

The Justification of Religious Pluralism

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We are living in an age which both globalization and multiculturalism have been of interest among nations and different groups of people. While some people have a tendency to welcome globalization which searches for the common ground, others agree to multiculturalism which emphasizes diverse cultural identities. In other words, globalization seems to seek one whereas multiculturalism seems to seek many. Huntington in his book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* believes that the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, conflict and war in the contemporary world are being shaped by different cultural identities. He wrote:

In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural. Peoples and nations are attempting to answer the most basic question humans can face: who are we? And they are answering that question in the traditional way human be-

ings have answered it, by reference to the things that mean most to them. People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, and institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations, and, at the broadest level, civilizations. People use politics not just to advance their interests but also to define their identity. We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against.¹

Religion is considered as one of the most important factors of cultural identities and civilizations. Religion is a force which has always played an important role in the history of humankind. If the Third World War happens, how can religion avoid its responsibility? Religion is more important than language in terms of cultural identities as Huntington put it, "Language is second only to religion as a factor distinguishing people of one culture from those of another."²

In this paper I defend that religious pluralism is an appropriate way to peace in the global age.

I US -vs- Them

Both the East and the West agree with the statement that "we know who we are only when we know who we are not." In chapter two of *Tao Te Ching* Lao Tzu said, "If all on earth acknowledge the beautiful as beautiful, then thereby the ugly is already posited. If all on earth acknowledge the good as good, then thereby is the non-good already posited."³ We know light when contrastive to darkness, white when contrastive to black, and vice versa. We know we are Christians, Muslims, Hindus, or Buddhists only when we know that we are not non-Christians, non-Muslims, non-Hindus, or non-Buddhists. Huntington also remarked, "...the tendency to think in terms of two worlds recurs throughout human history. People are always tempted to divide people into us and them, the in-group and the other, our civilization and those barbarians."⁴

If the East and the West make a distinction in the same way, then what makes them different in their way of thinking? Different kinds of

logic, I think, make them different. The West has been influenced by Aristotelian logic whereas the East has adopted the logic of dipolarity. Among the three laws of the Aristotelian logic, the Law of the Excluded Middle may be considered as the most fundamental because the other two laws can be reduced into it. Hence we may say that in Aristotelian logic the Law of the Excluded Middle is the most fundamental. If the West is influenced by Aristotelian logic, then it is surely influenced by the Law of the Excluded Middle. What does the Law of the Excluded Middle say? It says that either p or not-p is true, not both. Is this law helpful? Certainly, it is. Here we may think the same way as Husserl did with the scientific method. For Husserl, the scientific method is surely helpful, but the attitude toward the scientific method can be very harmful. The Law of the Excluded Middle inevitably leads us to reductionism. Reductionism will surely make us highlight and appreciate only things we consider as true, good, rational, centered, and so on. Unsurprisingly, for the West, knowledge, for example, is always defined as justified true beliefs. We can find the evidence from Plato's *Theaetetus* to A. J. Ayer's *The Problem of Knowledge* and Edmund Gettier's article "*Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?*" After the terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001, in his speech President Bush made clear to the whole world, "Either you are with us or with them?" This clearly demonstrates the Law of the Excluded Middle because there is no place for "both...and" and "neither...nor." The logic of dipolarity, on the other hand, is based on, we may call, the Law of Complimentarity. This law is fundamentally different from the Law of the Excluded Middle because it gives place to "either...or," "both...and," and "neither...nor." This is the reason why for the East, knowledge includes both truths and errors. In Thailand there is a proverb saying, "Errors are teachers." This implies that Thai people appreciate errors as much as they appreciate truths. However, what I am saying here does not imply that all Westerners overlook and ignore errors and failures. People like C. G. Jung, Ralph Waldo Emerson or even Zig Ziglar never overlook and ignore errors and failures, and knowledge for them includes both truths and errors. What I am saying is that the overconfident attitude toward the Law of the Excluded Middle can be very harmful. People who have acquired this kind of attitude will overlook and ignore all things they consider untrue, evil, ugly, irrational, marginalized, and so forth. Recently, Francis Fukuyama wrote his article "US-vs-Them" in The Washington Post on Wednesday, September 11, 2002. He said:

