



CHULARAJMONTRI : A RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION  
AMIDST THAI SOCIAL CHANGES

Ms. PLUBPLUNG KONGCHANA

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
IN RELIGIOUS STUDIES

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION  
ASSUMPTION UNIVERSITY BANGKOK THAILAND

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
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## **ABSTRACT**

The Chularajmontri Shaikh Al-Islam is a religious institution for Thai Muslims. The institute holder, called Chularajmontri, assumes the responsibilities of the leader of Thai Muslims, and in the past he also assumed both military and civil institutionaldom. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, however with the Thai society being modernized, the role and duty of the Chularajmontri also underwent changes. Then there came administrative reform in 1932, the absolute monarchy has since been changed into a democracy of constitutional monarchy. The repercussion from the modernization and democratization is that though the Chularajmontri still remains the leader of Thai Muslims, secularization in it remarkably outshines its basic function as a religious institution. At the same time, Islamic world sees a trend of Islamic purification and revival movement, a desecularization. This refutes the long-held secularization theory and confirms Peter L. Berger's desecularization thesis which the researcher has made the conceptual framework of this dissertation. The thesis statement is "Thai society is currently in a struggle between secularization and desecularization, the Chularajmontri office is an appropriate organization capable of leading Thai Muslims during this secularization-vs.-desecularization era". The main objective of this research is to propose recommendations to the Chularajmontri in responding to the social changes in terms of secularization and desecularization.



The research output points out that the institution of Chularajmontri institute should return to its genuine status and function as a religious institution. In achieving that the Chularajmontri should build up charisma by conducting himself according to Islamic principle so as to set a good example for fellow Muslims. The Chularajmontri should also adjust this Islamic Institution in synch with the social changes in the aspect of secularization and desecularization in order to be truly functional as an Islamic religious institution and to make contributions to the wellbeing the whole society.



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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The Chularajmontri is the leader of Muslims in Thailand and advisor to the then Ministry of Culture over Islamic affairs. He is also the head of the Central Islamic Committees of Thailand.<sup>1</sup>

In the record which is considered a primary document by Jeremias van Vliet, a Dutch merchant, who came to reside in Ayutthaya Capital of Thailand during the mid of 17<sup>th</sup> century, there is a narration about a Siamese minister whose position was titled “Okluang Tsiut”,<sup>2</sup> then the leader of the Moors.<sup>3</sup> Okluang Tsiut as the leader the Muslim Moors then might be considered as the defacto Chularajmontri in Thai society today. And this is the evidence that the Chularajmontri is an institution in Thai society with a long history of about 400 years.

The role and function of the Chularajmontri in the beginning was the headman who took care of the Muslims who migrated from India, and those from the regions of Middle East, such as Iran, Arab, and Turkey; in addition to that he was also a head of the Right Port Department of the Ministry of Finance, where he administered trading and relationship with the nations in the western side of Siam; furthermore, he was also

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<sup>1</sup> Islamic Administrative Act 2540 B.E. (1997). In **the Royal Gazette**. volume 114, section 65 kor, Nov. 9<sup>th</sup>, 1997

<sup>2</sup> This document is titled “The Short History of the King of Siam 1640”, translated by Leonard Andaya from a transcription by Miriam J. Verkuyl – Van Den Berg, edited and introduced by David K. Wyatt. This document is reprinted in Baker, Chris; and et al. (2005). **Van Vliet’s Siam**. p. 37.

<sup>3</sup> “Moors” is what the Europeans called the Muslims in the Middle East or India; however the Muslims in North Africa are called “Saracens”.

responsible to lead the Muslim volunteer militants (Aasaa Khaek) to fight for Siam. The Chularajmontri therefore had many functions to perform, and the institute of Chularajmontri was therefore an agency of the government and therefore it changes its functions along with the development of Thai authority's administrative system. And the change in the role and function of the institute of Chularajmontri is remarkable especially when Thai society came to implement modernization institutionally during the reign of King Rama IV (1851 – 1868) and the process of modernization carries on ever since.

Up until now, the Chularajmontri assumes the role and functions according to law, namely he is the leader of Thai Muslims and regards the Islamic affairs in Thailand; he is also the advisor to the Department of Religious Affairs concerning religious support for Islam; he is also the chairperson of the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand, having duty to advise the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Education concerning Islam.

In the state that the Chularajmontri has the role of the leader of the Thai Muslims, which is a religious leader, the Muslim communities therefore expect the Chularajmontri to be genuinely a religious leader. However, modernization of Thai society has also rendered the Chularajmontri secular since he has to engage in many secular activities concerning Muslims, such as halal food certification, which requires him to deal with mundane food businesspersons who need halal mark on the packages of their products in order to sell them to Muslims within and outside the country.

While the institute of Chularajmontri changes in role and function along with the development of the modern society, the Muslims in Thailand undergo changes as well; they have come to demand for adherence to the true Islamic principle in its original pristine

essence due to the influence of movement of Islamic revivalism, such as Wahabi movement or the religious revolution of Imam Khomeini, that comes into Thailand.

The changing face of Thai Muslims poses a challenge directed to the role and function of the Chularajmontri. For example, when the Chularajmontri announces the result of moon observation for the purpose of carrying out Islamic religious activities, some Muslims will not follow him but follow the observation pronounced from Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the Khana Mai, reformist Muslim group, demands a reform in the Institute of Chularajmontri so as to truly perform the religious duties of Islam by the institute. This situation suggests that the institute of Chularajmontri has become entrusted by the Muslims less than before; and the issue is how the Chularajmontri should adjust itself to cope with the changing situation.

The objectives are to study the roles and functions of the Chularajmontri along its development history within the developing Thai society and to plot a picture of the Chularajmontri amidst the current changing face of Muslim. Then recommendations are then proposed to improve the institute, which is considered an indispensable institution of Thai society. In this dissertation, the researcher utilizes the concept of secularization theory and Peter Berger's desecularization thesis as the framework of the research. The current development in Thai society may be explained by the framework of Peter Berger regarding secularization and desecularization with the current situation being depicted as a clash between secularization and desecularization, which sends out a shock wave to the institute of Chularajmontri. As a result the Chularajmontri must consider a reform in the institute seriously in order to function well in the changing society.

### 1.1.1 CONCEPT OF RELIGION

Since the researcher will employ the ideas of secularization theory and desecularization thesis within the dissertation, while these ideas are quite controversial and not well defined, it is needed a clear groundwork before the dissertation can proceed. And that groundwork is in the concept of religion; with clear concept of religion, concepts of secularization and desecularization will be clear as a consequence, since the latter two concepts are founded on the concept of religion. Furthermore, in the later chapters of the dissertation the researcher will analyze the concerned religious problems in Thailand in order to devise certain recommendation to the Chularajmontri; therefore a clear and firm understanding of the concept of religion is a prerequisite. A way to get into it is to look into the concept of religion by surveying different definitions of religion and to choose the one which can provide satisfactorily distinct ideas of secularization and desecularization; also such definition must also be in line with the researcher's conviction about religion.

The very word of "religion" has an etymological meaning of binding back, to link back to the past.<sup>4</sup> However, religion may mean different things to different persons; likewise secularization and desecularization may convey different notions to different persons; for some yet it will be rendered meaningless and there is no such a thing as secularization theory. In this section the researcher would seek to clarify the concept of religion in a view to pave a ground for those of secularization and desecularization. A review of the concept of religion will give not only the foundation of the concept of secularization and desecularization but also a comprehensive significance of religious issues that may be encountered within the dissertation.

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<sup>4</sup> Webster's New World Dictionary of American Language. (1968). 2nd edition. p. 1200.

Generally speaking, secularization is regarded as man's relegation of religion, while desecularization is regarded as man's return to religion. However, before theory of secularization and desecularization can be discussed, there is need to clarify the concept from which the concepts of secularization and desecularization are derived, and it is that of religion. For those who do not seriously contemplate about religion, the concept of religion seems clear, but for those who do religion is never a clearly delineated concept. Religion is normally defined as a group of beliefs concerning the supernatural, sacred, or divine, and the moral codes, practices, values, institutions, and ritual associated with such belief.<sup>5</sup> As observed, "Religion" is defined in terms of "faith" and "belief system", therefore the concepts of faith and belief also need to be examined carefully, too. However, religion is also defined and explained in terms of the supernatural, divine or sacred, which are all equally obscure and personal; this may pose a hindrance in clearing the concept in the end. Also it may be observed that "religion" is used sometimes to refer to organized religions, while it is also used sometimes to refer to individual religious experiences. All these vague ideas increase the difficulty in delineating the concept of religion.

In the following the researcher would review several definitions of religion, the first category being the substantive definitions of religion which pay attention to the essence of religion, and the second is the functional definitions of religion which focus on what the uses of religion are.

### **a) Substantive Definitions of Religion**

Substantive definitions aim to pinpoint the essential elements of religion. The following are a few scholars' definitions of religion which may be classified substantive.

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<sup>5</sup> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religion>



Edward B. Tylor in 1873 defined religion as “belief in Spiritual Beings”;<sup>6</sup> however it is criticized of lacking the consideration of practice and rituals.

Emile Durkheim, on the other hand includes the elements of practice in his definition of religion; he maintains that a recognition of the division of life into sacred and profane realms allows us to identify religion in any culture and that religion is communal activity; his formal definition of religion is “A religion is a unified systems of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden – beliefs and practices that unite into a single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them”.<sup>7</sup>

Rudolf Otto, in his *The Idea of the Holy* (1917), defines the essence of religious awareness as awe, a unique blend of fear and fascination before the divine.<sup>8</sup>

The above are a few examples of substantive definitions of religion that rely centrally on the vague notions of divinity, the supernatural, transcendence, sacred etc, in giving rise to a notion of religion. However, these defining notions are themselves already obscure, the derived notion of religion is as matter of course obscure as well, though not necessarily less useful. But if we put aside the internal complexity and vagueness of these notions to focus on only the difference that is made by their presence or absence, their usefulness in defining a concept is seen. It therefore may be useful in our understanding of secularization and desecularization in the way that secularization refers to the decreasing presence of those sacred elements while desecularization is the increasing presence of these sacred elements in human’s belief systems. Generally speaking the belief in science and human-centric beliefs obviously involve less sacred elements; while the mystic

<sup>6</sup> Keith Roberts. A., (1995). **Religion in Sociological Perspective**, 3rd edition, p. 3.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.* p.4.

<sup>8</sup> Wulff, David M., (1997). **Psychology of Religion: Classic & Contemporary**, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. pp. 532-533.



supernaturalism or sacred or divinity predominates in religious beliefs. Though obscure as they may seem, sacred or divinity clearly exists at least in the realm of our psyche, and their notions are undeniable reality of life experience. Therefore, with substantive definitions of religion, secularization which implies a decline of religion makes sense and is a well defined concept.

### **b) Functional Definitions of Religion**

Functional definitions of religion focus on what religion does rather than on what essentially religion is as in the substantive definitions. These definitions often come from sociologists, once who do scientific study of human social phenomena including religion. Milton Yinger, basing on Max Weber's assertion that meaning of life is a basic human need, produces the underlying conviction that a fundamental concern of human beings is to understand the purpose of life and the meaning of death, suffering, evil, and injustice. Milton Yinger defines religion to be "a system of beliefs and practices by means of which a group of people struggles with these ultimate problems of human life".<sup>9</sup> And "religion helps individuals cope with these perplexities by offering an explanation and by providing a strategy to overcome despair, hopelessness, and futility."<sup>10</sup> This type of definition of religion would allow many other forms of beliefs, adherence, or loyalty, like nationalism, to be regarded as religion. Molton Yinger writes, "A term (religion)<sup>\*</sup> that already includes, by common consent, the contemplations of a Buddhist monk and the ecstatic visions of a revivalist cult member, human sacrifice, and ethical monotheism may have room in it for science as *a way of life*".<sup>11</sup> And the underlying assumption of this definition is that all

<sup>9</sup> Keith Roberts. A., (1995). **Op.cit.** p.7.

<sup>10</sup> **Ibid.** p.7.

<sup>\*</sup> appended by the researcher.

<sup>11</sup> Keith Roberts. A., (1995), **Op.cit.** p.7.

people are religious; as Yinger states “to me, the evidence is decisive: human nature abhors a vacuum in systems of faith. This [times of secularization] is not a period of religious decline but is one of religious changes.”<sup>12</sup> Keith A. Roberts states that “the underlying assumption of functional definition of religion does not really invite the question of whether a society is becoming less religious, but rather asks what new forms religion is taking.”<sup>13</sup> However, Milton Yinger insists that religion is a social phenomenon discounting private individual faith system. And Milton Yinger’s full definition of religion is “Where one finds awareness of an interest in the continuing, recurrent, permanent problems of human existence – the human condition itself, as contrasted with specific problems; where one finds rites and shared beliefs relevant to that awareness, which define the strategy of an ultimate victory; and where one has groups organized to heighten that awareness and to teach and maintain those rites and beliefs – there one has religion.”<sup>14</sup>

Clearly, functional definitions of religion include many social and individual behaviors and phenomena as religious. Anything that gives meaning to life may be regarded as god or religion. And in regarding secularization and desecularization which is one of the major concerns in this dissertation, it is meaningless to discuss them at all. Religion only takes new forms, there is no such thing as secularization or desecularization. Just as Richard Niebuhr puts, “nationalism and science and many other belief systems are religion...the major threat to Christianity has always been idolatry rather than atheism.”<sup>15</sup>

Peter Berger gives that the function of religion is to provide a unifying symbol and a unifying world view for a group of people to unify into a society. If people in the same community hold different world views, the whole community will be segregated into many

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<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* p.7.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.* p.7.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.* p.7.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.* p.8.

factions, and consequently the society will not be a whole harmonious one. But the constructed world, the world view in form of religious belief that people have constructed for themselves, is so fragile that people need to protect it by clothing it in an aura of sacredness. However, with development of empiricist ideologies that has spawned rise of science and technology, world view is constructed upon the principle of reason in form of causality and logic, sacredness is precluded. On the other hand, pluralism has prevailed resulting in the very world view becoming relative which Peter Berger sees this as a crisis for individual and society as a whole.<sup>16</sup> Peter Berger's notion of religion, though functional in technique, at the same time embodies some substantive elements, like sacredness, in it; it is therefore also useful to the research.

In conclusion, as abovementioned there are mainly two categories of definitions of religion, namely substantive definition and functional definition. Substantive definition focuses on the essence of religion, such as divinity, awe or sacredness, and thus provides a rather vague idea of religion. Though vague in the eye of scientists, substantive definitions of religion do provide a distinguishing quality of religion – the presence of awe, divinity or sacredness is, the absence of it is not. Functional definitions are mainly contrived by sociologists, who pay more attention to the function or utility of religion in human life. Knowing well the vagueness of substantive definitions, they focus on what it does instead of depicting what it is. It is partly due to the bias of scientific method, i.e. the tangible quality of a happening is preferred over the intangible quality. Substantive definitions tend to be narrow in identifying religious phenomena, while functional definitions tend to be inclusive and tend to be all encompassing in identifying religious phenomena. Nevertheless the researcher finds that however vague and seemingly frustrating it may be in giving clear

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<sup>16</sup> Berger, Peter L., (1967), *The Sacred: Elements of a sociological Theory of Religion* Canopy, pp.125, 127.

and distinct idea of religion to most scientific minds the substantive definitions are more useful in distinguishing religiosity from secularity, i.e. the decreasing presence of the elements of the supernatural, awe and sacred etc may be deemed as secularization and the increasing presence of it may be deemed desecularization; and it thus provides a clear conceptual framework in understanding secularization and desecularization within this dissertation. In other words, if there is to be such a concept as secularization, it must be understood under the conceptual framework of substantive definitions of religion. As a result, this dissertation will be founded mainly on the essential elements of religion as provided in substantive definitions of religion. The supernatural, sacred, awe, divinity or transcendence or the same sort is the essence and core element of religion. The researcher also has her conviction that belief in super being and belief in other non-super beings are very different in the way believing is taking place, i.e. in believing in a scientific statement there lacks the supernaturalism, respect, and awe that diffuses in believing in a religious statement. Believing in deity requires higher devotion and piety in the process of believing. There is something out there for which we believe in a heartfelt manner but for which we cannot clearly account for, and that something is ineffable.

In the above notion of secularization, the term “secularization” can also be applied to other religions other than those of Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition, though secularization is a concept invented within Judeo-Christian context. Moreover, the above concept of secularization entails that secularization is essentially the decreasing value that people generally have for divinity, the sacred or the transcendent; it does not necessarily lead to denial of divinity – only a shift in taste. Therefore it is possible that desecularization is true and it is possible to argue for desecularization.

## 1.1.2. MYSTICISM IN RELIGION

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In view of the researcher, what makes religious different in terms of intelligibility and sentiment is mysticism; or in other words mysticism is an essence of religion. While sciences have their foundations preferably strong in the sense that it is impossible to refute or contradict, and that it is clear and self-evident; such as self-evident axioms in mathematics, and experience-verifiability in foundations of natural sciences. Everything here needs to be clear, which means describable on basis of taken-for-granted common sense. Knowledge in these so-called sciences is defined to be justified true belief. On the contrary, religion is founded however on the ground of opposite nature to that of the sciences. The foundation of religion is ineffable (indescribable), i.e. unclear; the belief is based on piety, not on justification or rationalization, in fact whether religious belief is justifiable or not is unclear. While science needs reason and evidence to justify its belief; religion relies on emotional involvement in religious experience to justify its own, and emotion is often regarded unclear.

Mysticism is defined to be any doctrine that asserts the possibility of attaining knowledge of spiritual truth through intuition acquired by fixed meditation; or vague or obscure thinking or belief.<sup>17</sup> However, if the concept of mysticism is to be applied to religion, the researcher thinks that the first part of the definition is secondary while the second is primary. The vagueness, obscurity, mystique or mystery, is what attracts or propels people to believe. According to William James there are four characters of mysticism first ineffability, noetic, transiency and passive though conscious.<sup>18</sup> The details of the four characters are as follows.

<sup>17</sup> Webster's New World Dictionary of American Language. (1968). 2nd edition. p.942.

<sup>18</sup> James, William, (1981). *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp.367-368.



Ineffability is the state of mind which defies expression, and that no report of its contents can be given in words. And in order to know and understand that state of mind, the only access is by direct experience; but it cannot be imparted and transferred to others. The peculiarity of the states of mind is more like states of feeling than like the states of intellect. One needs to be in love in order to understand a lover's state of mind.

Noetic quality is a quality of mystical state of mind; and it is also a state of knowledge in addition to that of feeling. They are states of insight into depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect. *'They are illuminations, revelations, full of significance and importance, all inarticulate though they remain; and as a rule they carry with them a curious sense of authority for aftertime.'*<sup>19</sup> Noetic quality may be construed as knowledge in the sense of savage mind that does not know of reasoning. Noetic quality is both feeling-like and knowledge-like; while knowledge in the sense of modern mind is conceptualization of the reality.

**The Transiency of Mystical Experience** The notion of transiency emphasizes the quality of mystical experience being short and difficult to sustain. Importantly, though, the qualities of the experience can be brought back to the mind afterwards. The mystical experiences in the mystic do not last long however once it comes back again the mystic would recognize it.<sup>20</sup>

**The Passivity of Mystical Experience** the notion of passivity is meant to convey that when in a mystical state "[the] mystic feels as if [her] own will were in abeyance, and indeed sometimes as if [she] were grasped and held by a superior power." Even when the

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. p.367

<sup>20</sup> Read more at Suite101: William, James and Mysticism: Defining the Mystical Experience <http://www.sutie101.com/content/william-james-and-mysticism-a168156#ixzz16Aol3ZCT>



mystic induces this state through meditative, intentional acts, it remains that when she enters the state she in effect loses self-control.<sup>21</sup>

Mysticism is from the viewpoint of rational mind irrational in nature, therefore if rationality is a basis of secularization mysticism is a basis of desecularization. And the researcher holds that the essence of religion is mysticism and religion is a form of desecularization.

The researcher here examines Rudolf Otto's study of mysticism in religion as an example of illustrating mysticism as an essence of religion. Rudolf Otto points out that nonrational factor is the idea of divine, often overlooked, is what constitutes the essential living core of every religion; and he also points out; and he holds that conceptualization, which is a form of rationalization in scientism, invariably diminishes the experience and "the experience is therefore most directly expressed by negative means: in darkness, emptiness, and silence".<sup>22</sup> And the tendency for the rational to distort and displace the nonrational may be seen in the fate of the word "holy", which is originally used to refer to a unique and profoundly moving feeling response but now used to denote mainly the ethical quality of absolute goodness – a derivative meaning. Instead of "holy", Rudolf Otto uses the word "numinous", which derives from the Latin "numen" meaning divine will or power. His focus of study is thus the numinous consciousness, "a complex feeling state that, given the accompanying intimations of its object, is also in some sense cognitive, even before it is schematized by rational concepts".<sup>23</sup> As Rudolf Otto holds that numinous consciousness, a nonrational experience, is beyond utterance, his study is comprehensible only to those who have had such experience before. Rudolf Otto describes the numinous

<sup>21</sup> Read more at Suite101: William, James and Mysticism: Defining the Mystical Experience <http://www.sutie101.com/content/william-james-and-mysticism-a168156#ixzz16AoUhjwL>

<sup>22</sup> Wulff, David M. (1997). *Op. cit.* p. 533.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.* p.534.

consciousness in terms of “a dual structure corresponding to the twofold character of its object, the *mysterium*”,<sup>24</sup> namely “*mysterium tremendum*, an object that is awesome and daunting”, “*mysterium fascinans*, which is attractive and fascinating as nothing else can be”.<sup>25</sup> Rudolf Otto says that the strange harmony of contrast, of the opposing qualities of the dual structure, “is at once the strangest and noteworthy phenomenon in the whole history of religion”.<sup>26</sup> According to Rudolf Otto, *Mysterium Tremendum* has three elements, awfulness which is uncanniness, shuddering, or demonic dread – a religious or mystical awe; majesty, absolute overpoweringness that makes people feel small and nothing; and energy which is symbolically represented in such expressions as passion, will, force, and activity.<sup>27</sup>

## 1.2 THESIS STATEMENTS

Thai society is currently in a struggle between secularization and desecularization; the Chularajmontri institute is an appropriate organization capable of leading Thai Muslims in this era of clash between secularization and desecularization.

## 1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE DISSERTATION

1. To study the roles and functions of the Chularajmontri in Thai society.
2. To analyze of the Chularajmontri amidst the changing face of Muslims in Thailand.

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid. p.534.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid. p.534.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid. p.534.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. p.534.

3. To recommend to the Chularajmontri in responding to social changes in term of secularization and desecularization.

#### **1.4 LIMITATION OF THE STUDY**

The research topic of this dissertation, namely that of Chularajmontri, has not been seriously undertaken by other researchers, so the previous relevant works for reference are quite limited, although nowadays with the increasing interest in Islamic affairs, the relevant research works, such as texts, newspapers, articles and magazines written by scholars, keep coming out. There are also interviews permitted to the researcher with some Imams and persons with first-hand information that have provided valuable input to the dissertation; but the sensitivity of the issues and the related data that the dissertation is concerned also put a limitation on it. Another limitation is that most information and ideas that the researcher has collected are from various groups of different interests therefore are sometimes prejudiced, but the researcher is to try her best to employ the least prejudiced ones by cross-checking for their neutrality and consulting the Qur'an and Hadith (English and Thai translations) with assistance of accredited scholars.

Furthermore, the dissertation limits its study to the Chularajmontri institute in the context of Thai society, from pre-modern Era up to Democracy Era (2010, the year Chularajmontri Sawad Sumalayasak passed away). Also the secularization theory and desecularization thesis are employed as the framework of the research ideation regarding religiosity situation.

#### **1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

The main research methodology is document research, data collection and free-form interviews with learned persons, data analysis, and criticizing. The ideation of the

research is based on the secularization theory and desecularization thesis, including other theories from the discipline of sociology of religion. However, the researcher is careful in observing the way of Islam prescribed in Qur'an and Hadith in treating Islamic religious issues in order to minimize groundless conclusion since after all this dissertation is a research regarding Islamic affairs.

## 1.6 DEFINITION OF TERMS USED

**Chularajmontri** – the institutial Muslim leader of Thailand with a long history; since the Pre-Modern times, there have been predecessors of Chularajmontri which came with different names. However, since the Democracy Era the organization is called Chularajmontri and currently being established by the authority with the provision of the Act 2540 BE (1997) regarding the religious affairs. It has the primary function of providing advice to the government agencies regarding Islamic affairs. The chief of the Office is called “Chularajmontri”.

**Desecularization** – it refers to the reverse of secularization, which is a decline of religion; desecularization is the revival of religion. That is to say, having faith in religion and recognizing the value of religion leads people back to religion; desecularization is therefore a prevailing social phenomenon. It is widely different from the era of modernization during the 19<sup>th</sup> century where people retreated from religion, which subsequently resulted in religion veining relegated in its significance in the sodiety, and religion had then come to be an affair of individual.

**Khana Kao and Khana Mai**– Generally, Khana Kao are traditionalist Muslims in Thailand while Khana Mai are reformist Muslims in Thailand. Khana Kao refers mostly to the Thai Muslims in the rural areas, the Thai Muslims of Malayan descendent in south, and

those in urban areas. The Khana Kao Muslim group is discerned only with the presence of and in contrast with the Khana Mai, or the reformist Muslims adhering to the interpretation of Wahhabi Movement. The reformist Muslims call for purification of Islamic practices as they believe that the original way of Islam as to Qur'an (the Muslim sacred scripture) and Hadith (a report or collection of the sayings attributed to the prophet and members of the early Muslim community) is the only way, other new "innovations" are to be purged of. They often criticize Khana Kao for practicing impure Islam, i.e. with "innovation" like incorporating traditional or local elements into Islamic practices, since these elements are not prescribed in Qur'an or Hadith; the Khana Kao, however, claim that their practice does not go against the Qur'an and Hadith, at least no restriction is prescribed.

**Modernity** – in terms of social consciousness, modernity features people's firm belief in reason, materialism, and science and technology, while their former attachment to mystical religious doctrines are loosening. Reason and materialistic sciences dominate, absolutism and reductionism prevails, and the belief in them is unshaken. Modernization is the process of social change started by industrialization. There are four dimensions of modernization, according to Peter Berger, first the decline of small, traditional communities; second the expansion of personal choice in which people start to see their lives as a series of options, called individualization; third increasing social diversity, as modernization promote more rational and scientific worldview, and people of different backgrounds come together in bigger cities; and forth the future orientation and growing awareness of time, unlike pre-modern people who focused the past, modern people look more to the future, and there are better consciousness of time among modern people.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Macionis, John J. (2003). **Sociology**, p. 629.

**Muslims in Thailand** – it refers to the Muslims, who are Thai by ethnicity or by legal nationality; they may have descended from different ancestor races, such as Chinese, Cham, Malay, Iran, India, or Arab, and so on.

**Religious institution** – it arises from the belief and feeling that believers in a particular society adhere to the same religious principle, which in turn gives rise to a web of relation that unite people within the society. Creating unity in society is also an important function of a religious institution.

**Secularization theory** - Secularization is historical decline in the importance of the supernatural and sacred in the society. The idea of secularization theory is that modernization necessarily leads to a decline of religion, both in the society and in the minds of individuals.<sup>29</sup>

**Social Change** – Social changes are often irresistible and irrevocable changes, like the change in population, change in culture and change in technology etc. Social changes may be attributed to economic factors, like downturn of economy; political factors like change of political forms due to conflict of ideology and idea; and also the external factors such as foreign economic pressure, political or military threat and cultural impact etc. The results of social changes include urbanization, convenience in life, modernity etc; while there are also some sacrifices, such as pollution of environment and loss of spirituality to materialism.

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<sup>29</sup> Berger ,Peter L., (1999). **The Desecularization of the World Resurgent Religion and World Politics.** p.2.



## 1.7 EXPECTATIONS

This dissertation is expected to provide a clear understanding of secularization and desecularization and about the background, and the roles and functions of the Chularajmontri institute in Thai Society; in order to discuss of this religious institution amidst the changing face of Muslims in Thailand. It is expected that the Chularajmontri would feel the need of improvement in responding to the demands of the current situation in order to strengthen its leadership among the Thai Muslims amidst the greater social context of secularization.

## 1.8 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE DISSERTATION

1. To attain knowledge and understanding the changing role and function of Chularajmontri in the vicissitude of Thai society.
2. To provide recommendations to the Chularajmontri so that it may incorporate them into improving the institution in order to fulfill the true requirement of being a religious institution.
3. To provide a case study for other religious organizations in preparing themselves to respond to the social changes in terms of secularization and desecularization

## CHAPTER 2

# SECULARIZATION AND DESECULARIZATION

### 2.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the researcher examines the concepts of secularization and desecularization to form a conceptual framework for the latter part of the dissertation. Before going further, the notion of secularization will be explained based on the notion of religion to which the researcher has subscribed. In the last chapter the substantive definition of religion (and the functional definitions with incorporation of substantive elements like Berger's) has been described, which states that religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things; the researcher therefore would also construe the concepts of secularization and desecularization in light of the abovementioned substantive definition of religion. Simply put, according to substantive definition of religion, secularization implies a decrease of sacredness, while desecularization implies an increase of it, in life. The main reason is that substantive definition provides a direct and firm notion of religion and its subsequent notions in secularization/desecularization; while functional definition is an indirect definition and tends to create confusion in idea whether or not there is secularization. With the substantive conceptual framework, an efficiently clear meaning of secularization/desecularization may be pinned down quite firmly; and also it is beneficial to research relating to the social climate in which the Chularajmontri is in. However, before going deep into secularization/ desecularization, several scholars' notions of secularization will be examined. The researcher sees that secularization is a contra concept of desecularization, and understanding one concept will suffice in understanding the other.

At first the idea of Peter Berger, and a few others such as Tomas O' Dea and Al-Altas will be adhered, about secularization; the reason for such adherence is that Peter Berger's idea of religion is compatible with the researcher's as he incorporates elements of substantive definition of religion in his idea of religion, thus providing a clear and unambiguous concept of secularization/ desecularization.

## 2.2 SECULARIZATION

As mentioned in the previous section, secularization may be characterized by man's shift from their believing in gods to believing in reason and finally in man. Historically, the term "secularization" was first used in the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) following the Thirty-Year War,<sup>30</sup> when considerable church's properties were sequestered and placed under the control of secular authorities. In surveying relevant literatures about secularization, the term "secularization" is often given a functional definition. For example, "secularization" is defined by John Swomley to be the "historical process by which society ceases to be dominated by the church",<sup>31</sup> while in the Routledge's *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, secularization is defined as the process of social change in which religion loses social signification, i.e. losing significance in social consciousness – religious beliefs and ideas are increasingly relinquished by general population, religious personnel diminishing in number and losing social status, and religious and spiritual bodies losing control of property and resource it previously enjoyed in traditional society.<sup>32</sup> The

<sup>30</sup> Thirty-Year War (1618 – 1648) was a war that broke out of the religious conflict between the Catholics and the Protestants. The war took place mostly in the land of Germany and many European countries were dragged into it. The war was ended with the Treaty of Westphalia which signified an end to the Holy Roman Empire. From then on, state religious belief was no longer imposed upon the individual belief system of its people. See detail in Spielvogel. Jackson J., (1999). **World History the Odyssey**. pp. 462–463.

<sup>31</sup> Swomley John. (1968), **Religion, the State, and the Schools**. p. 31.

<sup>32</sup> **Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy**. (2000). pp. 790-791.

definition of secularization where church loses out power does not involve directly and expressly the concept of religion (though church is a symbol and institution of religion) while the second one makes some reference to and draws on the concept of religion and religiosity within society. This historical use of the term “secularization” or the definition of the term in a functional sense (such as the loss of church’s power) does not convey a clear concept relevant to the study here. In the following the researcher would probe into the essence of secularization.

Peter Berger defines secularization as “the process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the dominion of religious institutions and symbols”.<sup>33</sup> He provides the reason that the function of religion is to provide a unifying symbol and a unifying worldview for a group of people to unify into a common society. But the constructed world, the worldview in form of religious belief that people have constructed for themselves, is so fragile that people need to protect it by clothing it in an aura of sacredness. However, with development of empiricist ideologies that has spawned rise of science and technology, a worldview is constructed upon the principle of reason in form of causality and logic, sacredness is precluded. Furthermore, pluralism has prevailed, resulting in every world view becoming relative which Peter Berger sees as a crisis for individuals and society as a whole.<sup>34</sup> And that provides the necessity of sacredness in religion. Thomas O’ Dea makes a similar description of secularization; it is that “secularization involves a transformation of nonrational religious experience into language in the form of myths, and eventually to a systematizing of beliefs in logical, rational terms. For him it is a move two steps away from the awe-filled mysteries of nonrational experience to the abstractions of rationality and analysis that is the core of

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<sup>33</sup> Berger, Peter L. (1967). *Op. cit.* p.107.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.* p. 125, 127.

secularization.”<sup>35</sup> On the part of Islamic scholars, Al-Altas has made an analysis of the secularization etymologically. He says the term “secular” comes from the Latin word “saeculum” conveying a double connotation of time and location; the time refers to now and present, the location refers to world or worldly sense of it. Therefore “secular” means contemporary events and views the world as a historical process.<sup>36</sup> And “this spatio-temporal connotation conveyed in the concept secular is derived historically out of the experience and consciousness born of the fusion of the Greco-Roman and Judaic traditions in Western Christianity.”<sup>37</sup> He gives a definition of “secularization” as “men’s deliverance first from religious and then from the metaphysical control over his reason and his language and it is the loosing of the world from religious and quasi-religious understanding of itself, the dispelling of all closed world views, the breaking of all supernatural myths and sacred symbols...”<sup>38</sup>

It is seen that all the three scholars agree that secularization implies a loss of sacredness in life. Secularization is characterized by man’s shift from believing in gods to believing in reason and finally in man. Also it is observed that these three notions of secularization are in line with substantive definitions of religion, as it is seen that in their notions of secularization sacredness and myths are the elements that are losing out with decline of religion.

Of course as there are many other definitions of religion, especially those in sociology which are mainly functional, there are thus other definitions of

<sup>35</sup> Keith, Roberts A., (1995), *Op.cit* . p. 340.

<sup>36</sup> Al-Altas, Muhammad Naguib, Syed. (1993). *Islam and Secularism*. p. 16.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid*. p.16.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid*. p.17.

secularization/desecularization as well; however there are several elements that are shared among different versions of secularization being summarized by Tschannen:<sup>39</sup>

1. a rational, utilitarian, and empirical/scientific approach to decision making, so the world becomes “disenchanted,” and

2. Institutional differentiation and increased autonomy of various institutions from religious dominance.

3. Decrease in otherworldliness or supernaturalism [within religious ideologies]

The word “disenchanted” implies the loss of sacredness in the world; the word “supernaturalism” also implies sacredness. This suggests that substantive notion of religion and thus that of secularization is nevertheless a shared notion among different schools of idea. It is therefore understandable for the researcher to take secularization as a loss of sacredness and supernaturalism<sup>40</sup> in people’s consciousness in delineating the concept of religion and other derived concepts. Furthermore, within the practical context of Islamic study where sacredness and faith, rather than reason, is highly valued as the Islamic essence,<sup>41</sup> substantive definition of religion and subsequent notion of secularization, like in those of Berger, O’ Dea and Al-Altas, become very relevant and useful. It may be summarized that conceptually secularization would essentially connote a decline of influence of the supernatural, sacredness or transcendence on society as a whole while there is increase in rationalization of society.

