

INDIAN BUDDHIST REALISM ON THE CONCEPT OF (HUMAN) BEING AND KARMA

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1. Introduction

This paper is intended to investigate the ideas of man and his action or karma in Indian Buddhist Realism, in other words, known as Indian Theravada Buddhism, to show that although all schools of Buddhism believe in the law of karma and its retribution, even then they do not believe in the same thing; there is something different between them, if not entirely. This is due to their interpretation of the teaching. In this paper the writer mentions the puggalavadins belief also, because it belongs to the same tradition. First of all the writer would like to draw our attention to the characteristics of the doctrine of karma in general.

1.1. The Volition is Karma

The Anguttara-Nikaya defines karma as deeds or actions that are associated with the mental state of volition (cetana). All volitional actions involving mentality (mana), word (vaca) or body (kaya), are regarded as falling within the domain of karma, which is constituted by good, bad or neither good nor bad actions. According to Buddhism, karma without volition, namely, the instinctive actions such as sneezing, respiration and so on, is not regarded as karma because it does not consist of a volitional consciousness, which is the most important factor in determining the nature of karma. To quote the passage in the Anguttara-Nikaya thus: "I declare, monks, that volition is karma; having intended, one does a deed by body, word or mind" (AN, VI. 63). The emphasis on volition, which is one of fifty-two cetasikas arising with every kind of citta in performing all activities, to be karma is accepted as the

Buddha's contribution to the karma- doctrine. Karma and its result are invariably compatible just as every object is accompanied by its shadow. As karma may be good, bad or neutral, so may the vipaka. It may be noted at the outset that the neutral karma (abyakata), according to the Nikayas, means good deeds of the Arhants called kiriyakamma (ineffective action), but according to the Abhidhamma it also covers kammavipaka (karmic result) as it is a result in itself and is not productive of another result (A Manual of Abhidhamma, pp.22, 158). Generally, the volitional karma always consists of either good or bad and such a karma does not vanish without producing its effect, as the Buddha quoting the words of ancient Rsis proclaims: "Those who do good receive good and those who do evil receive evil, what a man reaps accords with what he has sown" (SN, XI.1.10).

1.2. Freedom and Volition

Buddhism classifies freedom into two kinds, of which one is the freedom of volition, and the other is the freedom from volition. According to the former, it has been observed that volition is not something which belongs to the past, but it is a faculty that is ever present. This volition is, therefore, a factor in the determination of events. If volition does not itself participate in the present activities, then it can be said that all such activities are mechanically or deterministically caused; it lacks freedom of volition. The freedom of volition can be seen from the feeling of man in doing karma, "if he feels free while performing deeds, then his intention becomes perfect, giving rise to perfect result" (AN, III. 337-338). Thus, in terms of the karma-doctrine, freedom of volition is made possible, but not in determinism and fatalism which explain everything through inscrutable forces. According to the view point of the freedom from volition, freedom in the ultimate sense is not considered from the level of ordinary man's mind, which is based on desire, attachment and ignorance, but it is justified from the mind of only purified persons, who possess the freedom from impure volition. The difference between the two is that while

the former known as mundane freedom which prolongs samsara belongs to only ordinary man, the latter known as supermundane freedom never binds anybody in samsara and is possessed by only the Arahants. Therefore, the Arahants' actions cannot be called karma, but simply a mere "doing", which is without results to be accumulated by their consciousness.

As far as the Buddhist standpoint of volition is concerned, the point of comparison can be made between Buddhism and other schools of thought. The Upanisads (CU, 3.14; BU, IV. 4.5), emphasize volition as the determination of karma. However, the idea of volition is not systematically stated in the Upanisads, only in Buddhism the volition can be uniquely defined as karma, while Buddhism regards volition to be karma, Jainism admits the karma itself to be the significant factor. In the Majjhima-Nikaya, Jainism is reported to have taken into account the bodily action as more important than the mental action as is evident from the following:

How can an insignificant wrong of mind shine out in comparison with this important wrong of body, since the wrong of body itself is the more blamable in the effecting of an evil deed, in the rolling on of an evil deed - wrong of speech is not like it, wrong of mind is not like it. (MN, III. 207)

As against this, the Buddha admits a deed of mind as more important than that of body and speech, because the mental karma is the starting point of all acts. Man always thinks before doing and speaking. Moreover, the mental action includes belief, view and theory technically called ditthi (view), (MN, I. 373). If a view is wrong, speech and action are also wrong (Dh, v. 1,2), as mentioned in the Middle Path. Buddhism holds that unconscious acts, though technically deeds, do not constitute serious karma, but Jainism maintains that "a man who kills or harasses in any way a living being without intent, is nonetheless guilty, just as a man who touches fire is burnt" (Poussin, The Way to Nirvana_, p.68). In this way, Jainism is known as kiriyavada, which upholds the view

that karma is responsible for all the limitations of the souls, so most of the activities of the soul are affected by karma. However, in Jainism, there is a kind of karma called lokasangraha which does not bind the soul. Like Buddhism, Jainism asserts that the Arhants work without being bound by the results of their karmas. Unlike the Upanisads and Jainism, Buddhism does not accept any permanent souls as the doer and receiver of karma and its result apart from the ever-changing consciousness, which is not self, but continuity. "When a person, although ignorant, performs good or bad deed consciousness acquires it" (SN, XII.6.51). Unlike the unconscious acts, actions done with ignorance bear their fruits in accordance with their nature. In conclusion, Buddhism is not fatalism and determinism, because it accepts the possibility of changing the result of karma by human effort.

1.3. Karma vs. Fatalism or Determinism

The ground for confusing karma with determinism or fatalism is worth considering. The former believes that every event is causally determined, and the whole universe works deterministically; so the freedom of actions becomes illusion and is nothing but reactions of the past deeds. The latter is based on the belief that the present human agent is due to his past deeds which act like unseen forces that cannot be changed or avoided. To put it in a nutshell, the fatalist explains everything through some unseen and inscrutable fate, whereas the determinist explains the events through some prior events¹. It seems that through the karma-doctrine we come to the same conclusion, like the determinist, that "our present actions are determined by our previous actions", on the one hand and like the same fatalist that "what has been has been" or "what will be will be", on the other. But, in reality, it will be correct, in accordance with the law of karma, to say that "I am what I have made myself to be" or "it is my actions alone that determine my own situation; I will be punished or rewarded because of my own actions". The doctrine of karma does not allow us to shift the burden of our misery and happiness to a supreme

force, but we see our present behaviours, dispositions and aptitudes, and so on, through our own past deeds. Certainly, the expressions, like "one gets what one deserves" or "one is what he is due to his previous actions" or "as we sow so shall we reap," are not deterministic and fatalistic. The minimum assumption of the karma-doctrine is that human beings are responsible for their actions and that they are the master of their own achievements or failures. The karma-doctrine is attacked as leading to lethargy and as killing any human effort. The allegation is invalid, for, in fact, the language of the karma-doctrine is a kind of inspiration. It cherishes hope, creates expectations and orients our actions in that direction. Besides, it warns us against our future misdeeds. Therefore, the importance of human effort has been taken care of by the karma-doctrine, and determinism and fatalism do not accommodate human deliberation and endeavour. Once the karma-doctrine is understood in its proper perspective, that is, as a moral law of life, there will hardly be any scope for further confusion in this matter (Ibid).