A year after Sept. 11, one of the most notable features of international politics is how the United States has become both utterly dominant and lonely. There was a large, spontaneous outpouring of support for the United States and for Americans around the world after Sept. 11. But with the demonstration of American military superiority that came with the rousing of al Qaeda and the Taliban from Afghanistan, and President Bush's doctrine of preemption against the "axis of evil" powers, new expressions of anti-Americanism began to pour forth. Americans are largely innocent of the fact that much of the rest of the world believes that it is American power, and not terrorists with weapons of mass destruction, that is destabilizing the world. And nowhere are these views more firmly held than among America's European allies.⁵

Fukuyama's article had been written before the United States attacked Iraq. With the attitude of the Law of the Excluded Middle, the emphasis is always put on one side, not both. At first it may begin with "the West or the rest," and then finally it may be just only "the US or the rest." Fukuyama may be right when he said:

The United States fought the Cold War as the leader of Western democracies with shared values and institutions. What is going on here? Does the "West" still exist as a meaningful concept? In my view, deep differences are emerging among Western democracies on the subject of democratic legitimacy at an international level - differences that will be highly neuralgic in America's dealings with the world in the coming years.⁶

II. The Ultimate Reality: One or Many

The problem of one and many seems to be as old as philosophy itself. Is the real one or many? Some say one while others say many. From our sense experience, it appears obvious that there are many things in the world, both things made by man such as computers, airplanes, roads, books, songs, and so forth and natural things like trees, birds, stones, mountains,

rivers, forests, and so on. It seems certain that, from our sense experience, the real is many. In other words, the real is a plurality. Can our sense experience deceive us? As we all know, the answer to this question will be certainly affirmative. Some people may continue asking, "Why not?" We can be mistaken by our sense experience. For example, we always observe that the sun moves from the east to the west. This makes us feel that the sun moves around the earth. In fact, it is the earth that moves around the sun. A more interesting question to be raised is: Does our sense experience deceive or mislead us? Sometimes yes, and sometimes no. If our sensations are sometimes trustworthy and sometimes not, then what should we do with them? Should we throw all sensations away and never trust them at all? If we do so, we would "throw away the baby with the bathed water." Surprisingly, we have found from the history of philosophy that quite a few philosophers did so.

Now if we turn to use our reason to speculate, we can imagine that the ultimate reality is one, and also that it is many. For example, we can imagine that the reality is one as mind or one as matter, or one as both mind and matter. However, no matter it is mind or body, it can be many like many souls or many atoms. A question that can be raised here is: Can our reason deceive us? The answer would be yes. We can find the evidence from Zeno's paradox which involves a race between *Achilles and a tortoise*. From this paradox, it is obvious that pure reason does deceive us. If pure reason can and does deceive us sometimes, then should we never trust it at all? Again, if we do so, we will not escape from "throwing away the baby with the bathed water."

Since either sense experience or pure reason can and does deceive us sometimes, either of them cannot be the only trustworthy foundation in epistemology. If we apply the Aristotelian Law of the Excluded Middle here, we will see the problem clearly.

Either sense experience or pure reason.

Not sense experience.

Therefore, pure reason.

or

Either sense experience or pure reason

Not pure reason.

Therefore, sense experience.

Even though these two syllogisms are valid according to the Law of Disjunctive Syllogism, their answers do not help us solve problems in epistemology. No matter we choose pure reason or sense experience, it will not help. In other words, either of empiricism and rationalism is not sufficient in solving epistemological problems. We need both sense experience and pure reason to solve such problems. If we follow the Aristotelian Law of the Excluded Middle, we are forced to choose either pure reason or sense experience, and not both. Therefore, if we need both of them, we have to transcend the Aristotelian Law of the Excluded Middle. As a matter of fact, in our daily lives, we do not use the so-called law in all contexts. We use it in some situations, and we do not use it in others. The Eastern way of thinking, for example the Buddhist logic of non-attachment, cares for each particular situation, so it is always flexible. If a waiter asks a Buddhist, "Tea or coffee?" it is always possible for him or her to say "Neither" or "Both." Not just only "Tea" or "Coffee" as the Aristotelian Law of the Excluded Middle requires us to choose. What I am saying here is not that the Aristotelian Law of the Excluded Middle is wrong. I am just saying that this law, like all others, is limited, and that it should be applied in some contexts and situations only, not in all cases. As I mentioned before, the overconfident attitude toward it can be very harmful. I think Derrida recognizes this problem of the Westerners quite well when he attacks the metaphysics of presence and logocentrism through his deconstructive reading or the logic of deconstruction. If we transcend the Aristotelian Law of the Excluded Middle and welcome both sense experience and pure reason, then we may confront another question, "Are they sufficient for our epistemological framework?" I think they are not sufficient. However, we will consider this problem in the next section. Now let us turn to the metaphysical problem of one and many.