<sup>39</sup> Keith. Roberts A., (1995). **Op.cit** . p.344.

<sup>40</sup> Some scholars have suggested that this single factor (reduction of supernaturalism) should be used as the sole criterion in defining “secularization”. Source: Keith. Roberts A., (1995), **Op.cit** . p. 345.

<sup>41</sup> As exemplified by the doubting philosophy of Islamic scholars, such as Al Ghazali, the prevalence of Sufism, etc.



However, secularization is generally regarded as a Western product. It is due to the fact that a noticeable secularization in Europe occurred around the middle of 14<sup>th</sup> century which is the ending period of the medieval times; this secularization is a consequence of the changes in the European societies and has later spread out all over the world and has a far-reaching impact on the world civilization. One of the consequences is that it develops secularization theory which states that the development of modernization will necessarily lead to secularization. Peter Berger is one of the renowned proponents of this theory, but he later recants it after observing that the reality is not as the theory predicts; the world is as religious as before and in some places even more religious. Since the researcher will mainly make use of Peter Berger's ideas regarding secularization and desecularization as her research framework in dealing with the current social context wherein the Chularajmontri is situated; in the following sections, some ideas regarding secularization and desecularization of Berger are further examined.

### **2.2.1 THE ORIGIN OF SECULARIZATION**

There are huge amount of factors that give rise to secularization, the researcher will review them under two categories; firstly, the factors from outside and secondly, the factors from within the religion itself – especially Christianity and Judaism, Islam, Buddhism and Chinese Confucius ideology. The factors from outside are mainly the disenchantment of the world by the rise of modern science; while the factors from within are ideal seeds within the doctrine and tradition. However, since secularization is first conceptualized in Europe and European culture of secularization is the most influential one in the world today, secularization in Europe is first examined to see its historical development before the secularization factors from within and outside religious traditions.

### a) Secularization of Europe

Secularization happened first and took its notion in Europe. During the ending period of the Middle Age, while most European societies were plunged into decline, there was Renaissance where Ancient Greek ideas were revived and there followed the surge of arts and sciences. The decline of medieval European societies and the Renaissance epitomized a departure from religion which formerly dominated Europe in the past centuries. The royal institutions became so strong that they broke free from the church to build their own kingdoms with the kings having the divine right. These kingdoms were run in the form of modern nation states with kings as the heads and bodies of bureaucracy supporting the kings.

The Europeans of this period received influences from the Greek and Roman, they tended to respect dignity of man; and humanism was gradually conceived. Man was regarded as able, intelligent and rational, and virtuous; the intellectuals of this period tended to have their academic interest in humanity, humanism and anthropocentrism therefore were conceived. Furthermore naturalism and empiricism were also conceived among the Europeans, since the nature was regarded as sense-detectable with the five senses which are the primary sense data receiving devices for the natural scientists, and the rational faculty could be applied to learn of its regularity. In their social structure, there was increasing urbanization and bourgeoisie class was formed ever since the 12<sup>th</sup> century. The result was that most major European societies had become urban societies. There was use of money as medium of exchange of goods and services. There was clear division of labor and various different occupations and professions were developed; these professionals needed freedom to pursue their careers. The professionals on the other hand had learned to have critical mind with the use of reason and had made great advancement

in science and technology. The further consequence was the outbreak of the Enlightenment which then saw an industrial revolution where steam engines were used to achieve mass production. The advance in science and technology had enabled Europeans to have a good economy; they had enough food, nice clothing, good transportation means such as trains and ferries to travel farther and faster than before; they also had radios and telegraphs to communicate with far-away people. The invention of printing machines had allowed them to propagate knowledge throughout the society better. All these happenings had rendered Europeans to become more this-worldly concerned (as this world has been made more comfortable to live in by science and technology) rather than otherworldly concerned as they previously were. This shift of paradigm is obviously secularization as according to the abovementioned definition of secularization – loss of sacredness, loss of supernaturalism, loss of otherworldliness; and with the expansion of European powers over the world through colonialism and imperialism, secularization is brought all over the world as well.

#### **b) Factors from Within**

The factors from within are the ideal seeds of secularization in the doctrine of Judaism and Christianity as observed by Peter Berger (1969). Such description of process of secularization can provide a historical view of secularization process – from the perspective of factors from within. In the following the researcher will review the Peter Berger's analysis of secular root within Judeo-Christian tradition.

Peter Berger studied the extent to which the Western religious tradition may have carried the seed of secularization within itself. And he concludes that if it is demonstrated that religion has carried a seed of secularization, it should be clear that “the religious factor must not be considered as operating in isolation from other factors, but rather standing in

an ongoing dialectical relationship with the ‘practical’ infrastructure of social life”.<sup>42</sup> The modern world may be interpreted as a higher realization of the Christian spirit,<sup>43</sup> and the Protestantism plays a peculiar role in establishing the modern world. The Protestantism reduces the world to reality devoid of sacredness – mystery, miracle, and magic, i.e. “disenchantment of the world”. Protestantism pushes sacredness away from the world of reality; they even minimize the mediation of the sacred and the real-life world. Protestantism, by separating the world and heaven, intends to emphasize the terrible majesty of the transcendental God and it throws man into total “fallenness” in order to make him open to the intervention of God’s sovereign grace – the only true miracle in the Protestant universe.<sup>44</sup> This mediation between the heaven and earth is so minimized by the Protestantism that the world becomes secularized.

Next, Peter Berger pushes on to investigate the Protestantism’s root in the earlier Biblical tradition to find out the secularization potency. Indeed, the earliest available source shows that secularization was found in the religion of ancient Israel. In ancient Israel culture, there is one element which is called “cosmological” (common with Egypt and Mesopotamia) which means that the human world is understood to be embedded in a cosmic order that embraces the entire universe. This order not only fails to make sharp difference between the human world and the worlds of gods, but it posits continuity between the two.<sup>45</sup> For example, disobedience to the god-king of Egypt is not only a political or ethical malfeasance, but a disturbance of the cosmic order of the universe that may affect the annual flooding of the Nile etc. In short, “cosmological” means that human affairs are ongoingly nomized by means of cosmization, that is, by being brought back into

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<sup>42</sup> Berger, Peter L., (1979). **The Heretical Imperative: Contemporary Possibilities of Religious Affirmation.** p. 110.

<sup>43</sup> **Ibid.** p.110.

<sup>44</sup> Berger, Peter L. (1967). **Op.cit.** p. 112.

<sup>45</sup> **Ibid.** 113.

the cosmic order outside of which there is nothing but chaos. In this cosmological worldview, there is a strong attraction to the Israelites even long after their own religious development has decisively broken away from it. The double exodus of Israel, one the patriarch's exodus from Mesopotamia another the exodus under Moses from Egypt, do not mean only geographical or political exodus but rather a break away from the entire universe. At the heart of the religion of ancient Israel lies the vehement repudiation of both the Egyptian and Mesopotamian versions of cosmic order. Israel defined itself as separation from that cosmic unity that the Memphite Theology identified with the divinity Ptah – “for everything comes from him ...” This great denial of Israelite religion may be analyzed in terms of three pervasive motifs – transcendentalization, historization and rationalization of ethics.<sup>46</sup> In the Old Testament, God created the world but leaves it alone – deism. The God in which all Israelites believe acts historically rather than cosmically, as the result Israelites are left on their own. This event the Judeo-Christian traditional belief of the original sin where Adam and Eve were driven from Eden is also a sign of secularity in human being.

However, the ideal seeds within Judeo-Christian tradition are not all that would lead to secularization; there are also other religious factors as well. The religious conflict within Christendom that had led to wars and eventual division is a major force that pushes Europe towards a more liberal end of religious requirement and finally to inevitable secularization, as Christopher Dawson puts, “...it was during this century of sterile and inconclusive religious conflict that the ground was prepared for the secularization of European culture.”<sup>47</sup> “The immediate cause of secularization of European culture was the frustration and discouragement resulting from a century of religious wars, and above all

<sup>46</sup> Berger, Peter L. (1979). *Op.cit.* p. 115.

<sup>47</sup> Dawson, Christopher. (1942). *The Judgment of the Nation.* pp. 9-11, 253- 255.



from the inconclusiveness of their end.”<sup>48</sup> Also “the chief cause of the secularization of Western culture was the loss of Christian unity... The mere fact of this loss of unity created a neutral territory which gradually expanded till it came to include almost the whole of social life... When once men had admitted the principle that a heretic could be a good citizen...” “In this way there arose the new liberal humanitarian culture which represents an intermediate stage between the religious unity of Christendom and a totally secularized world.”<sup>49</sup> On the other hand also, the incorporation of reason into development of religious doctrines, especially the development of Christian theology, for instance, “Thus, attempts by orthodox apologists to establish religion on a secure, rational basis often had unintended secularizing effect, in that the criteria could oust the sanction of the supernatural.”<sup>50</sup> The advances of knowledge which is often encouraged by Church, like the establishment of colleges by Christian Church, also encourage secularization. The import of reason secularizes the mind of people. Also The separation of Church and state after the Treaty of Westphalia, the nurture of tolerance of religious differences, the eventual development of religious pluralism, the view that religion is essentially a private and personal matter often contribute to the secularization of people. In general this suggests that the development of Christianity is a one major force behind secularization.

From the above explanation of Peter Berger, it is found that doctrine of Judeo-Christian religions has its seed of secularity is mainly that the world of God becomes separate distinct from the world of human, and from there human is free from intervention of God. The researcher thinks it an important notion of secularization which may be generalized to as framework to apply to other religions.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 9-11 , 253- 255.

<sup>49</sup> Dawson, Christopher. (1942). *Op. cit.* pp. 103-104.

<sup>50</sup> <http://www.secularislam.org/separation/secularization.htm> (online : 2 Oct. 2009)



On the part of Buddhism, secularity elements are even easier to see in its doctrine. The teaching that the origin of suffering is in one's ignorance, and the way to liberation is to rid one's ignorance by learning. This implies that liberation is achieved with one's own effort, not by gods; and learning also implies one's using of wisdom to solve one's own problems. The use of wisdom also implies rationalization of own mind, which clearly falls into the secularization definition of Thomas O'Dea.

On the part of Confucianism which emphasizes this worldly matter, its doctrine features strategy to harmonize the worldly society. There is ethical code of relational conduct for people of different roles in the society, parent-child relationship, husband-wife relationship, elder-younger brother relationship and ruler-citizen relationship etc., so that different peoples can live harmoniously within the society. With this worldly life emphasized, China was regarded by many Western scholars, like Leibniz, as the one of the most secular society.

On the part of Islam, as a religion with its doctrine in connection with those of Judeo-Christianity, it also has its seeds of secularity. However, unlike its two siblings, Islam possesses stronger sense of tradition. Where Islamic tradition emphasizes faith more than reason, also the Mosque and ordinary life of Muslim are not separate, there is no such a dichotomy of priesthood and common believers or laity in Islamic organization as in other four major world religions, and way of life of Muslims is often compulsorily intermixed with religious rituals; as a result Muslims are comparatively less secularized. And as it is later demonstrated, Muslims are currently the strongest and largest current of desecularization.

### c) Factors from Outside

As for the secularization factors from outside the religious ideology; it is mainly from the separation of church and state, and the disenchantment of the world by modern science. According to Peter Berger, secularization is the process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols. When it is the case of society and institutions in modern Western history, secularization manifests itself in the evacuation by the Christian churches of the areas previously under their control or influence – as in the separation of church and state, or in expropriation of church lands, or in emancipation of education from ecclesiastical authority. The separation of church and state also has resulted in specialization of church which has in turn resulted in the world being divided into a sacred the church and a profane the state, contrasted with the past scenario where every affair of society is under the sacred control of the church. Such happening also affects the totality of social life and of ideation; and the most important of all, it gives rise to science as an autonomous, thoroughly secular perspective on the world. There is not only the secularization of the society and culture; there is also the secularization of consciousness. The modernization always accompanies the process of secularization. The carrier of secularization is the modern economic process, the dynamics of capitalism. On the other hand, the anti-religious propagandas and repressive measures of Marxist regimes also facilitate the process of secularization.<sup>51</sup> The power of reason manifests itself in success of science and technology which has emboldened man in facing the objectivised universe. The researcher thinks that the reverence of reason is one of the important factors that lead man to secularization; and this can be traced back to the period of Renaissance and then back to the classical time of Hellenic Greek. However, science

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<sup>51</sup> Berger, Peter L. (1979). *Op.cit* .p.107-110.

though plays a very significant role in bringing about secularization, is also a major factor that leads to today's desecularization.

According to David Ray Griffin, the previously divinized world, i.e. reality of soul and matter or theistic vision of the reality, has been dedivinized or disenchanted by modern science. Modern science has denied the world of all subjectivity, all experience or feeling; there is no purpose within natural entities, "no creativity in the sense of self-determination..., no internalization of divinity can occur."<sup>52</sup> And with the success of objectivization, mechanistic, reductionistic approach in physics, this kind of approach and viewpoint is adopted regarding all the reality. The primary supposition of science is that the world is objective, and is knowable by man. Such kind of objective world view is propagated through modern education system where reason, scientific method of observation and humanism is highly valued over religious doctrine; secularization is thereby also popularized in the social consciousness.

Industrialization and the subsequent urbanization also play part in the process of secularization. The detail of industrialization and modernization in bringing about secularization will be elaborated in the discussion of secularization theory next section.

The development of liberalism, humanism, nationalism, the Divine Right of King, democracy and socialism all have their hands pushing the world to secularization. It can be observed that all the above ideologies have put man at a central focus – anthropocentrism and to relegate religion as superstition. This-worldly matter is more valued than the otherworldly matter.

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<sup>52</sup> Griffin, David Ray., editor. (1988). *The Reenchantment of Science Postmodern Proposals*. p. 2.

Another force which is constantly maintaining secularization is deprivation of the population from access to religious doctrine. Such kind of deprivation take the form of reduction in theology studies in universities in favor of more pragmatic courses such as science, engineering, humanism, and commerce which make better money. The result of ignorance of religious teaching as an effect reinforces the secularization trend.

The researcher thinks that the major reasons that have given rise to secularization are the empiricist ideologies that give rise to science plus its derivatives, such as humanism, capitalism and socialism, while the conceptual seed in the doctrines of religion, such as those of Judaism and Christianity plays a supportive role.

Rationalization is a major force of secularization; religious personnel are displaced within educational institutes by teachers who tend to supersede faith with reason, their students are thus secularized through rationalization. Another symptom of secularization is the privatization of religions, as their significance in public has decreased, and is confined to only private needs. The onslaught of magic and paganism by Christianity on the other hand has by the way created secular section in the society. The development of democracy and capitalism also leads to secularization. In the past, people are related by spiritual bond, but now by economical force, such as employer-employee relationship due to division of labor. Beside there being declining religiosity in society there is departure from older doctrinal, liturgical and ethical traditions. There is general shift from paternalism to fraternalism in secular society. There is also shift from next-world orientation to this-world orientation, hedonism prevails.

Moreover, besides the examination of the ideological root of secularization and some other extra-religious causes, there is also historical cause of secularization – the

Crusade (1095-1292). The Crusade was initiated mainly by a religious motivation; however the consequence of Crusade is that Europe had a renaissance to recall the Greek rationality-revering tradition and thence science and technology – a clear process of secularization. From the point of renaissance onward Europe has entered its golden era; while the East and the Islamic worlds had passed their peaks and went on their declines. It is noteworthy that the secular ideas of the Greek were transmitted to the Christian Europe from the hand of Muslims who had possessed these ideas and had enjoyed their golden era before the Europeans.

To conclude, secularization is social change wherein there is decline in sacredness and increase in rationalization within a society. There are several important causes of secularization, namely the Judeo-Christian tradition's secular seed that leads to the rise of Protestant ethic, modernism and humanism, the effectiveness of rationalization in solving daily problems and the ensuing rise of science and technology, the separation of state and religion resulting in a profane world.

### 2.2.2 SECULARIZATION THEORY

The idea of secularization theory is that modernization necessarily leads to a decline of religion, both in the society and in the minds of individuals.<sup>53</sup> Education will go together with secularization, for educated people secularization theory is regarded as taken-for-granted truth and will be silly to argue for or against it. Education equips people with rationality in their mind and so in their practice they equally apply this rational technique to solve problems which were previously regarded as unthinkable.<sup>54</sup> For modern times, secularization theory puts that religion is unthinkable and unnecessary. Actually many

<sup>53</sup> Berger, Peter L. (1999). *Op. cit.* p. 2.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.* p.11.



theologians believe in secularization theory, they believe that modern men are unavoidably and irreversibly a secularized character, and theology must come to term with it. The pioneers of secularization theory are Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Karl Marx, Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud;<sup>55</sup> most of them are scientists with materialist ideology. There is a global trend of shift of consciousness, power, and culture from the more celestial to the more secular, such as from belief-oriented consciousness to reason-oriented consciousness; religious institutions which have their business with otherworldly matters will be eventually replaced by institutions which have their main business on this-worldly matters. It is virtually regarded that secularization is a principle of historical development of human society, and has been used as criteria, such as bureaucratization, rationalization and urbanization, in judging a society's progress. The advance of human's knowledge about the material world, the so-called scientific knowledge; people believe that the universe is basically material and that every phenomenon in this universe can be reduced to a material cause. Therefore the phenomena such as spiritual, divine, otherworldly, magic etc. are regarded incidental phenomena of material things or disregarded for good. Religion is studied, instead of using theological methodology but sociological methodology. With sociology of religion, religion is assumed to be based on the incomprehensibility of the world and on man's helplessness in that incomprehensible world, religions are explained as social phenomena due to the human needs of survival, such as aspiring of a rich harvest; social forces, such as need of organization society, psychological factors such as the grief-induced aspiration to have better life, or fantasy due to extreme physical conditions. And this leads to Nietzsche's "death of God," which means that people no longer believe in God, and it is regarded as a

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<sup>55</sup> Weber holds that modernization is essentially the process of human's increasing use of instrumental rationality. Marx said religion was a kind of opium. Freud attributes varieties of human behaviors to sex drive. source: Cahoon, Lawrence E., (1996). **From Modernism to Postmodernism: An Anthology**. p. 52.



great liberation from superstition. The characteristic of secularization is that this world is what matters, not other worlds. The work of the universe is explainable using material causes. Secularization theory also asserts that with advance of human knowledge, there will be general shift of consciousness on both the levels of society and individual. People in general will be more secular, like being more rational, more scientific, more industrious, and economical in living. And this implicates that secularization is a global phenomenon of modernization. As a result, culturally people will be more Westernized and more materialistic, as we can see that secularization is traced back to the times of Enlightenment in Europe where Greek philosophy and scientific knowledge were revived,<sup>56</sup> and was followed by industrialization, imperialism, and colonization of the western which were the consequence, mainly of the success of science and technology. Science and technology enabled the Westerner to build strong iron ships which sailed by steam power with coal as the energy source and to invent high-power gun; other inventions that enabled Westerner to sail through the blue ocean to reach other lands more safely were map, compass, and telescope. The Western modernization provides a good living example for secularization theory, since we can see that the advance of modernity coincides with the decline of both religious practice and belief. Secular mind regards things that cannot be reasoned as devoid of meaning; thus politically celestial authority will be declining, and capitalist power, industrialist power and technocrat power will come into place. Democracy is also an incidental phenomenon of secularization. On the part of religion or other spiritual institutions, they will adjust themselves in accordance with the modernization, like in the US attendance of church does not have its merit from faith of God but from the recognition they will receive from the community and businesses they will have subsequently. In terms

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<sup>56</sup> Berger, Peter L., (1999). *Op. cit.* p.2.

of religiosity, secularization theory implies that religiosity will disappear from humanity one day.

Nevertheless, secularization theory is under heavy attack as the reality of the world today has been otherwise than as been predicted by the theory. Nowadays more and more scholars, as represented by Peter Berger, have come to believe that the original conviction on secularization theory is mistaken. The world is not really a secularized one as many intellectuals believe; it “is as furiously religious as it was and in some places more so than ever”.<sup>57</sup> Secularization on the societal level is not necessarily linked to secularization on the level of individual consciousness.<sup>58</sup>

### 2.2.3 ISLAM AND SECULARIZATION

Customarily Islam is characterized antithetical to secularization, but in fact Islamic world does have its history of secularization. Syed Mujtaba Rukmi Musavi Lari once says that most of the Westerners are unaware of the fact that their philosophy, civilization, their prosperous economy since the Industrial Revolution and the advance in science and technology that they enjoy are much indebted to the Islamic world.<sup>59</sup> This saying epitomizes secularity in Islamic teaching.

After the Prophet Muhammad has first declared the birth of Islam in 622, the Muslim Arabs, during 7<sup>th</sup> to 8<sup>th</sup> century, were able to expand their influence into many lands and cities on the Arabian Peninsula, such as Tigris-Euphrates Delta, Byzantine Empire, Persia, Egypt, and other cities in the present Middle Asia and the lands in the

<sup>57</sup> Ibid. p.2.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid. p.3.

<sup>59</sup> Lari, Mujetavba Ruk Mi Musavi Sayed. (2004). **Western Civilization through Muslim Eyes**, translated into Thai by Kitima Amoratat, p.182.

north of the Indus River. These lands are the cradles of many ancient civilizations such as Mesopotamian Civilization, Greek Civilization, and civilizations in the Indus Valley. An effect of Arabian conquest of these lands is that the nomadic Arabs came to be cultured by these civilizations.

The conquest of Byzantine Empire enabled the Muslim Arabs to have lands connected with the Mediterranean Sea. This also made the Muslim Arabs realize of the importance of having a navy and acquiring arts of warfare, also the importance of express communication with horse-riding messengers. On the other hand, the leaders of the Muslim Arabs patronized trading activities; this might be due to the teaching of Prophet Muhammad (hadith) that after praying in Mosques thou shall go trading. Also the Muslims during the period were encouraged to engage in activities of agriculture and industry. Under the Persian and Hellenistic influences, the Muslim Arabs developed their social structure, customs and manners, and became interested in pursuing knowledge and wisdom. Such influences also are not antithetic to the Islamic Faith as can be seen in prophet Muhammad's teaching (hadith) that thou shall go searching for knowledge even if thou will go as far as to China, or that the ink of philosophers is even more important than the blood of those who sacrifice for the religion, or whoever leave their homes for pursuing knowledge and arts are the ones who walk the path of Allah. These secularity elements in Islam had enabled the desert-wandering Muslim Arabs more urbanized in way of life. This transformation is clearly observed in the luxurious life of Caliph in the palace in Damascus (the current capital of Syria) during the ending period of the Umayyad Dynasty (611-750).<sup>60</sup> Caliph indulged himself with big feasts of food and many alcoholic drinks,

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<sup>60</sup> See Islamic Civilization in Umayyad Dynasty and Abbasid Dynasty in Craig, Albert M. and et al. (1986) **The Heritage of the World Civilization** pp. 373-387 and Karim, Ehsanul. (2007) **Muslims History and Civilization (Hand-Book)** pp. 75-104, 208-223, 233-247

enjoying beautiful women who danced in the rhythm of music. In leisure, Caliph would go hunting which was a popular sport of the times.

In education, subjects like history, geography and science were added among the religious subjects. Khalil bin Ahmad was the first person who compiled Arabic dictionary; Khalid bin Yazid, a scholar acquainted with broad knowledge of chemistry and medicine, was the first to translate Greek texts to Arabic. Such academic achievements were a result of the patronage of Caliph of Umayyad who encouraged medicine study and translation of medicine texts.

During the Abbasid Dynasty (750 – 1258), the capital was eventually moved from Damascus to Baghdad, the capital city of Iraq nowadays. The Caliph Harun Al Rashid built the capital with roads, canals, springs and travelers' lodgings out of an intention to encourage trading. During that time, Baghdad was a world trade center; there were huge varieties of merchandises; like silk and ink from China; jewelry and silver wares, hard woods and dyeing colors from India; cereals and glass from Egypt; slaves and gold from Africa; leathers from Spain and furs from Russia, to cite some examples. The prosperity of the Abbasid was a fruit from trading and understanding of science; the Caliph of Abbasid patronized the pursuit of scientific knowledge by sponsoring the establishment of a high institute of academics named Darul Hukama (House of Wisdom); persons from different countries, Jewish or Christian, who were knowledgeable in Greek and Arab, were invited to translate the Greek texts of philosophy, music, mathematics, chemistry, physics and medicine to Arabic; Indians scholars were asked to translate Sanskrit texts of astrology.

Apart from patronizing translations, the Caliph encouraged Muslims to enquire knowledge by establishing libraries in the Mosques in Baghdad and other places, like Al

Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt; libraries of the Moors in Cordoba University of Spain where there were more than forty thousand volumes and was open to the public. The encouragement of knowledge enquiry among the Muslims had enabled the Islamic world to be very advanced in science, philosophy, arts and literatures. However, during Crusade they were robbed of the long-accumulated knowledge by the European invaders and later this knowledge led to Renaissance in Europe.

#### **2.2.4 CURRENT SITUATION OF SECULARIZATION**

After the end of World War II in 1945, there was a significant change which was that the United States of America and the Soviet Russia became the two superpowers displacing the previous European powers. The two superpowers competed in extending their influences into the other parts of the world by propagating their political ideologies with the United States of America being the leader of the free democratic world and the Soviet Russia the leader of the communist bloc. As a consequence, the world was divided into two major blocs struggling with each other in a state of cold war; there were propagandizing and proxy wars being conducted by the two superpowers.

At the mean time each of the two leader states also was seeking collaboration in economy among the nations in their own blocs. For example, the Soviet Russia and the East European nations co-formed the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance; while the US-led free democratic world co-operated to establish an international economic collaboration organization for promoting free trades of industrial products, agriculture produces and services, which later has been turned into World Trade Organization (WTO). The dispersion of secularization varies from place to place, society to society, profession to profession, and age to age. The places where industrialization and urbanization takes place



intensively, people there tend to be more secular and of course more educated. For example, the developed countries are more secular than the underdeveloped or developing countries. The people in the societies of professional such as modern medical doctors or engineers are more secular than pure scientists or teachers of literature. The people of working age tend to be more secular than the senior people who are heading to life after death. The USA and USSR on the other hand also were engaged in competitions in military and communication technologies. At a certain point in time, the USSR was successful in sending astronaut satellite to orbit the earth; it was later followed by the USA's similar attempt and success. The competition between the two superpowers in science and technology has resulted in the world entering IT era at the end of 20<sup>th</sup> century. However, the competition between the two superpowers has come to a change when the USSR president Mikail Gorbachov, in 1986, changed the national policy from one focusing on pursuing communist ideology and armament development and providing subsidy to communist countries to one that gives priority to economic and technological development which was dubbed Perestroika and Glasnost Policy.<sup>61</sup> Perestroika was the policy aiming to improve the economic structure, like opening to the private sector opportunities in conducting business or infuse the people with attitude of economic competition and creative thinking in a view to build a new economy and society. Glasnost was the policy to open up mind to freedom of ideologies and to recourse the country towards a more democratic end. With divided opinion regarding the Policy, nevertheless the Perestroika and Glasnost Policy has partly brought the USSR to a collapse. In 1991, the Berlin Wall which was a symbol of cold war was demolished and marked the end of it. The USSR also lowered its significance in the arena of world politics. Contrariwise, the USA has since then become the only mega-superpower dominating the world.

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<sup>61</sup> Laquere, Walter. (1989). **The Long Road to Freedom**. pp. 197-207.



The aforementioned world situation has resulted in several remarkable global flows as noted by Arjun Appadurai<sup>62</sup> as follows:

1. Humanscapes which is the flows of population movement
2. Technos which is the flows of knowledge of technology and machinery and information technology
3. Financescapes which is the flows of currencies
4. Mediascapes which are the flows of symbols which are broadcast by media and also the flows of the ability to broadcast
5. Ideascapes which is the flows of concepts, ideologies and languages of ideas and politics.

Such flows may be regarded as a global phenomenon which is called the *World without Borders* which means that there is no obstacle or border to limit trading and investments of the foreign business people; and investors are able to move their money from one country to the next with ease. In addition, there are foreign labors or the immigrants including visiting relatives and tourists moving all around the world.

The world without borders means free competition in economies and investments. The free world believes that free competition would result in creations and products according to the ability of each person, and every one would be given equal opportunities in doing business and investing. The idea of free competition therefore would lead to

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<sup>62</sup> Appadurai, Arjun. (1996). **Modernity At Large: Cultural Dimension of Globalization**. p. 27-47. (Conclusion of Appadurai's idea of global flows by Paitoon Mekusonl, (2005). **Human Civilization** p. 244).

economic development and social advancement, while also allows currencies to flow freely around the globe into different financial centers where returns are higher.

The advancement in science and technology is proportional to the advancement in industries which are currently exploiting the possibilities in telecommunication and information technology that has rendered the world a smaller one and rotating in a faster pace; also the world is overloaded with data and information.

With the fast and globe-wide coverage of media made possible by advanced information technology, symbols, ideas, ideologies or incidents can be broadcast to the world instantly; there is no longer geographical obstacle for people's exchanges of information; the major obstacle is the illiteracy of the people in some disadvantaged areas of the earth. The borderless contacts of people however are governed by laws and agreements which become more and more precise and internationalized. The intellectual right issue has become a focus point of concern of the global business since intellectual right law has an effect of encouraging people to create new things and ideas and to discipline them from piracy.

The observed secularization of the current world is that the world is still proceeding in the direction of modernization and becoming more secular. In politics, democracy is the world's favorite choice which allows large amount of people to participate in politics and administration; in economics, it is characterized in free competition in commerce which leads to expansion of capitalism and materialism; in culture, the world sees influx of Western culture or the influxion of the cultures of more advanced countries to less developed ones. This global trend serves to confirm many sociologists' conviction that the world will become more and more secular as modernization goes on. However, amidst this

global trend of secularization there is also trend of desecularization which is constantly challenging the secularization theory.

However, in view of the researcher, secularization is not an absolute phenomenon where a secular person is never religious; in fact, a person's secularity is measured in degree, it is high or low in religiosity but there is no absence of religiosity. Nowadays with higher access to religious texts and in fact advanced scientific texts, more and more people are awakened to their religiosity.

### 2.3 DESECULARIZATION

As mentioned before desecularization is defined in correspondence to that of secularization due to their antagonistic conceptual relationship. Desecularization is thus defined as man's increasingly valuing the divine, the sacred or the transcendent, such supernatural notions play increasingly important role in their consciousness and their everyday life. Also the term "desecularization" connotes people's remaining their faiths in the supernatural amidst secularization and people's shift of faiths in reason-oriented materialism to supernatural faiths.

Desecularization can be a result of many happenings, but in the researcher's opinion the two world wars during the 20<sup>th</sup> century have left a deep scar on human's confidence and positive view in science and technology and also in rationality. It may be regarded as a violent blow that bends humanity towards desecularization as human beings have seen the negative side of science and technology that it could be massively destructive and it is rigid, cold and without feeling. It cannot be denied that there were more than 20 millions of casualties, military and civilian, during the two world wars (WWI

during 1914-1918, WWII during 1939-1945).<sup>63</sup> Such unprecedented mass killing in the history of humanity was a result of advancement in science and technology, the development of which was considerably induced by the requirement of the wars; increasingly mass destructive weapons, like machine guns, armored tanks, jet fighters, carriers and submarines, chemical and biological weapons and atomic bombs were developed and deployed to kill human beings in large scale. The damage to humanity is unfathomably huge, besides loss of lives and properties there are losses of opportunities of other peaceful deployments of the scarce resources that have been exhausted in the wars. The deep scar in the mind is the hardest to recover. People increasingly question the virtue of science and technology, or the virtue of material advancement in bringing about happiness to humanity. There is thus a global trend of renouncement of reason-oriented ideology which has led to dehumanized humanity and cruelty in destruction of mankind. The researcher thinks that this development supports the desecularization of humanity. In the following section several details of the causes of desecularization will be observed apart from humanity's greatest tragedy brought about by science and technology during the two world wars.

### 2.3.1 CAUSES OF DESECULARIZATION

Regarding cause of desecularization, Peter Berger has the following observations. Secularization theory insists that in the end the sacred will disappear all together. However, the reality has not been as predicted by the secularization theory, except in most parts of Europe, many other parts of the world are as religious as ever, like the Muslims, the

<sup>63</sup> Black, Cyril E. and et al. (1992). **Rebirth: A History of Europe Since World War II** p. 45 and Bourne, John and et.al. (2000). **The Great World War 1914-45** pp. 300, 584-590.

Hindus Indians, and some of the people in US and many in Asian countries.<sup>64</sup> Modern education and technology has not rendered them secular. In some places and in some people increasing desecularization is taking place. According to Berger, modernization is a major factor that “has provoked powerful movements of counter-secularization.”<sup>65</sup>

Desecularization takes many forms, the major one is the privatization of religions – privatized to a narrow section of society, or even to the inner hearts of individuals, this results in persistence of religions; another form of desecularization is the rise of vernacular worship or other alternative forms of religious behaviors amidst the fall of mainstream traditional religions – these private religions provide unrestrained freedom of religious pursuit and cater customized needs of individuals in modern democratic society.

In fact, the development of natural sciences and technology, which has brought about industrialization and thus secularization, also through its very development has led to desecularization. Disenchantment of science<sup>66</sup> is a global trend of development of viewpoint regarding science that is in line with desecularization theory. Modern science has disenchanted the world, and its dry view of the reality also disenchant the science itself.

Whereas secularization has a feature of rising of natural science, desecularization has a company of disenchantment of science and then reenchantment of science whereby science is modified and changed to better suit human taste.<sup>67</sup> In this section the researcher will show how advancement of natural science has led to desecularization.

<sup>64</sup> Berger, Peter L. (1999). *Op. cit.* p. 3.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.* p. 3

<sup>66</sup> Cahoon, Lawrence E. (1996). *Op. cit.* pp. 665-666.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.* p. 666.



By nature, human need faith in their every bit of life, without faith in something human become disoriented, drifting aimlessly in the flow of time. Religion is a major form of faith, and it provides a basis on which human form the order of their life and also makes meaning of their lives (individual and social);<sup>68</sup> if one order is shattered a new order tends to be built in its place, as Berger comments, “I can drop a hint: Modernity, for fully understandable reasons, undermines all the old certainties; uncertainty is a condition that many people find very hard to bear; therefore, any movement (not only a religious one) that promises to provide or to renew certainty has a ready market”.<sup>69</sup> The researcher believes that we are (at least in Thai society) currently in a transitional period of old order breaking down and new order being contrived which may be named postmodern era; the terms ‘post-modernity’, ‘desecularization’ or ‘disenchantment of science’ all convey the sense of uncertainty, insecurity, unease of humanity in confronting new happening or unforeseeable future. In fact, the current world is characteristic of being rapid-changing, unpredictable situation and happening, like the 9-11 event; even the nature is so unpredictable like tsunami in the Andaman Sea. This situation is mainly due to the advancement of science and technology directly or indirectly, like in the fields of nano-technology, bio-technology and information technology that have enable the rapid flow of information; with the debut of Einstein’s Relativity Theory and the explosion of the atomic bomb in Japan more than 60 years ago, the old order of material worldview that has Newtonian physics as its underpinning has been pronounced outdated from then on. While new order has not been fully established, yet new happening in information and biotechnology further jeopardize the situation. Today, we never feel the same of the world like we did in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

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<sup>68</sup> Berger, Peter L. (1967). *Op. cit.* p. 19.