2. The Indian Schools of Buddhist Realism on the Concept of (Human) Being and Karma

2.1. The Buddhist Realism on (Human) Being

2.1.1. The Sarvastivada Realism

The two realistic schools of Buddhist philosophy, namely, the Vaibhasika and the Sautrantika, owe their origin to the Sarvastivada, which advocates the idea that all things (Dharmas), no matter whether they belong to the past, the present or the future, exist as substances (dravyath sat)². Although both the Sarvastivada and the Theravada branched themselves off from the Early Buddhism or Sthaviravada known as Hinayana (as opposed to Mahasanghika, known as Mahayana), yet whereas the latter firmly follows the same tradition of its predecessor, the former has many things changed (Conze, 1962, p. 119). The Sarvastivadins maintain

that all Dharmas, which constitute a human being, such as the five khandhas, the twelve ayatanas and the eighteen dhatus, and so on, do really exist throughout the three divisions of time, though the phenomenal world and human existence may vanish. In this regard, Th. Stcherbatsky is right in saying: "All Dharmas exist essentially (svalaksanatah sat)." (Stcherbatsky, 1923, p.26 n.1). The fundamental text of this school is Abhidharmajnanapraasthana sastra which was written by Katyayaniputra, the founder of the Sarvastivada school, whose headquarters was in Kashmira. The final stage in the development of the Sarvastivada philosophy was represented by Vasubandhu who wrote the Abhidharmakosa.

The Sarvastivada also like the Theravada admits two kinds of truth, namely, sammutisacca and paramatthasacca, to use the Pali words. However, the conventional truth (sammutisacca) is divided into four kinds: (i) Provisional Being (prajnaptisat), which exists provisionally, such as men, women, jars, etc. They are entities in the natural world. (ii) Relative Being (parasparapeksatah sat), which dependently exists, such as long and short, this and that, etc. (iii) Normal Being, which are ideas comprising contradictions and do not appear really in the natural world, such as "hairs of tortoises", "horns of hares", etc. They exist only nominally as concepts. (iv) Aggregational Being, according to which the existence of the individual is nothing but an aggregate of many constituent elements (Dharmas). In the ultimate sense, the individual person itself does not exist (Nakamura, (n.d.), p. 236).

The four kinds of being belonging to the conventional truth cannot be associated with the Dharmas which belong to the ultimate truth. The Sarvastivada classified all constituent elements of human being into seventy-five numbers, which are divided into two major groups, of which one is samskrta (cooperating elements), and the other is asamskrta (non-cooperating elements). The former is divided into four major groups, viz., (i) rupa (matter), (ii) citta (consciousness), (iii) caitasika (states and characteristics of the mind), and (iv) citta-viprayukta-samskara (powers that are neither mental nor material but common to both mind and matter), (Ibid., pp.231-

235). But the asamskrtadharmas are of three kinds, namely, (i) Akasa (space for all Dharmas), (ii) Pratisankhya-nirodha (the extinction of elements through knowledge), and (iii) apratisankhyanirodha (the extinction of elements due to lack of productive cause). These seventy-five Dharmas, though separate from each other, cooperate with one another due to causal relation (paccaya). These Dharmas exist actually (Ibid., p.235). From the above classification the difference between the Theravada and the Sarvastivada can be drawn as follows: whereas the former classifies the conditioned Dharmas into three categories, the latter does it into four. However, the fourth category of the latter is included in rupa by the former. Hence, in the Theravada school, rupa consists of twenty-eight and Nirvana is treated as an additional Dharma. An important point to notice is that the Theravadins give akasa among its list of derived material elements (upadaya-rupa), while with the Sarvastivadins it is elevated to the rank of an asamskrtadharma. Moreover, the Theravadins do not believe in the permanent existence of the Dharmas through the three divisions of time, but the Sarvastivadins argue for it in accordance with the following four reasons. Firstly, the Buddha has taught it explicitly; secondly, mind-knowledge arises from the contact between mind and its object. If past and future Dharmas do not exist, they could not produce the mind-consciousness which has them for objects; thirdly, without an object no knowledge can arise, and all our knowledge would be restricted to the bare present; and fourthly, if the past does not exist, how can a good or bad action produce a fruit in the future? For at the moment when the fruit is produced the cause of the retribution is past (Conze, 1962, p.139). The Theravadins reply that the aforesaid reasons are inconsistent with the Buddha's words: "What is past is got rid of and the future has not come (atitamnānva gameyya- nappatikankhe anagataṃ)" (MN, III. 187). Hence, according to the Theravada school, all time except the present has no existence. Moreover, the Buddha, according to the Theravadins, never asserts the existence of permanent entity, but he does always say: "Impermanent are all compound things, arising and perishing are their nature (SN,

I.1.); that which is impermanent is non-substantial" (SN, III.1). According to the Theravada philosophy, things are dependently originated; they are related to one another by means of causal relation (paccaya).

2.1.2 The Vaibhasika Realism

As has been mentioned earlier, the Vaibhasika school owes its origin to the Sarvastivada; it is therefore, in agreement with the latter in holding the existence of Dharmas through the three divisions of time. But, the Vaibhasikas accept both the Sarvastivadin's existence of sankhatadharma as substances and the Theravadin's doctrine of momentariness as holding that all conditioned things are real not in the sense that they are substances characterized by permanence, but in the sense that they are aggregates of elements (Dharmas), which, while being impermanent, are yet real in virtue of their simplicity, individuality and unanalysability (Banerjee, 1974, pp. 158-159). They are in a bid to reconcile the kṣāṇikavāda with the theory of substance by emphasizing the word Dharma, as T.M.P. Mahadevan puts it: "The Dharmas are the ultimate elements of existence which are momentary, and yet real" (Mahadevan, 1982, pp.134-135). This makes the Vaibhasikas postulate two kinds of atoms (paramāṇu). The one which is the smallest and the most subtle unit of matter is called the substantial atom (dravyaparamāṇu), and the one, which forms a unity and has characteristics of simultaneous arising and perishing, is known as the aggregate-atom (saṃghata-paramāṇu), (Chandrasekhar, 1982, pp.89-90). But the Vaibhasikas' atom-theory is different from that of the Vaiśeṣikas'. In the first place, whereas the atoms of the latter are permanent or external, that of the former are impermanent or momentary (kṣāṇika). Secondly, according to the Vaibhasikas, the aggregation of atoms or Dharmas is due to the law of Dependent Origination, but for the Vaiśeṣikas the principle of the inherence of the whole in the parts is admitted instead (Banerjee, 1974, p. 159).

