Abstract

The problem of induction is a multi-faceted problem, involving several aspects of epistemology. Since David Hume sensationalized it in the eighteenth century by claiming that induction had no logical foundation, many philosophers have tried to meet the challenge, resulting in several creative ways to solve it. However, most people hold that Hume’s argument is irrefutable, but at the same time they think that the success of natural science proves that induction is quite reliable, if used properly, although it does not guarantee absolute certainty. This is called ‘the paradox of induction.’

In this writing, I shall critically examine the problem of induction in general and Hume’s conception of the problem in particular. Then I shall discuss popular attempts to meet the challenge and explain why they fail to solve the problem decisively. Finally, I shall offer a way out, not in the form of a solution, but one of circumvention. I shall conclude that induction should be treated differently by people in different fields of study. This will avoid the conflicts that may be caused by different aims of particular fields of enquiry.