<sup>69</sup> Berger, Peter L. (1999). *Op.cit.* p. 7.



When the course of humanity development is observed back in time, humans are as ever in the process of building and rebuilding a system of faith using whatever available material at hand, many things come and go but mysticism and awe of religions seem to have captured humanity the best. The notion of deity never dies; it just changes its form. Even in the most profane society in the ancient time such as ancient China, Tian Ming (Command of Heaven) played major role in every establishing and destroying of a dynasty. Or even within modernization-secularization, rationality and natural science is revered like god.

In the Western society whose people have been exerting great influence to the world since the recent history? Back into its medieval time, religions of Christianity dominated most part of Europe both in time and space. However, with the demonstration of Galileo at the inclining tower, Darwin's Evolution Theory and the Renaissance, the old order of the dominance of Christianity started to shatter and had been replaced by a new order underpinned by natural science and technology at the break of industrial revolution at the turn of 19<sup>th</sup> century hence opening a new chapter of history called modernity. With advancement of natural science and technology, there came industrialization and urbanization in people's life and there came materialistic worldview in people's consciousness. Human being turned out to be a relative of ape, and there was continuity between human and other things living and non-living along the line of evolution; spirit had become a byproduct of matter. People were bolder as never before, full of confidence that they can eventually change everything with their brains and hands, nothing is above them. Modern time features a secularization of humanity; with human faculty of reason nothing is unknowable, nothing is invincible, nothing is more sacred beyond human reason. But it did not last long. The eyes of reason see only those which are seeable and ignore those which are unseeable, thinking that all that is seeable is all that the world is,

resulting in a reason's solipsistic worldview. Further development of science and technology has told us clearly that the more we know we do not know. With such discovery, the order that had been only established by natural science for a few decades started to shake at its root; newly found confidence faded away quickly and fear crept in silently. The unease and fear born out of insecurity come from the vacuum of belief system in humanity; humans have no choice but to abandon their arrogance and to face the reality of the overwhelming world. The sense of higher being's provision however can give human a moment of comfort. There again the history repeats, human returns to the embrace of god. The return to god and thus desecularization of the world can best describe what the world is today; the world today is the result of advanced natural science development that has turned back to deny its original root. Post-modernity is characteristic of never an order being fully formed, it is constantly in a process of changing or, to be precise, deconstructing. Everything is possible and nothing is certain. With this setting, it is matter of course that general people are drifting afloat in their spiritual life. The natural science and material order, or the natural-science-based religion, has been shattered, though not completely it is almost done, and new order is yet to be formed, providence of god is a natural resort and so religious people are again turned to after a temporary turning from.

Beside the cause within the development of science that has led to desecularization, the over-abundance of material life of modern men is also a factor that urges people to seek an alternative way of development – which oftentimes is the spiritual life. Development of spirituality eventually opens up way to desecularization.

### 2.3.2 ISLAM AND DESECULARIZATION

As has been mentioned, either traditionally, historically and ideologically, Islam always goes an opposite direction to the secularization; in other words it walks together with desecularization. Even Berger observes that the two most dynamic religious upsurges in the world today are Islam and the Evangelic.<sup>70</sup>

Al Ghazali was an Islamic philosopher who renounced reason for faith and started the Islamic tradition of Sufism. He is a hero to many Muslims even today. Al Ghazali was acquainted with Hellenic classics which put reason in a very high status. However he thought that reason cannot access God directly only sense experience can do so, thus renounced the use of reason in knowing God. Philosophizing is accused of corrupting religion, while mysticism such as Sufism is praised as a way to directly access God.<sup>71</sup>

The trend of modernization, which has brought about secularization, results in developments in science and technology and also the idea of equality among fellow human beings.<sup>72</sup> Such a trend has penetrated into Islamic world, and it seems irresistible especially when the world is dominated by the West. Some Muslims are quite worried of such development in Muslim societies, like Muhammad Bin Abdul Wahhab of Saudi Arabia, Muhammad Ali Bashah of Egypt, and Sayyid Jamaluddin Al Afghani, to name a few. Modernization may lead to secularism which is antithetical to Islamic ideology since secularism would lead people to build a materialistic society that does not worship Allah

<sup>70</sup> Berger, Peter L. (1999). **Op.cit.** p 7.

<sup>71</sup> Imron Maluleen, (อิหมรอน มะลูลีน), (2007). **Islamic Philosophy: Complete Version.** p. 12.

<sup>72</sup> Charan Maluleem, (จรัญ มะลูลีน), (1998). **Western Asian Studies: Panorama of sociology and Human Science.** referring to Zakaria, Rafiq's Struggle within Islam. p. 159.

but money; and therefore, modernization is considered antithetical to the spirituality.<sup>73</sup> Religion will become a private affair; the piety of faith in Allah will be displaced by the piety in a careful financial budgeting.<sup>74</sup> As a result, there have been movements within Islamic world that herald a return to the pristine original Islam; such movements are in fact Islamic desecularization movements, some of which are as follows:

#### **a) Wahhabi Movement**

The Wahhabi Movement has been initiated in Saudi Arabia by Muhammad Bin Abdul Wahhab (1695 – 1786) under the influence of the idea of Imam Hanbali of a Sunni order, which was being propagated in the Arabian states such as Saudi Arabia.

Muhammad Bin Abdul Wahhab has an aspiration to purify Islam by returning to the Islam during the period of its founder Muhammad which is considered to be pure and true. His methodology is to adhere strictly to the scripture of the Al Qur'an and Hadith; denying ideas of philosophers which may be ijma or ijtiḥad, and also those of saints, and denying any kind of superstition and rituals of other religions that have been integrated into Islam.

Muhammad Bin Abdul Wahhab tried hard to propagate his ideology but met many obstacles; until he won support from Muhammad Bin Saud who hoped to use the force of Wahhabi to establish an administration under Sultan of Ottoman Empire did he come to be successful and influential.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.* referring to Laurence Urdang and Stuart Berg Flexner ed. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, (1969). cited in Rafiq Zakaria, the Struggle within Islam, p.19.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.* referring to Murtaza Asadi "Modernization and the Muslim World" translated from Persian by Alar Saadat Echo of Islam. July, 1996. No. 145, pp. 41 – 43.

The propagation of Wahhabi ideology was later extended into the Middle-East, for example into the land of Egypt which was then a part of Ottoman Empire. This as a result had led to Muhammad Ali Bashah of Egypt cruelly persecuting the Wahhabi followers in Egyptian land. Despite that, the Wahhabi ideology survived and flourishes in the world of Islam; it now has its strong hold at Al-Azhar University in Cairo of Egypt and Wahhabism has been carried to other Muslim lands, such as Sudan, Indonesia and Thailand.

Wahabbi Movement is considered a desecularization current which hails a return to the original teaching of Islam as recorded in Al Qur'an and in Hadith in a hope to revitalize Muslims, who are so weak that they have no choice but to accept the Western science, together with philosophy, culture, and other civilizations of the West into Muslim societies. This movement is backed by strong faith in religion, and the Wahhabis are the Muslims who are driving behind the Islamic Reform.

#### **b) Islamic Revolution in Iran**

Islamic Revolution in Iran took place in 1979 under the leadership of Ayatollah Al Khomeini or popularly known as Imam Khomeini. The goals of this revolution were to purge of the Western influence that was engulfing the Iranian economy; it is said to be a struggle against the White Revolution,<sup>75</sup> to defy the Shah's effort to modernize the country and to establish an Islamic State. The Shah, with Shah Muhammad Reza following his father's footstep, was adopting the White Revolution policy which purported to modernize Iran. The revolutionary faction accused the Royalty for betraying the tradition and culture of their own country, and also betraying the true teaching of Islam;<sup>76</sup> and that the Shah

<sup>75</sup> "White Revolution" is described as "a step towards reinforcing the foundations of a despotic rule and consolidating the political, cultural and economic dependence of Iran upon world imperialism." – "The vanguard of the Movement" (1963). **The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran**. p.6.

<sup>76</sup> Rainan Arunrangsee (ไรน่าน อรุณรังสี), (2001). translated. **Iran, the Cradle of Civilization**. p. 72.



allowed the Westerners to exploit the interest of Iranian people. Therefore, the resolution was to de-establish the Monarchy and establish an Islamic administration.

The idea of establishing an Islamic state has great impact on Muslims in Islamic World, as can be observed in the Muslim Brotherhood Movement which broke out in Egypt during the middle of 20<sup>th</sup> century under the leadership of Hassan Al Banna who hoped to fight for the liberation of Egypt and dethrone the King Faruq (1936 – 1965) in 1952, who did not behave himself as a good king, and to help the Arabian Palestine who were under the rule of Britain. Later this group of Muslims was also active in fighting against the secular policies, like the policy of All Arabic and socialist policy of the Egyptian president Abdul Nassir since these Muslims thought that Islamic principle shall be adopted instead as Islam covers all aspects of human living according to their motto “Ikwan al-Muslimun”. They also opinionated that the government should adopt Islamic principle in administering the country, pointing out that a government which did not run the country in accordance to the Islamic principle was not a government of Muslims.<sup>77</sup>

This was also due to their resenting the Egyptian government’s policy of separation of state and religion. The Muslim Brotherhood Movement was downplayed in later period due to the movement’s disintegration in 1948; the demand of an Islamic state was therefore not successful yet.

The Islamic Revolution of Iran has great impacts on the transformations of the society and politics in Iran as it has been transformed into a “religious state” with the administration being changed to the Islamic Republic of Iran from the public voting in May 1979 which also pronounced the end of the reign of the Shah. This revolution has

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<sup>77</sup> Charan Maluleem (1998). *Op. cit.* p. 229.



achieved the long-time wish of establishing a true Islamic state – which is the Islamic Republic of Iran. The new government was successful in reducing Western influence in the economy; they also brought reforms in the society and religion by adhering to the principle in the Al Qur'an, reviving the characters and pride of being people of Islamic state, returning to the original pristine Islamic culture instead of Western culture. They condemned materialism, and defied capitalism and individualism, which were viewed as being mean, selfish, oppressing and depriving, and estranging morality – all these went against the principle of Islam.

Imron Maluleem comments that the Islamic revolution in Iran far differs from other revolutions in the world. It is being guided by religion, the Shi'ah order, as Islam has great impact on the society; also the Shiite religious elders play the most crucial political role in this revolution. The Islamic Revolution in Iran may be regarded as a desecularization movement, as it is observed that the people of Iran have chosen Al-Qur'an and Hadith over Western modernization as their blueprint of country administration and development. By turning to Islam, they also resist the penetration of materialism, capitalism and individualism which secularize the society.

The success of Islamic Revolution in Iran has become a role model for many Muslim countries; no matter they are Shi'ah or Sunni. It also affirms and sparks up many Muslims' hope that they can realize the ideology of Islamic state which has happened before during the four Caliphate reigns after the passing of the Prophet Muhammad. For example, the Shi'ah in Iraq demands to establish an Islamic state in the eastern part of the country. More and more Muslim women put on hijab to identify themselves as a part of Islam, even those in secular countries like Thailand and France Muslim demand to wear

hijab in public. Furthermore the success of Islamic Revolution in Iran has attracted many people to convert to Shi'ah; such trend has also penetrated into Thai society

### **c) Desecularity of Islam**

Apart from the above Islamic desecularization movements, it is noted as in the section of the current situation of secularization that Islamic world in general is considered less secular; here Al Ghazali may have his influence in the current Islamic scholasticism and the way Muslims adopt in conducting an Islamic life. It is clearly observed from the press today especially since the date of 9-11 in 2001 that the radical Muslims have been active on the world arena. And that also makes Islamic world a major desecularization force in the world today.

Even a rough observation will suggest that Muslims are people of desecularization, while of the other two main stream religions, Christianity and Buddhism, the believers are comparatively less de-secular. Islamic world may be regarded as the largest community of desecularization.

In this section the researcher will use the distinctness between the profanity and the divine of a religion as a yardstick to compare de-secularity and secularity of the respective believers of the three major religions, namely Buddhism, Christianity and Islam. The higher the distinctness between the profane and the divine of a religion would imply the lower proximity of religion or de-secularity in everyday life of community the more secular or the less de-secular its believer is. The idea behind this yardstick is that the higher the distinctness between profane and divine, the commoner's life or the profane, is thrown farther away from divine, and thus become more secular and less de-secular.

In Buddhism, the distinction between the profane and the divine of Buddhism is high comparatively. Sangha community is always located within a distinct geographical location clearly taken away from the mundane life and location of the profane communities, though the two communities are related somehow economically and socially. On the one hand, the attires of the two communities which represent the profane and the divine are also distinct. Monks are dressed in specifically distinct yellow robes to distinguish the divine away from the profane. On the other hand, a typical Buddhist man will go into and out a monkhood which also symbolizes and reinforces the distinction between the profane and the divine; especially that during the monkhood the man is required to observe many special precepts which are not needed during his profane life. In short the difference between the profane and the divine in Buddhist society is huge.

Therefore in Buddhism, the profane and the divine are symbolized quite distinctly. In addition, Buddhist doctrine emphasizes the use of reason, the development of the self and the reliance of the self, the profanity is diffused throughout its fundamental teaching. For examples, the principle of the ignorance being the origin of suffering, and the way out is to learn more to enlighten oneself and to frighten away fright within oneself. This suggests that Buddhism is a humanist doctrine to a certain degree, the reverence of humanity tends to increase degree of secularity and decreases degree of sacredness.

In Christianity, or Judeo-Christianity, it has been mentioned of the secularity origin within its doctrine previously. The reverence of humanity and human reason, and also human self reliance; while god is posited far away from the human world leaving human to its own destiny. The human world is pulled far apart from the sacred world; the proximity between the two is therefore low. The protestant ethics and Pope John Paul II's accept of

the reason and expression of regret over the Church's handling Galileo;<sup>78</sup> along side with faith are clear traits of secularity development in this tradition. On the other hand religion is separated from the state and education by secular law. Also going to church on Sundays and going to profane work places during weekdays also mark a distinctive line between the profane and the divine. During their normal daily life they are required less of religious observance, except their occasional exclamation "My God" which does not relate much to the divine either.

In Islam, the profane and the divine intersect, Muslims typically believe in their destiny being prearranged by Allah. It is often observed that many Muslims attribute without curse their dire fate to the will of Allah. From their daily observance, like the five prayers a day, fasting during the month of Ramadan; their politics, the state and religion tend to be united, not separated as the Western modern states; Muslims adopt shari'ah, the Revealed Law, in governing everyday conducts of people in Muslim societies; Muslim's de-secularity may be clearly observed. This is clearly contrasted with the law of Christian societies, and many modern laws today, which is delivered from Roman law system based on jurisprudence which is a systematic and rational study of law. They believe without question in every bit of the Qur'an. The attire of the Muslims are specific especially the hijab of women Muslims; they are distinct from people of other religions notably but among themselves regardless of religious teachers or ordinary Muslims they do not differ much. The religious institutions and the profane communities are close and mixed. Muslim

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<sup>78</sup> "Faith and reason are like two wings on which the human spirit rises to the contemplation of truth;...". <http://www.ewtn.com/library/ENCYC/JP2FIDES.HTM> Galileo was reburied on sacred ground at Santa Croce in 1737. He was formally rehabilitated in 1741, when Pope Benedict XIV authorized the publication of Galileo's complete scientific works (a censored edition had been published in 1718), and in 1758 the general prohibition against heliocentrism was removed from the Index Librorum Prohibitorum. On October 31<sup>st</sup>, 1992, Pope John Paul II expressed regret for how the Galileo affair was handled, as the result of a study conducted by the Pontifical Council for Culture. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galileo>

children are sent to religious schools, the Muslim state law incorporates Islamic precepts and their punishments are in accord with the Islamic teaching. From the prevalent social consciousness, it is observed that a typical Muslim would attribute his destiny to the will of Allah while the Christian or the Buddhist would likely to attribute to their own problems.

To conclude from the above with distinctness or proximity between the profane and the divine as the yardstick, Islam is a religion with the closest proximity between its profane sphere and the divine sphere and thus Muslims the most de-secular. If a scale of deism-theism is used, Islam will be put close to the theism end of the scale while the other two religions will be put closer to the deism end. In other words, for Muslims god lives along their lives and takes care of them. And therefore, Islamic way of life is more compatible with desecularization while Buddhist and Judeo-Christian ways of life can go along well with secularization.

### **2.3.3 CURRENT SITUATION OF DESECULARIZATION**

After the World War II, while the United State of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) were competing with each other in expanding political and economic influence, the countries in Europe as well as Japan were recovering from the ruins of war. These war-torn countries hastened to develop their industries in rebuilding prosperity in their countries. At the same time the less developed countries, located mostly in Africa and Asia, came to form a group called “Third World Countries” in an effort to avoid walking in the shadow of the powerful nations.

However, the third world countries are unable to succeed as aspirated, but the format of grass-root movements conducted by their peoples has ever since become the way grass-root peoples around the world adopt in carrying their political struggle.



According to Chairat Charoensinoran in his book, *Nation-State and the New (ir) Regular World*, the movements of grass-root people always have issues of injustice, be they political, economic, social, and cultural.<sup>79</sup> Their movements surround demand for respect in value of their beliefs, religions, tradition, and local wisdoms, which are relegated or belittled by mainstream modern culture. This kind of movement spread across the world rapidly especially after the end of cold war between the USA and the USSR approaching the end of 20<sup>th</sup> century.

In the developed countries, while one group of people are enjoying convenience and comfort brought about by development in economy and science and technology, which make possible large scale of supply of varieties of consumer products and services; there is a certain group of people, composed mostly of youths, who come to defy the society by denying modernity. For example, there are hippies, who are signature humankind of the era; they dress differently, they travel to remote areas, such as India, Tibet, and Nepal, to search for the truth of life; they also take drug to escape the reality.

The above movements in both Third World countries and the developed countries may be interpreted as desecularization, since they oppose modernity which is characterized by secularization. However, after the Cold War the growth of regime of democracy and modern capitalist economic system compel the world community to develop in the same direction. As a result, there have come to be crashes in traditions and practices, especially in the areas of religion, ethnic nationalism, and rurality.<sup>80</sup> For example, there are conflicts in Algeria,<sup>81</sup> Congo, East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Thailand, because there are

<sup>79</sup> Chairat Charoensinoran, (ไชยรัตน์ เจริญสินโอฟาร), (2006). *Nation-State and the New (ir) Regular World*.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.* pp.342-343.

<sup>81</sup> Howe, John. "The Crisis of Algerian Nationalism and the Rise of Islamic Integralism", *New Left Review* 196/1992, pp. 85 – 100.



movements to demand for religious revival, or demand for equality for minorities or indigenous peoples. As time goes by, these demands aggravate into violence; there are assassinations of the leaders, murders of people of other races, destructive bombings, and hijacks, for example, with two passenger planes hijacked to crash into the World Trade Center twin towers on September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001, which marks a height of grass-root struggle against superpower, minority against mainstream. The United States of America fights back in ally with major Western nations in the name of “fight against terrorism”. Many people, including Chairat Charoensinoran, call it a new “reason” for imperialism.<sup>82</sup>

The conflicts arising after the end of Cold War pursuing the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) in 1991 are not clash of civilization as depicted by Samuel P. Huntington, but rather in the researcher’s view a clash between secularization and desecularization. In fact, the researcher thinks that people are thirsty for spiritual juice in these days as science disenchant the world. The social problems and many other human problems cannot be solved by merely advancing technology. For example, the problems of love, beauty, marriage, spirituality and the sacred are rarely answerable by modern scientists. People are generally deprived of their spiritual life by the prevailing materialism. And that is why there is a tendency of desecularization which in some places, especially the Islamic world such as Iran, has taken place in large scale.

There are several other foci of desecularization force besides in religious entities, namely in the advanced intellectuals, the senior, the enlightened, and the individuals in extreme situation. For example the people who are tired of material life or dying patients, are increasing in number and constitute a huge market for desecularization. The relinquishment of socialism which is a big foe of religion for its rigid material view

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<sup>82</sup> Chairat Charoensinoran. “Wars on Terrorism: The New Legitimation of Empire”, *Op. cit.* p.140.

regarding religion and the increasing number of new religions may be viewed as an evident of desecularization of the world today. There are in fact also increasing use of religious cause as the cause of political struggle today as it was many hundred years ago.

## 2.4 SUMMARY

The essence of religion is the divinity, sacredness, transcendence or the like, without which religious activity can hardly be distinguished from other social activities. The nature of believing in deities and that of believing in other non-divine being, like reason, is not the same. Believing in deity involves a sense of mysticism, romanticism and eternity and requires lots more of ethical total commitment, while believing in reason requires support in form of evidence for the sake of sense of security – lacking huge demand of ethical and moral commitment.

Secularization features a departure from the sacredness, divinity, transcendence or the like; and an embrace of the disenchantment of the world, the appreciation of reason and the value of humanity over the rest. Secularization is very concentrated among the intellectual circles; the educated or those who are taught to use more of their rational faculty tend to be more secular. However, for those advanced intellectuals secularity tends to decrease; divinity and sacredness returns.

If secularization theory is defined as the decline of religion along modernization, this theory is too narrow to cover the religious phenomena in society; but if it is defined as the decline of religiosity, it is easily rebutted by the fact of persistence of religions in private circles and the rise of variety of alternative religions. In fact, that the secularization necessarily leads to decline of religion is true by definition but not necessarily true by

causation. Since secularization, as can be traced to its original use, is defined to be the phasing out of religious authority in social consciousness; meanwhile, the phasing out of religious authority, as exemplified by the obvious decline of many religious institutions, does not necessarily imply the decline of religiosity, the spirituality or the faith dimension of humanity. Therefore, in researcher's view secularization theory and desecularization thesis are nonsense, it leads to people, especially the academics, misunderstanding the reality that with on-going modernization people will eventually become less and less faith-oriented, and become more and more reason-oriented. Religiosity simply changes its forms along modernization but not its essence.

Desecularization arises from the disenchantment of science itself among the intellectual circles; on the other hand in the Islamic world where religiosity is very intense, it also constitutes a major force of desecularization. Desecularization among intellectuals is a major force that gives out ripples of desecularization in the world, the reenchancement of science – making science more humane. On the part of Islam, which has a sizable believing population, and would over take Christianity as the largest religion, it represents the large port of desecularization of human population and will play a critical role in expanding desecularization.

In conclusion, there may be decline of religion as to secularization theory, but it in fact is temporarily put in a sleep mode. The human's awareness of other higher being is always there and man's religiosity, or their sense of sacredness, never dies from humanity. In fact in the time of secularization, reason is revered unlike god; however the way one has faith in god and the way he or she has it in something else is never the same. The experience of awe is reminding human of the profundity of the sacredness beyond the comprehension of rational mind. Secularization is only a temporarily valid worldview

which is an illusion created by human's arrogance over its limited reason faculty. Nowadays after a considerably long period of material indulgence, people are fed up with material and increasingly make a quest in the dimension of spirituality.



## CHAPTER 3

# THE BACKGROUND OF CHULARAJMONTRI AND ITS AUTHORITY

### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

In order to understand of the Chularajmontri amidst the changing Thai society, it is necessary to have background knowledge of the Chularajmontri. The topic of this section therefore starts with a brief history of Muslims in Thailand. The history of Muslims in Thailand may be approached in several contexts, namely by dividing the Muslims into language groups of Malay-speaking Muslims and Thai-speaking Muslims, or by dividing the Muslims into different sects, such as Sunni and Shi'ah; however here the study of the history of Muslims is conducted with respect to the ethnicity of the Muslims settling down in Thailand in order to provide a view of the influx of different ethnic groups of Muslims along with propagation of Islam in Thailand and to provide a view that the leadership of Muslims in Thailand is composed of different ethnicities.

The contents of this section include history of Chularajmontri, organized in order of periods, namely the Pre-modern Era, the Modern Era, and the Democracy Era, so that the roles and functions of the Chularajmontri within Thai society will be seen change from period to period, so that the background of the Chularajmontri will set into view. The current section also covers the current status of the Chularajmontri and the issues that render the Chularajmontri secular at the moment. The knowledge and understanding of the background of the Chularajmontri will further provide a foundation for recommendation to



the Chularajmontri in improving its roles and functions to fit itself into Thai society which sees a change from secularization to deseculariation.

### 3.2 A BRIEF HISTORY OF MUSLIMS IN THAILAND

Thailand today has its Muslim population of about 2,224,485 persons out of the total population of 63,389,730.<sup>83</sup> The Thai Muslims descend from ancestors of different races due to the fact that Thai society is always a cosmopolitan society where peoples of different ethnicities have long been living together; for example, there are Arabs, Chams, Chinese, Indians, Indonesians, Iranians, Malayans, and others,<sup>84</sup> who have settled down in different provinces of Thailand. It may be further elaborated as follows.

#### 3.2.1 MALAY ETHNIC GROUP

The propagation of Islam in the lands of Malay archipelago and peninsulas in Southeast Asia is thought to have begun ever since around 12<sup>th</sup> century<sup>85</sup> and the great number of Malay people have since come to observe Islam, especially after the kings of Malaka and Pattani<sup>86</sup> converted to Islam. However, in the later period when Malaka was occupied by the Portuguese in 1511, Patani which remained an Islamic state in these areas had gained more importance both secularly and spiritually. Namely, the Patani State back then was located at the area of Kruse (under the administrative area of Pattani Province today), where nearby a river ran through to the ocean providing convenient transport

<sup>83</sup> Department of Religious Affairs. (2006) **The List of the Province in Thailand Ordered by Number of Population with Percentage of Muslims.**

<sup>84</sup> Saowani jitmuad (เสาวนีย์ จิตหมวด). (1988). **Ethnic Groups: Thai Muslims** pp.10-12.

<sup>85</sup> Archeologists have unearthed tomb stone inscriptions in Indonesia which is estimated to date back to about 12<sup>th</sup> century; also in records of Marco Polo, an Italian merchant, there are mentions of Arabian Muslim communities in the port cities along Sumatra coast of Indonesia in 13<sup>th</sup> century; similar records about Muslim settlement in the areas can also be found in the records of Ibn Batuta, a Moroccan who travelled to Southeast Asia in 14<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>86</sup> In the tale of Hikayat Patani, a clergyman cured the ailing King of Patani on the condition that the King must convert to Islam after he had been cured. See Teeuw, Andries & David K. Wyatt (1921). *Hikayat Patani*. p. 7.

between sea and inland. With such fitting geographical factor in facilitating international trade, 15<sup>th</sup>-17<sup>th</sup> century was therefore a prosperous period of Patani in spices trading; foreign merchants from China, Siam, Japan, India, Arabia, Iran, and those from Europe such as Portuguese, Dutch, transported their merchandises, such as silk, ceramic, rice, pepper, tin to Patani port to trade with one another.

In its spirituality aspect, Patani had become an important center of Islamic study in the region of Southeast Asia and was reputed as a “Balcony of Mecca”; and the power of Malay culture plus that of Islam tended to engulf foreigners into Patani society. For instance, as mentioned by Nithi Aeusriwong, a Chinese young man, Lim Tho Kiam, in the tale of Spirit Lim Ko Niao, conceded to convert to Islam because he married a local princess. This tale illustrates that Patani State was able to make the Chinese man, who had brought Pattani many crafts and technology, surrender into a Malay Muslim wholeheartedly.<sup>87</sup>

The above narration of Patani is a little long-winded though, it is to provide an understanding that Thai Muslims of Malay ethnicity has an identity, namely Malay ethnicity, speaking Malay language, and being Islamic. These people have been settling in the area that long has been its own civilization; and this fact sets the Thai Malay Muslims apart from other Thai Muslims of other ethnicities who have their ancestors migrating from foreign countries.

One may ask of the reason behind the presence of Malay Muslim settlement in the central region of Thailand. The major reason why there has been migration of Malay

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<sup>87</sup> Nithi Iaosriwong (นิตี เอื้อศรีวงศ์) (2007) “A Brief History of Malay Patani.” In **Midnight Knowledge 4: Malay Studies.-Basic Knowledge of Malay People in the South.** p.23

Muslims into the central region of Thailand is that in the past when there were wars between Siam and Malay since the period of Ayutthaya unto Bangkok Period, and every time the Siam was victorious the people of Malay who were defeated would be captured into the central region, namely Ayutthaya city or Bangkok and the surrounding provinces since during those periods labors were crucial to security of the state and its economy. The captured labors might be deployed in the public works, such as to dig canals and to build city walls, or to develop new lands. Labors therefore were more valuable than the land which was abundant in Southeast Asia during the time. Nevertheless, the Muslims were allowed freedom in practicing their religion just like the foreigners of other religions were allowed to practice own religions in Thai society. However the power Malay culture receded in the later generations of the Malayan due to the mainstream national culture and the social environment; they have come to adopt Thai culture and Thai language. These Malay Muslims in the central region therefore become Thai Muslims, who mostly are engaged in farming, cultivation, fresh water fishery, and trading.

When Siam had reformed itself to become a modern nation state, it had clear-cut borderline of the nation state, all the citizens were Thai by law.<sup>88</sup> However, the Muslims in the deep-south provinces did not like to be called “Thai Muslims” as Thai people were regarded in connection to those who observed Buddhism; the Malay people could not be Thai citizens as that would be regarded as abandonment of their own religion.<sup>89</sup> These people therefore developed hatred towards Thai language as they thought that it was a language of Buddhism, thus Thai language study was not popular among them.<sup>90</sup> The

<sup>88</sup> Saowani Jitrmuad, (1988) *Op. cit.* p. 106.

<sup>89</sup> Chaweewan Prachuabmoh (จิ๋ววรรณ ประจวบเหมาะ) (2004) “Society and Culture of Malay”. In **Midnight Knowledge 4: Malay Studies Basic Knowledge of Malay People in the South**. p. 58

<sup>90</sup> Rattiya Salae. (2004). Patani Darussalam Malay-Islamic Patani. Towards the Being of “Provinces of Pattani Yala, and Narathiwat”. In **Covered History of Three Southern Provinces: Patani State During “Srivichai”. Is Older than the Historical Sukhothai**, p. 258 more please refer to Omar Farouk (1983).

being of Malay was tied to their cultural identity, language, and Islam together with the memory of history of the conflict between Siam and Malay in the past and the idea that it was they who were the real owner of the land since their forefather's times and the Siamese were the invaders. The aforementioned factors and feeling are the major factors mobilizing the Muslims of Malay ethnicity in the deep-south provinces to rise to resist the Thai authority until the present days.

### 3.2.2 CHAM ETHNIC GROUP

The Cham people are an ethnic group resulting from ethnic mix of Chinese, Khmer, Malay, and Indian; they originally settled in the present day Vietnam since the beginning of the Christian era. Around the 5<sup>th</sup> century, the Cham kings were able to gather various city states into Champa Kingdom. And in the time pursuant around the 9<sup>th</sup> century, Islam spread into Champa Kingdom, resulting in a number of Chams converting to Islam.<sup>91</sup> Champa Kingdom fought many wars with Vietnam, and many Chams were captured to the Vietnamese land in the north; besides, many Chams fled the wars in home country to take refuge in foreign lands, such as southern China, islands in the southern China Seas, around the Mekhong Delta, and Cambodia. The wars with Vietnam continued until the fall of Champa Kingdom around the 15<sup>th</sup> century.

A question may be asked regarding when the Cham Muslims had come to settle down in Thailand; the answer to this question cannot be based on clear evidence, but a check in the Ayutthaya's royal colonial by Luang Prasert Arksornniti, which is highly regarded as the most accurate narration of the events during the Ayutthaya Period, reveals

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"The Origins and Evolution of Malay - Muslim Ethnic Nationalism in Southern Thailand" **Islam and Society in Southeast Asia**. pp.250-281

<sup>91</sup> Taylor, Philip. (2007) **Cham Muslims of the Meklong: Place and Mobility in the Cosmopolitan Periphery**. pp. 67-102

an event in the year 1419 where a noble had escaped royal punishment to take refuge around Bataakhucham area. When the researcher looks into the meaning of name of the place “Bataakhucham”, “Bataa” is a Khmer word “Bantay” meaning camp while “khu” is a Thai word meaning the canal people dig to make protective obstruction or to keep water; therefore the “Batakhucham” would mean a camp or a community of Chams surrounded by protection canal. This Cambodian linguistic trace provides a clue leading to a supposition that the Cham people came from Cambodia to settle down in Ayutthaya. And when the relationship between Siam and Cambodia during the Ayutthya Period before 1419 is studied, it is found that Siam had mobilized army to attack Angkor Thom the capital city of Cambodia many times in the 15<sup>th</sup> century,<sup>92</sup> where each time of Siamese victories they would capture Cambodians including Chams back to Siamese land. Therefore, it is not surprising that there was a Cham settlement at the location of Bataakhucham which was an area outside the island of Ayutthaya City.

The wars between Siam and Cambodia persisted until the end of the beginning period of Bangkok (18<sup>th</sup> century), during the time of the wars batch after batch of Chams came to settle down in Siam at different points of time. Apart from the Chams who were captured back to Siamese land, there were also Chams who came by will to settle down in Siam in a bid to escape disasters of political struggle in Cambodia or because they did not want to live under the rule of the French who came to colonize Cambodia in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

At any rate, the study of Cham migration to Siam, forced or willing alike, cannot tell the exact number of the people or the households due to a lack of historical document. The available documents however enable us to know of the professions that the Muslim

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<sup>92</sup> Plublung Kongchana (2007). “Historical Development of Cham Community in Ayutthaya City”, **Pra Arthit Ching Duang**, pp.16-17



immigrants in Siam were engaged in, namely farming, cultivation, and trading; in addition the Chams in Ayutthaya also served the royal court in the position of Cham volunteer army. As evidenced in the document of “Three Seals Law”, the leader of the Cham volunteer army was Ok praya Rajwangsant. Besides participating in wars, the Cham leader was responsible for order of Cham community during peace time; just as the Ok Pra Chularajmontri, who was responsible for governing the Moor community. The volunteer armies however were scrapped when Siam modernized itself.

During the Bangkok Period, Cham community had become business community of silk-weaving mills in Bangkok, since Jim Thomson, an American businessman, came to engage in business of Thai silk export; therefore the Chams of Bangkok Period were engaged in silk weaving business apart from serving the government in mostly navy, or engaging in trading and in fresh water fishery.

Due to the continued trace of the past, the Chams in their old community in Ayutthaya are able to remain a community until today, likewise for the Cham community in Bangkok. Apart from these, there are yet Cham communities scattered in upcountry provinces, such as Chacherngsao and Trad Province, which is adjacent to borderland of Cambodia.

### **3.2.3 MUSLIMS OF INDONESIAN ETHNICITY**

Conversion to Islam of the Indonesian ethnic group has its connection to propagation of Islam into the area around the Southeast Asian archipelagos in similar manner of the conversion to Islam of the Muslims on the Malay Peninsula where the Muslim population saw an increase in the 13<sup>th</sup> century.