Regarding the characteristics of sankhatadharma, the Vaibhasikas like the Theravada divide them into four kinds,

viz., (i) jati (origination) or upacaya (growth), (ii) sthiti (existence) or santati (continuity), (iii) jarata (decay), and (iv) anityata or aniccata (in Pali) (extinction or impermanent). According to the Vaibhasikas, all the conditioned Dharmas, both of mind and matter, are applied for only rupa-lakkhana, but for citta-lakkhana; the following are accepted: (i) uppada (genesis), (ii) thiti (development), and (ii) bhanga (dissolution), (Abhs., IV. 3). It is to be noted that unlike the Abhidhamma, the Anguttara-Nikaya holds that the conditioned things, both mental and material, must undergo these three signs, viz. uppada (genesis), annathatta (changeability while it persists), and vaya (passing away), (AN, I. 151; The Gradual Sayings, I. 135). Both the Theravada and the Vaibhasikas agree that the unconditioned things (asankhatadharma) are not characterized by these lakkhanas.

2.1.3. The Sautrantika Realism

This school was founded by Kumaralata and was so-called because it accepted the authority of the sutras, that is, sutranta, and rejected the authority of the Abhidharmas, followed by the Sarvastivadins, and of the Vibhasas, the commentary on the jñānaprasthāna from which the Vaibhasikas derived their name³. The Sautrantikas started their philosophical inquiry against the Sarvastivadins and the Vaibhasikas with the idea of strictly adhering to the direct discourses (sastra) of the Buddha. In the first place, the Sautrantikas rejected the main thesis of the two schools, which held that the Dharmas exist throughout the three divisions of time, because to do so is to advocate a sort of eternalism (sassatavada) which is in opposition to the teaching of the Buddha. Secondly, the Sautrantikas do not agree with the long list of seventy-five elements admitted by the two schools, for they hold that Dharmas are fictitious. Hence the Sautrantikas rejected akāśa, Nirvāṇa, and citta-viprayukta, but offer a short list of forty-three elements classified under five heads as follows: (i) Rupa, comprising four mahabhūtarūpas and four upadaya-rūpas, (ii) vedana, which is classified into pleasure, pain and neutral feeling, (iii) samjñā, which consists of six internal sense-organs, (iv) vijñāna, which is of six kinds

corresponding to the six sense-organs, and (v) *samskaras*, which are numbered as twenty in all including ten good (*kusala*) and ten bad (*akusala*) *Dharmas* (Banerjee, 1974, p. 163). Unlike the *Vaibhasikas* and the *Sarvastivadins*, the *Sautrantikas* accept the existence of *Dharmas* only in the present, not in the past and the future. Following this they reject the permanent aspects of *Dharmas* admitted by the two schools. Like the *Vaibhasikas*, they hold that all *Dharmas*, both mind and matter, are in momentary state and yet they are real. As regards the *samskṛta-laksanas*, they are not in agreement with the *Theravada*, the *Sarvastivada* and the *Vaibhasikas*, that is, they reject the characteristic of decay (*jarata*) by saying that whatever that arises has no time to persist, but perishes immediately (Karunadasa, 1967, p. 84). But, like the *Puggalavadins*, the *Sautrantikas* postulate that there is a subtle consciousness survives after emancipation (Chandrkaew, 1982 , p.94).

The main conflict between the *Vaibhasikas* and the *Sautrantikas* lies in the common ground of their realism, the former having held that our consciousness of objects or the external world is direct and immediate through perception (hence it is known as direct realism) the latter having regarded this consciousness as indirect and mediate, that is, derivable from inference instead of from perception. The *Sautrantikas* deny perception of all objects; hence their position is called indirect realism or representationism (Sinha, 1972, pp. 35, 59). But the *Vaibhasikas* argue that perception is the ultimate ground of inference, for, if there is no perception of an external object, it can never be an object of inference. This *Vaibhasikas'* stand is in conformity with that of the *Theravadins* who hold both perception and inference as valid sources of knowledge by stating that the inference will be valid if it is in agreement with perception. As far as the ideas of being and soul are concerned, the *Theravadins* do not make any mention of the total number of *Dharmas* taken as a whole and do maintain that there is no permanent soul, but only the combination and continuity of the five *khandhas* and their attachment.

While the Sarvastivadins maintain universal existence of all Dharmas, the Vaibhasikas find them all defective and uphold their own view that the difference in time depends upon the difference of the function of an entity; at the time when an entity does not actually produce its function, it is future; when it produces the function it becomes presence; when after having produced it, it stops, it becomes past; hence there is a real existence of the three divisions of time. But both the Vaibhasikas and the Sarvastivadins hold that there is no soul, but there are only the elements (Dharmas) of personal life. The Sautrantikas believe only in the existence of present and are like the Puggalavadins in holding that the soul is an individual which has a separate existence, though we could not say that it was either different or identical with the elements of a personal life, yet its existence cannot be denied (Dasgupta, pp. 115-117). Commenting on the significance of the term 'Dharmas', N.V. Banerjee observes: "On the positive side, Buddhism goes naturally further in replacing the concept of substance by its novel concept of Dharmas by which it means indivisible and analysable elements" (Banerjee, p. 158). Since all schools of Buddhism advocate the ideas of momentariness, impermanence, substancelessness and the doctrine of Dependent Origination, in spite of regarding Dharmas as unanalysable elements or substance, they differ from the Hindu idea of permanent soul. We can maintain that "all of them are marked by a more or less complete departure from the Hindu way of thinking which is dominated by the idea of substance regarded as permanent and as logically prior to causality" (Ibid., pp. 157-158).

2.1.4. The Puggalavada Realism

There are two schools of Buddhism, namely, the Sammitiya and Vatsiputriya, which are known in accordance with their teachings as Pudgalavada by holding that "in addition to the impersonal Dharmas, there is still a person (puggala) to be reckoned with, and their teachings challenged the fundamental doctrine of all the other Buddhist schools" (Conze, 1962, p. 122).

As has been seen, the purpose of the Buddha's denial of the existence of self is to object the two extreme views, namely, 'eternalism' (sassataditthi) and 'annihilationism' (ucchedaditthi). The former view is presented in the Pakudha Kaccayana's sassatavada and in the Upanisads, whereas the latter is seen in the Ajita's ucchedavada and in the Carvaka. The Buddha, when asked by Vacchagotta Paribbajaka whether there is a permanent soul or not, kept silent. The reason behind this silence was given by the Buddha himself later to Ananda that Vacchagotta was not mature enough to understand the truth pertaining to Atta (self). If the Buddha answered him either 'yes' or 'no', Vacchagotta would understand it as either eternalism or annihilationism (SN, IV. 400). The Buddha took these two views as wrong (micchaditthi). According to him, the idea of permanent soul came from 'grasping after the five khandhas' (attavadupadana), which are not permanent soul, but dependently originated in accordance with the law of Paticcasamuppada. If we follow 'right view' (samma-ditthi) by adopting 'wise attention' (yonisomanasikara) to the five khandhas, there will not originate the notion of the permanent soul (MN. I.7).