If the Aristotelian Law of the Excluded Middle can be transcended or put aside, then we do not have to choose just only one thing between one and many. In other words, we can think of the problem of one and many not just only in terms of "one **or** many" but also in terms of "one **and** many." That is to say, **both** the ultimate reality as one **and** the ultimate reality as many are true. In mathematics we have learned that one is less than many, and that many are more than one. In ontology, it goes on the

opposite way. Ontologically speaking, one is more and larger than many, and many are less and smaller than one. One and many are interrelated in the sense of holism, not in the sense of reductionism. For reductionists, one can be equivalent to many, just like water is equivalent to H_2O . For holists, one or the whole is more than the sum of its parts (which are actually smaller wholes). Thus according to holism, water is more than H_2O . We cannot reduce water into H_2O without losing something. Let us consider a chair as an example. For reductionists, on the one hand, the chair is no more than, say, thousands of atoms. For them, the chair is equivalent to the total sum of atoms. For holists, on the other hand, the chair cannot be reduced into the total sum of atoms without losing something. It is true that the number of the atoms that comprise the chair will not change even though the chair is cut into pieces, but we will not call those pieces a chair any more. If we reduce the chair into atoms, we will lose some properties (like we can sit on or stand on it to get something out of reach), structures, relations among atoms, and a concept of a chair. Hence, for holists, the chair is more than the sum of its parts in this sense.

In the Western traditions Whitehead and Hartshorne made a great effort on the relations between the One and the many. Both Whitehead and Hartshorne consider the One as God who is dipolar. God is a social or compound person who has both an abstract pole and a concrete pole. His concrete pole includes the world and everything in it. In this sense we can say that the One includes the many. In other words, the many are in the One. However, the One and the many are not equivalent. If the One and the many are identical, then God and nature will be the same. Whitehead and Hartshorne are different from Spinoza who considers that God and nature are identical. Thus according to Whitehead, Hartshorne and the panentheists, God is the One whose concrete or consequent nature includes everything from galaxies to protons. If these people are correct, **both** the One **and** the many are true together. The metaphysical problem of one and many is no more a matter of "either...or." It can be solved through the logic of "both...and" as Whitehead put it:

Thus the consequent nature of God is composed of a multiplicity of elements with individual self-realization. It is just as much a multiplicity as it is a unity; it is just as much one immediate fact as it is an unresting advance beyond itself. Thus the actuality of God must also be understood as a multiplicity of actual components in process of creation. This is God in his function of the kingdom of heaven.⁷

III. Religious Experience and Religious Language

Are sense experience and pure reason sufficient for our epistemological framework? Empiricism considers sense experience (facts) as the foundation of knowledge whereas rationalism considers pure reason (logic). It seems that for both empiricists and rationalists, on the one hand, they use “either...or” between sense experience and pure reason. However, the realists, on the other hand, think that we need both sense experience and pure reason, and that both of them are not sufficient for epistemological framework. For the realists, intuition is needed for the argument for the existence of the external world. To argue for the existence of the external world which can exist independently, we need to “neglect” or transcend ourselves otherwise we could not imagine the world that can exist even before we and our ancestors were born and came into the world. Intuition is a matter of degree. In Buddhism, one can acquire the highest intuition or enlightenment only through practice. As Koller put it:

Following the Way is difficult. It is, indeed, so difficult that it has not yet been mastered by the discipline and self-control of the majority of humankind. Consequently, it should be kept in mind that there is all the difference in the world between *following* the Way and *talking* about following the Way. To follow the Way there is no substitute for practice. In fact, without practicing the Way, it is unlikely that one will even achieve a satisfactory intellectual understanding of what the Way is.⁸