After the Dutch East India Company vocseized Celebes Island (Sulawesi), there was evidence indicating that the Indonesian Muslims who then came to settle down in Siam were Muslims from Celebes Island, which belong Indonesia nowadays. Siamese called these people “Khaek Macassar”. An evidence of the Khaek Macassar is the record about the 1686 Macassar rebellion in Ayutthaya that can be found in letters written by Westerners and the document of *The Ship of Sulaiman* prepared by Ibn Muhammad Ibrahim Rabbi, a secretary of an Iranian envoy entering Siam during the Reign of King Narai (1656 - 1688) of Ayutthaya. It therefore is evident that Muslims from Celebes Island came to settle down in Ayutthaya City.

The major reason of the Macassar rebellion was the disapproval of the prime noble, Constantine Falcon, in the court of King Narai. Falcon was a Christian and thus was viewed as the one who obstructed Muslim’s interest and disgraced Muslims.<sup>93</sup> When the related documents of the rebellion are perused, it is known that the Macassar settled down at the Klong Takian canal mouth; they were engaged in spices trading, and their community custom was the Kris Dance<sup>94</sup> which was a dance with weapon, Kris, in hands waving. Kris Dance had interested many Ayutthaya dwellers in no less degree than the Taaziyah Ritual of Shi’ah Muslims. After the Macassar rebellion however, stories about Indonesian Muslims simply disappeared.

During the Reign of King Rama V, a large number of Muslims from Java Island of Indonesia had come to settle down in Siam, such as in Bangkok. Imron Maluleem refers to

<sup>93</sup> Forbin, Chevalier. de. (1997). **The Siamese Memmories of Count Claude De Forbin 1685-1688**. Introduced and Edited by Machael Smithies. pp. 65-119

<sup>94</sup> Rabbi Muhammad Ibrahim. Ibn. (1972) **The Ship of Sulaiman** translated into English by John O’Kane p. 168

the Bangkok census of 1945, which reveals that Java Muslims were the second largest Muslim group after Malay Muslims<sup>95</sup>. The reason behind the migration of Java Muslims into Siam during the Reign of King Rama V is the invasion of the Hollanders who captured Indonesia as colony; another reason may be the aftermath of the King Rama V's trip to Java in 1870, where the King was pleased to hire Java Muslims to work in Bangkok, such gardening in west Java style.

Then during the World War II, there was another big migration of Java Muslims into Siam, however this time due to the fact the Japanese had drawn Javanese labors to build the Railway of Death in Kanjanaburi Province. After the end of the war, many Javanese decided to settle down in Bangkok and also in the southern part<sup>96</sup> of Thailand, such as Phuket Province and Phattalung Province.

The Java Muslims in Bangkok mostly settle down around the area of Trokrong Namkhaeng of Yannawa district; and along they also build Masjid Java for performing religious ritual.<sup>97</sup> Other Java Muslims in Bangkok settle down around the area of Makkasan district, along the Sansab Canal; and in Tambol Sansab, to name a few.

### 3.2.4 Muslims in the West of Thailand

Muslims in the West of Thailand in this dissertation's definition of term used consist of Burmese, Srilankan, Bangladeshi, Indian, Pakistani, Afghanistan, Arab, Iranian, and Turk. These Muslims travelled across the border to settle down in Thailand in different points of time. However, due to lack of data and the role of Muslims of some ethnicities in

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<sup>95</sup> Imron Maluleem (อิมรอน มะลูลีม) (1995) *Op cit.* p. 9

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.* p. 9

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.* p. 9

the western countries, together with political changes, such as the cases of Pakistan and Bangladesh; Pakistan separated from India after the latter gained independence from British and Bangladesh separated from Pakistan in pursuing time; it is therefore not convenient to make a clear description of the ethnic groups from each of the countries to the west of Thailand. The researcher has chosen to provide account for the ethnic groups whose data are sufficient as follows.

### 1) **Muslims of Iranian ethnicity**

When the Iranian Muslims came to settle down in Siam is not evidently known. But Raymond Scupin observes that an Iranian word “Bazaar” appears in the Sukhothai inscription No.1, which is a record produced during the period of King Ramkhamheng around the year 1292. From this observation, it may be supposed that Siam and Iran have established relationship since the 13<sup>th</sup> century. However, one Iranian word may not be sufficient to conclude that there was Iranian settlement in Sukhothai City, which was an ancient capital city of Thailand during 1249 – 1463.

The evidence that clearly links to Iranian settlement appears in a record of a Portuguese, Tome Pires. This record is a narration of foreigners in Ayutthaya City in the year 1515; and a piece of record reads “... at any rate, there are foreigners of many nationalities, namely Arab, and Persian...”.<sup>98</sup> This record tells clearly that at the beginning of 16<sup>th</sup> century there had already been Iranian settlement in Ayutthaya; the Iranians had their settlement situated on the island of Ayutthaya City. This supposition is consistent with the map indication of Moor Road in the daily record of Pastor Francois Timoleon de

<sup>98</sup> Ministry of Education (1989), *Thailand and Portugal 470 Year of Friendship* pp. 75-76

Choisy, who provided descriptions of the road in Chinese community and the road in Moors community; the two were beautiful roads of Ayutthaya City.<sup>99</sup>

The document “The Ship of Sulaiman” also provides additional information about Iranian settlement in Ayutthaya City; these Iranians were merchants, military experts, religious masters, poets, and adventurers. Most of the Iranians were Shi’ah Muslims, and they were called “Khaek Chao Sen” by the local Siamese,<sup>100</sup> while the officiating Muslims were called “Khun Nang Khaek” (Islamic noble). Among the Muslim nobles, Okphra Chularajmontri was responsible for taking care of the Moors, which included Iranians, Arabs, and Turks. One the reputed Chularajmontri is Sheikh Ahmad, who was skilled in international trade, public administration and war; he had the highest official ranking among the Muslim nobles as Okya Boworn Rajnayok. And because of him, the position of Chularajmontri had been monopolized by the Iranian Muslims until after the year 1932 which was the year of democratization of Thai administration; the Chularajmontri holders from then on were no longer from exclusively the lineage of Sheikh Ahmad.<sup>101</sup>

During the period of Ayutthaya, Iranian Muslims had higher social status than that of other Muslim groups because the Iranian Muslims were well-off nobles and had connection with the kings and with the kings’ relatives through wedlock. The Iranian Muslims have built a mosque, called Golden Mosque, or “Kudi Chao Sen”, which is located within the area of Ayutthaya Rajphat University of Ayutthaya Province.

<sup>99</sup> Choisy Francois Timoleon. de. (1863) *Journal du Voyage de Siam*. Translated into Thai by Sant T. Komolbutra (สันต์ เทวรักษ์ โกมลบุตร) p. 139

<sup>100</sup> The peoples from India or the lands of the Middle East are called by Siamese “Khaek Thes”, but the Iranians were called “Khaek Chao Sen” since the Iranian Muslims performed Taaziyah ritual during Ramadan and they chanted “Yaa Hoo Sen”, but in the Siamese ear it was like “Chao Sen” so their name came along.

<sup>101</sup> For further reading, refer to Plubplung Kongchana “History of Chularajmontri of Thailand”, *Thai-Iranian Friendship of more than 400 years*, pp.156 – 186



After the period of Ayutthaya, the Siamese capital was relocated to Thonburi City in 1767, Iranian Muslims once served as Siamese nobles in the royal court also served the royal court of Thonburi. They built several mosques in Thonburi, namely Kudi Charoenpasana and Masjid Padung Tham. Nowadays, the Iranian Muslims still practice Taaziyah ritual at the Kudi Charoenpasana and near Wat Hongsaram of Thonburi. Some of the Iranian Muslims travel to study Islam in their forefather's country, Iran, after the Islamic Revolution by Imam Khomeini; the effect is that the Iranian Muslims in the community increasingly put efforts to practicing Islam in Shi'ah way rigorously.

## 2) **Indian Muslims**

Indians have long been travelling to the lands of Southeast Asia, which they call "Suvanabhumi" since the ancient time. After Islam spread into India in the 10<sup>th</sup> century, Indian merchants continued to travel to Siam though without record evidence. Two gold coins were found by archeologists in an Ayutthaya temple; one side of the coin reads "Sultan al Adil", another side reads "Chyn al Abidin Malik" translated as "king of justice"; this King of Justice ruled Kashmir State from 1420 to 1470.<sup>102</sup> The above evidence suggests that there had been contacts between Muslims in India and Ayutthaya during the 15<sup>th</sup> century. And through the work of Imanaga Seiji, it is known that the Indian Muslim settlement was at the place called Masjid Takial Yokin, which is located on the bank of Chao Praya River to the south of Ayutthaya City; the mosque was built by Saint Chaful Rayan (Abdula bin Ibrahim), a Sufi Muslim, around the 17<sup>th</sup> century<sup>103</sup>. The fall of Ayutthaya also put an end to Indian Muslims in Ayutthaya.

<sup>102</sup> Imanaga, Seiji (2000) *Islam In Southeast Asia* p. 201

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.* p. 201

During Thonburi Period, an Indian Muslim named Adam Ali from the Indian city of Lucknow came to settle down in Thonburi about 200 years ago; he was a Shi'ah Muslim and built a mosque called Masjid Dil Barah on the Thonburi bank of Chao Praya River. Another mosque built by Indian Muslim is Masjid Saifi (Masjid Teuk Khaw); it was built in the beginning period of Bangkok by an Indian Merchant, a Shi'ah Muslim.<sup>104</sup>

In addition, a mosque called Masjid Harun situated on Bangkok bank of the river was built a Yemen Muslim, but most of the mosque visitors are Indian Muslims and Bangladeshi Muslims.<sup>105</sup>

### 3) Pakistani Muslims

After Siam had entered into the Bowring Treaty, which marks the modern history of Thailand, Pakistanis (Pakistan was still a part of India at the time) came to Siam as British subject to trade in Bangkok. These Pakistanis put up their houses in the districts of Bangrak, Mahanark, and Rajchawongs. Later during the period from the time when Pakistan went independent in 1947 to the time after the World War II, great number of Pakistani immigrants came to Thailand because it is a land of fertility<sup>106</sup>. And later on they move about to other parts of the country, such as Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, and Tak provinces in the north; Khon Kaen and Surin provinces in the northeast. Among the Muslims, Pakistani Muslims play the greatest role in economy, while their population ranks second.<sup>107</sup>

<sup>104</sup> Prayoonsak Chalayondecha, (1996) *Muslims in Thailand* p.31

<sup>105</sup> Imanaga Seiji, (2000). *Op.cit.* p.202

<sup>106</sup> Imron Maluleem. (1995). *Op. cit.* p.9

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.* p. 9

The work of Jirasak Sosan provides additional information that the first group of Muslims to have settled down in the northeast was the Pakistani Muslims who immigrated to Thailand since the World War I. The time of the Pakistani settlement coincides with the construction of the railway in the lower northeast, namely Nakhorn Rajasima, Surin, and Ubon Ratchathani, in 1900.<sup>108</sup> Due to the fact that the population of the Pakistani Muslims living in the central, northern, and northeastern parts has increased plus they have good economic status; these Muslims also are interested in participating in the Thai politics, say to become a people's representative. The researcher sees a trend that the Pakistani Muslims would play an important role in desecularization of Thai society.

#### 4) Chinese Muslims

Islam has spread into China since the founding period of Islam in the 7<sup>th</sup> century. The Chinese in Yunnan have come to observe Islam since the 13<sup>th</sup> century<sup>109</sup> thanks to the Silk Road and the expansion of power sphere of Mongol. However in the time pursuing, the religion propagated through seas from Arabian Peninsula, through Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean, the coasts of Southeast Asia, and the South China Sea to arrive at the southern part of China, such as Guang Zhou Province or Hai Nan Island. The travel of Islam continued for many centuries.

However, the Chinese Muslims of concern here are those migrating from Yunnan Province of China through Burmese land just near the northern border of Thailand to settle down, at the beginning, in Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai provinces; and later on they spread out to provinces like Lam Poon and Mae Hong Son provinces. Thai people call these Chinese Muslims from the mainland China “How” “Chin Hwo”.

<sup>108</sup> Jirasak Sosan, (2010) **Nurul Imam: Sacred Land and Muslim Identity in Pluralist of Northeastern Society**, Ass. Prof. Dr. Yaowaluk Abhicharttiwanlop ed., (จิรศักดิ์ โสตะตัน นูรุลอิมาาน และอัครดักขณมุสลิมในพหุสังคมอีสาน พศ.ดร. เขวาลักขณณ์ อภิชชาติวิศลภ บรรณาธิการ) p.5

<sup>109</sup> Berlie, Jean A. (2004) **Islam in China Hui and Uyghurs between Modernization and Sinicization**. p. 88

During the beginning period about 200 years ago, there were caravans (by horses) coming from Yunnan to Burma, Laos, and Thailand. These caravans carried with them many types of merchandise from China, such as masks and metals in bar or powder form. During the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, Yunnan exported tea, opium, bars of iron and lead, silver pieces, copper utensils (often coming from Sichuan), salt and clothing, Sandalwood and fossil-wood, which were commodities in demand in the region. At the same time Thailand furnished in return cotton, ivory, vegetable gums, European products, gold and silver dust, areca nuts, and bird's nest, which Chinese merchants brought back to sell in China<sup>110</sup>.

In the beginning period, Chinese Muslims travelled back and forth in caravans to do business between Yunnan and the northern land of Thailand. Their concrete settlement in Thailand began after a Muslim rebellion took place in Yunnan in the year 1879, which triggered off a wave of Muslim migration to foreign lands, including Thailand.<sup>111</sup> The first Chinese Muslim community in the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century was located at Wiang Ping village, Chiang Mai, by a Chinese Muslims, named Chiang Cheng Suu.<sup>112</sup> (ขุนช้างเคียงสือเกียรติ) However as time went by Chinese Muslim community at Ban How grew bigger, so some of them decided to move out and set up another Chinese Muslim community near the Chang Puek Gate of Chiang Mai;<sup>113</sup> they also built a mosque there. Nevertheless, before the period of World War II, there was not much of Chinese Muslims settlement; and until the civil war between Koumintang and communists broke out did the Chinese Muslims once again migrate to settle down on the northern Thai soil, say Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai provinces. These Chinese Muslims established a community at Sanpakhoi located to

<sup>110</sup> **Ibid.** p 89

<sup>111</sup> Imron Maluleem. (1995) **Op.cit.** p.10

<sup>112</sup> Imanaga, Seiji (2000) p. 205

<sup>113</sup> **Ibid.** p. 206

west of Ping River; and they built Masjid Attagwa<sup>114</sup> and a religious school. The Chinese Muslims have adjusted themselves well into Thai society; they have three names, one Islamic, one Chinese and one Thai; they spoken Thai language (northern Thai dialects); they dress in universal fashion like a normal Thai does. However, they pray or practice their religion strictly in the way of Hanafi Islam.<sup>115</sup>

Thai society is composed of peoples of diverse ethnicities, and it is so even within the group of Muslims. Although Muslims of each ethnic group would have their own background and own identity, the religion is what they have in common. They also see a trend of desecularization, like the Chinese Muslim community at Sanpakhoi the religious school is put up to enroll in Chinese students and Muslims of other ethnicities. The question here how the Chularajmontri should adjust itself as a religious leader while the Muslim society moves towards the end of desecularization.

### 3.3 THE HISTORY OF CHULARAJMONTRI INSTITUTE

The word “chularajmontri”, consisting of “chula” and “rajmontri”, is not a Thai word in its etymology. There are two mainstream theories regarding the first component, “chula”; one is that it is a deviated pronunciation of the Farzi word “Ulama” or “Jallah” which means ritual performer; second is that it is a deviated pronunciation of the Farsi word “Mulla” that means religious leader.<sup>116</sup> The second component, “rajmontri”, is a Sanskrit word that means aristocrat to the king. Therefore, in a dictionary “chularajmontri” is defined to be the official leader regarding Islamic affairs in Thailand and advisor to the

<sup>114</sup> Ibid. p. 207

<sup>115</sup> Ibid. p. 207

<sup>116</sup> Plubplung Kongchana (พลับพลึง คงชนะ), (2005). “History of the Position of Chularajmontri of Thailand”, *Thai-Iran Friendship: A Good Relationship of More Than 400 years*. p.161.



state regarding Islamic affairs,<sup>117</sup> or in other words the Chularajmontri is Shaikh al-Islam of Thailand.

The etymology of “chularajmontri” suggests that Chularajmontri is a position originated in foreign country and has connection with Iran. From historical fact, the organization which later on has developed into the Chularajmontri was first established in the 10<sup>th</sup> century in Khurasan State (which was located in North-eastern part of the current Islamic Republic of Iran.) However, in this era, Khurasan state was ruled by Arab under Caliph of Abbasid Dynasty (750-1258) The reason for establishing such a religious institution was to separate out the ruler’s roles and functions in religion from those in administration and politics; the roles and functions of Shaikh al-Islam of Khurasan state were mainly to provide advices regarding Islamic law (Shari’ah) to head the judges in adjudicating cases, to administer the organization of Islamic officials, and to be religious teachers.<sup>118</sup> As time passed by, religious institution of this form that was first conceived in Khurasan state had been widely adopted by many leaders in different lands, both Muslim lands and lands with Muslim minority. Further, the title of the institution had been localized, namely “chularajmontri” in Thai.<sup>119</sup>

One may be concerned of how the Chularajmontri differs from the leader of the Bureau of Buddhism (Phra Sangharacha). Phra Sangharacha is the monk installed by the King to perform the duty of administering the other monks; while the Chularajmontri is not

<sup>117</sup> **The Royal Academy Dictionary** (1999). p.320.

<sup>118</sup> Sefatgol, Mansur, (2002). **Religious Institution and Thought during the Safavid Iran of the Religious Structure in Iran 16th-18th Century**. Translate from Farsi into English by Pornpan Prongchitr. pp. 450-458. and see Imtiyaz, Yusuf. (1998, July). Islam and Democracy in Thailand: Reforming The Office of Chularajmontri / Shaikh Al – Islam. **Journal of Islamic Studies**. 2( 9) : p.283 with reference to Richard W. Bullier (1972), “The Shaikh al-Islam and the Evolution of Islamic Society,” **Studia Islamica**, pp.35, 53-4; see also Lapidus Ira M. (2002), **A History of Islamic Societies**, pp.262, 324, 358, 427, 433, 447, 602, 785, 811.

<sup>119</sup> In Iran, the leader of religions institution is called “Ulama” or “Ayatollah,” in Cambodia is Called “Muftii”; in Indonesia, is called “Majlis Ulama”. Further details may be found in Nahdlatul Ulama Indonesia. Website: [www.NU.or.id](http://www.NU.or.id). pp. 36.

ordained as is Phra Sangharacha it has the duty by tradition to lead the Muslims in practicing Islam according to the Islamic provision. However, the difference between the two is mainly in the appearance, in essence they are the same; each of them is the leader of a religious community in an area. This difference may be attributed to organization of monastery in each religion; Buddhism has the monastery separate from the secular community while in Islam monastery and secular community are in each other. This suggests that the secular sphere and religious sphere in Buddhism are separate while the two spheres are one and the same in Islam. Therefore in comparison on average Muslims are generally more religious than Buddhists, except that the latter are ordained; or in another way round, a Muslim is ordain in his/her home.

The position of Chularajmontri in Thailand may be traced back to the Ayutthaya Period (1350 – 1767), though without any clear evidence when the position was first established. The earliest record that refers to persons who took the said position is a record of a Dutch merchant who came to station in Ayutthaya City, named Van Vliet.<sup>120</sup> This historical evidence leads to the conclusion that during the reign of King Songtham (1610 – 1628) of Siam there was already the ministerial position of Chularajmontri as evidenced in Siamese nobles' records. The Chularajmontri back then had a Prestige rank (บรรดาศักดิ์) of Okloangh (ออกหลวง) or Okphra (ออกพระ); the duty of the noble (Chularajmontri) was to govern the Moors<sup>121</sup> and to accompany the King to different places. It then may be concluded that Chularajmontri was a court position originated in Ayutthaya Period, until now it has already about 400 years of history. During this period, the Chularajmontri had assumed different rules and functions in accordance with the social changes of the times.

<sup>120</sup> Baker, Chris; et al. (2005). *Op. cit.* p. 37.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.* p. 236.

The study of the current Chularajmontri necessitates study of its historical background in order that the motion picture of the office along the change of the environment may be clearly seen; and the answer as to how the office has been changing, why it has changed, and what the consequences of the changes are may be found as well. The researcher resorts to the social invention analysis of John P. Gillin<sup>122</sup> in illustrating the changes in the Chularajmontri along the history; the dimensions of social invention, namely form, function, meaning, and principle of the social phenomenon will be considered in reviewing the changes in the Chularajmontri Office. For convenience of studying the background of the Chularajmontri Office, the researcher divides the history into several periods which may not match the conventional division which relies on times of the Siamese capital cities<sup>123</sup> as the criteria of the division; since the changes in roles and functions of the Chularajmontri do not necessarily match with the time of the rises and falls of the capital cities. And one question to be asked is what the changes in the state of authority and duty of the Chularajmontri are, why the changes happened, and how the changes had impacts on the Chularajmontri in each period of the history.

The researcher sees that the changes of the Chularajmontri Office are mainly consequential of the changes in the administration of Siam; hence the Thai history is divided into three periods, namely Pre-modern Era, Modern Era, and Democracy Era. In different historical periods, there were many particular demands from the Chularajmontri Office, and that also provide the reason for having the office or the position.

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<sup>122</sup> Horton, Paul B., Hunt, Chester L., (1984), **Op. cit**, p.514.

<sup>123</sup> Ayutthaya Period (1350 – 1767), Thonburi Period ( 1767 – 1782) and Bangkok Period (1782 up to now)

### 3.3.1 CHULARAJMONTRI IN PRE- MODERN ERA

Thai historians define the Pre – Modern Era to be the period from 17<sup>th</sup> century to the end of 18<sup>th</sup> century, or the transitional period from the Ayutthaya Period to early Bangkok Period, or from the reign of King Songtham of Ayutthaya to that of King Rama III (1824 – 1851) of Bangkok. The structure of the society was Sakdina (Thai Feudal System),<sup>124</sup> which was composed of upper class people, such as the king, members of the royal family, and the nobles who assumed the function of ruling the commoners, who were freemen and slaves. This system determines the responsibilities and the rights of each person in the society; “Sakdina” is the responsibilities and the rights of a person in the society and it is quantified with “Sakdina” as the unit. Everyone in the society, except the King, is governed by being assigned with a certain number of Sakdina. For example, the crowned princess has the highest Sakdina, 100,000; the commoners have Sakdina of 25, while the slaves have 5. The relationship of people in the society depends on each other’s Sakdina. The people of higher Sakdina will enjoy higher reward and suffer higher punishment than those with lower Sakdina. The foreigners are not assigned of Sakdina but they must follow the local rule; once they come to serve in the court they will be assigned with Sakdina accordingly. The Chularajmontri, who was Iranian descendant, came to serve in the court as the head of the Right Port Department under the Ministry of Finance; he was assigned a Sakdina of 1400, the same as the head of the Left Port Department.


Regarding the form of the Chularajmontri Office, the persons who took the office in this inception period were foreigners of Iranian origin; and the office would be passed

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<sup>124</sup> The structure of Thai Sakdina (Thai Feudal System) is consisted of people of ruling class, such as the King, members of the royalty and nobles; and people of ruled class, like commoners (phrai), and slaves; in addition, there are people of specific groups, like monks, Brahmins, ascetics of other religions, and foreigners. These aforementioned groups of people have relations with one another according to provisions in the Law of Sakdina. See in **Three Seals Law** (กฎหมายตราสามดวง). p. 1-327. Wales Quaritch, H.G. (1965). **Ancient Siamese Government and Administration**. New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp. pp.69 - 134

over to the Chularajmontri's eldest son. Later on the office holders were Siamese of Iranian origin; and the succession of the office was from fathers to the eldest son or from elder brothers to younger brothers. The function of the Chularajmontri was mainly designated by the Thai administration. The Chularajmontri was a noble serving the court, which suggests that he was appointed by the King. The evidence in the Three Seals Law shows that the Chularajmontri served as the Head of the Right Port Department (as contrasted to the Left Port Department which was the ministry dealing with the Chinese Affairs); from perspective of the line of command, the Chularajmontri was under the Krom Kosādhīpatī (Finance Department), as the following diagram illustrates.

Diagram 1 Organization of the Administration as in Three Seals Law



Source: Trade Organization of Pedagogy Council. **Three Seals Law**, Volume 1, pp.219-237.

The role and function of the Chularajmontri during this era is derived from its job.

Krom Kosādhīpatī (Finance Department) administered commercial activities, such as



regulating trading; constructing and launching of royal trading boats to foreign lands; administering foreign merchants; collecting taxes; adjudicating cases of commerce and taxation. In addition, Krom Kosādhpati (Finance Department) also was responsible for administering foreigners and foreign affairs, like dispatching envoys to establish relationship with other countries; it also had the duty to receive envoys of other countries and to provide translators. The Chularajmontri had the responsibilities of similar nature but that they were limited to lands and peoples to the west of Siam, such as those in South Asia and the Middle East areas, and also those from some European countries in later period.

In normal situation, the Chularajmontri was responsible for administration of the Moors as was described by Van Vliet, which suggests that Chularajmontri would have the duties of taking care of, adjudicating cases of, and the supporter of Islamic activities in Moor society, besides being a religious master. But when there was war, Chularajmontri also functioned as the head of volunteer Moors military (Asaa Kaek), where he amassed people under his control to fight the enemy. Asaa Kaek was under the Commander of foreign volunteer military of the Defense Ministry.

It may be concluded that during this era the Chularajmontri as a noble of the Siam court assumed the roles and responsibilities as a noble of civil affairs and military affairs, which were his official functions. Apart from these, the Chularajmontri also functioned as a Mulla (religious leader) of the Muslims of Shi'ite sect; he was responsible for performing many religious activities; like Taaziyah Ritual ceremony, which was important to the Shi'ite Muslim communities, some of which still have it nowadays. The principle of the Chularajmontri may be viewed as that it was to operate in capacity of a noble of the court and in capacity of the leader of Muslims in Ayutthaya.

During the latter times, even when the capital city was relocated from Ayutthaya to Thonburi, the early period of Bangkok, until the time of King Rama III; the Chularajmontri still retained similar roles and duties. Nevertheless, after that the institution came to experience decrease in its significance. According to the study of Julispong Chularatana,<sup>125</sup> the reason behind the decline of the Chularajmontri may be attributed to fact that the Siamese influence over commerce in the western seas had declined due to loss of important ports such as Mergui, Tavoy, and Tenasserim (which was located in current of Myanmar.) And also Siam needed to defend itself from Burmese army attacking the southern cities; consequently King Rama I ordered the governor of Nakhon Si Thammarat to administer the western ports instead.<sup>126</sup> Also the collapsed of Islam Naval trade in India Ocean let to the decline of office of right port from then on, the Chularajmontri's roles and duties in administering the Right Port Department thus diminished.

In addition to the aforementioned factors leading to decline of Chularajmontri, the trading with the Chinese had expanded rapidly, especially during the latter Ayutthaya Period. This as an effect had promoted the influence of Chinese nobles, as can be seen in the fact that Chinese had become the head of Krom Kosādhīpatī and the head of Middle Department, and they had a prestige rank higher than the Chularajmontri, and the people previously under the control of the Right Port Department had been transferred to the Middle Department.

Despite the fact that the Chularajmontri institute had declined during the early Bangkok Period, the Chularajmontri was an influential noble during the reign of King Rama III due to the kinship that he had with the royalty.

<sup>125</sup> Chulispong Chularat. (2003). **Ministers of Right Port Department: Study of Roles and Duties during the Period of Ayutthaya to Rattanakosin in 2153 – 2435 B.E.**, pp. 264 – 272.

<sup>126</sup> See Wilai Pongpattharakij (1999). **The Role of Chao Phaya Surindharaja (Chan Chanharonawong): Governor General of the West Coast Provinces of Thailand, 1786 – 1807** p. 34.

To conclude, it is found that during the Pre-Modern era the Chularajmontri is characterized by three functions, namely civil, military, and religious, which were designated by the Thai authority to the Chularajmontri. The mix of the institution's roles is due to the fact that the Chularajmontri was appointed as the leader of the Moors community – a Muslim leader that is in itself both community leader and religious leader as a matter of nature. It may be observed that Thailand's adoption of Chularajmontri institute is different from the original intention of its first inception in Khurasan state, where it was established for the sole purpose of dealing with religious matters. Therefore the Chularajmontri institute has a tradition of both secular and religious functions. However, it is not proper to judge that the institution of Chularajmontri was secular in its first appearance in Siam; the reason is that Islam is a religion which has a lot of detailed observances being incorporated into everyday life of Muslims, the so-called secular life of a Muslim in fact has a lot of religious elements inseparable from his everyday life. Therefore, to rule a Muslim community is to rule them both civilly and religiously; a Muslim leader such as the Chularajmontri, is therefore not secular by his civil function.

### 3.3.2 Chularajmontri in Modern Era

Thai historians define the Modern era to be from the King Rama IV (1858 – 1868) to the King Rama V (1868 – 1910) until the reign of King Rama VI (1910 – 1925), during which modernization of Siam was initiated. The process of Thai modernization was in fact an imitation of the West, since by definition modernization is brought about by industrialization; however, Thailand started its modernization without much of the support of industrialization but by imitating the west. During the reign of King Rama V, there has been a major reform in administrative system where various administrative functions were ministerialized. The Chularajmontri during this period took the form of nobility of the

court; succession was from fathers to eldest sons or elder brothers to younger brothers depending on the intention of the King.

However, it is during this period when the Chularajmontri's meaning was marginalized and its function trivialized. At the time when Siam had reformed itself by imitating the modernization of the West; King Rama IV ordered to improve the administration especially in the areas of trading and foreign affairs, which was under the responsibility of the Chularajmontri. However, the Chularajmontri then was prominent in resisting the West, which, though was King Rama III's policy, was not during the reign of King Rama IV who accepted and adopted modernization. And it may be due to this fact, the Chularajmontri former duty of collecting taxes on in-bound goods was transferred to other agencies, thus further shedding commercial influence of the Chularajmontri office. Furthermore, King Rama IV was pleased to have westerners transferred from the Right Port Department to serve in the Middle Port Department, resulting in the Chularajmontri losing its job in foreign affairs. Nevertheless, the Chularajmontri of this era were still under Krom Kosāhipatī as before, but the jobs at hand were inventory handling and book-keeping for the goods presented to the King.<sup>127</sup> It was until the year 1892 during the reign of King Rama V that all the port departments were disestablished due to re-organization of the public administration.


Nevertheless due to kinship with the royalty, the Chularajmontris managed to serve in court as noble, like as advisor in the Court of Foreign Cases or in Ministry of Justice. It is until the time of modernization activated by King Rama V was the Chularajmontri relocated to assume duties as officials in the Stamp Department, which was to collect

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<sup>127</sup> Chulispong Chularat. (2003). *Op.cit.* pp. 327 – 328.

duties and stamp taxes on petitions from foreign courts.<sup>128</sup> After King Rama V modernized Siam and established ministries in his administration; the Chularajmontri was in the Stamp Department of the Court of Foreign Cases under the Ministry of Justice.<sup>129</sup>

**Diagram 2** Administrative Reform during the Reign of King Rama V 1892



Source: Improved on Buncha Kaewketthong (1979) **Administrative Reform ation by King Rama V**. pp. 10 -13.

In year 1902 during the reign of King Rama V, Siam had authority over Narathiwat, Pattani, Yala, and Satun after negotiating with Britain.<sup>130</sup> The majority of the population in

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.* p. 335.

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 329 – 335, the speech of the King Rama V in explaining the administrative reform and the royal letters that the King had with Somdet Phra Maha Samanachao Krom Phraya Wajirayanwaroros. (1997). The King IX granted the print and distribution during the procession of granting royal cremation fire to the body of Mr. Kan Israsena Na Ayutthaya on March 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1997, pp. 13 – 76.

<sup>130</sup> Pensri Duck, “Thai – British Treaty” on March 10<sup>th</sup>, 1909 in **Foreign Affairs and Thai Independence and Sovereignty (From King Rama IV to Regime of Marshal Piboonsongkhram)**. p. 90. In this treaty Thailand was to transfer states of Kalantan, Tranganu, and Palit to Britain, who further demanded Thailand to give them Satun, Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat; but Thailand refused. For further reference, please see Marks, Tom. (1891). **The British Acquisition of Siam Malaya (1896-1009)**, pp. 26-62.



these areas was Muslim; as a result the Chularajmontri functioned as a link between the central authorities and the religious notables of the Muslim community.<sup>131</sup>

To conclude, the change in the Chularajmontri during the early Modernization era is that it had been shed of all official functions in administration but religious ones as a religious leader that they had performed since the Ayutthaya Period; the Office continued to lead in performing religious rituals of Shi'ite Muslims. For example, during the Reign of Rama V, the ritual of Taaziyah hosted by the Chularajmontri was sponsored by the Siamese Royal Court and was often presided by the King or His delegates,<sup>132</sup> such royal patronage of Islamic affair in effect helps in heightening the status of the Chularajmontri as the leader of Islam in Thai society. The Chularajmontri during this period no longer went to the battle field nor did he administer the foreign trades; but the Chularajmontri was still an official of the king and had to perform many secular functions; in addition he also came to have close kinship relation with the royal family. Such development laid a ground for further secularization in the Chularajmontri in later period.

### 3.3.3 CHULARAJMONTRI IN DEMOCRACY ERA

Thai historians define the Democracy Era to be from the 1932 coup d' etat during the reign of King Rama VII (1925 -1934) up until now. This period has been dominated by the western-educated liberalists, who had been sent to study abroad during the Modern Era; after coming back most of them assumed leadership positions in Siam. These liberal leaders played an active role in secularizing Thai society; and politically they had caused the political system to be changed from the Absolute Monarchy to Constitutional Monarchy. However, the government during the staid period was not a true democratic one;

<sup>131</sup> Imtiyaz Yusuf, (2009). *Op. cit.* p. 284.

<sup>132</sup> Chupispong Chularat, (2003). *Op.cit.* pp. 332-333.

Chai-Anan Samudavanija called it “a stable semi-democracy”,<sup>133</sup> as there was coup's usurping the democratic governments from time to time during the period.

During the transitional period of Thai political system, Thai government was devoid of the Chularajmontri, who was considered as a legacy power of the Absolute Monarchy. Nevertheless, the first Chularajmontri (1945 – 1947) of the Era, Cham Promyong (Hajji Shamsuddin Mustafa), was appointed by the democratic government for political and administrative reason of saving the south provinces from separation after the end of WWII;<sup>134</sup> as during the Modern Era the Chularajmontri was appointed by the King Rama VIII, with the nomination of the Prime minister, then Pridi Phanomyong, since Cham Phromyong was a close alliance who fought together with Pridi Phanomyong in reforming the administration.<sup>135</sup> Cham Phromyong, who came to resume the position of Chularajmontri after a long time vacancy, was also the first Chularajmontri that was not from the lineage of Iranian Muslim, Shiite Muslim descending from the Ayutthaya Period. The form of the Chularajmontri had changed during this Era; namely Cham Phromyong as the Chularajmontri had a status of a government official,<sup>136</sup> instead of its former status as a noble of the court; and Cham Phromyong was not an Iranian Thai but was an Indian-Malay Muslim of Sunni sect; further the Office of Chularajmontri was no longer succeeded within family line. The Chularajmontri, however, was but an advisor to the King over Islamic affairs.<sup>137</sup>

It is noteworthy that Cham Phromyong was the first Chularajmontri who had received education in the Middle East; he used to study at al-Assha University, a reputed

<sup>133</sup> Imtiyaz Yusuf, (2009) *Op.cit.* p.278. (With reference to Chai-Anan Samudavanija, “Thailand: A Stable Semi-democracy” in *Democracy in Developing Countries*).