The Idea of Man (Puggala): Since, the Puggalavadins go against the fundamental teachings of the Buddha, they are known as "heretics", in other words, "outsiders in our midst", (Conze, p.123), or "heretics within the fold" (Venkataramanan, 1956, p. 274), due to their accepting the existence of a person (puggala), which is another name for the permanent soul as well-known in the Upanisadic thought. Their views were rejected by the Abhidhammikas and other orthodox schools of Buddhism. But, it is noticed that the idea that "there is a persisting personal entity or soul" is clearly stated by Mrs. Rhys Davids in her later writing. It is said that she has collected some of the philosophical tenets of the Puggalavada school in the introduction to her translation of the Kathavatthu (Points of Controversy (Kathavatthu, 1915, 1969, p. Introduction). The famous passages often quoted by the Puggalavadins are mentioned in the Pali canon thus: "One person (ekapuggala) when he is born in the world is born for

the advantage of the many, the person is the Tathagata” (A.I.22). The favourite Sutta named the burden (bhara) Sutta is often found quoted by them: “I will teach you the burden, its taking up, its laying down, and the bearer of the burden. The five skhandhas of grasping are the burden. Craving takes up the burden. The renunciation of craving lays it down. The bearer of the burden is the person” (AN, IX. 256 ; SN, III. 250 ; Cf. Conze, pp.124-125). The Puggalavadins would say that here the person is different from the five skhandhas. For, if they were identical, then the burden, the Vatsiputriyas say, would carry itself, which is absurd.

According to the Theravada, the person mentioned above is a mere conventional being; it denies a self- substance apart from the qualities and dismisses the belief in a substratum for the qualities as a superstition (Hiriyanna, p.140). “Any object, physical or mental, is just a bundle (sankhata) of qualities” (Sundararaman, 1940, p.165). Early Buddhism maintains that there is no permanent person or self, only personal continuities are there. Taking the opposite view, the Puggalavadins, especially the Sammitiyas, say that “the personal continuities or a series of psycho-physical states are self or person,” for “the self is neither a mere name for a collection of many separate elements nor is it a simple external substance.” The Self, according to them, is, therefore, “an organism, an organismic whole which is asraya prajnapta, that is, conditionally cognized and conditionally existent. They maintain that neither an absolute existence nor an absolute non-existence would be the right view in regard to the individual self” (Venkataramanan, p.274). They further assert: “Totally denying the existence of the self would be to commit a heresy. But if we say that the self is conditionally existent, that would be the right view” (Sammitiya Nikaya Sastra, 1953, p.176). Certainly, the personalists do not take man to be a simple inflexible entity, self-identical and ultimately real. The individual is a complex of all five Skhandhas. It is an organismic whole, conditionally existent. The individual is a stream of personal life, self-conscious and purposive. Kalidas Bhattacharya remarks: By ‘self’ the Sammitiyas and

Vatsiputriyas may have meant nothing more than this indefinite self, a self which, through undeniable, is neither actually nor possibly a self contained entity. Personality can as much centre round such indefinite self as round a self that is definite (Bhattacharya, 1961, p. 83).

According to the personalists, the self cannot be denied because otherwise the fact of personality and the notions of karma and samsara would go futile. Although it cannot be denied, yet it also cannot be definitely asserted nor is it a mere series of the five skandhas when it is analysed. Hence, to say that the self 'is' would be an attaditthi (eternalism), and the self 'is not' would commit micchaditthi (annihilationism), (Sammitiya Nikaya Sastra, p.176). This amounts to saying that the self is neither existent nor non-existent, but is conditionally existent (Ibid.).

Unlike the Puggalavada, early Buddhism maintains that there is no permanent self or soul to be annihilated or external to the individual. The five skandhas are not self at all, they are merely the conditioned. But the personalists hold that the self which is the complex of skandhas is the conditioned self, "the self can be conceived in correlation with the five skandhas", (Conze, p. 128) "the self likewise manifests itself through the psycho-physical elements, and therefore co-exists with them not as a separate thing, but as a kind of "structural unity" (Ibid.). It is an organismic and dynamic unity of the ever-perishing skandhas. According to them, there are three ways of denoting the existence of the self through the complex of skandhas which constitute individuality. That is, the self is denoted by reference to (i) the basis, (ii) transition and (iii) extinction, which can be contrasted with the states of arising, persisting and perishing of the self. The first two denote the existence of the individual or self, while the last one to the state of receiving the skandhas, i.e. karma and Nirvana.

2.2 The Buddhist Realism on Kamma and Rebirth

2.2.1 The Sarvastivada Realism

The Abhidharmakosa of Vasubandhu which is written from the standpoint of the Sarvastivada and which is regarded as an authority for all schools of realism, will be brought into focus as it is different from the Theravada's point of view. A.K.Chatterjee remarks that the scholars can learn far more from the Kosa with its commentary about the dogmatics of the ancient Buddhist schools than from any other work, and it affords them a sidelight upon the debates between the Vaibhasikas and the Sautrantikas (Chatterjee, pp. 36-37). It may be noted here that at first Vasubandhu was a Sautrantika which must be understood as the Sarvastivada itself, and wrote works from the Hinayana point of view, but during the later part of his life he was converted to the Yogacara school of Mahayana by his brother and teacher Asanga (Ibid., pp.3,36). As regards the process of rebirth, the Theravada admits the gandhabba (skt. gandharva) as the patisandhi-citta (rebirth-linking consciousness), and not as an 'intermediate-state being' (antarabhava) between death and birth. But Vasubandhu suggests that the gandhabba which is referred to by the Buddha is this 'intermediate-state beings' (Kosa., 3. 40-41). Found between two destinies, it exists between the moments of death and birth, and is made up of the five skandhas, which proceed to the place of rebirth (Kosa., 3. 10). However, the antarabhava is different from Atman, which is an entity, changing from the skandhas of one body for that of another (Kosa., 3. 18). By contrast, Vasubandhu's antarabhava is itself a karmically determined combination of skandhas (McDermott, "Karma and Rebirth in Early Buddhism", p.171). At the moment of man-birth, the antarabhava possessed the divine eye and, driven by karmic energy, goes to the place of rebirth; there it sees its parents united in intercourse. Finding the scene hospitable, its passions are stirred. It attaches itself to the zygote taking pleasure in the impurity of the sperm and ovum and establishes itself there. The skandhas after arising in the womb perish and are replaced immediately by the birth existence (Ibid., pp.171-172). With regard to the plane of existence, Vasubandhu is in agreement with the five destinies as mentioned in the Nikayas (DN, III. 234; AN, IV. 459).