Thus sense experience (facts) and pure reason (logic) are not sufficient for our epistemological framework. We need also other faculty, namely, intuition. Intuition helps us prove not only the existence of the external world, but also the existence of the Ultimate Reality. While we experience the external world through our senses, we experience the Ultimate Reality through our hearts. I would say that we experience the *same* Ultimate Reality through our religious experience. Even though we experience the *same* Ultimate Reality, we have *different* kinds of religious experience. Why so? Because one can understand one's own religious experience in terms of one's own language. We are always "thrown" into- to use Wittgenstein's term- some certain *form of life*. Each form of life has its own "*language game*." There are many forms of life, so it follows that there are many language games. Whenever we try to understand our religious experience, we need to understand it through our language games. Since all language games are different on account of different rules, it follows that our religious experience is different even though we experience the *same* Ultimate Reality. Moreover, the Ultimate reality itself means a *group* of qualities. This also makes our religious experience different. Hence James is correct when he wrote,

Ought it to be assumed that in all men the mixture of religion with other elements should be identical? Ought it, indeed, to be assumed that the lives of all men should show identical religious elements? In other words, is the existence of so many religious types and sects and creeds regrettable? To these questions I answer "No" emphatically. And my reason is that I do not see how it is possible that creatures in such different positions and with such different powers as human individuals are, should have exactly the same functions and the same duties. No two of us have identical difficulties, nor should we be expected to work out identical solutions. Each, from his peculiar angle of observation, takes in a certain sphere of fact and trouble, which each must deal with in a unique manner. One of us must soften himself, another must harden himself; one must yield a point, another must stand firm, -in order the

better to defend the position assigned him. If an Emerson were forced to be a Wesley, or a Moody forced to be a Whitman, the total human consciousness of the divine would suffer. The divine can mean no single quality, it must mean a group of qualities, by being champions of which in alternation, different men may all find worthy missions.⁹

In summary, **both** religious experience **and** religious language are different from one form of life to another.

IV. Exclusivism and Inclusivism

We live in the same world, and we are under or “included” in the *same* Ultimate Reality. Although we experience the *same* world and the same Ultimate Reality, we experience them *differently* because of our different language games and of the varieties of the qualities. Both the external world and the Ultimate Reality are- to use Locke’s words- “*something I know not what*.” The external world as “*something I know not what*” can be experienced differently by our five senses through our different language games. In other words, to understand the external world, we can use our empirical approaches. However, we cannot use our empirical approaches to experience or understand the Ultimate Reality as “*something I know not what*.” We use our hearts instead of our five senses. Our hearts make us feel religious experience. Religious experience is *existential* or *phenomenological* in the sense that we can and do feel it in our life. A question that can be raised here is whether our religious experience is “sufficient” to prove the existence of the Ultimate Reality as “*something I know not what*” which exists independently from our hearts. Religious experience is not sufficient to do so because religious experience is just an emotional response. Apart from the phenomenological approach, we need the *ontological* method to recognize the existence of the Ultimate Reality. Tillich made it clear as he wrote:

... the inductive way...can lead only to a finite part of the universe of finite objects through observation and conclusion. But the intention of every religious symbol is point to that

which transcends finitude. Nothing finite, no part of the universe of finite relations can be the referent of religious symbols, and, therefore, no inductive method can reach it...The phenomenological approach describes the holy as a quality of some encounters with reality...But it cannot go beyond the description. Phenomenology cannot raise the question of the validity of the phenomena it makes visible. The other way of reaching the referent of religious symbolism is the ontological one. It analyzes the kind of being man is, in interdependence with his world. It analyzes the finitude of the finite in different directions, it points to the anxiety which is connected with the awareness of one's finitude, and it raises the question of being-itself, the *prius* of everything that is. This approach tries to find the referent of religious symbolism not in a particular experience, that of the holy and of the ultimate concern implied in the holy, but it tries to find it in the character of being as such, in everything that is. ¹⁰