<sup>134</sup> Supoj Dantrak. (2004). *Op. cit.* pp. 66-80.

<sup>135</sup> Muhammad Laisuri, (1989). *Op. cit.* p. 15.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.* p.14.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.* p.13.

Islamic university in Egypt.<sup>138</sup> Therefore, despite a short period of only 2 years in the institute, Cham Phromyong had established a standard of the administration, such as supporting the Islamic law to be enforced in the four southern provinces, Narathiwat, Pattani, Yala, and Satun in the year 1946; he also appointed Islamic judges to adjudicate cases of family and inheritance matters by applying the Islamic law in the four southern provinces; and he also established Islamic colleges.<sup>139</sup> The achievements of Chularajmontri Cham are therefore the facts indicating that he was able to sustain religiosity of the Muslims by emphasizing education and community unity while the majority of the leaders in other sectors of Thai society were secular.<sup>140</sup>

The next Chularajmontri of the Democracy Era was Tuan Suwanasatsana (Hajji Ismaail Yahyawi), who held the office from 1948 to 1981; Chularajmontri Tuan Suwanasatsana was a Muslim from Bangkok, and the second Sunni in the position. Chularajmontri Tuan Suwanasatsana was elected from among the chairpersons of the Provincial Councils of Islamic Affairs (PCIA) of then the 24 provinces, under the provision of the Royal Decree 1945 regarding Patronage of Islam.<sup>141</sup> By the said royal decree the selection of the Chularajmontri was organized by the Ministry of Interior, and it was the first time the Chularajmontri was filled through a secular means. At the mean time, Chularajmontri Tuan Suwanasatsana was unlike the other previous ones, namely he was not a government official nor a noble but a commoner of high prestige, who was knowledgeable of Islamic teaching and worthy of respect among Muslims.<sup>142</sup> As a

<sup>138</sup> from interview with Mr. Chaisak Phromyong, son of the late Chularajmontri Cham Phromyong at the Institute of Asia Pacific Studies, Srinakharinwirot University on March 19<sup>th</sup>, 2003.

<sup>139</sup> Laisuri, Muhammad. (2004). *Op.cit.* pp. 31-32.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.* p.15

<sup>141</sup> The Royal Decree 1945 regarding Patronage of Islam was promulgated in the *Royal Gazette*, issue 62, section 26, dated Nov. 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2488 B.E. (1945).

<sup>142</sup> Amnuoy Suwanakijboriharn et al., "Preface" *Op. cit.* p. 7. in the same article, it is stated that initially the Field Marshal Preak PhibunSonghram asked for advice of the qualification of the person to be the

religious master, Chularajmontri Tuan Suwanasatsana had, besides restoring Mawlid Festival that celebrates the birth of the Prophet Muhammad, established religious schools and had left a major work, namely the translation of al Qur'an as according to the intention of the King Rama IX. The King saw that many countries had already arranged to have al Qur'an translated into their native languages; translation of al Qur'an into Thai was a pride of the nation and would enable the Thai Muslims who did not understand Arabic well to study the principle of the religion conveniently and widely; also it would open door to more people who were interested in Islam to study of and understand the teaching of Islam correctly.<sup>143</sup>

During the institute term of Chularajmontri Tuan Suwanasatsana, the institute functioned as a coordinator for various government agencies in regarding the religious affairs and Muslim societies; he also played a role in connecting with the foreign countries regarding the religious affairs and Muslim society; for instance, heading the representatives of Thailand in conferences and debates in Pakistan in 1958; or being invited to have a field trip in Saudi Arabia; and heading the Thai representatives to participate in rehearsing installing al Qur'an in Malaysia in 1961.<sup>144</sup>

The major change in the Chularajmontri is that the Chularajmontris were not in the form of nobility any longer but were religious masters, and they performed duties under the provision of the Royal Decree 1945 regarding Patronage of Islam, with the article 3 stating that the Chularajmontri shall perform duties under the King regarding the royal patronage of Islam, and the article 6 stating that the Chularajmontri shall chair the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand by position. However later on, the royal decree was revised

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Chularajmontri, and Mr. Samad Iamwiroj, a representative from the south advised he should be a man of religion.

<sup>143</sup> Tuan Suwanasatsana, (1969) "Preface" *Al Qur'an: A Literal Translation and Interpretation*. p. 7.

<sup>144</sup> Amnuoy Suwanakijboriharn. et al. *Op. cit.* p. 6.

and promulgated in 1948 in the article 3, which stated that the King shall appoint the Chularajmontri for the purpose of providing advices regarding religion to the ministry of Education over the royal patronage of Islam and appropriate budgets shall be allocated to the Chularajmontri Office.<sup>145</sup> The Chularajmontri therefore performed secular functions along side with religious functions; and the achievements of the Chularajmontri were widely recognized both among the Muslims and among the non-Muslims that the Chularajmontri was an Islamic religious leader in Thailand.

After the departure of Chularajmontri Tuan Suwanasatsana, the Ministry of Interior invited the chairpersons of the Provincial Councils of Islamic Affairs (PCIA) of the then 26 provinces to convene in order to select the new Chularajmontri; the selection result was Hajji Prasert Muhammad, a Sunni Muslim from Bangkok, holding the office from 1981 to 1997.

Again after Chularajmontri Tuan Suwanasatsana, Chularajmontri Prasert Muhammad (Ahmad Bin Muhammad) came to the office by a secular means of selection; and he was to perform duties as stated in the Royal Decree 1945. Furthermore, the Chularajmontri also played a role in solving unrest in the south by collaborating with the Division of Administration of Southern Border Provinces (DASBP) with a policy of “religion leading politics” which is a policy in line with Islamic way of not dividing religion from politics; religion and politics were blended seamlessly but were not interfering each other.<sup>146</sup> Chularajmontri Prasert Muhammad meanwhile was a religious teacher, who had studied religion in Mecca of Saudi Arabia and established a religious school and taught there on Saturdays. During this era, there were many Islamic scholars

<sup>145</sup> **The Royal Gazette**, issue 65, section 77, dated Dec. 31<sup>st</sup>, 2491 B.E. (1948)

<sup>146</sup> Samart Meesuwan. Editor. (2006). Biography of Chularajmontri Hajji Prasert Muhammad, **Sarn Miftah**, issue 20, year 7, May – August, 2549. p p. 16-17.



who had finished their religious studies abroad; they had contributed to the advancement of Islamic study in Thailand by, say, preparing religious manuals of Islam for the government official, which is very useful even for now.<sup>147</sup>

As for the Chularajmontri's role in building relationship with Muslim countries, Libya, which was reputed as a rigorous Islamic country and had an association for propagating Islam to the world, appointed Chularajmontri Prasert Muhammad the Islam propagator of Thailand.<sup>148</sup>

It is observed that the form of the Chularajmontris of this era is religious master, which is a heritage of Chularajmontri Tuan Suwanasatsana. The form and function of the Chularajmontri institute is therefore concentrated of religiosity amidst the constant turmoil of the politics. During the era the Islamic movements came into Thailand through the Chularajmontri, which as a result was a religious institution recognized by both Muslims and non-Muslims; the decisions of the Institute were therefore widely accepted and observed.<sup>149</sup>

During the term of Chularajmontri Prasert Muhammad, a group of Muslim politicians, called Wahdah, proposed some reform in the Chularajmontri. For example, it was proposed to have a revision in the Royal Decree 1945 to provide for direct election of the Chularajmontri or that the Chularajmontri should have a term in institute up to an age of 70 instead of lifetime.<sup>150</sup> Chularajmontri Prasert Muhammad disagreed with reason that the said proposed revision of the royal decree would create division among Muslims, and the direct election of the Chularajmontri and the term limitation had no precedent, nor did

<sup>147</sup> Muhammad Laisuri, (2004). **Op. Cit.** p.82.

<sup>148</sup> **Ibid.** p.37

<sup>149</sup> Chularajmontri Office, The reply of the Chularajmontri regarding the religious conflicts, Saranmitrah, **Ibid.** pp.29-38 and Chularajmontri regarding religious issues **Ibid.** pp.39-61.

<sup>150</sup> Imtiyaz, Yusuf. (2009). **Op. cit.** p.292.

it have any parallel practices in other religions, such as Buddhism and Christianity. The dispute over these issues was never settled but came to a compromise, which however was not enacted until the Chularajmontri Prasert Muhammad came to the end of his life in August 1997. Four months later, the Islamic Administrative Law 1997 was promulgated.<sup>151</sup> The law however does not stipulate direct election of the Chularajmontri or the term limit of the Chularajmontri.

Chularajmontri Sawad Sumalayasak (Hajji Ahmad Mamudsun Kore), a Bangkokian, holding the institute since 1997 until 2010, is the first Chularajmontri being selected under the provision of the Islamic Administrative Law 1997, and is the fourth of the Democracy Era.

Chularajmontri Sawad Sumalayasak is a Muslim of Sunni sect, who has a background of religious teacher who has been trained by a famous religious teacher; namely Mustafa Galimi, father of the late Chularajmontri Cham Phromyong; Chularajmontri Sawad Sumalayasak is also a disciple of Chularajmontri Tuan Suwanasatsana. Furthermore Chularajmontri Sawad Sumalayasak also furthered his religious education in Mecca of Saudi Arabia before serving as a government official taking a teaching post in Islamic College of Thailand; meanwhile, he also started the Islamic radio broadcasting.<sup>152</sup> Another of his important experiences is that he has resigned as a state official to enter politics as a partisan of Democrat Party and was twice elected as a representative of Bangkok; he is therefore the first Chularajmontri who has been a politician.

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<sup>151</sup> Ibid. p.296

<sup>152</sup> Adulah Antris. Editor et al. (2002). History of Sawad Sumalayasak, **Congratulations to the Chularajmontri in the Occasion to received the Deceration "Dirakekunaporn" in the year 2001.** p.5

When the background of the Chularajmontri Sawad Sumalayasak is studied, he is found to be a man of both secular and religious world; in addition, it is also due to the provisions of the Islamic Administrative Law 1997 which requires the Chularajmontri to play a role of both religiosity and secularity. In other words, the 6<sup>th</sup> article of the Islamic Administrative Law 1997 states that the King appoints a person to be the Chularajmontri for the purpose of being the Islamic leader in Thailand, with the person being nominated by the Prime Minister, and with the nomination being approved by the Provincial Councils of Islamic Affairs (PCIA) in Thailand.<sup>153</sup> And the 16<sup>th</sup> article of the Law states that the Chularajmontri has the following authorities and duties: to provide advices and recommendations to the state regarding Islamic affairs; to appoint qualified personnel to fill the advisory committees in drafting acts regarding Islamic affairs; to issue the results of observing the moon in order to determine the important Islamic religious dates; to issue the conclusions of the judgments regarding the acts of Islamic affairs. As the Law above designates, the major function of Chularajmontri is as a consultant to the government, but later becomes a consultant to the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Education;<sup>154</sup> the Chularajmontri is under the Department of Religious Affairs under the Ministry of Education. According to Dr. Imtiyaz Yusuf, the main functions of the Chularajmontri as the head of the Islamic Center of Thailand are to represent Thai Muslims at the national level; to issue *fatawa* (religious rulings); to regulate the administration of registered mosques; to distribute subsidies and grants to the mosques; to maintain a register of names of all the registered mosques; to publish Islamic religious literature; to declare the celebration of Islamic festivals such as *'Id al-Fitr* and *'Id al-Adha*, to organize the annual *Mawlid* celebration; to co-ordinate travel arrangements for the *hajj*; to appoint the *amir al-*

<sup>153</sup> Islamic Administrative Act. (1997). ministerial regulations and rules relating to administration of Islamic organizations in Thailand. **The Royal Gazette**, issue 114, section 65 kor, Nov. 9<sup>th</sup>, 1997, Chapter General, article 6.

<sup>154</sup> **Ibid.** Chapter 3 Islamic Center of Thailand. p.

*hajj* for Thai pilgrims; to grant religious certification of *halal* for food items produced by the Thai food industry and other notarial services.<sup>155</sup>

The fact that Office of Chularajmontri carries with it religious and social prestige at the national level and it includes various socio-economic benefits has resulted in the institution being jumbled with secularity; and this has led to heavy criticism of the office later on.<sup>156</sup>

### 3.4 CURRENT SITUATION OF CHULARAJMONTRI AND ITS PROBLEMS

The root of the problem that many groups of the Muslims have lowered their trust in Chularajmontri institute is that the Chularajmontri is more secular than is religious and thus no longer the same one as supposed to be. By examining the current process of selecting a person to be the Chularajmontri and the status of Chularajmontri as stipulated in Islamic Administrative Act 1997, which is the latest operative statute that provides for authorities and duties of the Chularajmontri; it is found that the statute has resulted in the Chularajmontri having double statuses, namely simultaneously the religious leader of Thai Muslims and the chairperson of the Islamic Organization of Thailand, of which the function is secularly administrative.

#### 3.4.1 THE PROCESS OF ASSUMING THE POSITION OF CHULARAJMONTRI AT PRESENT

After Thailand has come to have democratic administration in 1932, the effect to the Chularajmontri is that the religious institution has become more secularized. The reason is that the government which selects eligible person to fill the position of

<sup>155</sup> Imtiyaz Yusuf, (). **Op. cit.** p.285.

<sup>156</sup> Imtiyaz Yusuf, (2002). **Ob cit.** with reference to Omar Farouk, **The Muslims of Thailand**, p.114.

Chularajmontri has its political agenda in doing so. As in the case of Hajji Cham Promyong, he was appointed by King Rama VIII but under advice of the government to be the Chularajmontri in 1945; before this the King was the one to select and appoint qualified persons to fill the position of the Chularajmontri.

Cham Promyong though was qualified with knowledge in religion and required experiences from studying and traveling abroad,<sup>157</sup> however he was expected by the government to fulfill the mission of solving the problem of separatism in the Deep-south provinces of Thailand<sup>158</sup> and also the problem of British influence roaming in the northern part of the Malay Strait after WWII.<sup>159</sup>

As a result, the persons who are selected to fill the position of Chularajmontri ever since the Democracy Era are purported to perform political function primarily and secondarily religious ones; the rule of the Chularajmontri in religious affairs is thereafter not very clear and are ceremonial in nature. And due to the political reason behind Cham Promyong's coming to the Chularajmontri position, he was ousted also for political reason in 1947 and had to take exile in foreign country.<sup>160</sup> This incident had grave impact on the Chularajmontri institute as the widely revered leader of Islam in Thailand; the person who took the position of Chularajmontri was suppose to hold it for lifetime, but the reality was that he was no different from a secular politician who is nothing of sacredness, once having lost power would have to flee.

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<sup>157</sup> Chularajmontri Cham Phromyong, studied religion in Mecca; he also attended Al-Asha University in Egypt and had traveled to many countries in Asia and Europe. His spirit of revolution was inspired by the revolution of the Young Turk in Turkey where he happened to be residing when the revolution took place. Cham Phromyong also spoke several foreign languages.

<sup>158</sup> Supoj Dantakual. (2004). *Op. cit.* p.121.

<sup>159</sup> Report "In memory of Uncle Cham Promyong, the Late Chularajmontri and the Continued Legacy" *Islamic Guidance Post* (ทางนำ), August 25<sup>th</sup>, 2532, p.13.

<sup>160</sup> In 1947, Lieutenant General Phin Chunhawan launched a coup and seized power; the supporters of the former government, with Chularajmontri Cham Phromyong one of them, had to flee the country and position of Chularajmontri was deserted.



After the period of Chularajmontri Cham Promyong, Marshal Plaek Phiboonsongkram who came to power as the Prime Minister and the minister of the Interior invited the chairpersons of all the Provincial Islamic Committees to select the Chularajmontri in 1948, and the outcome was Chularajmontri Tuan Suwannasartsana, who collected the highest votes.<sup>161</sup>

1948 was the year of adopting the method of selecting the Chularajmontri by Provincial Islamic Committees, where the chairpersons of the Provincial Islam Committees would vote to select from the eligible persons the person with the highest votes to assume the position of Chularajmontri; this selection method is being in use until now. After Chularajmontri Tuan Suwannasartsana pass away in 1981, the Ministry of Interior held a selection where the chairpersons of Provincial Islamic Committees selected an eligible person to be the Chularajmontri. The result was that Hajji Prasert Muhammad, a reputed Islamic religious teacher, was selected to hold the position; Hajji Prasert Muhammad in addition was appointed by the King to chair the Islamic Committee of Thailand<sup>162</sup>; he held the positions from 1981 – 1997. After decease of Chularajmontri Prasert Muhammad, chairpersons of Provincial Islamic Committees selected Hajji Sawasd Sumalayasak, a member of the Islamic Committee of Thailand and member of the Parliament,<sup>163</sup> to be the Chularajmontri, and he holds the up until 2010.

In the past, during the period of absolute monarchy, the Chularajmontri position holders were selected by the King; but during the beginning of the change of administrative system, the government would select and nominate the Chularajmontri-to-

<sup>161</sup> Amnuoy Suwannakijboriharn, () **Op.cit.** p.50.

<sup>162</sup> Samart Meesuwat. editor, et al. (2006). Biography of Chularajmontri Hajji Prasert Muhammad .**Op. cit.** special issue, the 20<sup>th</sup> issue of 7<sup>th</sup> year, May - August, 2006. p. 15-17.

<sup>163</sup> Amnuoy Suwankiborihan. (nd.). **Op. cit.** pp.4 – 5.

be to the King for royal appointment. Later with the enactment of Islamic Administrative Act 1997, the government then has the members of Provincial Islamic Committees to select a person eligible for the position of Chularajmontri; after the person is obtained, the Ministry of Interior would propose the person to the Prime Minister, who then would then nominate him to the King for further royal appointment.

Such process of selecting the Chularajmontri has in effect rendered the position secular like a normal political position. Since the beginning of the selection process, those who want to be the Chularajmontri would need to solicit votes by resorting to usual election techniques which are normally adopted by politicians; like forming parties with supporters, traveling around the country to solicit votes with other Provincial Islamic Committees, asking for assistance and promising return with politicians who have influence over votes. All these vote soliciting activities and other selection procedures, such as candidate background checking, need fund, man power, and time; it is estimated that those who have chance to become Chularajmontri may consume up to no less than one million baht budget per person.<sup>164</sup> It is unthinkable how the Chularajmontri can be sanctified as a religious entity if it is created through money and some dirty political tactics.

The means that such way of obtaining the position of Chularajmontri has rendered the one who wins the position indebted with favors that supporters have provided along the selection process; payback is a tacit promise. Some supporters may by the way come to important positions in Islamic organizations, such as the offices that certify documents and persons, like persons who are going for Hajj, or Halal food certification.<sup>165</sup> Due to the above consequences and effects, Chularajmontri selection has led to partying and conflict

<sup>164</sup> Muhammad Raisulree. (ไอศูรี มุฮัมหมัด). (2004). **Who Define the Muslim Society?** (ใคร....กำหนดสังคมมุสลิม). p.40. (This act was drafted during the latter period of the Chularajmontri Prasert Muhammad)

<sup>165</sup> Ibid. p.48.

among Muslims, which provide a chance for the politicians to have influence over the Chularajmontri, who then would work for the interest of the politicians besides fulfilling the duties as provided in the Act 2540.

With the background of assuming the office of Chularajmontri studied, it is found that the Chularajmontri has been partially secularized along the development of Thai society. However, at the meantime, the Muslim society which has a characteristic of strong religiosity in their everyday life as ever due to Islamic teaching and provision has seen a movement of Islamic revivalism. It is that Muslims around the world are keen to change themselves and their communities to tally with the true Islam, instead of going with the flow of western secularization; and it is clearly observable in various Islamic movements at both international level and local level.

### **3.4.2 THE TWO HATS OF CHULARAJMONTRI**

Chularajmontri Sawasd Sumalayasak is the first Chularajmontri to have been selected under the Islamic Administrative Act 1997.<sup>166</sup> And due to this Act, the current Chularajmontri is the one with two concurrent statuses as follows.

#### **3.4.2.1 CHULARAJMONTRI AS THE LEADER CONCERNING ISLAMIC AFFAIRS**

The said Act states that the King shall appoint the Chularajmontri as the leader concerning Islamic affairs in Thailand;<sup>167</sup> and the Chularajmontri has the following duties and authorities.

1. To provide advices and recommendations to the authority concerning Islamic affairs
2. To appoint qualified persons to be advisors regarding Islamic provisions

<sup>166</sup> Ibid. p.45

<sup>167</sup> Islamic Administrative Act 2540 B.E. (1997). Article 6, section 1, general

3. To announce the result of moon observation as according to article 35 (11)<sup>168</sup> in deciding important religious days
4. To pronounce judgments as according to Islamic provision


In considering the authorities and duties of Chularajmontri in the Act 1997, the Chularajmontri has a status of the leader concerning Islamic affairs in Thailand as the position holder is knowledgeable enough to provide advices and recommendations to the authority and that he is the one qualified to judge over the disagreements regarding Islamic matters. Formerly the judgments were commonly over the ritual matters being practiced in Thailand, like Wai Kru ceremony or other ritual matters that Muslims think may violate the Islamic provisions.

#### **3.4.2.2. CHULARAJMONTRI AS THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE CENTRAL ISLAMIC COMMITTEE OF THAILAND**

It is stipulated in the Act 1997 that there shall be one committee named “the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand”, which is composed of the Chularajmontri and other committee members, and the Chularajmontri shall be the chairperson of the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand. In the above situation the secularity of the Chularajmontri is clearly seen. However, before considering the Chularajmontri in this status, it is necessary to understand the organization structure of the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand as depicted in the following figure.

<sup>168</sup> **Islamic Administrative Act 2540 B.E.** (1997). Article 35 regarding duties and authorities of the Mosque Committee; item 11 is about moon observation and reporting of it to the provincial Islamic committee.

### Organization Chart of Islamic Organization in Thailand



Source: by the researcher, according to the **Islamic Administration Act 2540 B.E. (1997)**.

The organization structure of the Islamic organization is composed of the following committees of different levels, namely,

**Mosque Committees**, of which the committee members are selected from mosque men who have registered with each of the 3,507 mosques over 64 provinces of Thailand.<sup>169</sup>

**Provincial Islamic Committees**, of which the committee members are selected from mosque committees in the provinces with no less than 3 mosques and there are 36 such provinces.

<sup>169</sup> There are 3,507 mosques, which have been registered with the Ministry of Interior, in 64 of Thailand's 76 provinces. Further details of the mosques are available in [www.thaiislamic.com](http://www.thaiislamic.com), and further information of mosque committees may be found in the **Islamic Administrative Act 2540 B.E. (1997)**. Articles 23 to 29.



**The Central Islamic Committee of Thailand**, which is composed of the members who are selected from Provincial Islamic Committees and are representatives of their own provinces, one from each province. Other members are selected by the Chularajmontri and they make up one third of the provincial representatives in the Central committee.<sup>170</sup>

By chairing the Central Islamic Committee, the Chularajmontri has the following authorities and duties.

1. To provide advices to the minister of Interior and the minister of Education in enforcing the said Islamic Administrative Act
2. To provide advices or recommendations regarding Islam to the provincial Islamic committees and the mosque committees
3. To appoint sub-committees to perform duties as been assigned by the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand
4. To issue regulations regarding asset administration and interest pursuing of the offices of provincial Islamic committees and mosque committees
5. To issue regulations regarding proceeding and controlling of the administration in provincial Islamic committees and mosque committees
6. To perform the duty in capacity of the provincial Islamic committee for the province which does not have its own provincial Islamic committees; in such case, the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand may also delegate a provincial Islamic committee of a nearby province to perform such duty

<sup>170</sup> Currently, Thailand is divided into 77 administrative divisions, or provinces. But there are 36 Provincial Islamic Committees from 36 provinces, each of which has Muslim population and at least 3 registered mosques. For further information, refer **Islamic Administrative Act 2540 B.E. (1997)**. Article 23 to 29.

7. To consider and to judge objection petitions as stipulated in article 41.<sup>171</sup>
8. To realistically keep accounts of assets, documents, expenses and revenues of the office of the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand
9. To issue announcements and guarantees regarding Islamic affairs
10. To promote religious activities and Islamic studies
11. To coordinate with government agencies concerned with Islamic affairs
12. To perform other duties as stipulated in the Islamic Administrative Act 1997

That the above 12 items of authorities and duties are performed by the Chularajmontri in capacity of the chairperson of the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand has in effect led the Chularajmontri to perform administrative functions, especially in issuing regulations to regard assets and interest pursuing activities of offices of provincial Islamic committees and mosque committees; or bookkeeping of asset, documents and expense and revenues of the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand. These are too much mundane activities for a religious leader.

The simultaneous functions of the Chularajmontri, one as religious leader and another as administrator, has created a dilemma and weakness in the current Chularajmontri. As religious leader, it is desired that the Chularajmontri should hold the position for life time so as to create an air of sacredness around the position; while the Chularajmontri also has to perform secular functions, such as the chairperson of the Central Islamic Committee, so as an administrator the term in office is supposed to be

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<sup>171</sup> **Islamic Administrative Act 2540 B.E. (1997).** Category 5, regarding Mosque Committee; article 41 states that Mosque committee members shall be out of office if they fall under criteria as stipulated in article 40 (4), (5), and (6), namely short of qualification or having undesirable qualities as designated in the Act, or mosque men of no less than half of the total have petitioned to terminate certain committee members and the provincial Islamic committee has investigated the case and judged that the concerned committee members shall be terminated; or the provincial Islamic committee has investigated to find that the concerned committee members misbehave, defect in duty, run the mosque in an improper and destabilizing way, or in a way in conflict with Islamic principle or in conflict with interest of the mosque.

limited, but in fact it is lifetime due to his simultaneous religious function; and that simply invites criticism. In short, lifetime in position of the Chularajmontri has created two simultaneous antagonistic effects of sacredness and secularity in the Chularajmontri and in the institution. At the end, secularity is perceived to be defilement and stain that degrades sacredness and charismatic authority of the Chularajmontri. This is a structural weakness, along with the process of coming to the position, in the Chularajmontri Office that needs improvement.

Now Islamic revivalism which is a strong movement of desecularization among the Muslims around the world is inevitable due to globalization. One effect is the above antagonistic situation of the Chularajmontri plus the current trend of desecularization and strong religiosity of Muslims have plunged the Chularajmontri Office into credibility crisis. The question here is whether the Chularajmontri Office can sustain itself in the Thai society in the wake Muslim desecularization.

### **3.5 CHARISMATIC AUTHORITY AS THE REAL AUTHORITY OF CHULARAJMONTRI**

For the purpose of sustaining itself under the aforementioned critical circumstance, the Chularajmontri must rectify the twisted structure and the elements currently existing in the institution; namely a religious entity should, by its nature, perform religious functions and should have authority compatible with its religious function, that is, as the researcher observes and proposes charisma and charismatic authority.

The thesis of this chapter, which is also the fundamental thesis on which all arguments herein ride on, is that charisma of a religious leader is the real religious authority; all the legal authorities (by contents and formats are antagonistic to religious authority) that have been conferred to the Chularajmontri and the Institution, by Islamic Administrative Law 1997, do more vice than virtue in empowering the Chularajmontri.

The researcher chooses to focus on improvement in charismatic authority of the Chularajmontri because the way that the Institution is created and run is not done out of the understanding of the nature of religion but due to reasons of administration and economy, and of convenience and ignorance. Of course, if secularization theory is right, eventually the researcher's thesis of charismatic authority as the real authority of the Chularajmontri will be proved wrong as well; and the institution of Chularajmontri would eventually become a secular administrative agency or simply be disbanded in the end. But the fact is opposite, people are as religious as ever, and secularization theory is wrong; the institution should have authority suitable to its nature; a religious organization should be equipped with real religious authority, which comes from charisma. Another reason for focusing on improving its authority is that it is a structural problem and a resolution of it may probably lead to a concrete and long-lasting frog-leap improvement in this institution. Charisma improvement should be made the main theme, while other improvements are supportive and complementary to it.

According to Max Weber, authority is defined as legitimate forms of domination; and domination is defined "*as the probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) will be obeyed by a given group of persons*"<sup>172</sup> and that "*every genuine form of domination implies a minimum of voluntary compliance, that is, an interest (based on ulterior motives or genuine acceptance) in obedience*".<sup>173</sup> And the domination has also its temporal dimension, i.e. the domination relationship must sustain for a period of time long enough that regular patterns of inequality are established. The legitimacy in the authority is delivered when the subordinates accept, obey, and consider domination to be desirable or

<sup>172</sup> Gerth, H.H. and Wright Mills, translated, Edited. (1946). **From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology**. p. 212.

<sup>173</sup> **Ibid.** p. 212.

at least bearable and not worth challenging. There are mainly three types of authority, namely legal or rational authority, traditional authority, and charismatic authority.

As Max Weber puts, legal or rational authority rest on “*rational grounds – resting on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands.*”; traditional authority has “*traditional grounds – resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them*”; charismatic authority has “*charismatic grounds – resting on devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him.*”<sup>174</sup>

In the following, the researcher will review three types of authority, legal/rational authority, traditional authority, and charismatic authority, in an attempt to observe their compatibility with the Chularajmontri institute.

### 1) Legal or Rational authority

Rational or legal authority is prevalent and is a symbol of modern world today – a secular world; it is based on law and rationality which is mostly instrumental rationality. It may be generalized in a way that organization of virtually all the organizations, be they economic, profit or non-profit organizations, educational, and governmental organizations which are main operators of the world today are predominantly functional or instrumental and rationalizable in their organization structure design. These organizations are designed

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<sup>174</sup> Ibid. p.328.



to achieve the highest possible efficiency in economics, which implies profit-maximization and cost-minimization; and these organization structures are sustained by legalization.

People with authority in this system base their authority on law and those subject to such authority also base their obedience on law. Such kind of authority may be easily classed as authority of the secular world. This type of authority is antireligious in its formation, because as has been mentioned religion is antirational in its mysticism; therefore the researcher will not recommend it for the Chularajmontri though it may be supportive on the sideline. In fact the researcher believes that by empowering Chularajmontri with legal or rational authority immensely and openly, it has an effect to the contrary of empowering it in performing religious duties; the institution simply loses its awe and sanctity in front of the Muslims. Religious authority does not come from secularity but from the spirituality. However, the fact is the fact after all, the institution is in a secular context; legal and rational authority is inevitable for a legal entity to exist. The Chularajmontri can never go without secular authority, like the basic laws for its creation and existence in legal context; but such secularity should be marginalized while authorities that promote sanctity should be adopted. The legal and rational authorities are only useful to the Chularajmontri if they promote charisma of the Chularajmontri and sanctity of the position.

## **2) Traditional authority**

On the part of traditional authority, Max Weber states that traditional authority rests on a belief in sanctity of everyday routines; while George Ritzer states that traditional authority is based on a claim by the leaders, and a belief on the part of the followers, that

there is virtue in the sanctity of age-old rules and powers.<sup>175</sup> The most important type of domination of which the legitimacy rests upon tradition is patriarchalism, wherein the father, the husband, the senior of the house rules over other members of the house. Patriarchalism, which is a personal prerogative and can be exercised without restraint, can rule well a family, a household, or a clan. However, in the larger context like a society, or a country, patriarchalism may need to be transformed into patrimonialism which is patriarchalism plus the power holder's administrative apparatus. Since in larger context, patriarchalism is limited without an administrative apparatus to carry out the domination; but patrimonialism is also limited by its reliance on its own administrative apparatus. Other types of traditional authority are gerontocracy or rule by elders; feudalism which was important in the past. Max Weber says traditional authority is a means by which inequality is created and preserved. Due to the fact that the Chularajmontri has been serving Thai society without disruption for more than 400 years, the Institute is naturally empowered with traditional authority. However, for now the traditional ground of Chularajmontri is disrupted by the modernization; tradition has only a vague and rather insignificant effect on its current status. In fact, the study of the Chularajmontri's background and the current situation of challenges from the Khana Mai show clearly how eroded the Chularajmontri's institute traditional authority has been. Apart from this, with the Islamic revival movements in especially the influential Middle East and globalization of the world that make data and information available equally to virtually everyone with the internet connection, the traditional authority of the Chularajmontri is suddenly overwhelmed as other greater and more historic Islamic centers are readily accessible. Therefore, traditional authority though is an asset of and compatible with the Chularajmontri as a religious institution, it is not adequate to make it influential as religious leadership.

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<sup>175</sup> Ritzer, George. (2010) **Sociological Theory**. p.132.

### 3) Charismatic authority

As for charismatic authority, it is a quality being endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or exceptional powers or qualities, not accessible to everybody. It is also a primitive form of authority, and in the researcher's eye the most god-sent-like quality. The researcher analyses charisma into five fundamental aspects in part for better study of the concept and in part for better recommendation to the Chularajmontri which is upcoming later in this chapter. It is also the thesis of this chapter that charisma should be injected into the Chularajmontri in order to empower the institution. Therefore the five aspects of charisma are the reasons why Chularajmontri should be empowered with charismatic authority in order to genuinely strengthen the institution effectively, rather than other types of authority especially the legal and rational one which is currently empowering it.

First, charisma is divine-like quality. *"The provisioning of all demands that go beyond those of everyday routine has had, in principle, an entirely heterogeneous, namely, charismatic foundation,"*<sup>176</sup> thus the demand for charisma is not ordinary type of demand; instead it is a demand beyond everyday life demand. It is similar to religious demand. *"The charismatic hero does not deduce his authority from codes or statutes, as is the case with the jurisdiction of institution; nor does he deduce his authority from traditional custom or feudal vows of faith, as is the case with patrimonial power."*<sup>177</sup> Charisma holders are always able to display extraordinary power, and are always regarded as god-sent. Like the chief of Mormons, as given by Max Weber, who *"proved himself to be charismatically qualified, as have 'heroes' and 'sorcerers.' All of them have practiced their arts and ruled by virtue of this gift (charisma) and, where the idea of God has already been clearly*

<sup>176</sup> Gerth, H.H. and Wright Mills, translated, Edited. (1946). *Op.cit.* p. 245.

<sup>177</sup> *Ibid.* p. 249.

*conceived, by virtue of the divine mission lying therein.”*<sup>178</sup> Charisma is often regarded as supreme and respectable for reason of mysticism. The real source of authority in fact springs from mass response to the charisma. *“The subjects may extend a more active or passive ‘recognition’ to the personal mission of the charismatic master. His power rests upon this purely factual recognition and springs from faithful devotion. It is devotion to the extraordinary and unheard-of, to what is strange to all rule and tradition and which therefore is viewed as divine. It is a devotion born of distress and enthusiasm.”*<sup>179</sup> *“Its ‘objective’ law emanates concretely from the highly personal experience of heavenly grace and from the god-like strength of the hero.”* *“Hence, its attitude is revolutionary and transvalues everything; it makes a sovereign break with all traditional or rational norms: ‘It is written, but I say unto you.’”*<sup>180</sup>

From the above, it suggests that charisma can evoke a mystical response or at least religious experience in a group of people who are in distress and are in need for a miracle; therefore charisma is often associated with religion. It is not a surprise that tales of heroes and heroism which connotes charisma are recurring themes in many religions and myths. This point clearly suggests compatibility between religion and charisma, and appropriateness of charismatic authority to the Chularajmontri, which is a religious entity. A qualification of the Chularajmontri is therefore certain extraordinary abilities and arts; this is very demanding of the Chularajmontri-to-be in his education and training.