As far as the concept of karma is concerned, the Sarvastivada accepts the fourfold divisions of karmas, viz.: (i) Dark karma with its dark results; (ii) fair karma with its fair results, (iii) dark and fair karmas with their dark and fair results, and (iv) neither dark nor fair karmas with their neither dark nor fair results. The fourth refers to kammanirodha or Nirvana. The third means some good acts are mixed with some bad acts in the same thought (Kosa., IV. 129-130). The Sarvastivada further classifies the fourfold division of karma into bodily, verbal and mental karmas. However, the Sarvastivada holds that volition (cetana) is not different from mental karma as is admitted by the Theravada. Both bodily and verbal karmas arise from the mental karma (Kosa., IV. 2). As is stated earlier, the Theravada considers all volition as karma. The verbal and bodily karma are not merely based on the volition but also the mental impulse.

According to the Sarvastivada, to be complete and really fruitful, a karma must be composed of three stages, namely, (i) prayoga (preparation), (ii) maula karmapatha (principal action) and (iii) prstha (the back). For example, the act of stealing to be called as stealing must consist of the three stages; firstly, a man goes prepared to the place where the thing to be stolen is kept; secondly, it means the actual taking of the thing; and thirdly, it signifies the thing that has been utilised by the man. Another example is the case of killing: Firstly, a man who desires to butcher a cow goes to a market with some money and buys a cow; secondly he kills the cow with a knife; and thirdly, he sells the meat of the cow (Kosa., IV. 140). Unlike the Sarvastivada, the Theravada says that killing to be complete and fruitful must consist of the following five conditions, viz., (i) It is a living being, (ii) he knows that it is a living being, (iii) he intends to kill it, (iv) there is an attempt of killing by appropriate means, and (v) finally, the living being is killed (Sirimangalacariya Thera, 1961, p.210). The first three conditions can be included in the first stage of the Sarvastivada, the fourth condition in the second stage, and the fifth condition in the third stage, respectively.

2.2.2. The Vaibhasika realism

Now let us turn our attention to the Vaibhasikas and the Sautrantikas' explanation of karma. The Vaibhasikas analysed karma into two kinds, namely, *vijnapti* (patent) and *avijnapti* (latent). These two karmas can be applied for the bodily action called *kayika-vijnapti-karma* and *kayikavijnapti-karma* and for the verbal action called *vacika-vijnapti-karma* and *vacikavijnapti-karma*. The patent-bodily-action means a kind of appearance which is expressed from the mind and is known by others, such as the act of giving charity that shows virtuous intention and informs others of the giver. The patent-verbal-karma means speech that is uttered from an intentional impulse and is understood by others. The *avijnapti* karma means a latent potential action impressed on the bodily and mental stream of the person who perform an ethically significant action. It is unseen efficacy capable of producing consequences at some later moment of time. For example, John hires someone to commit a murder. In giving his orders to the man, he commits a patent vocal karma. However, John is not yet a murderer, since no death has occurred. Nevertheless, the intention to kill continues within John. In obeying John's orders the accomplice commits a patent bodily karma by doing the murder. At that precise moment, John becomes a murderer along with the accomplice. The connecting link between John's murderous intention and the actual murder is called a latent karma. The latent karma is said to be either bodily or verbal depending on whether it proceeds from a bodily or a verbal patent act. The latent karma is either good or bad. But it is never neutral or undefined (Kosa., 4. 28). However, the patent karma may be undefined. The Vaibhasikas hold that any act cannot be called undefined if it comes in terms of either good or bad.

To the question, "How can an act bear fruit if an individual is impermanent?" the Vaibhasikas reply that the act is held to exist in its own nature in all times, whether past, present or future. Only the mode of its existence varies (Kosa., 5. 58). The vaibhasikas introduce the concept of *prapti*

(possession) as a link between the past, present and future. Prapti appears as certain immaterial entities in the series of psycho-physical combination, which is always changing. The prapti is also momentary, but it generates an entity similar to itself. Through a continuing process of possession, we continue to possess our acts even long after the actual moment of their accomplishment. In short, the Vaibhasikas posit an intermediary form of avijnapti karma, operating through a process of the continuous generation of 'karma possession' (prapti).

2.2.3. The Sautrantika Realism

The Sautrantikas do not agree with the Vaibhasikas' theory of the vijnapti and avijnapti karmas. Like the Theravada, the Sautrantikas say that the patent karma, whether bodily or verbal, is distinct from cetana, since there is no act beyond the intentional impulse. The Sautrantikas regard the Vaibhasikas' interpretation of the two karmas as meaningless and unnecessary. The Sautrantikas do not accept the Vaibhasikas' conception of avijnapti karma and prapti. They argue that neither the past nor the future exists, thus the past acts do not exist. When the Buddha affirmed the past karma, he affirmed the inevitability of its result. An act is considered present or past according to whether it operates or has ceased to operate. If a past act bears fruit, it is because it operates, and thus it is a present rather than a past act. The Sautrantikas hold that the link between the past act and the present one is none other than the potential volition which acts as the karmic power. Therefore, volition should be distinguished from the mental act itself. The potential volition is known as vasna which plays its role as seed (bija), (Kosa., 2. 185, 272). While the potentiality is in an individual, it is termed vasna, but in the process of birth, it is called bija. The Sautrantikas replace the avijnapti-karma by vasna and the prapti by bija; and they maintain and admit only the present existence of karma. By denying the Vaibhasikas' understanding of vijnapti and avijnapti-karma, the Sautrantikas assert that karma consists of

volition plus the act after having willed, through bodily, verbal and mental actions. They defined three kinds of volitions, viz., (i) resolution, (ii) decision and (iii) driving volition. The first two of these are grouped in the mental action, but the third means the act after having willed, namely, bodily and verbal actions.

2.2.4. The Puggalavada Realism

The problems of the five skandhas and karma-samsara are seriously taken into account by the Puggalavadins who argue that had the self been absolutely non-existent, then there would be neither the doer nor the deeds or any consequence thereof. According to them, reduction of man to a mere combination of skandhas and elements would give a mechanistic view of man, and a firm belief in the external self would give us a completely static view of self. By so doing, we seem to ignore the sense of unity and creative freedom in man. By ignoring freedom, we tend to ignore moral agency or moral responsibility (Venkataramanan, p.274). With regard to karma, moral agency or moral responsibility of man, the Puggalavadins declare: "One does one's own deeds, the results of one's deeds will not go to another" (Sammitiya Nikaya Sutra, p.165). "In order to bring one's deeds to manifestation, one proceeds to take another birth" (Ibid.). Like early Buddhism, the Puggalavadins lay stress on the law of karma and its results: Deeds are twofold, good and evil; and these deeds are done in the world by men; these deeds are their treasures, seized by themselves and followed by themselves. Gross skandhas are the result of bad deeds and fine ones are those of good deeds. Good and bad, both are deeds done by men who follow, seize and expel the course of karma (Ibid., p.185).

