states (following the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998 in the United Kingdom), makes restricting the rights of an individual to practice or change their religion illegal in article 9, and discrimination on the basis of religion illegal in article 14.

However, like many other Western societies, France is just as affected as any other country by questions relating to religious pluralism. Therefore, it seems especially interesting to examine whether the concept of reasonable accommodation could be introduced in France. It is far from clear whether France would welcome the

introduction of reasonable accommodation, both because of the laicité ideology and because of the fact that the mechanism of reasonable accommodation is possibly not the best way at the practical and theoretical level, to address the French situation.
Chapter 6
Recommendations and Conclusion

When asked what led people to support terror, whether ideologically or literally, people stated that they believed that their Muslim brothers were easy "prey" for radicals, as these Islamists are able to use religious association to convince despondent, disenchanted, and unemployed Muslims both in Europe as well as in French society.

France, and indeed the European Union must take steps now to promote future research. In terms of national cohesion, unity, and integration France can learn from other European countries such as Britain in order to improve its policy of laicite in accommodating its Muslim population. Firstly, France needs to improve its engagement with its religious institutional organizations so that they are more effective. Secondly, and this also refers to the public/private divide, France ought to accept that there is unity in diversity and allow for religious difference by permitting more religious expression in the public sphere as this is an important part of peoples' personal identity. It might mean that France needs to revoke the 2010 law (The French Ban on face Covering) or include religious teaching in schools but this might help it to include its Muslim minorities.

In terms of equality and neutrality, France needs to disestablish its Catholic privileges, and put more effective anti-discrimination measures in place to allow equal access to employment, housing, healthcare etc. France might also benefit from a policy of differential treatment in which it provides opt-outs or exemption clauses for religious reasons. This could mean stretching as far as allowing some separate religious personal laws, like in India, for its Muslim communities, but this would require additional training in the courts and would likely be very complicated.

Furthermore, in terms of state control and the public/private divide, France must change its policy of one-sided exclusion so that it no longer actively disrespects

\(^{200}\) C. Haguenau-Moizard, Ibid, p. 31.
religion. In order to best accommodate its Muslim minority, this may need to be more than just a negative liberty. France could try porous boundaries through which it is able to intervene fairly in order to preserve equality between religions instead of favoring Catholicism, and through which religion can have a greater involvement in state affairs.

There will always be a rise in intolerance of religions in France and it will disturb the way minorities live. Muslims must adapt themselves to a "new European context marked by different values," At the same time, traditional Europeans must move beyond fears of cultural differences and learn to trust their not so new neighbors.

It should be understood that it not a threat to 'Frenchness' but rather should, alongside other immigrant experiences, emerge as constitutive Hexagonal and European identity. French and European elites and Islamophobias must let go of reductive and mis-informed uniform. Europeans promoting and embracing diversity while reducing alienation and exclusion, and the perceptions of isolating factors, coupled with Muslim integration and secularization, may be the most productive and effective methods to counter terror and those who adopt it. It is certainly the essence of Frenchness. This perception that all Muslims are terrorists is not true. Therefore, everyone should educate themselves in learning the true meaning of terrorist.

Overall, France and its policy of laicite need to be more relaxed and flexible in order to better accommodate its Muslim population. This may also entail a less principled and more pragmatic outlook so that France does what is best for the people living in France, not necessarily just its citizens, rather than simply following the romantic ideals of the Republic in which citizens must 'transcend their particularities' and first consider themselves French before anything else. Such a conclusion may be controversial in the French context as it demands not a rejection but a rethinking of French principles and laicite, and though these changes may make France less 'exceptional', they will hopefully improve the way it governs and treats its people. Such measures might also make the world safer and allow minorities to live freely.
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