Second, charisma comes from extraordinary ability inside a charisma holder, independent of other “ordinary” routines. Charisma *“knows no regulated ‘career,’ ‘advancement,’ ‘salary,’ or regulated or expert training of the holder of charisma or of his*

<sup>178</sup> Ibid. p. 246.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid. p. 249.

<sup>180</sup> Ibid. p. 250.

*aids. It knows no agency of control or appeal, not local bailiwicks or exclusive functional jurisdictions; nor does it embrace permanent institutions like our bureaucratic 'departments,' which are independent of persons and of purely personal charisma. Charisma knows only inner determination and inner restraint. The holder of charisma seizes the task that is adequate for him and demands obedience and a following by virtue of his mission. His success determines whether he finds them.*"<sup>181</sup> *"Charisma can be, and of course regularly is, qualitatively particularized. This is an internal rather than an external affair, and results in the qualitative barrier of the charisma holder's mission and power."*<sup>182</sup> This point suggests that the charisma comes from the inside of the charisma holder, his personal family and education background is very instrumental in informing the personality in which charisma resides. The person of choice must be racially and socially suitable for the concerned situation. On the other hand, internal charisma is a barrier of the mission and power of the charisma holder; this means that the followers who recognize the charisma of the holder can help enhance spreading out his sphere of power and influence. In the current world of media culture, the mass media can play a very effective role in this function.

Third, charisma also depends on whether the followers can perceive of the charisma of a person. *"His charismatic claim breaks down if his mission is not recognized by those to whom he feels he has been sent. If they recognize him, he is their master – so long as he knows how to maintain recognition through 'proving' himself. But he does not derive his 'right' from their will, in the manner of an election. Rather, the reverse holds: it is the duty of those to whom he addresses his mission to recognize him as their charismatically*

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<sup>181</sup> Ibid. p. 246.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid. p. 247.



*qualified leader.*”<sup>183</sup> The audience and the recognizers of the charisma is the other important corresponding part of the charismatic, the charisma of the holder is no use without positive response from its audience. The relationship between the charisma holder and his audience is a co-dependent one with the audience playing a more crucial part in enforcing the intensity of the charismatic authority while the charisma itself is only an initiator of charismatic authority. Charisma holders need to maintain their charisma by fulfilling the demand of the audience. If the Chularajmontri position holder has already charisma, it is a challenge for him to let people know of his charisma. Exposure to the public is a direct means to show off charisma. However, as charisma is an important quality in a religious leader, and it is a matter of course that charisma is a qualification for a Chularajmontri-to-be. Therefore, a Chularajmontri must have already possessed a certain degree of charisma before coming to the position; and the challenge for him is to maintain and expand his charisma.

Fourth, situation counts in allowing a person an opportunity to display his/her charisma. The situation that is good for a charismatic leader is an extraordinary one, the so-called collective distress from which the person who emerges as a leader to ease such distress will be charismatized. *“Where there is no war, charismatic war lord is absent.”*<sup>184</sup> That situation makes a hero perfectly elaborates the relationship between the charismatic authority and the situation that favors charismatic authority formation. The most effective and favorite situation is a crisis situation where the majority of the people are under distress and hope for transcendent power to help. Thai society is currently in many crises, the spirituality problem and the violence problem in the Deep-south; the Chularajmontri

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<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.* p. 246.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.* p.246.

does have a lot of chances to enhance his charisma, or the one who can do it may be the next Chularajmontri.

Fifth, charisma is opposite to rationality and economic gain. *“But charisma, and this decisive, always rejects as undignified any pecuniary gain that is methodical and rational. In general, charisma rejects all rational economic conduct.... In its ‘pure’ form, charisma is never a source of private gain for its holders in the sense of economic exploitation by the making of a deal.”*<sup>185</sup> *“It is the very force that disregards economy.” It is possible because it is the very opposite of the institutionally permanent. “In order to do justice to their mission, the holders of charisma, the master as well as his disciples and followers, must stand outside the ties of this world, outside of routine occupations, as well as outside the routine obligation of family life. .... In these respects, the economic conditions of participation in charisma may have an (apparently) antagonistic appearance,...”*<sup>186</sup>

Charismatic authority does not go together with mundane authority and routine economic functions, it would only be defiled by the latter. Therefore the lesser the mundane and economic routines are involved the better the charismatic authority. For the current situation of the Chularajmontri, instead of an air of sacrament there is a thick smell of money as it is also a body to warrants and guarantees that involves a lot of money, such as Halal food certification and Hajj permissions.

To conclude, rational and legal authority is by nature antagonistic to a religious organization; at least it cannot be the power pillar of a religious authority though it may be supportive of it in the ulterior. Rational or legal authority therefore can only play an assisting role in fostering genuine religious authority which the researcher believes is

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<sup>185</sup> Ibid. p. 247.

<sup>186</sup> Ibid. p. 248.

charismatic authority. The researcher thinks that the Chularajmontri cannot rely on traditional authority significantly since traditional authority in the Chularajmontri has been disrupted by modernization, globalization, and the very secular act that provides for the existence of the Chularajmontri as the Islamic religious leader in Thailand. The Chularajmontri is no longer a religious leader by its de facto duty as the Shaikh al-Islam in Caliphate state in the past. The goal in strengthening the position of the Chularajmontri is to cultivate a natural power and leadership in the Institution holder, and such power is charismatic power or authority.

The reason that charismatic authority is the real authority in the Chularajmontri is that the Chularajmontri is a religious leader, and religious power or authority has its merit in its sacred and mystic origin. The said religious power or authority can never emerge out of other but charisma, and it is in fact a charismatic authority. As Weber has pointed out that charisma is a natural source of power; it is not man-made and thus it is not low and secular. And if God is to confer a power to a person, that person must be given charisma – extraordinary quality and ability; no other means is more suitable than charisma. In the case of Islam, Allah would be the most ideal source of power or authority; and of course the leadership in Muslim leaders is bestowed by Allah. However, the said leadership is only potentiality; actualization of the leadership depends on each individual leader to realize it and let people perceive of it.

Enacting to authorize or to legally empower the Chularajmontri as it is being practiced nowadays in effect defeats its charisma as a quality of being a religious leader, as Weber observed “... *charismatic domination is the very opposite of bureaucratic*

*domination.*”<sup>187</sup> The action of charismatic authority depends very much on the part of the followers to perform the obedience in effecting this kind of authority; while legal authority depends effectively on the part of policing in compelling conformance and obedience. In face of faith, policing is ineffective thus law cannot materialize its power to influence the mind of people; further most modern laws are based on political and economic rationality in their enactment and enforcement, such groundings are only to be considered as defilement or demystification or desecration in respect of religion. Even though charismatic authority may take a long time or amazing genius to realize, it is not impossible, and it is strongly recommended for a religious leader to be successful in career. From the history, the major religious leaders or prophets, like the Lord Buddha, Jesus Christ, or the Prophet Mohammad, all derives their power and authority from their own charisma. The method of searching for new Dalai Lama of Tibet Buddhist Sanggha is grounded in the principle of charisma as well; no explicit rational law is to stipulate how a Lama-to-be child is chosen. The chosen child once chosen is bestowed with charisma, since he is chosen by the current Lama or senior monks; after that he is kept well and educated well so that along the path he grows up he will be ensured of more charisma. The Lama example is a typical routinized charismatic authorization with reliable effectiveness.

While Thai society is undergoing a process of desecularization, in fact for the whole world desecularization is a strong current especially among the Muslims as have been mentioned in the chapter 2; however, the Chularajmontri of Thailand, on the contrary, is at its peak of secularization. Such a paradoxical situation of the Chularajmontri may lead to a crisis in the institution and Islam in Thailand. Since general Muslims expect Chularajmontri to be a person of responsibility and role in supporting Islamic affairs and should behave as a true Muslim who is rigorous in observing the religious precepts while

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<sup>187</sup> Ibid. p. 248.

keeping secularity at minimum. Disagreement with and defiance of the Chularajmontri suggests that the institution must improve itself so as to resume its function of the leader and of sustaining the society. The researcher thinks that the cause may be the fact that the concerned leaders in Thailand are unaware of the current trend and the *fact* of desecularization in Thai society and in the world community; this clearly indicates that they are holders of secularization theory which has been proven wrong. The Chularajmontri and the concerned parties need to be aware of such development and put in effort to revitalize the institution to desecularize the institution in order to stay with the current development. Next the researcher would recommend improvements in the several aspects of the Chularajmontri, however, as the focus point of recommendation in this dissertation suggests, charisma improvement is the targeted end of the improvements.

### 3.6 SUMMARY

The historical study of the Chularajmontri institute may lead to a conclusion that the rules and functions of the office in the Pre-modern Era through the Modern Era and until the Democracy Era had changed along the history, as can be seen in recent history that the Chularajmontri before was an official of the Public Relation Department<sup>188</sup> which was directly under the Office of the Prime Minister. Up until recent time, the Chularajmontri was under the Department of Religious Affairs of the Ministry of Education; and now it is under the Ministry of Cultural Affair.

It is observed that Chularajmontri has a unique characteristic as a religious institution in that it has role and function of two natures, religious and civil, unlike the leaders of Buddhism who are traditionally supposed to refrain from engaging in civil

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<sup>188</sup> Chularajmontri Cham Phromyong served as a government official as a division head of the Public Relation Department (former Propaganda Department) under the Office of Prime Minister.



affairs. However, the secular civil functions of the Chularajmontri change all the time with pressures of politics both local and international; consequentially the institute has experienced a decline in its secular roles and function, and thus meaning, in Thai society; but it still retains its religious function. This finding suggests that Chularajmontri is significant as a religious institution of the Muslims in Thai society.

Due to the changes in Thai society, many institutions in the society, not only the Office of Chularajmontri but also the Buddhist institutions which are widely respected by the Thai majority, are affected by secularization as a result. A major ensuing problem is that, as pointed out by Nithi Aeusriwong, the Buddhist Monastery has only little role in everyday life in the society today.<sup>189</sup> At present, the Chularajmontri is facing with changes in the society, which are consequences of globalization; the problem is how the institute can sustain itself as a religious institution. Historical lessons show that only the institute is able to exercise its religious function as it is demanded from the Muslims will it sustain itself within the society.

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<sup>189</sup> Nithi Iaosriwong, (2008). The Future of Sangha Organization in **Looking Forward: Analytial Essays for Adjusting Direction of Thai Society**. p.118

## CHAPTER 4

### CHULARAJMONTRI AND CHANGING FACE OF ISLAM

#### 4.1 INTRODUCTION

The changing face of Islam in the Modern Era took place upon the Western powers' expansion of influences in politics and administration, economy, and culture throughout the world during 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. The rise of the Western powers has introduced structural changes and personal relations in the society. For example, the administration was changed from the state where local ruled the local to the state where white men or Western agents ruled the local through system of colony; the economy was changed from self-sufficiency to market economy with Westerners as the owners and operators, like large-scale farming or mining, with modern technology introduced. One important change in economy is that the system of trading monopoly by the local states was replaced by free trade where Westerners could directly deal with the local people to buy raw materials to feed their factories.

In the previous chapter the researcher has examined the Chularajmontri institute in the past, and has pointed out that the Chularajmontri was initially established by the secular authorities for the very pragmatic purposes of administration and trading, but later on it had been relegated along with the modernization of Thai society. (From this relegation it may be seen that Thai society has been secularized, faith as represented by the position of Chularajmontri which was influential over the then everyday business is no longer the case within the context of modernity.) In fact, whether it is at the level of the globe or at the level of Thailand, modernity is a crucial factor in shaping the major affairs

and we are living within the pervading ambience of modernity which is a major force that drives social changes around the world today. And within it Islam is no exception. In this chapter, the researcher will examine the changing face of Islam with modernity as the reference point. Today Islam is shaped predominantly by modernization which is first initiated and propagated by the West through European imperialism, and now the neo-imperialism again of the West. In fact many scholars see the same thing, as it is not to be disputed that “the dominant reality in shaping the modern Islamic world politically, economically, and religio-culturally was the impact of European imperialism.”<sup>190</sup> Ever since the times of Saladin’s occupation of Jerusalem, and the Crusade, the European colonization, the victory of Islamic revolution in Iran, the Gulf War, the 9-11 incident, and the US invasion of Iraq; it is observed that the West revolves around an effort to keep their dominancy over the world and Islamic lands while the Islamic world revolves around an effort to fend off the Western influence; especially when the Islamic world happens to have possessed large oil reserves.

The specific subject of this chapter is a study of the changing face of Islam in Thai society that has its impacts upon the Chularajmontri Institute. The researcher herein will examine the problems and challenges facing the institute that come from changes from without the Islamic world and those within the Thai society. The changes from without the Islamic world started around the 19<sup>th</sup> century when Westerners began to expand their domain of influence around the world. This change has brought about the diffusion of materialism and technology that has greatly enhanced people’s living; along with that some political ideologies, such as nationalism, liberalism, and democracy, are brought in. Moreover, the Western culture is brought in as well, in an outfit of modernization, to larger parts of the world; and Western modernization is regarded as a symbol of advancement.

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<sup>190</sup> Esposito, Fasching L., Darrell J., Lewis Todd. (2002), **World Religions Today**. pp. 185-186.

Such diffusion has of course reached the world of Islam; and it has given rise to various responses from the Muslims, ranging from rejection and confrontation to admiration and imitation. Nevertheless the ideologies of some Muslim divisions which reject Western culture and modernization have spread into Thai society and have given rise to a wave of desecularization among Muslims to call for a return to the original pristine form of Islam and a purgation of the current impurities in Islam in a view to revive the long lost Islamic glory. Also within Thai society which has undergone a social change in the form of secular modernization, it has experienced an off-balanced development due to the over-emphasis on the material side of humanity and ignoring its spiritual side. There is less concern over the matters of virtue-and-vice or those of heaven-and-hell in everyday life of people in the society. All these happenings are evident in current popular contents of the mass media that can serve as a mirror of the social mentality. The secularization of Thai society has sent a rather grave impact to the traditional Islamic way of life within Thailand.

Currently, the Chularajmontri institute is being confronted both by the Thai social changes and the wake of desecularization in sizeable Thai Muslims. The Khana Mai (Thai reformist Muslim division) is criticizing intensely the institute's performance from time to time. With no less degree of intensity, the violence problem of the three southern provinces is also agitating the institute. The institute on the other hand has responded by rebutting the wrong views regarding Islamic principle in a view to help ease the conflict and problem. But the reality is that Chularajmontri institute's involvement has not received its merited respect and observance among the fellow Muslims; it is even despised, violence goes on and becomes more intensified, the Chularajmontri is even pressured to desert the position. The issue at hand is that the Chularajmontri is tested of its vitality in the current changing face of Islam amidst modernization.

## 4.2 THE IDEAS OF MUSLIM REGARDING MODERNIZATION

Judaism and Christianity, the two elder cousin religions of Islam, have quite similar pattern of change in the past century; it is that they are adapting themselves quite well in the surge of science and technology and humanism. Faith and reason are blended carefully within their doctrines. Believers of these two religions find no conflict between their faiths and their secular ways of life, or at least they are not much troubled by the everyday-life secularity. The fact that lies in front of us all is that along with modernization, reason is highly treasured among the Western cultures since their adopting the Hellenic legacy during the Renaissance, and after that the West thrives as never before and dominates the world. In contrast, the Muslim falls as the Western rises. Many Islamic states in the Middle East were colonized by the West. And even now after they have gained independence, they are in a disarrayed condition due to the former colonizers' arrangements which are out of Western interest, such as the drawing of borderlines of the independent states, the erections of monarchies or militant dictators to continue to safeguard the Western interests inside these areas etc.; while the local Muslim interest is relegated to the fringe. With this picture, it is not difficult to understand why the Crusade has left vague impression in Christian West while it has left a deep scar in the Islamic world. With modernity being a product Western civilization, the viewpoint of the Muslim regarding modernity has always been the opposite of the Western one. In fact, the ideas of Muslim regarding modernization are mainly Islamic responses to modernization which is mainly brought about by the Western world.

To conclude, by borrowing words of Esposito et al., *“Islam today is an immediate and direct heir to both premodern and modern Muslim responses to the decline and disintegration of Muslim societies and the challenge of European colonialism and*



*modernity*.”<sup>191</sup> Modernity being a product of Western culture is viewed with hostility among Muslim. In the following section we will examine each of the Muslim responses in details. The researcher would classify Islamic responses to modernization into two groups namely those that accept and utilize modernization, and those that reject and defy modernization. However, there is one common element in the above branches of Islamic ideologies; it is that they all want to revitalize Islamic world.

#### 4.2.1 ISLAMIC ACCEPTANCE OF MODERNIZATION

They were the groups of Secular Modernism and Islamic Modernism as follows:

##### a) Secular Modernism:

This Islamic ideology is initiated by Taha Husayn (1889 – 1973) and Ali Abd al Raziq (886-1966) of Egypt. It has received quite popularity among the educated elites. Secular modernism favors the position that the future of Islam lies not in the return to the pristine Islamic tradition or in Islamic Modernism but in an aggressive pursuit of Western-oriented liberal, secular reform. The conservative Muslim’s herald of Caliphate is regarded not appropriate but the separation of religion and state is. However, secularism is severely criticized by the conservative branches of Islam and due to its friendly stance towards the Western culture which is stereotyped to be connected with the Western imperialism or colonialism. With the link with Western culture which is always considered a foe than a friend among the main stream conservative Muslims, secular modernism of Islam has made more enemies than friends among Muslim brothers just because they want to reform and to have more of Western element in their culture.

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<sup>191</sup> Ibid. p. 226.

## b) Islamic Modernism:

Ideally, Islamic Modernism is an attempt to mediate between the secular modernism and conservative Islamic ideologies. This branch of Islamic reformist *“insists that the corpus of Islamic law consists, on the one hand, of divinely revealed and thus immutable laws and, on the other, of laws that were human interpretations that meet the needs of past historical and social contexts and were therefore subject to change.”*<sup>192</sup>

Islamic Modernism does not, like secular modernism, try to accept directly the foreign elements such as modernity and secularity of the West; neither do they advocate conservative ulama's blind clinging to the past and traditional interpretation. Instead it is presented in an easy package for Muslims, it states that faith is compatible with reason and Islam is compatible with modernity, and science and technology is acceptable. Ijtihad (independent use of reasoning in interpreting Islamic doctrine) is highly praised, alongside with Allah's Command. Islamic modernists would put that the current failure and disintegration of Islamic societies is not due to the pitfalls of Islam but to the departure of Islam. As is observed, Sufism is a mystic element of Islam that is vulnerable to incorporating other non-Islamic elements,<sup>193</sup> such as indigenous animism of localities, into Islamic doctrine. Thus Sufism falls a target to the criticism of Islamic modernists who subsequently call for a reform and purification of Islam.

The main ideological leaders are Muhammad Abduh of Egypt, Sayyid Ahmad Khan of Indian and Muhammad Iqbal of Pakistan, Sayyid Jamal ad-Dien or Al-Afghani,<sup>194</sup> and Ziya Gokalp. Though influenced by the philosophy of 19<sup>th</sup> century Europe, these Islamic modernists like to see an advanced Islam in terms of material and spirit as comparable to

<sup>192</sup> Ibid. p. 233.

<sup>193</sup> Lings, Martin. (2000). **What is Sufism**. pp. 11-16.

<sup>194</sup> See detail in Glasse Cyril. (1991). **The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam**. p 24.

the West but in their own Islamic version. These people advocate a reform in Islamic religion, education, and society.

*“Islamic modernists advocate flexible, continuous reinterpretation of Islam so that Muslims may develop institutions of education, law, and politics suitable to modern conditions. Modernizing tendencies appeared in the last decade of nineteenth century in response to Westernizing regimes and European rule.”*<sup>195</sup> It is observed again and again that the Islamic modernism is a response to the realization that Western nations had outpaced the Islamic states in terms of social development, economy and military by employing science and technology; and that the advantages that the Western nations have pose a threat to the Islamic world. As a result, a group of intellectuals saw a need for Muslims to reform themselves in order to fend off the Western dominancy. While they observe that the adoption of reason in advancement of science and technology of the West had empowered them, the Muslims generally held a fatalistic attitude which the modernists excused as an important factor dragging them behind the Westerners. They meanwhile germinate the idea of strengthening Muslims by adopting reason into Islamic teaching so Muslims could advance their own science and technology to compete with the West. While also unwilling to adopt Western way wholesale in order to keep Islamic character and essence, these modernist Muslims also see that the scientific and technological underpinning of European power could be reduced to categories and practice that Muslims could learn without damaging Islamic integrity. They validated their ideological orientation by asserting that European science had developed on the basis of classical Islamic learning transmitted to Europe through Muslim Spain<sup>196</sup> – therefore were Muslims to learn modern sciences, they would reclaim their own heritage, and this kind of learning

<sup>195</sup> **Islamic Modernism Encyclopedia**. p. 273.

<sup>196</sup> Muyudin Yayah Hajji. (2005). **Islam in Spain and Sicily**. translated in to Thai by Ibrahim Narong Rucksakiet, Haleah Jehdoh. p.142.

is called a return to Muslim Golden Age. Besides urging relearning the Islamic long-lost heritage that was embedded in the Western knowledge, the adoption of rationality by encouraging the use of *ijtihad* (independent reasoning), which is regarded as the revival of Islamic rationalist philosophical tradition, is another important element in Islamic modernism. The Islamic modernists hold that the revealed knowledge was essentially rational or that the revealed knowledge could be achieved by exercising reason. Again, the modernism is mainly popular among the intellectuals; while the general Muslims are opt for less complex ideology like nationalism and fundamentalism which finally led to independence in many countries after the World War II. Modernism manifests itself differently with different emphases in different places; like in the Indonesia or in Thailand, Islamic purification is a main theme.

Conclusively, the Islamic modernism emerges from a demand for surviving the Islamic world under the pressure of Western world by using secular means but within Islamic package which is a technique to win acceptance among Muslim brothers in addition to providing an Islamic rationale for embracing reason, science and technology, and modernity. There is a need for the Muslims to strengthen themselves by adopting Western knowledge and technology while maintaining Islamic character. So the modernists validate themselves by resorting to Islam's Golden Age while claiming that the current Western science and technology also have an Islamic origin. At the same time, there is revival of rational philosophical tradition of Islam. Modernization though has a secular root; the emergence of Islamic modernism is not a secular movement since Islamic modernists try to modernize within the religious framework.

In the current reality many are fed up with modernization and secularization, as can be observed in many budding religious sects or communities that try to promote alternative

ways of living life in defiance of modernization and secularization; however, there is no one organization or religion that shares the degree and scale of antipathy that Islam has against modernization especially the Western-induced ones. Generally, sensationally and doctrinally, Islam allows no room for secularization, so leave alone the modernization.

While Christianity has its element of secularization in its predecessor, Judaism, whose people, Israelites, in a time had to live their life without close care of God, during exodus from Egypt; Islam also has its secularity in its tradition. As has been pointed out in the discussion of secularization theory, reason is a major factor of secularization as it has paved the way to modernization with the development of science and technology. In Islamic history there has been golden time of Muslims where science and technology and commerce were highly developed. It was the period where Islamic ideology embraced reason, for instance, there were famous Islamic philosophers who integrated the reason-oriented tradition of Greek ideology with Islamic, like Al-Kindi, Mu 'tazala,<sup>197</sup> Abu Bakr al Razi, Ibn Rush. Al-Ghazali was the one Islamic philosopher, who relegated reason for faith and whose influence is far reaching, has in researcher's opinion formed a habit of typical Islamic ideation. Historically the Western world received its secularity and science and technology at least through their contact with the Muslim. With the knowledge of science and technology, and reason-oriented Hellenistic philosophy that the West received via the Islamic world during the time of Crusade, the Western world started Renaissance to develop itself into an industrialized world; Western countries therefore became stronger nations as they still are now.

The influence of Western world to the other worlds is huge due to their advanced technology; and the other worlds have received Western technology often together with the

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<sup>197</sup> See detail in Glasse Cyril. (1991). **Op.cit.** p. 291.



Western culture. It is important to view Western culture as distinguished from science and technology and knowledge Westerners may bring in. Many people consider them all as one same entity, so when they oppose Western culture their emotion tends to render them antagonistic towards Western knowledge and science and technology. Especially with the current conflict between Islam and Christianity (in fact Western capitalist and materialist cultures) due to the interest conflict, Islamic world tend to reject everything Western including science and technology and knowledge, especially the reason-oriented culture of Western world that are capable in developing ones' own countries, no matter Islamic or non-Islamic. Let the above alone, Muslims also tend to reject also other peoples who have received Western culture.

#### **4.2.2 ISLAMIC DEFIANCE OF MODERNIZATION**

They were the Group of Islamic Conservative Traditionalism and Neorevivalist Movement and Radical Islam.

##### **a) Islamic Conservative Traditionalism:**

This ideology is generally held among the ulamas (Islamic teachers) who are the core personnel that maintain Islam. Ulamas advocate applying Islamic principle and the Law uncritically onto the current Islamic societies regardless of the changes in time and space and the social environment. The ulamas are typical in their [intentional] ignorance of modern science and technology, and their refusal to incorporate science and technology into developing Islam; in addition, they also ignore and resist modernity, considering it a kind of Western product. By nature of conservative traditionalism, it enjoys a vast base of adherence among general Muslims; since people naturally tend to fear and defy changes which are typical in the current environment of science and technology. They therefore

always criticize hostilely the reformist movements no matter they are initiated by secular Muslims or Islamic modernists, and it in a certain degree has created a fearful atmosphere among Muslim brothers. The other reason for opposing the reformist movements is that the reformists pose a challenge to the conservative traditionalist's leadership status, political, religious, or intellectual.

The other group is those who defy modernization, they are mainly Fundamentalist Reformers and the Mahdi believers.<sup>198</sup> The Fundamentalist Reformers believe that the current backward situation of Islam is mainly due to the general weakening of Muslims' observance of Islamic teaching, *Jumud* (inertia). Therefore, in order to progress, Muslims must go back to the real teaching of Islam – a purification process. They call for a return to the Islamic Golden period that they enjoyed a few centuries ago before the fall of Baghdad where they used to have material prosperity, advances in science and technology, and dignity in their culture and identity. These Fundamentalist Reformers therefore forgo the possibility of utilizing modernization. Likewise, the Mahdi believers do not see the necessity to learn from the West in order to advance Islam. They believe that the world will one day come to an end and there will be a savior, Mahdi, coming to save the world from fallenness. They see the current fallen Islamic world where Muslims are bullied by the West as a sign that the world is close to its end and there soon will be a savior to save the world, which is in fact the Islamic world. The said savior is given names like Usman dan Fodio or Mahdi of Sudan. Mahdism can be regarded as a way that the oppressed Muslims may adopt in struggling against the Western pressure.

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<sup>198</sup> *Ibid.* p. 246.

### **b) Neorevivalist (Neofundamentalist) Movements and Radical Islam:**

Neorevivalist Movements and Radical Islam follow another rather extreme Islamic ideology that radically rejects any Western element though not necessarily modernity and modernization. Radical Islam is a more militant development of Neorevivalist Movements' ideology. This more activist and radical ideology is the driving force behind the dynamic spread of the contemporary Islamic resurgence. The two prominent movements are Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimi) whose ideological leaders are Hassan al-Banna (1906 – 1949) and Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) with the latter being the moral leader of Radical Islamic movements, and the Islamic Society (Jamaat-i-Islami) whose ideological leader is Abul Ala Maududi (1903-1979). All these ideological leaders are influenced by the legacies of the premodern Islamic Revivalist Movements such as Wahhabi, Senussi, Mahdi and also Islamic modernism. Neorevivalists and radicalists insist to return to the source of Islam; they do not think it is appropriate to adjust or adapt Islam within modernity and “rather than fleeing modern world, they sought to engage and control it.”<sup>199</sup> “In contrast to Islamic modernists who justified adopting Western ideas and institutions because they were compatible with Islam, al-Banna and Mawdudi sought to produce a new interpretation and synthesis. It began with Islamic sources and then found either Islamic equivalents or Islamic sources for new interpretations regarding government accountability, legal change, popular participation in the political process, and educational reform.”<sup>200</sup> The formative force of this ideology is the dissent of the neo-colonialism of the West and the East. If the situation of Westernization within Islamic states whose governments and the elites opt for continuing without checking, Islamic identity will be impaired in the end due to not the science and technology but to the accompanying

<sup>199</sup> Esposito, L. Fasching J. Darrell, Lewis Todd. (2002). **Op. cit.**, p. 236.

<sup>200</sup> **Ibid.** p. 237.

religiocultural penetration of the West (education, law, customs, values) which is considered far more pernicious and dangerous in the long run than political intervention.<sup>201</sup> Therefore they propose Islamic way as an alternative way to modern capitalism and Marxism. They consider themselves to be the few righteous communities within the corrupt broader community and they have the divine responsibility which is Allah's Command to reform the whole society; and it is the rationale for the call for jihad which is always associated with the Radical Islamic movements. Also "the renaissance or reformation of Islam would not come from modernity's emphasis on empirical reason and secularism but, as in the past, from revelation."<sup>202</sup>

#### 4.3 CURRENT TRANSFORMATIONS IN THAI SOCIETY: A SECULARIZATION

Every society is always in one or another form of changing which may differ in types, direction, or rate of change depending on many factors internal or external such as population growth, urbanization, change in worldview of the leaders, change in the environment, or change in technology, etc.

For now the dissertation is focusing on studying the change of Thai society in the path of secularization that gives the overall Thai society a modern look in its structure. In its politics and administration, a system of democracy with the constitutional monarchy is put in place, the administration is ministerialized in a western way; in its economy liberalism is imported in form of free market economy where all the people are equal under the constitution, industry is emphasized over agriculture in a way re-enacting the Western industrial revolution; in infrastructure Western architecture and ways of planning and

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<sup>201</sup> Ibid. p.237.

<sup>202</sup> Ibid. p.239.

building are adopted; in education Thai men and women of elite class have been sent abroad to receive Western education, and also Western school system and curricula are imported; in way of life Western fashion and manners were once mandated (during the regime of Field Marshal Pibulsongkram) which subsequently plays a speeding factor in Thai society's adoption of Western culture which is essentially secular. All these happenings are under the name of modernization. However in fact it is also a process of Westernization and of course it is a process of secularization – the increasing rationalization in people's life.

However, the following aspects of change will be examined, namely political change, economic change, cultural change.

#### 4.3.1 POLITICAL CHANGE

The change in politics is the administrative change from the absolute monarchy to a democracy under the constitutional monarch. And the political change was a result of the external pressure of the rising Western powers during 19<sup>th</sup> century starting with the Bowring Treaty between Siam (Thailand) and Britain in 1855.<sup>203</sup> The treaty resulted in Siam losing an important sovereignty, namely extending extraterritoriality to the British, and that meant British people were subject not to Siamese law but to the British law even they were in Siamese territory. And in later period, Siam had to extend extraterritoriality to other Western nationals as well. Extending foreigners with extraterritoriality was a loss of sovereignty which foretold of the future of falling into a colony; Thai authority therefore needed urgent measure to correct this development by resorting to adopting modernization

<sup>203</sup> Ingram, James C. (1971). *Economic Change in Thailand 1850-1970*. pp. 30-35.



of the country. And with implementation of modernization, secularization is a natural consequence.

The process of administrative change to a democracy is a century-long process; it started with the idea of liberalism that was budding among the elite class of Thai society who came to learn of the West and sensed the impending threat. Among the first group of Thai people who came into contact with the ideas of liberalism was that of some Royal family members and aristocrats, one prominent example is Prince Mongkut, who was interested in the West and came to learn English language and Western intellectualism, like science, through an American missionary. After the Prince had ascended to the throne to become King Rama IV, His Majesty requested his princes and princesses to learn English; and this request later also spread out to cover sons and daughters of his nobles. The consequence of learning English is that the Western intellectualism, knowledge, ideas, and Western ways of life have since spread into Thai society.

Secularization in Thai society took place fullfledgedly when King Rama V, one of the princes who were learned of English, implemented an administrative reform and installed the Privy Council to serve as the king's advisory body.<sup>204</sup> The installation of the Privy Council was a manifestation of King's liberal mind which may be attributed to the King's learning of the Western practices during his two trips roaming Europe. Nevertheless, the administrative power over the country still resided with the King absolutely.

To add to the drama of change, during the reign of King Rama V, an important event happened. A group of Thai intellectuals, who received their education abroad in

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<sup>204</sup> Wyatt, David K. (1975). *Op. cit.* p. 177.

Europe, submitted a joint-signed letter to the King in regarding an administrative reform from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy. Despite the failure of this petition, the rationale behind administering the country under constitution had won attention of learned people of Siam. There were articles criticizing the absolute monarchy and advocating establishment of a parliament and participation of civilians in the administration. And until 1932, the “Khana Ratsadon” (People’s Party),<sup>205</sup> composed of both military and civil officials carried out a reform to replace the absolute monarchy with a democracy of which the king is the head of state under a constitution. This development clearly demonstrates that Thailand had stepped into the path of secularization in its politics with the ideas of liberalism and democracy; and it also pronounces the end of the age-old belief of the King as a supposed deity. All in all a democratic system is a more rationally crafted administrative system than its predecessor.

The reformation of Thailand’s administrative system into a democracy is an outcome of the influence of Western thought. After the World War II, even with conflict in Thai political ideology, where democracy and socialism were in rivalry of each other; as an ally of the United States, Thailand chose a democratic system with the King as the head of state. However, the reason deep behind such choice is that democracy is more compatible with Thai society than socialism.

The development of Thai politics so far, despite the obstacles along the course due to fundamental setting of Thai culture, such as the deep-rooted cronyism, plus militant dictatorship, that hinder development of democracy; the political events that took places,

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<sup>205</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 232-234.

such as 14/10 incident in 1973<sup>206</sup> and the ensuing political movements, suggest that Thai society is heading to democracy.

#### 4.3.2 ECONOMIC CHANGE

The concerned economic change is a change from a rice-growing and barter economy to a capitalist industry-based economy.

The issue to study is why there has been a change in Thai society towards a capitalist end. Factors of change are both internal and external. The internal factor came to be with the wave of Chinese migration into Southeast Asian countries, such as Thailand during the 18<sup>th</sup> century. These Chinese immigrants came as laborers working in canal construction, and tin mines<sup>207</sup> where they earned their incomes in form of money; they were engaged in crop culturing for commerce or in trading of various goods. The abovementioned economic practices of the Chinese were definitely different from those of majority Thai's normal economic practices which were primarily of self-subsistence economy where production was for self consumption and exchange was not a major economic activity and only happened when there was leftover and thus money was not as popular as in today's economy. Since the Chinese were more experienced and efficient laborers than the local ones, so the Thai authority opted to increasingly employ them in the public projects rather than drawing labor from local people. On other hand, the Chinese came from exchange economy where money was extensively used, some of them were appointed as taxation officials who would collect taxes on behalf of the authority. The effect of the Chinese engagement in Thai economy is that exchange activities increased in Thai economy and money came to assume increasingly important role in Thai economy. The ensuing effect unto Thai society is that it has become more and more secular, since

<sup>206</sup> Pasuk Phongpaichit; and Chris Baker (1995). **Thailand Economy and Politics**. pp. 304-305.