All religions share at least one common belief, that is, one can never reach the Ultimate Reality except through practice. But practices and norms are different from one religion to another on account of different forms of life and language games. Thus how can one say that one religion or one way is correct and that other religions or ways are wrong? It is not surprising that we have learned from the history of many religions that many people believed in and adopted the exclusivistic thesis. Many Christians are familiar with the exclusivistic thesis: There is no salvation outside the Church. They adopt the attitude of this sort probably because of Jesus Christ's sayings "I am the Way; I am Truth and Life. No one can come to the Father except through me." ¹¹ From these sayings, they may interpret that no one can attain salvation except through the Christian Church. But if they consider Jesus Christ on the Last Judgement, they would lose their confidence in exclusivism. The Last Judgement is described as follows:

When the Son of man comes in his glory, escorted by all the angels, then he will take his seat on his throne of glory. All nations will be assembled before him and he will separate

people one from another as the shepherd separates sheep from goats. He will place the sheep on his right and the goats on his left. Then the King will say to those on his right hand, "Come, you whom my Father has blessed, take as your heritage the kingdom prepared for you since the foundation of the world. For I was hungry and you gave me food, I was thirsty and you gave me drink, I was a stranger and you made me welcome, lacking clothes and you clothed me, sick and you visited me, in prison and you came to see me." Then the upright will say to him in reply, "Lord, when did we see you hungry and feed you, or thirsty and give you drink? When did we see you a stranger and make you welcome, lacking clothes and clothe you? When did we find you sick or in prison and go to see you?" And the King will answer, In truth I tell you, in so far as you did this to one of the least of these brothers of mine, you did it to me. Then he will say to those on his left hand, "Go away from me, with your curse upon you, to the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels. For I was hungry and you never gave me food, I was thirsty and you never gave me anything to drink, I was a stranger and you never made me welcome, lacking clothes and you never clothed me, sick and in prison and you never visited me." Then it will be their turn to ask, "Lord, when did we see you hungry or thirsty, a stranger or lacking clothes, sick or in prison, and did not come to your help?" Then he will answer, "In truth I tell you, in so far as you neglected to do this to one of the least of these, you neglected to do it to me." And they will go away to eternal punishment, and the upright to eternal life.¹²

Exclusivism has no place in the present world, so some people may turn to inclusivism instead. An inclusivist may say, "All religions are good and can be included in mine." What is wrong with the attitude of inclusivism? It seems that ,at first glance, inclusivism looks suitable for the present world because people who hold it are generous in the sense that they welcome all other religions different from their own. However, as a

matter of fact, these people hold their religion as the central text and consider other religions as its chapters. This kind of attitude will inevitably lead to conflict and violence at the end. It cannot pave the way for peaceful co-existence. Can exclusivism or inclusivism lead us to authentic dialogue? **Neither** of them can. For people who have the exclusivistic attitude, they have no dialogue in their minds. What they have in their minds is just evangelism. Since they believe that their way is the only true way, they are not ready to listen to others. Thus dialogue plays no role for those who believe in exclusivism. Now when we turn to inclusivism, we may feel that people who have this kind of attitude seem to be prepared for dialogue. However, since deep into their hearts they believe that their way is somewhat superior to other ways, their dialogue is frequently ended with quarrels and conflicts.

V. Religious Pluralism and Authentic Dialogue

Neither exclusivism nor inclusivism is appropriate for the present world. Then what else should be our choice? My answer to this question is religious pluralism.

We have to accept the truth that none of us were born all alone. All of us were born in *different* cultures in the *same* external world. We cannot understand the external world as “*something I know not what*” without some certain form of life and some certain language game. Each form of life has its own norms and criteria. We cannot find any *neutral* or *universal* norm or criterion that can measure all forms of life. Our criteria and norms are always *relative* to our own form of life. Thus it is unjust or even impossible to use our own criteria to judge other forms of life different from our own. To use Kuhn’s term, all different forms of life are “*incommensurable*.” Thus it is obvious that the exclusivists and the inclusivists have no just ground to evaluate other religions. If all forms of life and language games are different and incommensurable, how can they say that only their way is the true way and that their way is superior to other ways?