According to the Puggalavadins, the doctrines of karma and rebirth are firmly and closely related. They are inevitably concomitant. Man does action to manifest himself. He depends on deeds and does not totally perish, for, if man utterly perishes, all deeds will also perish.

2.2.4.1. The Puggalavada's Theory of Transmigration

The Puggalavadins believe in the transmigration of the self, a view which differentiates them from other Buddhist schools. As has been seen, man in the Puggalavadin school always has a choice respecting of what he will do. It is said that because of man's being self-conscious, he is pressed on by his will or desire (trsna) and his sense of unity and freedom. Being bound by desire, he has no real freedom and he has to undergo birth and death again and again. A complete extinction of desire, in other words, clings, is called nirupadisesanirvana, which is itself 'the realisation of immovable joy', 'the abiding in external' (Ibid., p.159). According to the Puggalavadins, the external and immovable are the real nature of the self (puggala). To the Puggalavadins, transmigration seems impossible without the person (puggala) or self. The person trans-migrates; when the present skandhas are given up, the person is left there still. The person is embodied in the five skandhas of the "intermediary state". These are subtle, transparent, invisible to ordinary eyes, while the five skandhas of the states of birth and death are gross and easily visible to the eyes of flesh (Ibid., p.161). He gives up the gross, and the embodiments proceed on seeking a new body for a new embodiment in accordance with his karma. While seeking a new birth, man can see his way and choose an abode through the sense of the intermediary state which is the state of transition. "The time when the present span is just to end is also the time for the intermediary state to arise" (Ibid., p.161; Kosa., ix. 258). In this state, man is based on the five intermediary skandhas. The intermediary state is most suited for transition, for the exchange of the potency, for the next span of life, and for the passing on of virtue and vice (Ibid., p.161).

According to the Puggalavadins, the person (puggala) or self is neither absolutely identical with nor absolutely different from the five skandhas. "If they are absolutely different, it will make the person completely unrelated to the

skhandhas, and if they are absolutely identical, it will make the person as impermanent as the skandhas” (Venkataramanan, p.275). But the person or self exists in correlation with the skandhas (Kosa., ix. 233). “The self truly is? (Sammitiya Nikaya Sastra, p.178). The person or self is based on the five intermediary skandhas, for example, “the receiver of rupa exists only as mutually dependent on rupa, that is all. He is not mentioned as a separate reality” (Venkataramanan, p. 277). Stcherbatsky observes that the Puggalavadins try to support the doctrine of the supernatural, surviving Buddha (Stcherbatsky, n. d., p.31,n.1). As the Buddha himself said: “This sage Suneta, who exists in the past, that Suneta was I” (Kosa., ix. 271). Because the five skhandhas change, it can only be the “person” (pudgala) or self who makes the Buddha and Suneta identical (Conze, p.126). The Puggalavadins claim that they avoid from three errors (i) of ‘absolute identity’ between the self and the skhandhas, (ii) of ‘absolute difference’ between them, and (iii) of an unconditional denial of the self. Their position is that ‘not to take the lead of absolute difference is not to follow heresy’ (Sammitiya Nikaya Sastra, p.183).

The Puggalavadins ‘conception of puggala’ is somewhat different from Strawson's concept of person, which is primitive and irreducible in relation to either the mind or body (Strawson, 1959, pp.102-103). Like the Puggalavadins, Shoemaker attempts to establish ‘person’ as a higher concept than ‘human being’ (Shoemaker, 1971, pp.7, 237). The ‘puggala’ differs from both the ‘purusa of the Samkhya’ and ‘Atman of the Advaita’ which are identified with consciousness. But the ‘puggala’ can be compared with Atman of the Nyaya and of the Vaisesika; that is, the Atman is the person who is the doer of karma, the receiver of its result and the wanderer in samsara (Conze, pp.127-128). The self or soul which is admitted by the Yogacaras under the name of Alaya-vijnana is also similar to the puggala fundamentally. It should be mentioned here that no Buddhist schools can possibly admit the definite assertible self, a position that would go against the fundamental teachings of the Buddha. The Puggalavadins

conception of self is, therefore, neither definite nor indefinite. According to the schools of Buddhism:

Life is personal continuity that performs at least two functions of a self in that: (i) each continuity is separate from others, and (ii) is constantly there, though 'impermanent'. The Buddhist rejects a self, which runs like a single thread through a string of pearls. There are only the pearls, and no thread to hold them together. But the collection of the pearls is one and the same because they are strictly continuous without any interval between. (Ibid., 132).

Therefore, the personal continuities of the Sthavira school are 'the continuous flow of causality through the threadless pearls'. The Theravada school postulates the theory of 'a life-continuum'(bhavanga). The idea of "the continuous existence of a very subtle consciousness" belongs to the Sautrantikas. And the Mahasanghikas had a "basic (mula) consciousness" as the personal continuities. Although they are different in names, nonetheless they indicate the same meaning.

2.2.4.2. The Conditioned and Unconditioned Self

According to the Sammitiya, the state of extinction has two meanings, of which one is the extinction in the case of the wise who realise Nirvana, and the other is the extinction in the transition from one span of life to another, as in the case of the ordinary people when they die. From the standpoint of the extinction, the Puggalavadins further distinguish the self into two kinds, of which one is the conditioned self that is the self-conscious organism known as "the self-conscious seed of personal life" or the dynamic unity of the five skandhas. That is not true self, for it is subject to suffering by undergoing birth and death. This is itself called suffering due to its constituting of suffering; this conditioned self is sometimes known as consciousness (vijñāna). The other, the unconditioned self "whose characters are devoid of birth and death" (Sammitiya Nikaya Sastra, p.184), is the true self. "It is the state of immovable joy, and there is no more the state of receiving the

skandhas" (Ibid., p.174). The first kind is the 'non-self' called 'the divided self'; and the second is the 'true-self' called 'the undivided self'. The conditioned self becomes extinct when the forces of ignorance that constitute it are extinguished through the realization of Nirvana, but the unconditioned self does not extinguish with the extinction of the conditioned. The Puggalavadins maintain that samsara is endless and full of suffering because of misconception of the conditioned for the conditioned self. This amounts to saying that the unconditioned self is immortal and is fully obtained by the realization of Nirvana together with the extinction of life. The Sammitiyas maintain that this is what the Buddha wanted to show when he said that "man seizes *trsna* as his second and dwell for long in birth and death when *trsna* becomes extinct, there is never more this turning in the wheel of birth and death (Ibid., p.179), and as the *dukkha* is destroyed and the stream of *asravas* is put an end to, one reaches the Nirvana with residues. Then his body still continues to be, and at that time one is said to cross over to that shore and abide there. Only at the time of realizing the residueless Nirvana does one realize the immovable joy" (Ibid., p.181). According to the Puggalavada, the conditioned self is not external, but the external is the unconditioned self which is not denied by the Buddha. The Puggalavadins postulate the external self to solve the problem of Karma and rebirth. That is, while early Buddhism maintains that both empirical truth and ultimate truth (or to use the Puggalavada terminology, the conditioned self and the unconditioned self) are not self, the Puggalavadins consider them as the self. They firmly assert that 'the Buddha did not deny the self itself. In the case of the conditioned self, what the Buddha denied was unconditionedness, and in the case of the unconditioned self, what the Buddha denied was conditionedness' (Venkataramanan, p.280). The conditioned self undergoes birth and death in accordance with its karma which is caused by *trsna*. The unconditioned self, i.e. the state of immovable joy, can be reached after the realization of Nirvana and the extinction of the life-span. This idea earns the Puggalavadins the name 'heretics within the fold'. Edward