<sup>207</sup> Skinner, G. William. (1957). **Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History**. pp. 31-32.

exchange is an interest-guided relationship; people were thus related to one another out of mundane motive rather than a spiritual one.

The Bowring Treaty was an external factor that had facilitated change in Thai economy. With the treaty, the commerce long been monopolized by the Royal court's financial arm had come to an end, and coming into its place was free trade where foreign merchants were able to have direct trade contact with the local people. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century the Western merchants had a huge demand for agricultural produces, such as rice, sugar, etc, and others were hard wood and tin. With wider and freer direct contact with the Western traders, who were comparatively more secular, Thai people came to be infected by their secularity.

In terms of secularization, the aforementioned internal and external factors all helped speed up secularization in Thai society. Thai people in the central region, who were the first batch of the local to be secularized, began to expand their farm land for growing crops for commercial purpose. The incoming Westerners or the Chinese were granted monopolies to conduct commercial logging and mining. The supply chain back was that the local people was the producers, the Chinese were the middlemen providing logistic services to transport goods from inner land to sell them to the Western merchants. At the meantime, the Chinese merchants brought in goods from the Western world, such as textile, small machinery such as sawing machine, and other luxury products such as cameras and cosmetics. Thus the Thai economy has since been connected with the world economy.

The above economic changes had since transformed Thai into a money economy. The Thai King therefore ordered to have a coin factory built, paper money printed, and

banks established;<sup>208</sup> the infrastructure, such as roads, piers, and communication network, were put in place for the purpose of accommodating the changes in economy.

However, even with trading with the world, the Thai economy was fundamentally an agricultural one; it was not until the first National Development Plan of Economy and Society and the establishment of BOI (Board of Investment) in 1959 did Thai economy come to be industrialized. It is at the policy level that priority is given to mundane economic development. And the industries to be promoted are cement, textile, parts for automobile and machinery, and service industry and tourism. During 1988 to 1991, Thailand had a policy of “Changing battlefield into trading place”<sup>209</sup> which was devised to both tackle the communist insurgency and to develop the economy; and Thailand was designated to be a center of commerce and industry in Indochina. During this period, the government promoted and supported foreign investments which built factories in Thailand. And as a result, Thailand was transformed from a raw material supplying country to an export-oriented country with cheap labor and cheap raw material. Furthermore, the government also had policy to promote Thailand as a tourist destination hoping to earn more foreign currencies. With the policies of promoting foreign investment and tourism, Thailand had become more and more globalized with its economy growing rapidly.

It is observed that during the period in which economic development is emphasized, the government’s major policies revolved around economic interests and benefits, which is secular in its motive. At the level of common people, secularization might be felt everywhere; Thai people have come to be more industrious, interest (money)-oriented; they are more perseverant for better job which implies better money income; they

<sup>208</sup> Danai Chaiyotha. (2003). **Thai History : Thonburi Era to Rattanakosin Era**. pp. 193-194.

<sup>209</sup> Chan Sithong. (1998). **Bidding Farewell to Uncle Chart**. p. 122.



cherish the value of time as time is money - totally a Western secular value. But Thai secularization came to a check in 1997 when financial crisis broke out at the heart of the country.<sup>210</sup>

People start to question the value and virtue of economic development; and the King has kindly advised the nation to adopt a self-sufficiency economy and make it a way of life.<sup>211</sup> The researcher thinks that the King's self-sufficiency economy is a desecularization, since the research this way of life leads people to be humble towards the nature and humbleness in humanity is an important trait of religiosity.

#### 4.3.3 SOCIAL CHANGE

The social change in Thai society is a change from a society where the duties and rights of the citizens are designated definitely according to the social classes they are in to a society where everyone is equal before law. In terms of inter-personal relationships of the people in the society, it changes in primary nature of the relations, namely from kinship relationships or crony relationships which are primary relations to secondary relations which are formal or business relations.

The issue of concern here is why modernization takes place in the Thai society; and the rationale behind the leaders' need to modernize Thailand in order to win recognition from the Western nations with a hope to escape the fate of colonization.

Originally, the structure of Thai society during the Early Bangkok period in the late of 18<sup>th</sup> century was Thai Feudalism (Sakdina), which prescribed rights and duties of the

<sup>210</sup> Rangsana Thanapornpan. (1998). **The Financial Crisis and Finance Economy of Thailand**. 2<sup>nd</sup> Published . p. 27.

<sup>211</sup> Sunai Setboonsang. (2549). **7 Steps of Practice Towards the Way Sufficiency Economy from Concept Practice**. p.10.

people in the society ranging from the masters and nobles unto commoners and slaves according to their ranks in the society clearly. The Thai society was composed roughly of two groups of people, namely the ruling class and the ruled class. The relationships of the people in the society depended on kinship or crony group under the system of “Jao khun moon nai”(the masters ), which designated that the commoners must enter affiliation-ship of a master, or the head of a group, so as to be under legal protection. The Thai society was therefore characterized by patronage system where the master must take care of the subordinates while the latter must payback with labor, produces, and loyalty. The members of a crony group must help one another, especially the master, since the higher ranking the master achieved the higher the ensuing benefit the crony members would receive.

Modernization of Thai society leads to secularization in the society as well, as rationalization becomes core operator of the social life and economic interest prevails. However, it is worth noticing that modernization was initiated from above of the social hierarchy, namely the King and the elite class. King Rama III once gave words “... the warfare with the Vietnamese and the Burmese will be no longer, but the West is worrying. Do be careful. Do not give them a chance. Learn from them whatever is good, but do not idolize them!”<sup>212</sup> King Rama III was always opposed to the West, but his above words provide a glance of Siamese leader’s secularity, which is different from the leaders of other Southeast Asian countries at that time.

The succeeding kings, as a result of being learned of the Western scholastics, namely King Rama IV was interested in science, such as astronomy, and his younger brother was interested in Western ship-building technology. When being a prince, King Rama IV was ordained as a Buddhist monk; he had learned of Christianity out of a

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<sup>212</sup> Wyatt, David K. (1975). *Op. cit.* p. 165.

friendship with a Catholic Bishop, Jean Baptist Pallegoix. And due to the knowledge gained from Christian preaching, the prince-monk had established the Buddhist clergy sect of Dhammayuttika for the purpose of undertaking social welfare service as been practiced by the Western priests and missionaries.

The influence of the West had pushed the Siamese leader to embrace modernity while the Thai feudalism started to go out of date due to the economic transformation that led to rapid growth of the middle class which was composed of a variety of professionals. As a result the original structure of the society could contain such change, namely the Thai feudal relationship could not protect people of various professions, such as businesspersons, company employees, and workers, in big cities. This change in the society pronounced an end to the Thai feudalism. The new Thai state that perpetuated until the reform of the administration to democracy had awakened people in the society to individual liberties, rights, and equity.

However, secularization of Thai society still concentrated in the high society. Secularization in the other parts of the society was not until reformation of education was officially carried out; schools of systematic curricula were established, where subjects like mathematics, science, and health study were taught to commoners. Secularization therefore started to penetrate down and throughout the society.

#### **4.3.4 CULTURAL CHANGE**

The cultural change refers to changes of fundamental way of life, belief, and idea of Thai people by copying the West.

The question here is why the Thai people would embrace Western culture. The major factor is that the Western culture was spread into Thai society as a culture of superior people, in terms of power and prosperity. People adopting Western culture therefore are regarded as people of civilization.

In the movie “The King and I”, there is a scene when the King Rama IV dances with Anna, which, though fictitious is the movie, suggests that King Rama IV recognizes some elements of Western culture. For example, King Rama IV pronounced to abolish some of the original Thai customs, namely the ministers were waived of the need to prostrate when appearing before the King and they must be dressed with clothes. These changes were initiated in the royal court as the King saw fit, for instant fashion of dresses, foods, eating on table and chairs, practicing Western table manners, and speaking English to name a few. And gradually the Westernization in Thai culture had spread to the wider society of commoners. The Thais are therefore secularized in a Western way.

The secularization in Thai came to acceleration with the setting up of US military bases in Thailand during the Vietnam War.<sup>213</sup> And this happening may be attributed to the growth of service industry in responding to incoming of US soldiers; hotels, supermarkets, and nightclubs were popping up. New products come to Thai society, such as electrical appliances like radio, television, refrigerator, electrical cooker; and consumer products, such as butter, milk, sausage, canned food, beers, and liquors. It is note-worthy that the abovementioned products are produced out of the need to fulfill body’s desire for pleasure; they are so mundane that secularity spread out with consumption of their products and services. Moreover, the US soldiers had turned Thailand into an entertainment center; and

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<sup>213</sup> Pasuk Phongpaichit; and Chris Baker. (1995). *Op.cit.* pp. 275-277.

prostitution had become a career choice for many Thai women. This may be regarded as a sign of rottenness that secularization brought about.

At the same time, American culture such as pop music and the Hollywood movies were popular in Thai society, together with American fast food and blue jeans attires. These glittery new things outshined the traditional Thai culture, and they were readily absorbed by the young generations, who were more prone to secularity by themselves. This was a time of change, a hop to secularity by Thai people. Unscrupulousness is evident in the literature of the era such as *Boat of Men* by Krisna Asokesin, which described human life full of greed and lust; and *The Face of Thai Sakdina*, by Jitra Bhumisak, which described oppression in the era of Siamese Sakdina – a communist reflection of class struggle in Thai society.

During the dawn of secularization (also modernization), the major change with far-flung impact was that Thai people came to receive Western education, in form and contents, which emphasized the use of reason and scientific knowledge. Religious matters were no longer a matter of significance to community but only to individual sphere; hedonistic way of life has replaced ascetic way of life; even the then Thai leader, Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat enjoyed such way of life. And a major reaction to the leader's hedonism was the *14-October* uprising by the students and workers against the government due to the commoners' distrust of their leader and their secularity in their thinking. They demanded equality, leaders were no longer to be worshipped without question; they came to think that they also were eligible to enjoy this life. This secularity came in form of democracy and it precipitated in common Thais' mind, especially the learned.



Even though the current morality-oriented policy of the government is of political nature, it also reflects desecularization as a response to extreme secularization that offends morality and religiosity of the people. Nowadays, the mass media have given greater exposure to ethical and religious issues like to urge people to do well or to make merit; the Ministry of Education has also produced programs of ethics education and research. From observing the development of secularization from modernization to the current globalization, the research finds one aspect of secularization in the Thai society beside rationalization as characterizing the Western society; and it is mundanity - the people's being overwhelmingly preoccupied by matters of this-world-affairs which are mostly about fulfilling physical needs and desires - a very protruding reality of Thai secularization. The researcher believes that mundanity has similar effect as rationality in deviating people from religiosity. The rationale behind such mundanity is, the research believes, modernization and globalization of commerce intensify consumerism and materialism that expands people's physical needs by stimulating their desires. And with that huge amount of physical needs to fulfill, modern Thai people are overwhelmingly preoccupied with everyday life businesses; religiosity simply does not have a window of time to jump into their life. This feature of secularization is especially noticeable in Asian society where peoples are oppressed by the more powerful Westerners and the natural resources are scarce compared to its huge population. Therefore improvement in life security of people will lead eventually to desecularization of people.

#### **4.3.4.1 Analysis of Social Change in Thailand**

In comprehending the change of Thai society several factors need to be considered, first is a revisit to the definition of secularization and initial situation of Thai society, second is the influential historical and social factors behind the change which may be

divided into external factors and domestic factors, third is the current development of the world which is the situation that secularization is pushed to its limit and desecularization begins, and finally a comparison of Thai secularization and Western secularization is to be conducted to see what the former is really like.

A revisit to the definition of secularization is necessary because secularization is a Western concept but it is being applied onto a Thai setting. Phenomenally, functionally, or technically, secularization is a shift of church's dominance to king's or common people's dominance in power and influence in everyday life; qualitatively or intellectually it is a shift from mysticism to rationalism in people's thinking. In the researcher's view, Thai 's secularization may resemble the Western one in form but not in quality as Thai's initial situation was not the same as the Western one and Thai mentality is not the same as the Western. Thai's secularization was largely imposed, rather than a self-initiated movement, by the leaders who viewed Western modernization as advancement thus tried to impose modernization - secularization on the whole Thai society. Also the modernization-secularization is superficially copied rather than implemented with guide of the spirit of rationality.

Thai secularity is different from Western one in that the former is principally pragmatic and the latter rational, the two secularities are compatible. Therefore the modern Thai secularization takes the form of materialism and consumerism.

As for the initial status of Thai society, it was, and still partially is, an agrarian society. Animism, rather than rationalized religiosity as in the West, prevailed; rationalized religious doctrine of Buddhism was adopted but commonly in an animistic way. Therefore in contrast with the West, where secularization refers to an autonomous shift of power

from church to king or commoner guided by the Enlightenment - the increased use of rationality to become a modern man; Thai modernization - secularization was a forced one, by its leader class. After the aforementioned difference, shift from animism, which is a form of mysticism, to rationality may be likened to Western secularization in the sense of a shift from mysticism to rationalism.

However, the prevalence and the depth of secularization are different observably. Western secularization is self - initiated, spirit - guided, intellectually founded, and is blended in their culture; while Thai secularization depends on prevalence and effectiveness of modern education, which is a Western one. In the researcher's view, it still takes some time unfathomable for Thai culture to blend well with rationality and thus secularity in its rationality sense. Also it is quite notable that Thai people are quite functional or pragmatic in everyday life, but in their spiritual life they are quite animistic; and it is quite a dichotomy between the everyday life and spiritual life of a typical Thai national. The academicians conjecture, it may be due to the lack of scientific development in Thai society; in fact the researcher has a belief that science is a product of blending spiritual life with mundane life. Therefore, it is possible to state that in the initial state Thai people were secular in everyday life but animistic (deseccular) in spiritual life; and spirituality never intervenes with everyday life unless in critical moment when life and death is so near to each other. With Western modernity introduced by Western education, Thai spiritual life starts to shift though slowly from animism to rationality.

#### **4.4 CHULARAJMONTRI IN WAKE OF THAI MUSLIM DESECULARIZATION**

The Muslims in Thailand may be grouped into two groups according to their typical religious ideologies, namely the ideal-practicing Sunnis and the idealist Shiites.

Scupin Ramond, a scholar studying Thai Muslims, groups Thai Muslims into two groups, namely the Khana Kao (Old group) who are Thai folk Muslims in Buddhist environ with a generalized traditional worldview, they spread across the country in rural areas and in Bangkok; and the Khana Mai (New group), the reformist Muslims who advocate the ideas of purifying Islam, they believe that the current Islamic practices are not truly Islamic and in decadence and need be purified for the purpose of improving the current situation of Islam and reviving Islam to its golden age. The reformist Muslims are typically educated and are more vocal in academic and media spheres; they mostly reside in the cities in Bangkok and other provinces. The surge of Khana Mai is a desecularization move that poses challenge to the Chularajmontri, as the latter is a typically a representative of the Khana Kao. Though the Khana Mai poses ideological challenge to the Chularajmontri, some other movements of Thai Muslim desecularization resort to violence; and the violence in the deep southern provinces is a consequence. The surge of desecularization movements among Thai Muslims reflects the weakening authority of the Chularajmontri as the leader of the fellow Thai Muslims and the institute's loss of touch with the reality of the current development in the local Muslim community.

#### **4.4.1 KHANA MAI'S PERSPECTIVE REGARDING CHULARAJMONTRI**

“Khana Kao” and “Khana Mai” are informal names for two groups of Thai Muslims. The reformists Khana Mai call themselves “Sunnah” or “Salafi” referring to the Muslims who truly observe the words of God correctly, or the puritan Muslims. The Khana Mai's ideology has got influence from the Wabhabi movement. The Wabhabi ideology emphasizes the absolute oneness of God and advocates a return to the original teaching of Qur'an and Hadith while condemning all kinds of innovation (bid'a). Wabhabi movement has entered Thailand via an Indonesian political exile, Ahmad Wahab, who came to

Bangkok in 1906. This Islamic puritan ideology has received certain extent of acceptance among some groups of Thai Muslims in Bangkok, especially the educated and the academic Muslims, let alone those who have been educated in the Middle East where Wabhabi movement originated. With puritan ideology, the Khana Mai, who regard themselves as the Muslims practicing the right Islam, generally hold negative view toward the Chularajmontri, regarding it as a conservative religious leader with strong support from the traditional rural ulama, or the Khana Kao. The Khana Mai wants to reform the ideology and the practices to them right according to the Islamic principle. It is true for most of the cases that whatever attitude or criticism the Khana Mai holds against the Khana Kao is also against the Chularajmontri.

#### **a) Khana Kao – a result of enculturation**

Enculturation is the process by which a person learns the requirements of the culture by which he or she is surrounded, and acquires values and behaviors that are appropriate or necessary in that culture.<sup>214</sup> Khana Kao's ideology or consciousness of Islam is regarded by the Khana Mai as a result of long-time enculturation of Muslims within Thai culture which is predominantly animistic and Buddhist in its basis. And the Khana Mai view Chularajmontri Institution as the leadership of the traditional Muslims, the Khana Kao, who do not practice the correct Islam according strictly to Al Qur'an and Hadith since many local ingredients and what they (Khana Mai) call innovations are allowed in their practices of Islam, like the use Azimah (Islamic amulets), practice of Shirk imitating the Buddhists' merit-making (Tham bun) for 3 or 100 days for the deceased, or even the Mawlid which is a celebration of the Prophet Muhhamad's birthday, and

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<sup>214</sup> Graec, Lindsay. (2007). **Handbook of Socialization: Theory and Research**. p.547. and Grace, Lindsay. (2009). **Handbook of Research on Computational Arts and Creative Informatics: The Challenge of Enculhiration in the Arts**. pp. 312-324 .



performing the Wai Khru ritual which the Khama Mai oppose Muslims from taking part while the Khana Kao tolerate for the sake of community harmony. Khana Mai gives the reason for their opposition that all these are not prescribed in the Al Qur'an or in the Hadith.

Chularajmontri Prasert Muhammad was the first Chularajmontri to have publicly disputed the Khana Mai's doctrines on the Mawlid issue. The Chularajmontri ruled that such practice was allowable among Muslims on the condition that Islamic commands were not violated. For the case of Mawlid, the Chularajmontri ruled that Mawlid was a tradition adopted from the Egyptian, which was held for remembering the Prophet; and through it, it was enhanced the unity of the Muslims from different parts of the country. As well as the Wai Khru ritual, he ruled that the Muslim students might take parts in the ritual however they needed not to prostrate to worship in a way of worshipping God. He advised that it was no harm to have Mawlid celebration or to participate in the Wai Khru ritual as it was not against the Islamic teaching but it strengthened Muslim community; though it was not prescribed in the Qur'an or Hadith, it was acceptable.

However, instead of centering their criticism on revelation-reason issues and the urge to go back to pristine teaching of Qur'an and Hadith in order to attain the spirit of Islam, the Khana Mai seem to have taken the reformist ideas at face value without scrutinizing whether it is truly the spirit of Islam that needs to be called back; like they urge to abolish the local ingredients that have been absorbed in forming the local Islamic tradition and ideology. Many of the reformist influences are good, like the adoption of performing the sermon in Thai instead of Arabic for the purpose of better conveying the Islamic teaching. At the same time, their purgation of many of the local elements is irrational, like requiring the Muslims to eat using bare hands like the traditional Arabs did.

In fact, some of the teachings must be applied tactfully in accordance with the concerned context instead of applying them bluntly.

The abovementioned ideological and interpretational confrontation sets an open hostile stance between the Chularajmontri Institution and the Khana Mai. Oftentimes, the Chularajmontri is seen by the Khana Mai as an instrument of the government which is Buddhist authority in intervening the Islamic affairs. And not only do the Khana Mai, the Muslims in the south also disregard the Chularajmontri as their religious leader; rather they externalize their religious leadership to as far as Saudi Arabia as can be seen in their following the Saudi's pronouncement of commencement date and ending date of the Ramadan instead of the Chularajmontri's. Therefore, unless the Chularajmontri office has considerable reformist element, the Khana Mai would view it with distrust and hostility.

From the above examination and discussion, it is seen that the often clashing views of the Khana Kao and Khana Mai do pose challenge to the Chularajmontri in the light that institution is to survive and to reform itself as they provide valuable input in improving the office to better serve the community. In other way round, if an office does not serve its community, then what worth is it?

#### **b) Chularajmontri institute as a government-sponsored organization:**

In the eyes of the Khama Mai, the current Chularajmontri institute is an organization with traditionalist bend due to the fact that the organization of the Institution is filled predominantly with the traditionalist Muslims, for example, the 26 Provincial Islamic Council (PIC) representatives who are members in the Central Islamic Committee that nominates the Chularajmontri candidates, are chosen from the rural provinces where the traditionalists have strong base. The Khana Mai view that the 26 PIC representatives

are unequip with the necessary knowledge to deal with the problems of dynamic real-life world.

Other the other hand, the Khana Kao, due to their dominance in the Chularajmontri, view it as an institute of power by which they can benefit their own group; and also they can use it to fend off the challenges of the Khana Mai as it is clearly observed that the Chularajmontri has a great deal of respect and high status in the eyes of the Khana Kao. The institute represents the Khana Kao interests within the Thai administrative hierarchy. Moreover, the governments are more apt to support the Khana Kao into the Chularajmontri due to the politico-historical background and long-time familiarity and trust; the Khana Mai are new comers and mutual trust not yet been established. In the past, from the regime of Field Marshal Plaek Pibulsongkram unto later militant governments, the relationship between the authority and the Khana Mai has been rough; once with the government's policy of Pan-Thaiism, which was aimed to modernize Thailand and persecute the immigrant Chinese,<sup>215</sup> the Khana Mai were oppressed as well to point that they were forced to rebel against the authority. In fact it is from the beginning of militant governments that the Muslims, especially the Khana Mai and those in the four southern provinces, have developed hostility and distrust towards the central government. In contrast, the Khana Kao have close tie with the central government and they use the Chularajmontri institute to check the upsurge of the Khana Mai, as can be seen the leaders of the Provincial Islamic Committee are mainly drawn from the rural Muslims, who of course have conservative inclination. Therefore, all in all with distrust towards the central government and conflicting views with the Khana Kao, the Khana Mai views the Chularajmontri as a government-sponsored organization with distrust.

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<sup>215</sup> Wyatt, David K. (1975). *Op. cit.* pp. 241-244.

#### 4.4.2 DESECULARIZATION IN LOCAL POLITICS: A CASE STUDY OF PATTANI

It is a matter of course that being within the environment of non-Islam the development of Thai Muslims would intake influences from the environ and make appropriate adjustment to go along with the development of the environment. For instant, with modernization development within the Thai society, the Thai Muslims are not immune from being modernized, as exemplified by Muslims jumping into politics of democratic system, like Chularajmontri Chaem Phromyong, who was the first person to assume the position of Chularajmontri, was one member in the People's Party (Khana Ratsadon) that staged a bloodless coup to reform the administration from the absolute monarchy to democracy. The new democratic government's original motive of re-establishing the Chularajmontri is to co-ordinate the Muslims in the south to prevent the four southern provinces from breaking away after the WWII. And due to political reason, the Chularajmontri was to be filled with person from a trustworthy party, the Khana Kao, as have been mentioned earlier that the central government and the Khana Mai had developed distrust with each other. With the government's favor, the Khana Kao was bestowed with the opportunity to power in the position of Chularajmontri. With power acquired, the Khana Kao launched campaigns against the Khana Mai that further worsened the relationship.

After the administrative reform, Muslims were elected as people's representatives into the parliament. From interviews, taking part in politics by the Muslims is an option for the Muslims to exercise their rights, to have their voices heard, and to have their share in running the country. Muslims' taking part in politics at national level, which is a non-Islam and secular setting, is a secularization development of the Thai Muslims. Of course, with

modernization and secularization of the whole Thai society, Muslim community as a smaller part will inevitably be secularized as well.

Anyhow, there is a surge of desecularization in some groups of Thai Muslims, in Bangkok and in upcountry. But for the moment, desecularization in Pattani will be studied as case study because the desecularization process took place there concretely and it goes on until now. Other reasons for picking Pattani as a case study are that it is adequately representative due to its significance in historical background and the large network of Pattani politicians at provincial level in the deep southern provinces, and also at national and international levels. The desecularization process in Muslims of Pattani may be divided into periods according to the periods of political development as done by Bukori Jihmah, however with the researcher's explanations.

**The first period, 1933 – 1985,** is the beginning period of secularization. It is the period after the administrative system was changed to a democracy. The politics in Pattani during this period is a fight for political power between the old power which was the clan of the former governor of Pattani, which may be called “Khana Kao”, and the clans of clergymen, which may be called “Khana Mai”.<sup>216</sup>

The person in leadership of desecularization movement was Haji Sulong Tohmeena.<sup>217</sup> And the questions to be answered here are how the desecularization movement came about and why it succeeded.

<sup>216</sup> Bukoree Jihmah, (2006). **Local Politicians of Pattani** (บุญศรี จีหมะ, นักการเมืองท้องถิ่น จังหวัดปัตตานี), pp. 23.

<sup>217</sup> See detail in Chalermkiat Khunthongpet. (2004) **Haji Sulong Abdul Kardir: A Rebel.. or Hero of the Southern Provinces** (ชัย สุหลง อับดุล การ์ด กบฏ... หรือวีรบุรุษ แห่งสี่จังหวัดภาคใต้), pp. 15-27.



Haji Sulong Tohmeena was a countryman of Pattani; he was educated with Islamic scholastics in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, and became a religious teacher there for about 20 years. In the year 1927, he returned to visit his home town to find that the Pattani society was in a state of moral decadence; many people were credulous of black magic and mysterious power, which was in contrary of the Islamic principle that teaches Muslims to adhere to Alah only. In addition to that, Pattani came to encounter secularization due to the nationalistic policies and state-centered policies during the regime of Field Marshal Plaek Pibulsongkram, who wanted to build a unified state with consciousness of Thainess which was mainly founded on the principle of Buddhism and Thai culture. Of course there were some parts of Thai culture that the Muslims could not practice.<sup>218</sup>

Haji Sulong Tohmeena's tactics in the beginning period was to begin narrating about the religion in various communities until he was well recognized and respected. Then in 1929 he started building a Pondok school for teaching Islam with sponsor money from the people and the magnificent persons in the communities plus subsidy from the government during the regime of the People's Party (Khana Rasdon). When the Pondok schools were done with its construction, Haji Sulong Tohmeena began his career as an Islamic religious teacher in 1933. Being an Islamic clergyman trained in the birthplace of Islam made his Pondok schools very popular; also his school was used as a place to hold various religious activities for the Muslims in the neighborhood. As a result, the wide base of the public support, Haji Sulong Tohmeena was elected the chairman of the Provincial Islamic Committee of Pattani, which gave him a legitimate ground for engaging in political struggle to fight for political goal for the Muslims. Significantly, for example, he proposed 7 demands<sup>219</sup> for the Muslims in responding to the nationalist policy and state-oriented

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<sup>218</sup> Ibid. p.22

<sup>219</sup> Chalermkiat Khunthongpetch (1992). *op.cit.* p. 22.

policy during the regime of Field Marshall Plaek Pibulsongkhram. His proposal was regarded as an anti-state element, and as a result he was arrested and imprisoned for three years; after being released he simply disappeared without a trace.

Even though Haji Sulong Tohmeena's seven demands were not accepted by the government and his campaign was put on hold, which the concerned Muslims believed was a result of government intervention; it is widely believed that his influence on desecularization among the Muslims lived on. The evidence was that there was a gradual shift of power balance with the power shifting from the group of former Pattani governors that long monopolized the local politics to the religious leaders. Such a shift may be attributed to also the fact that the rapid changes in the society and the economy brought about by modernization and the nationalism led to uncertainty and insecurity in life; thus the people as especially the religious Muslims increasingly turned to take refuge in religion and to seek consultation from the persons who were learned of religion.

In conclusion, though Haji Sulong Tohmeena might have past away, his spirit of desecularization lived on and took root in Pattani and spread out to the greater Muslim community in Thailand.

**The second period** is from 1986 to 2004. This period is a continuation of ideas of desecularization by the Wadah group, which is a political group, founded in 1986. In this period there was change of ideology of Muslim politicians in Pattani from secularity to religiosity (a desecularization). This ideological change may be attributed, apart from uncertainty created by the modernization plus secularization and Muslims' intense religiosity, to other reasons namely the mysterious disappearance of Haji Sulong Tohmeena, father of Den Tohmeena, the leader of Wadah group; another reason of no less

importance was the expansion of the influence of the central Thai government into the Deep-south provinces being enabled by the wealth brought forth by the rapid growth of industrialization under the export-led strategy of the national economic plan beginning in the regime of General Prem Tinasulanonda. Some of the new happenings in the southern are that Buddha statues or images were installed in the schools in the South, even in those with Muslim students the majority; the names of the places and the towns were changed from local names to Thai names; some government agencies even forced Muslim women not to address in Muslim fashion as prescribed in Islamic teaching. This expansion of cultural influence was met with antagonistic reactions from the local Muslims, namely the Muslims in Satun staged protests against the Ministry of Education's installing the Buddha images in the schools.

The action of Ministry of Education led to regrouping of Muslim politician factions, which were originally organized to leverage for political benefits, into the Wahdah group to demand for justice for the Muslims in the Deep-south provinces. The Wahdah group managed to gain support from the Provincial Islamic Committee of Pattani, and influential Islamic leaders such as religious teachers and Imams in obtaining political power. The Wahdah group was elected into the parliament and continued their struggle in the parliament. Some of the group members managed to assume to important positions, like Wanmuhammadnor Matha, a representative from Yala, assumed the position of Minister of Transport and Communication and House Speaker of the Thai Parliament. Their major accomplishments were to allow Muslims to realize their religiosity in everyday life, like to have praying places in the international airports, train stations, and other transportation stops; to revise and improve the law regarding the Islam Committee of Thailand to designate election mechanism and office terms which were life terms previously; another accomplishment was the establishment of Islamic bank in Thailand.

The above examples of Wahdah group's accomplishments are incidents of desecularization which are accomplished through political means.

**The current period** is from 2005 to the present. The local politics of Pattani has changed a lot due to the violence broken out in the Deep-south provinces and the dissent of the Thaksin government for its policy for solving the unrest in the South. The result is that all the people's representatives elected from the Deep-south provinces are from the Democrat Party; while the members of the Wahdah group who run for the office under the banner of Thai Rak Thai Party are not elected even one. Despite this result the movement of desecularization goes on actively as ever, as may be observed that the elected parliament members who are from the Democrat Party are Muslims well educated, well connected with Islamic clergymen and with the grass-root people; some of them even have records of being imprisoned in security cases in connection with the violence in the Deep-south provinces. It is observed that in the Deep-south the political orientation may change but their religiosity, the propensity to desecularize never changes.

The above three periods of Pattani politics clearly suggest a resurgence of religiosity – desecularization; though desecularization through the parliament is legal and peaceful, desecularization in form of violence is a problem.

In the researcher's view the violence in the South instantiates the clash between security and religiosity. The incoming Thai influence in politics and culture, even with introduction of Buddhism, may be regarded as a secularization that does not go with Muslims. The reasons are that the greater Thai society has been secularized and Buddhism is in general less religious in practice. Of course it may be argued that it is mainly the clash between Thai Buddhist culture and Malay Islamic culture in a situation where a stronger

foreign culture is intruding a smaller local culture with a natural response that the latter would struggle against the former; however the intensity of religiosity in this inter-cultural struggle from the part of Muslims suggests that it is not exaggerating to state that it is a clash of secularization and desecularization.

#### **4.4.3 SOCIAL UNREST IN DEEP-SOUTH PROVINCES OF THAILAND**

The current conflict in the Deep-south of Thailand – Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat – is not a new eruption but in fact is an historical problem that has been disturbing Siam (Thailand) for a long time. The story can be dated back to the olden time when Siam was expanding its influence into this Malayan peninsula. Other causes of violence are conflict between the local politicians and those in the central authority, or even the conflicts among the local politicians themselves. However, these are generic problems of social, political, and economic nature; what hidden and is more significant is the identity problem.

##### **4.4.3.1 Differences in Identity**

The question is why the unrest and violence has broken out in the Deep-south provinces of Thailand while peoples of the other parts of Thailand also have problems of similar sorts.

a) Overall picture at country level: majority of the people in the Deep-south provinces have an identity distinguishable from the people of the other parts of Thailand, namely they are Malay descendents, they observe Islam, and they speak Malay language. That is the Muslims in the area from the northern part of Songkhla upwards speak Thai just as the peoples of the other parts do; but the Muslims living in the southern area of Songkhla speak Malay. Moreover, the Muslims in the Deep-south of Thailand do not share



the same historical consciousness with the rest of Thailand; for them the Muslims here only have a vivid memory of Siamese invasion since the olden days. As a resistant reaction, the Muslims in the Deep-south create their own identity to distant them from the Thais, by integrating Malay ethnicity – Kita Orang Melayu, the tradition of Malay language – adat, and Islam – Agama. The identity elements are so tightly integrated that they are hardly separable. This identity has created intense awareness of themselves being different from the Thai counterpart who speak, have Thai custom, and observe Buddhism.

b) Overall picture at local level: the wind of change of Thai society in the direction of modernization and secularization has reached the upcountry provinces, including the Deep-south provinces. In the process of urban-to-rural modernization and secularization, the differences between the urban society which is of mechanic solidarity and the rural society which is of organic solidarity has created intensive friction, which is especially hard for the rural people and even harder for the Muslims in the South. The said differences may be explained as follows.

1. Characteristics of the activities: urban communities are composed of people of different trades, different faiths and religions; while the communities in the Deep-south have unanimous belief in righteousness and morality prescribed by Islam.

2. Social control: Urban communities rely on rules and punishments prescribed by the rules provided by the acts or the constitution; while the Muslim communities rely on the Islamic law, Sharia. When there is dispute between Muslims, the Imam of the community Mosque will be invited to act as the arbitrator to decide the disputes according to Islamic principle.

3. Position of Individual: In a modern society with democratic administration, individuality of the people is high and division of responsibility is clear. In contrast, the Muslim society is closely knitted community according to the ideal Umma community of Islam. Responsibilities are not as clearly assigned to each individual in working, say an Imam may undertake other professions as well, like growing rice, keeping orchards, trading, or fishing.

4. Economic Structure: the urban society has a capitalist economic system which depends heavily on trading; while the economy of the Muslims is implemented according to Islamic principle, it is a sufficiency economy and the Muslims must donate some of their incomes, called Zakat, to help the poor.

When these overall pictures are compiled, it is not difficult to come to a conclusion that the Deep-south provinces have tendency of conflict arising from difference in identity that sets them apart from the rest of Thailand. Therefore, the fact that the Thai state which is secular and has modernized itself expands its influence into the Deep-south provinces through service of pan-Thai nationalism has grave impact on the identity of the Muslims in the areas. Especially in tangible areas such as attires of universal fashion dictated by the central authority, also the compulsory secular education brought in by the central Thai authority and the government-designated adoption of Thai language have affected the Muslims' religious education since the religious texts are written by the local Islamic scholars in Jawi language using Arabic alphabets. The Muslims in the Deep-south provinces view Thai state's modernization-turn-secularization a threat to their own identity which has high intensity of religiosity and such a view contributes to arise of social unrest in the Deep-south of Thailand.