Religious pluralists accept the fact that there are many forms of life on earth, and that these forms of life are different and incommensurable in the sense that they cannot be evaluated without referring to certain *particular* criteria which belong to a *particular* form of life. For them, it is

unjust or even impossible to use the rules of basketball to judge soccer, and vice versa. The religious pluralists always recognize that even though we live in the *same* world and under the *same* Ultimate Reality, we have *different* religious experience and *different* religious language because we live in *different* forms of life. As Hick put it:

All human beings have been influenced by the culture of which they are a part and have received, or have developed in their appropriation of it, certain deep interpretative tendencies which help to form their experience and are thus continually confirmed within it. We see evidence of such deep “sets” at work when we observe that mystics formed by Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, Muslim, and Jewish religious cultures report distinctively different forms of experience. Thus, far from it being the case that they all undergo an identical experience but report it in different religious languages, it seems more probable that they undergo characteristically different unitive experiences (even though with important common features), the differences being due to the conceptual frameworks and meditational disciplines supplied by the religious traditions in which they participate.¹³

Then how can we arrive at religious pluralism? First of all, we need to respect other religions as rational in their own contexts or forms of life. There is no way for us to judge the rationality of other forms of life in so far as we are outsiders. We need to assume that all people are rational, and that most (if not all) of their norms and practices are rational otherwise they would not survive. Second, we need to understand that even though we are different, we are, more or less, interdependent on one another. This kind of understanding will help us see the limits of the Aristotelian Law of the Excluded Middle. In our life we do not need to use “either...or” in all situations. We are free to use “either...or,” “both...and,” or “neither...nor” in different situations and different contexts. Third, we need to practice, practice and practice. If we follow the Way faithfully, then we will transcend all diversities and differences. We will be able to see one in many and many

in one.

If we acquire the attitude of religious pluralism, then we will be prepared for authentic dialogue. Buddhadasa suggested three missions which can lead us to true dialogue. First, one should understand other religions. Second, one should arrive at the essence of one's own religion. Third, all of us should get together in detaching sensual pleasures and defeating materialism.¹⁴ If we sincerely believe in religious pluralism, then our dialogue with believers of other religions will be certainly authentic. Authentic dialogue will lead us to happiness and peaceful co-existence. Adopting religious pluralism does not prevent people from evangelism. The point to keep in mind is that evangelism should be done through authentic dialogue. After having interreligious dialogue, it is the task of the Holy Spirit whether He would like to inspire people to convert or not. I believe that authentic dialogue is always fruitful. Unlike in businesses, in religions there are no patents, copy rights or trademarks. We are always wholeheartedly willing to share our religious experiences and beliefs. Thus I am never reluctant to say that I am a Catholic by tradition, a Protestant by Spirit, and a Buddhist by the way of thinking. I see nothing wrong with this kind of "Three in One and One in Three." I do not feel like Huntington when he wrote, "A person can be half-French and half-Arab and simultaneously even a citizen of two countries. It is more difficult to be half-Catholic and half-Muslim."¹⁵ This sounds very much influenced by Aristotelian logic, namely, the logic of non-compromising dualism.

Endnotes

- 1 Huntington, Samuel P., *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, (New York: Touchstone Book, 1997) p. 21.
- 2 Ibid., p. 70.
- 3 Lao Tzu, *Tao Te Ching*, the Richard Wilhelm Edition, (London: Arkana, 1985) p. 27.
- 4 Huntington, op. cit., p. 32.
- 5 See Fukuyama, Francis, "US vs. Them" in *The Washington Post* on Wednesday, September 11, 2002, p. A17.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 Whitehead, Alfred, *Process and Reality*, corrected edition, ed. By David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne, (New York: The Free Press, 1979) p. 350.
- 8 Koller, John M., *Oriental Philosophies*, 2nd ed.,(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1985) p. 134.
- 9 James, William, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, (New York, Penguin Books, 1982) pp.486-7
- 10 Tillich, Paul, "The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols" (1961) in David E. Klemm, ed., *Hermeneutical Inquiry*, (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986) pp. 167-8.
- 11 See John 14:6 in *The New Jerusalem Bible*.
- 12 See Matthew 25: 31-46 in *The New Jerusalem Bible*

- 13 Hick, John, *Philosophy of Religion*, 4th ed., (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall International, Inc., 1990) p. 119.
- 14 See Buddhadasa Bhikkhu, *The Essence of Christianity that Buddhists Ought to Know*, (Bangkok: Dhammadana Foundation, 1985) p.3.
- 15 Huntington, Samuel P., *The Clash of Civilizations: The Debate, Foreign Affairs*, 1993, p.27.