Conze remarks that the Puggalavadins' main crime consisted in acting like the boy who honestly said that the emperor had no clothes on everyone else knew that this was so, but pretended that it was not. He further observes: "It may be that the Puggalavadin theory was so universally rejected because it was based on a fundamental misconception of the purpose and function of Buddhist philosophy" (Conze, p.131). Conze seems to agree with Candrakīrti who has shown that under certain circumstances it may be useful to teach that there is a self, under others that there is none, under others again that there is neither a self nor a not-self, like the Buddha who when asked by Vacchagotta refused to commit himself on the question of the existence of the self. Because in the context of salvational practices, an absolute 'is' or 'is not' is useless and misleading (Prasannapada by Candrakīrti quoted in Conze, p.130). For my part, to uphold the Buddha's words 'all Dhammas are not- self' is always right according to his purpose.

3. Concluding Remarks and Comparison

The conclusion as a remark will be emphasized on the standpoint of Theravāda as all schools of Theravāda Buddhism centered on the concept of realism. The analysis of the being into five khandhas, on the one hand, and twelve āyatanas, on the other, is only for investigation and comprehension of the true nature of beings. The five khandhas and twelve āyatanas do not function in isolation in the way we have described. But we have discussed them in isolating one from another in order to comprehend their relative positions that constitute personality. We may briefly point out here that the personality can be viewed both in its synthetic and analytical aspects. When the four elements (mahabhūtarūpas) and the five khandhas take place, then we synthetically understand man. But when we analytically separate the constituents from one another, then the so-called personality disappears. The personality is constituted by nama and rūpa, and is in a state of flux. It is subject to the three characteristics of anicca, dukkha and anatta. The Buddha in his discourse on khandhas and

ayatanas, presented in the khandhavagga (SN, III. 1-36), and salayatanavagga (SN, IV. 1-6), characterized all the five khandhas and twelve ayatanas transitory in nature. The attachment to these khandhas and ayatanas can hardly yield anything but suffering. The only escape from suffering, the Buddha recommends, is renunciation of ignorance, desire and attachment that rule over the domain of khandhas and ayatanas. In studying nama and rupa, the following points should be brought into our notice. Theravada Buddhism cannot be called materialism, because the materialists, like the Carvakas and Ajita Kesakambala hold that the reality is one, that is, matter, the so-called mind or consciousness is the only product resulting from the proportional combination of matter ⁴. Unlike materialism, the Buddhist philosophy in the conventional sense admits the reality of both matter and consciousness. The consciousness or mind (citta) does not occur because of the mixture between the four elements, hence it does not disappear merely because of the dissolution of them. Buddhism cannot be called annihilationism (ucchedavada) either, because it accepts the doctrine of rebirth. However, by accepting the reality of citta, Buddhism cannot be regarded as idealism, which upholds only the existence of mind. For example, the idealists such as the Vijnanavadins of Yogacara Buddhism assert that matter is nothing but as idea that is created by citta; mind alone exists, and the external world does not exist at all (Chatterjee, 1987, p. 45). The Western idealist, Berkeley, said that to be is to be perceived, i.e. the existence of matter depends on the perception of citta⁵. Theravada Buddhist philosophy is not idealism, because it holds that matter and form really exist outside consciousness or name. This is tantamount to saying that no matter, whether citta thinks of it as such or not, it is still present in the external world; matter is independent of the awareness of citta or viññana. Another thing is that though the Theravada Buddhist philosophy accepted the reality of both consciousness (citta) and matter (vatthu) known as nama and rupa, it is not dualism which holds that both mind and matter are real substances, that they equally exist, and are independent

of each other. René Descartes is a dualist. And he laid down that mind and body are two independent substances.

The clear and distinct perception of the external world shows that it is extended. But extension is known only through our ideas of it (Mayer, pp.115, 117; Walsh, n.d., p.50). Matter has an extension for its nature of extension. The problem that cannot be solved in Descartes' dualism is how matter and mind that categorically differ from each other relate to each other. The Theravada Buddhist philosophy does not face this problem, for it holds that *nama*-and-*rupa* or mind-and-matter are not permanent, they always change in accordance with Tilakkhana. Moreover, *nama* and *rupa* dependently originate according to the doctrine of dependent origination. *Nama* arises dependent on *rupa* and *rupa* on *nama*, and their functions go on dependently just like the boat and the boatman, the lame and the blind and the sound and the drum (Vism., 595, 596, 597; Visuddhi., III. 217,218,219). It is beautifully explained with a comparison of a marionette (*daruyanta*) in the Visuddhimagga thus:

Just as marionette is void, soulless and without curiosity, and while it walks and stands merely through the combination of strings and wood, yet it seems as if it had curiosity and interestedness, so too, this mentality-materiality is void, soulless and without curiosity, and while it walks and stands merely through the combination of the two together, yet it seems as if it had curiosity and interestedness. (Vism., 594, 595; Visuddhi., III. 216)

In India, the Samkhya is also known as a typical representative of dualism just as does Cartesianism in the West. According to the Samkhya, there are two categories, *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* that are different from each other. The former is conceived to be 'matter', while the latter to be 'consciousness'. It also differentiates mind from consciousness, by regarding mind (*antahkarana*) as the product of *prakṛti*. The relation between the self or consciousness and the mind is not rationally conceived by the Samkhya. If the *puruṣa* is infinite (*vibhu*), as mentioned by the Samkhya, how can it come into contact with a particular mind in exclusion to other minds?

The purusa is immaterial; if so, how can it be reflected in the mind or any aspect of it? Whereas the Samkhya regards both prakṛti and puruṣa as external and unconditioned, in the view of Buddhist philosophy both matter and mind are ever-changing and conditioned. In Buddhism, the terms "mind" and "consciousness" are one and the same, and there is no permanent entity that transcends them. The Buddhists have no problem in explaining the relation between nama and rupa as mentioned earlier. Moreover, according to the theory of relation (paccaya), consciousness is related to matter by way of pacchajata-paccaya (the relation of post-existence), and matter to consciousness by means of purejata-paccaya (the relation of pre-existence). That is, consciousness and its psychic factors arise after the arising of the body and the sense-organs and their objects must exist prior to the arising of consciousness. Therefore, consciousness in Buddhist Philosophy is the knowledge of the objects. Jainism, like Cartesianism and the Samkhya, advocates dualism, i.e. the doctrine of jiva and ajiva. Jiva or soul, according to Jainism, is in its pure existence all-conscious. But it is made unconscious by the covering of karma-puggala (the particles of matter). Jainism regards karma as matter that always binds the soul, hence Jainism always worries about freeing the soul from karma by self-mortification more than by the moral cultivation of soul. But unlike Jainism, Buddhism accepts karma as the state of mind, not that of the matter. There is no permanent soul, only the combination of nama and rupa that are related to karma (kammappaccaya). Buddhism regards karma as the co-existent state of nama and rupa, and it can be removed by the practice of insight.

The Theravada Buddhist philosophy is not materialism or dualism, but realism in the sense that it recognizes the reality of consciousness and the external objects independent of their cognitions. It believes in the reality of consciousness and the reality of external world, but not in their permanence like dualism. Buddhism admits the reality of momentary consciousness and the objects. Consciousness is consciousness of the object (arammanam cintetiti cittam), (DhsA., 63). It

occurs dependent on the objects; without the objects consciousness cannot arise. As stated earlier, through the contact between sense organs and their corresponding objects arises consciousness. Consciousness, according to the realistic Buddhist philosophy, is not substance because the substantial thing will endure permanently by itself, but consciousness always undergoes change and it is impermanent and changes every moment, that is, it is subject to the law of Tilakkhana. According to the Theravada Buddhist philosophy, not only consciousness but also matter arises and perishes every moment. The duration of matter in each moment lasts longer than that of consciousness, namely, the seventeen moments of consciousness is equivalent to a mere single moment of matter (tani pana sattarasa cittakkhanani rupadhammanamaya), (Sangha., 20). The moment of consciousness is called consciousness-stream. Apart from the ever-flowing mental stream, there is no soul which subsists as an unchanging entity. Like the modern psychologists, the Buddhists are concerned only with the ever-changing process of body and mind. But unlike the former, the latter holds that the flow of mental activities (cetanakamma) do not come at an end at the time of the death of the body. Residual effect of the past karmas are potentially present in the form of sankharas at every moment of consciousness-stream. With the denial of permanence of mind and matter, the Theravada Buddhist philosophy is, therefore, opposed to that of Puggalavada; Vijnanavada; and especially Upanisads which hold the permanence of soul known as Atman. As is mentioned earlier, the Buddha rejects the soul for the reason that its existence cannot be proved by means of experience, both mundane and supermundane. It is understood that the Buddha's position is similar to that of the empiricist or experientialist.

Hume, like the Buddha, rejects the existence of soul or self after analysing the notion of personal identity. While Hume destroys the concept of mind as set forth in Berkeley's idealism, the Buddha disproves the idea of self in the Upanisad's idealism. Hume's analysis has similarities to that of the Buddha in several respects. The concepts of "impression"

and "idea" can be compared with that of "vedana" and "sanna". The most important similarity between Hume and the Buddha is their discovery that "human reason is the slave of the passions" (Jacobson, p.164). The Buddha concentrates on human beings and finds nothing but the ever-changing elements of nama and rupa, Then he concludes thus: "All recluses and brahmins who regard the soul in diverse ways, regard it as the body-mass of five khandhas based on attachment or as one of them" (SN, III. 46; The Kindred Sayings, III. 41). In the Samyutta-Nikaya, the Venerable Khemaka, when asked by Dasaka Bhikkhu whether in this five khandhas he discerns the self or anything pertaining to the self, replies thus: "In these five khandhas, friend, I discern no-self nor anything pertaining to the self" (SN, III. 137). Hume, like the Buddha, rejects the existence of the self, because he cannot discover it after reflecting upon it, what he finds is the ever-changing perception, then he concludes thus:

Setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement... there is not any single power of the soul which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment... there is no any single power of the soul which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment... there is properly no simplicity in it at one time, not identity in different, whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that, the comparison of the theatre must not mislead us, they are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind (Hume, 1896, pp. 252-253).

However, Hume fails to explain the connection among the distinct perceptions, as he confesses thus: "In short, there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent, namely, 'that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives a real connection among distinct

existences... For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding" (Ibid., p.163). Hume's dilemma was solved by the Buddha 2500 years ago by the elaborate 'Law of Relations' (paccaya), called Paticca- sumuppada, which will be stated in detail in the sequel. Hume, like the Buddha, sets aside metaphysics and contends that the self is a product of man's propensity to obsessions, or illusion (vipallasa) according to the Buddhist terminology, but the Buddha goes even further by providing its solution: "Whatever, monks, is the origin of the number of obsessions and perceptions which assail a man, if there is nothing to rejoice, to welcome, to catch hold of, this is itself an end of a propensity to attachment, to repugnance... to ignorance, this is itself an end of taking a weapon,... of lying speech". We can say that the Buddha's analysis of experience is for the purpose of eradicating that experience, while Hume intends the improvement of understanding and the sharpening of perception (Jacobson, p.163).

According to Buddhism, the personal-identity process is nothing but that of perception. The process of perception is also known as the process of rebirth. The process of rebirth is the process of name and form. To know the latter, the doctrine of Dependent Origination should be taken into account at length. It is said that the problem of personal identity is solved by the Buddha with the help of the doctrine of Dependent Origination.

NOTES

1. Dr.N.C.Padhi, in his book entitled *Karma and Freedom*, (pp. 241-269), remarks that 'determinism is a mere abstraction of science and is not a necessary basis of the human affairs in general and their moral behaviour in particular' (p.243), and fatalism originated due to the accomodation of the idea of supreme dispenser of justice in the conceptual framework of the karma doctrine.'(p.249).
2. Kosa., v.24; See also H. Nakamura, "*Analysis of the Individual Existence by Way of Buddhist Psychology*", (*Freedom, Progress & Society*), p.230.
3. T.M.P. Mahadevan, *Invitation to Indian Philosophy*, p. 134, where he said: "A section of the Sarvastivadins in Kashmir elected to follow the Vibhasas ; therefore, they came to be called Vaibhasikas".
4. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, I. pp. 275-279; A.L. Basham, *History and Doctrines of the Ajvikas*, pp.15, 17, where Ajita Kesakambala was believed to be the forerunner of the later Carvakas.
5. Will Durant, *The Story of Philosophy*, (New York: Pocket Books, 1953), p.257; D.M. Datta, *Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 251; Y.Masih, *A Critical History of Modern Philosophy* (Delhi: MB, 1983), pp. 171-172; John Hospers, *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis*, p.507.

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N.B. Some original texts in Pali will not be quoted here, because they are popular already.