#### 4.4.3.2 Deep-south Provinces in Globalization

Surin Pitsuwan, in his research “Islam and Malay Nationalism”, comments that the people in the Deep-south provinces culturally belong to Malaysia while politically they belong to Thailand. Historically, culturally, and in terms of belief and language, they do have closer link with the Malay world; however, politico-geographically they are in Thai nation state.<sup>220</sup> These differences have distanced them from the general Thais in terms of ethnic-national consciousness. Further the people in the Deep-south provinces are mostly Muslims, while the rest of Thailand is predominantly Buddhists. This insight suggests that there is consciousness of Malay nationalism in the areas of Deep-south provinces of Thailand and it is being used as a political force for demanding autonomy. The right to autonomy can be achieved by means of both ideological struggle and prolonged violence. The violence that goes on currently in the Deep-south provinces began with an armament robbery at a local police station in Cho airong district, Narathiwat Province, on 4<sup>th</sup> January 2004. After this incident, a series of violence follows and continues in the Deep-south provinces until now. In the researcher’s view the above happenings are manifestation of religiosity of Muslims in general and the rapid secularization brought about by globalization.

##### a) Desecularization of Muslims in General

Surin Pitsuwan opines that with shift of the power structure of the society the Muslims try to adjust themselves to the change while also seeking every opportunity to obtain the right to autonomy. Despite the differences in demands of different groups of

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<sup>220</sup> Surin Pitsuwan. (1985). *Islam and Nationalism: a Case Study of the Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand*. pp. 89-90.

Muslims according to their situation and interest, it is Islam that is shared universally among them and is connecting them together.

Further explanation may be provided to the above opinion that while the Thai society was being modernized during the modernization period the Muslims in the Deep-south provinces struggled against such a change in pursuing the right to self-rule by resorting to an identity, which was composed of Malay ethnicity, Malay language, and Islam, as a political means however with Malay nationalism at the front line. This is because the mainstream ideology of that time was nationalism; however, nowadays Islam is put at the front line. As indicated by the research of Bukori Jihmah, which reports that amidst the changes in politics that are taking place one thing remains unchanged and shows propensity of increasing intensity and it is a factor that determines the direction of the political development; that factor is religion – Islam in this case.

The surge of religiosity, increasing desecularization, among the Muslims may be attributed to the Muslims' adjustment in resisting the impending social changes amidst globalization that is brought about by the advance in information and telecommunication technologies, effecting a wider dissemination of knowledge and information over the world. This globalization situation together with development of the economy and society amount to different kinds of problem, such as poverty among the disadvantaged peoples, illegal businesses along the border, addictive drug, violent crime, and pornography; all these go against the Islamic principle. As a result, these disturbing problems, uncertainty, and anxiety in life arise; and the Muslims nowadays turn more and more to rely on Islamic clergymen for console, advices, opinions, interpretation in conducting themselves in line with the Islamic principle. The changes brought about by globalization leads the Muslims

in the Deep-south provinces, who are by the nature of Islam already very pious religious people, to become even more pious to their religion.

### **b) Struggle against Globalization**

The current Thai society is to brave the turbulence of globalization that rampages all about despite the borders of nation states. One effect of such situation on the Thai society is that the national culture has been weakened; the society is developing in a process of cultural homogenization as a result of convergence of different cultures. Examples of some of the common phenomena that best present the current situation of Thai culture are McDonalds, Karaoke, Chinese movies and Japanese or Korean TV series, and internationalized Thai food, Thai boxing, and Thai massage as a product for sale. The commercialization of culture has reduced its value to prices; even some religious values are converted into price, and those values of religion which cannot be converted into price are relegated along the trend – a secularization brought by global commercialization.

On the contrary, globalization also brings about cultural bewilderment to the people thus creating a feeling of identity loss – an uncertainty situation that people fear to face. A response to that is what Eric Hobsbawm calls invented tradition, which is a revival of former culture and reproducing it so that the society can go on.<sup>221</sup> In the case of Thai culture, it is at its core secular in the aspect of pragmatism and therefore it blends well with foreign cultures in the direction conforming consumerism and capitalism. At the same time another force is also surging in response to globalization; and it is localism that is trying to revive local cultures, wisdoms, and histories in an effort to resist the force of globalization.

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<sup>221</sup> Hobsbawm, Eric. (2006). *Invention of Tradition*. p. 247.



The crash between these two forces however has a grave effect on the people in the Deep-south provinces.

The overall development of Thai culture in a secular direction has created problems for the Muslims in the Deep-south provinces, since the religious Muslims are overwhelmed by the secularity of the Thai culture even to the point of cultural shock. Uncertainty situation is certainly created as a result; and this situation will bring about anxiety and fear, like fear being culturally and ethnically engulfed or even ambushed. A protective response is to invent own identity by connecting Malay ethnicity, Malay language, and Islam; and on the other hand by connecting Thai ethnicity and Buddhism in creating the other in the process of creating a self. However the fact is that not every Malay are speaks Malay or observes Islam just as not every Thai speaks Thai or observes Buddhism. The invented self identity and the other are antagonistic to each other, there is tension everywhere in the spaces of society, namely Malay versus Thai, Malay language versus Thai language, Islam versus Buddhism, and desecularization versus secularization (here it is needed to revisit the conclusion in Chapter 2 that Muslims are generally more religious than Buddhists or Christians). When other problems like structural and personal conflict between the locals and the dispatched official of the central government are added on top of it, it simply bursts. It burst in the form of Mosque Kreu-se uprising and massacre in Pattani Province.

The incident on April 28<sup>th</sup>, 2004 is that a group of Muslims came to use Mosque Kreu-se for the purpose of stimulating the demand for independence of the Republic of Islamic State of Pattani. Then the soldiers intervened by encircling the mosque for the next eight hours before charging into it, leaving behind 32 dead bodies inside.<sup>222</sup> This incident

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<sup>222</sup> On-anong and Nakhrin Mektrairat (อรอนงค์ – นครินทร์ เมฆไตรรัตน์) ed. (2009) **The Incident of Mosque Kruese**. [www.thaipoliticsgovernment.org/wiki](http://www.thaipoliticsgovernment.org/wiki) (กรณีมัสยิดกรือเซะ)

had caught attention of the world community and drawn a lot of criticisms. However, from the perspective of this dissertation, this incident is a movement of desecularization.

If one observes the incident on its face, it may be construed that it is a demand for independence; but once it is scrutinized into its meaning, some questions may be raised, namely why Mosque Krue-se was chosen to announce the demand, why the group leaders were religious teachers (Ustas) and why some participants were dressed as religious preacher.<sup>223</sup>

Mosque Krue-se has been pronounced a location of antiquity since 1935. This is related to the tale concerning the spirit shrine of Lim Ko Niao, who committed suicide after her elder brother refused to return to see their sick mother in China. The story goes that her elder brother married a Muslim and was converted to Islam following his wife's faith; so before she died she cursed the mosque.<sup>224</sup> Chaiwat Satha-anant opines that the tales of Mosque Krue-se and the tale of Spirit Lim Ko Niao are the arena for identity contest between the Malays and the Thais.<sup>225</sup> However, the fact that a mosque is used, the leaders are religious teachers, and some participants dressed as religious preacher may be interpreted that it is a clash between secularization and desecularization, the former implying Chinese and Thai and the latter implying the local Muslims. The fact that the Thai state declares Mosque Krue-se a location of antiquity implies that the sacred place of the local Muslims has been secularized into a tourism attraction. The response of the Muslims in the surrounding areas is that they would come to pray at the mosque and forbid non-Muslims from entering the site. In 1990, there was a demand to revoke the antiquity location pronouncement of the mosque and also a demand to remove the spirit shrine of

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<sup>223</sup> Chaiwat Satha-anant. (1994, February). Krue-se: Muslims' New Arena for struggle for Identity Sarakade 9 (168): 94-108.

<sup>224</sup> *Ibid.* pp.99-100.

<sup>225</sup> *Ibid.* p.101.

Lim Ko Niao from its adjacency.<sup>226</sup> The Mosque Krue-se incident is followed by the protest and tragedy of Tak-bai in Narathiwat Province. The latter incident happened on October 25<sup>th</sup>, 2004, where a lot of Muslims gathered at the office of Tak-bai district to demand justice for the 6 protesters who had been arrested for being instigators. The government then ordered to disperse the protesters and arrested a lot of them, who were then uploaded into trucks which took them to be detained in a distant military camp. The trip to their detention place ended with 84 deaths in addition to 60 missing in the incident.<sup>227</sup> Most of the deceased died from starvation, dehydration, and suffocation, since the Muslims were in fasting during Ramadan and the weather was hot plus the improper manner of transporting human in jammed trucks. Among the detainees, it was found that some had taken addictive drug.<sup>228</sup> Concerning this incident, the Independent Committee has conducted investigation in many perspectives to come to a conclusion that most of the people died during the transportation and the deaths were not expected and there was no intention to lead to such a tragedy.

When the two incidents are compared, though the nature of religiosity in Tak-bai incident is not as conspicuous as the Mosque Krue-se incident, the fact that the Muslim protesters were fasting in Ramadan relates this incident to Islam as there had to be some Islamic ideology behind the protest. And it is not a simple protest to merely demand release of the 6 detained instigators. It is worth noticing that why the Muslims in fasting came to protest while the Islamic precept forbids Muslims from fighting during fasting since Ramadan is a period for spiritual cleansing and preventing the self from doing evil things. After the Tak-bai incident, killings are everyday event in the Deep-south provinces,

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<sup>226</sup> *Ibid.* p.97.

<sup>227</sup> [Th.wikipedia.org/wiki, Massacre in Tak-bai](http://Th.wikipedia.org/wiki,Massacre_in_Tak-bai) (online)

<sup>228</sup> Areepin Binji; O. Lawman: & Suhaymi Ismael. (2007). et al. (1999) "Revealing Examination Result of Tak-bai Mob Dispersion", *Pattani: History and Politic in the Malay World*. p. 447.

even Ramadan is no exception. It is told that some religious teachers teach that killing during Ramadan can lead the killer into heaven. It is found that such idea is being taught really, reflecting that desecularization in certain groups of Muslims has been overdone and it has deviated from the teachings of Prophet Muhammad. Nevertheless, the two incidents have in effect reinforced the momentum of the local people's creation of self identity and desecularization in resisting the secularity of Thai identity.

### **c) Desecularization in Politics**

Islamic clergymen are very influential over the desecularization in the politics of the Deep-south provinces as they assume a role of spiritual leader, especially the clergymen who own reputed Pondok schools and have a huge number of students. During the period of modernization of Thailand, the Thai government had reformed the education and issued the law of compulsory education which brought about dissent among the Muslims in the Deep-south provinces because female students were forced to attend in the same classroom with male students, and the classrooms were in the Buddhist temples with Buddhist monks as teachers, and the teaching language was Thai. This education reform created a paranoid feeling that the central government intended to assimilate their culture. The compulsory education also heightened the importance of Pondok schools as a place to learn Islam in a hope to preserve their culture. However, as time passed by many Muslim parents came to see the importance of ordinary education in creating good future for their offspring, they tend to send their children to ordinary public schools or private schools that provide Islamic education laterally in an effort to balance secularity in ordinary education. Bukori Jihmah narrated that the private schools that also provided Islamic education side by side with ordinary education grew rapidly in number in comparing with Pondok schools which provided only Islamic education. These private schools besides having income from

the students had also income from the government's subsidy. With better financial situation, the owners of the private schools entered arena of politics. What is phenomenal here at present is that those who enter politics in the deep-south provinces are predominantly Islamic clergymen themselves while in the past the politicians were persons were those having close tie with the clergymen; and many of them are owners of private schools that provide Islamic education along side with ordinary education and what gets them elected is their success in religion of Islam. For example, they must have been educated within Islam properly, like attending Pondok schools; they must graduate with religious study degree from university; or they must conduct themselves piously according to Islamic principle. Therefore the election arena is thick with the air of Islamic piety of the candidates, like the Wadah group, Jamaah-Ulamah group, and Santipap Thai party. This local political atmosphere clearly suggests desecularization of the local Muslims in the Deep-south provinces.

#### **d) Violence in Deep-south Provinces**

Apart from clash of cultures at local level that contributes to the violence in the Deep-south provinces, the external forces of Islamization also have their impacts. The major forces of Islamization from the outside are ideology of the Wahabi school of thought, the success of Ayatollah Khomeini's 1979 revolution that has turned Iran into a religious state, and movements of other religious groups that have effects on desecularization of the politics in the Deep-south provinces. However the society is in a transitional period as a result of the unsustainable modernization, it is not stable and strong enough to cope with changes; and consequently the Thai state becomes too weak to develop the South properly. In addition to that are the differences in ethnicity, religion, and culture, together with conflicts persisting from the past until the Mosque Krue-sa incident



and the Tak-Bai protest-turned-tragedy, where violent suppression was resorted? Other incidents that also fan the violence are the mysterious disappearance of Haji Sulong, a reputed Islamic religious clergyman; and Mr. Somchai Neelapaijit, a lawyer famed of pleading for Muslims. Yet another factor of no less importance is that the government officials dispatched down to the Deep-south provinces are not well informed of the local culture and religion; they are not equipped with the local Malay language as well due to pan-Thai mentality of the central government. As a result there are misunderstanding as an outcome of differences in language and belief, and soon mistrust develops, and afterwards physical violence between the locals and the officials breaks out. The local Muslims therefore develop a perception that being a citizen in this country does not warrant justice and equity. In fact this area is so fragile that unexpected violence can break out anywhere and anytime.

The violence, especially physical violence, engineered in the Deep-south provinces takes the forms of assassination, arson, or bombing. Though it is understood that the violence committed here aims to protect the local identity; among the three pillars of identity, Malay ethnicity, Jawi language, and Islam, it is Islam that is very much resorted. The motives, causes, and motivations of bringing about violence are predominantly of religious nature. For example, killing a non-Muslim is not wrong; or carrying Jihad, which nominally implies carrying out physical violence against non-Muslims, during Ramadan will assume to heaven as a martyr. Although the above teachings are quite far away from the Islamic principle, this is a glimpse of weight of religiosity in the local identity. The researcher can feel a force of desecularization active in the culture of the people of in the Deep-south provinces.

#### 4.4.4 ROLE OF CHULARAJMONTRI IN WAKE OF THAI MUSLIMS

##### DESECULARIZATION

No matter whether it is through theoretical inference, through comparison of religious doctrines and practices of the three mainstream religions of the world today, and through observation of happenings in the Deep-south, the conclusion of this dissertation is clear that Muslims due to the nature of practicing Islam tend to have higher religiosity and thus tend to desecularize. While the greater Thai social and cultural context is secularizing, the smaller Muslim society and culture remains steadfast religious and tend to do the opposite – to desecularize sometimes with violence. Where the Chularajmontri should stand and what he should do are what this section is to investigate.

Desecularization of Muslims though is not related to the Chularajmontri by law as the latter is in a status of advisor over Islamic affairs to the Ministry of Education and is the chairman of the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand; in tradition the Chularajmontri has a status of the leader of the Muslims in Thailand. With the conflict in religious ideology and problems of violence happening in the Deep-south, the people in the society, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, expect the Chularajmontri to do something to solve the problem. However with modernization and secularization after the 1956 Administrative Reform, the Chularajmontri was put under a secular administrative and thus is interfered by secular politics ever since. But this does not mean that the Chularajmontri ceased to be active in the Islamic spirituality in Thailand. In fact the Chularajmontri plays a crucial role in cushioning the clash between Muslims and non-Muslims, and between secularity and religiosity.

The persons who assumed the position of Chularajmontri after the 1956 Administrative Reform were Chularajmontri Cham Phromyong who lost this position by political force, and then there were Chularajmontri Tuan Suwannasatsana, Chularajmontri Prasert Muhammad, and Chularajmontri Sawad Sumalayasak. They all make different contributions to Islam in Thailand and the Thai society as a whole.

#### 4.4.4.1 Chularajmontri Soothing Clash

In the era of secularization-desecularization clash, which is comparatively more severe in Islamic space since the clash does not only happen at the level of ideology but also in everyday life, the Chularajmontri is therefore occupied with the business of soothing the clash here and there, as exemplified in the following questions and answers regarding religion and culture.

Chularajmontri Tuan Suwannasatsana played a major role in translating Al Qur'an into Thai. One purpose is to provide Thai Muslims who do not know Arabic language with readily legible Islamic canon; another is to a standard source of knowledge for reducing disputes in Islamic doctrine among local Muslims, since Muslims are always in concern of their religion. Their life will not be happy if they always have disputes over Islamic matters due to different sources of information and differing understanding. Chularajmontri Prasert Muhammad, on the other hand, provided standard answers to questions that concern the Muslims arising from the fact that they are situated amidst the greater context of non-Muslim and also concern the government officials who are to work in the Deep-south as they will be situated in the society of predominantly Muslims. The Chularajmontri gave totally 23 answers, and some of the important ones are as follows. **Question 3:** Is the Wai Khru ritual against Islamic canon? The answer is that bringing flowers to the teachers for

worshipping the teacher is against Islamic canon, but if with other intention it is allowed; paying respect to the teacher in classroom is not against Islamic canon; giving incense and candle to teacher is not permitted as it is an act of worshipping. **Question 8:** Is wearing shorts, in boy-scout and sport attires, against the Islamic canon? What to do? The Answer is that wearing shorts is not allowed, wearing trousers is allowed instead or long socks should be put on in doing those activities. **Question 10:** What are the limits in celebrating the Prophet Muhammad? The celebrating parade is allowed if it is not considered a part of the religion, decoration of the parade with animal images or with women is against the Islamic canon. As observed, these questions are around whether it is proper for Muslims to practice Thai customs, and the Chularajmontri provides satisfactory answers backed by Islamic prescriptions to allow them to live side by side peacefully with the non-Muslim Thais, and at the same time to give the Thai officials a guideline of what to conduct within the context of Islamic culture.

#### 4.4.4.2 Chularajmontri Rebutting Wrong Views about Islam

During the term of Chularajmontri Sawad Sumalayasak, the leadership of Thai Muslims was maintained. He visited the Muslims in the South, received visiting Muslims from upcountry and foreign countries. He sponsored Islamic activities, like Islamic education, reading Kore, and organizing Mawlid celebration. However, in the face of desecularization that turns into violence the Chularajmontri also made effort to help ease the situation by rebutting the wrong views of Islam that leads to violence.

On April 28<sup>th</sup>, 2004 in the morning, there was violent confrontation between the government officials and a group of insurgents at Pattani. During the confrontation a document entitled “Berjihad di Patani”(the struggle in Pattani) was discovered; it was

believed to belong to a man went by the name Ghulam Azzuluk Ingmuliyamenah (กอลัม อังซูลุก อิงมุลยาเหม็นะห์) who composed it at the Guatigou (กัวลาติโก) in Tnohmaroh City of Kalantan Province of Malaysia. The document was hand-written in Malay language for the purpose of conveying a message to the Thai people in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat Provinces where Malay is the local dialect. The document was dated December 10<sup>th</sup>, 2002.

In “Berjihad di Patani” (the struggle in Patani) it was written that the violent events that had taken place were by the hands of innocent people who sacrificed their lives in the suicides. The document had referred to several divine prescriptions that might be found in the Al-Qur’an and hadith; in addition, the document further emboldened the people in the three southern provinces with the ideology of Malayan ethnicity.

Nirand Phantarakit, who works for the Office of Chularajmontri, has compiled this document in responding to “the call for jihad, or the struggle in the way of Allah.... for the sake of the Muslim brothers in Pattani...”.<sup>229</sup> The content of the booklet is said to be a description of religious struggle and war (jihad) for the purpose of liberating Pattani from the Thai authority.

In this booklet, people are divided into three groups namely,

Group 1: those who join their war and concur with their way in separating Pattani are regarded as Muslims with true piety (*Mumin*); the warriors who dare sacrificing life are called Jahid.

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<sup>229</sup> Nirand Phantarakit. (นิรันดร์ พันทรกิจ) (2004). **Jihad... The Distorted Islamic Teaching: a Criticism of Document “Bur Jihad de Patani”** (ญีฮาด...คำสอนของอิสลามที่ถูกบิดเบือน: บทวิพากษ์เอกสาร “เบอร์ญีฮาด ดี ปัตตานี”). p. 3.



Group 2: those Muslims who do not agree with their way are deemed betrayers or hypocrites (*Munafiq*).

Group 3: those who hold other religions are regarded as heretics (*Kafira or Mujrikin*).

The people of group 1 are responsible of eliminating those of groups 2 and 3. This fighting is compared to the wars of Badr and Uhud where Prophet Muhammad fought with the enemy that came along to defeat him. Inside the booklet, the model of comparison is constructed to state that the people whom are slain by them, Buddhists or Muslims alike are heretics or betrayers just like the enemy who were slain by Prophet Muhammad and his comrades. They thus concluded that their war is a just one.<sup>230</sup>

The Chularajmontri had issued a document in responding to “Berjihad di Patani” (the struggle in Pattani), stating that the said document had contained certain hermeneutic contents which were mis-interpretation of Islamic teaching, and there were messages that tended to fan up violence. The Chularajmontri had then called up a meeting for this very matter on June 10<sup>th</sup>, 2004.<sup>231</sup> The meeting had drawn up the following resolutions: “Berjihad di Patani” (the struggle in Pattani) was not a document of religious teaching, nor a paper of academic religious writing. But it is a writing that aimed to instigate people, and

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<sup>230</sup> Ibid. p.5.

<sup>231</sup> The people attending the meeting included senior Institutions of the Chularajmontri Office, the chairmen of Islamic committees of the Deep south provinces, intellectuals of Islamic study from the central and the south, the president and the representatives of the association of the private Islamic schools in the southern border provinces, the president of Bohol schools of the south, the chairmen of Islamic Committee of Chiangmai and Nonthaburi, the Chief General of the Religious Affair Department and representatives from the Division of Public Relation and Special Task Force (กอ.รณน.) – Chularajmontri document ศพ0183.06.ศ/2547 dated June 11<sup>th</sup>, 2547 Buddhist era, signed by Swad Sumalayasak, the Chularajmontri, as the chairperson of the Central Committee of Islam of Thailand)

to entice people into a wrong way in terms of ideology in order to eventually lead to violence.

In this document, Nirand Phantarakit criticized that there were many mistakes regarding the presentation of Islamic prescriptions.

The writer of this document was not a Thai academic of Islamic study, it might be a foreigner who might gain benefit over jeopardy that might entail in Thailand and who did not truly understand the teaching of Islam.

The document had resulted in impairment of image of Islam and Muslim community who made enemy of fellow people of different religions, which was not what the Islam was teaching its believers. This document also posed a threat to the national security of Thailand.

Apart from this, the Southern Islamic Organization Network for Peace was convened on June 8<sup>th</sup>, 2004 with participation of Provincial Islamic committees from the southern bordering provinces. The main resolution was that the writer of the document was weak in Islamic culturing but was keen in using Malay language and in deploying mass psychology techniques in emboldening and instigating people.

The resolution regarding the manual is that the document is in a format of specific manual with the contents which are partly true, however, without the correct Talfiq reference. The manual lacks academicism; the many deployments of prescriptions from the Al-Qur'an are absolutely incorrect, and are interpretations embedded with specific interest for the purpose of the writer. The content in this manual had a feature of Tariqah and was

embedded with political agenda and nationalism, which was probably related with a Tariqah group that was behind several unrest incidents in Malaysia a year ago. The target groups to embolden and instigate are Muslims and youths. Eventually, the group had designated among the members of the operative groups to adopt the way of Shafii, which is a clever means of network sprouting as the Muslims in these areas adopt the practice of Shafii. The preachers who carry the manual would instruct people not to kill fathers or mothers; and training is divided into many categories.

The survivors of the incidents confessed that the reason they were fearless in causing the unrest was not due to the influence of the text nor the preachers, but due to the excitement of caffeine during the night of the incident. The persons who lured them to drink coffee spoke in Thai language.

However, the meeting concluded that considering from the viewpoint of struggling, the momentum was only sufficient to bring about a disruption.

Nirand Pantarakij wrote a paper presenting his opinion regarding the booklet. He says the booklet not only is hazardous to the national stability but also hazardous badly to Islam, since it is a call for jihad which is a struggle in the way of Allah for the Muslim brothers in Pattani.<sup>232</sup> The booklet is meant to be the manual for the “Shaid” (religious warriors); also compiling the booklet does not refer to any viewpoints of any philosopher, but it purports to provoke violent sentiment instead of presenting a correct way of philosophical thinking.

Nirand Pantanakij criticizes that the fact that the booklet states that the people who are slain and destroyed, no matter they are Muslims or Buddhists, are heretics and

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<sup>232</sup> Nirand Phantarakij. (2004). *Op.cit.* p. 3.

betrayers, just like those the Prophet and his comrades had fought with before in history. With such comparison, they has concluded their war a just one.<sup>233</sup>

#### 4.5 SUMMARY

The political change during the ending period of the Middle Age that divided the administrative power from religion in the Western world, which is a part of the losing out of power and significance in everyday life of religious institution – the so-called secularization, is a process of opening the chapter of modernization, namely the modern era. The modern era is characterized mainly by the dominance of rationality in ideology, in contrast with faith in the former era of religion; the advance in science and technology in everyday life. As time passes by, modernity has spread to every corner of the world together with secularization due to the expansion of influences of the technologically advanced Western powers. In fact, the general adoption of Western secular education system plays an especially important and effective role in modernizing the world. The reactions from the Islamic world and others range from accepting or adjusting themselves to modernity up to rejecting it. The Muslims stand out in the end of rejecting the modernity due to its higher religiosity in its religious practices.

For Thailand, its leaders have chosen to embrace modernity in an effort to survive itself from engulfment of the Western powers; it therefore had modernized itself in its fundamental areas, namely its polity, economy, and culture since the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Even though Thailand is successful in modernization to a certain extent, its elite class and middle class have become secular due to their Western education; it has bent towards the end of materialism and consumerism due to emphasis in developing its economy in the

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<sup>233</sup> Ibid. p.5.

direction of capitalism. The religious piety has been relegated to personal affair. The Thai society is therefore secular and rich in materialism and consumerism while the rationality aspect of secularity is yet to be developed.

Now with realization of the overstress of secularity in form of materialism and consumerism which has caused social crisis, such as the 1997 financial crisis; the country therefore tries to realign itself with desecularization policy, such as the King's sufficiency economy, and the ethics-led country development policy. Today, there are increasingly campaigns and activities of developing the society's morality by both private and public sectors. Its effectiveness is yet to be seen in time.

In the world of Islam, secularity is a foe rather than a friend; the Islamic practices and the prescribed conducts of everyday life make the Muslims less secularized compared with the Buddhist counterpart. For example, the Muslims are prescribed to worship Allah five times a day, they take oath to be loyal to their religion, to fast during the Ramadan, to donate Zakat, and they must try to pay a pilgrimage in Mecca; also they must refrain from liquors and pork, and the Muslim youth must study religion beside secular study. These daily practices and the compulsory religious education blend Islam into Muslims' everyday life effectively, which is unlike the optional practices of Christians and Buddhists where temple or church is rather separate from daily life. The everyday life of Muslims is already a movement of desecularization; but for those Muslims who reject modernity and desire a revival of pristine Islam, like Wahabism and Ayatollah Khomeini's religious revolution and the Khana Mai, their desecularization is even stronger.

The Thai society in this moment is in a state of imbalance, as been put by Prawet Wasi, of mind and body, of society and economy and politics and the environment; the



imbalance is a symptom of sickness that would lead to disintegration of the society.<sup>234</sup> In the researcher's view, Thai society therefore needs desecularization, namely morality and spirituality restructuring to rebalance itself in the development. Muslims' desecularization propensity may be utilized if managed properly. The key in this dissertation is thought to be the Chularajmontri (of course leaders of other religions are as important, but they are beyond the scope of the study), who must play a more important role in soothing the conflict or clash between secularization and desecularization and helping rebalance the Thai society. The question here is what he should do and how.



<sup>234</sup> Praved Wasee. (2009, 13 October). "Open Letter to Thaksin" **Matichon Daily**, (ประเวศ วะสี "จดหมายเปิดผนึกถึงทักษิณ" หนังสือมติชนรายวัน ฉบับวันพุธที่ 21 ตุลาคม 2552). p.11

## CHAPTER 5

### RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

#### 5.1 INTRODUCTION

The Chularajmontri is an institution in Thai society. Institutions are important for sustaining a society. In the researcher's opinion, institutions are pillars underpinning the society; and the Chularajmontri, which is the leadership institution of Thai Muslims since 17<sup>th</sup> century, is an institution of that type for the Thai society. In fact the Chularajmontri is the leadership institution of Thai Muslims and is indispensable for them to live peacefully amidst the majority non-Muslims in Thai society. One major reason for that is that the existence of the Chularajmontri symbolizes a guarantee of foothold of Muslims in Thai society which is predominantly Buddhist. Also due to strong sense of community of Islamic principle and Muslims, the leader is indispensable since without leadership a community would disintegrate into anarchy. Therefore the Chularajmontri is indispensable for the Muslims in Thailand; it has been there for a long time and has become an inseparable part of the Thai society, especially at this moment of turbulent change in the age of globalization.

However with changes in the Thai society, especially the major changes during the Modernization Era where secularization was brought about change in a large scale through modernization; the Chularajmontri institute have to adapt its roles and functions accordingly in order to hold steadfast to the changing Thai society, as a result the institution has come to perform both religious and secular functions, with the latter function perceivably outshining the former function, while it is widely expected to perform mainly religious function as it is a religious institution. The role of the Chularajmontri as

religious leader, as time passes by, is increasingly eroded and challenged as a result of its increasingly and overtly significant secular functions in the society. At the same time its charisma which is the major source of authority for a religious entity gradually fades as a result of the secular legal and administrative environment it has no choice but to attach to and also as a result of lack of self-development in the institution itself. As a religious institution, the Chularajmontri needs charisma that is constituted of certain characteristics which help enhance religious authority.

At any rate, the general Thai Muslims still see that the Chularajmontri is significant as the leader in practicing the religion of Islam,<sup>235</sup> but its image as religious leader has been tarnished due to its secular functions and its being subordinate to secular administrative entity, such as the Department of Religious Affairs of the Ministry of Education (now this department transferred to the Ministry of Culture), in organizational hierarchy of the society; while its function as a secular administrator has become more and more prominent to extent that it outshines the glory of religion for which the institution is supposed to be there. To worsen the situation of the Chularajmontri is the globalization that also brings about globalization of Islamic leadership; this also immensely erodes leadership and authority status of the institution. Such situation of this institution has amounted to some groups of Muslims criticizing and challenging the Chularajmontri openly, which rarely happened before. These criticisms may be summarized in one that the Chularajmontri is no longer suitable to be a religious leader and a reform in it is urgently needed. In return, such a general unsupportive view among the Thai Muslims regarding the Chularajmontri may also amount to weakening of this institution so much that it can no longer perform its function of leading the Muslims and sustaining the society; that may lead to dire

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<sup>235</sup> From interviews with Thai Muslims in different people, areas and provinces, compilation of their opinions suggests that the Chularajmontri is an important institution acting as a centre coordinating the Muslims all over the country.

consequence to Thai society as a whole, especially to the Muslim in this country in the long run.

The problem is that in the past the Chularajmontri had always been able to adapt itself in its role and function to the changing Thai society, and it has been able to sustain itself for a long period of time including the modernization and secularization in the recent past; however now amidst desecularization in social transformation, the Chularajmontri institute does not seem to be able to adapt itself to the change. This symptom may be observed in the Chularajmontri's weakening role as a religious institution in the eyes of general Muslims, especially the Khana Mai, and also the fact that it is unable to contribute influence in solving the crisis in the Deep-south provinces. The past centuries may be dominated by secularization; but for this century the surge of religiosity, especially among the Muslims, is very strong. This situation really presses the Chularajmontri to realign itself in its core function.

Now sustainability of the Chularajmontri lies on whether it is aware of the current situation and its ability to adapt itself in its role and function to the changing Thai society. Thus the problem at hand is how the Chularajmontri can adapt itself to the changes. In this chapter, the researcher would propose recommendations in hope that the Chularajmontri may incorporate them in improving the institution so that it can come back as the leader of Muslims in Thailand as it is supposed to be and in fact the current situation really demands a real one of this.

## 5.2 RECOMMENDATION ON IMPROVEMENT IN CHULARAJMONTRI INSTITUTE

As has been suggested in the chapter 3 of this dissertation, charisma is natural and the most suitable authority for a religious authority body such as the institute of Chularajmontri; therefore in order to be successful, the Chularajmontri should develop his charisma suitable for his role and function. The researcher will adopt three characteristics of charismatic religious figure, namely superb knowledge, immense benevolence, and great influence, as the framework for developing charisma in the Chularajmontri and his institute as a religious leadership or authority institution of Islam in Thailand for the reason that the Chularajmontri is a person chosen by God, Allah, to lead the Muslims to a good way of life. Superb knowledge here refers to capability to know of many things, ability to think and to solve problems; immense benevolence here refers to loving kindness or immense mercy to all, it is similar to agape in Christian term; while great influence refers to ability to affect other people. These three characteristics of charismatic religious figure are ordered in importance and achievability by the Chularajmontri as a human being. Superb knowledge is the most important and more achievable by human, it also enhances influence as knowledge is power and it can support benevolence. Characteristic of immense benevolence is more achievable by human being than the characteristic of great influence, thus has an edge over the latter for creating charisma in the Chularajmontri. The rationale behind this framework for developing charisma of Chularajmontri is the idea of theism in Islamic theology. Theism generally states that God has created the world and still takes care of the world. Along this line of idea, a prophet, or an important religious person, in the world may naturally and logically be considered as an act of God in taking care of the world. In other words, these people are god-sent to the world; they may be regarded as evident of God, witness of God, representative or messenger of God. In the case of the Chularajmontri, he may be interpreted as a person chosen by God to be the leader of Thai



Muslims and to take good care of them; he being highly knowledgeable, immensely benevolent to needy, and gracefully influential are highly expected by fellow Muslims who would look up to him for guidance. And these three characteristics of magnitude are always found in great people, while ordinary people cannot possess but only hope to acquire these qualities. It is natural to interpret that these extraordinary qualities are god-bestowed, alluding to God who possesses the qualities of omniscience, omnipresence, omnipotence, and unlimited benevolence. Therefore, the fact that a religious leader, who possesses the qualities of immense knowledge and wisdom, loving kindness, and great influence, may be interpreted as an evident of God and that he is chosen by God and is bestowed by God with these qualities. The above interpretation in turn reinforces charisma of the Chularajmontri, making him popular and respected, provided the Chularajmontri must make people aware of his extraordinary qualities. The following sections are details of recommendations for the Chularajmontri in enhancing his charisma in a way to enhance authority in the person and the institution according to the said framework.

### **5.2.1. AUTHORITY OF CHULARAJMONTRI IN ASPECT OF SUPERB KNOWLEDGE**

Superb knowledge is immense capability to know of things, immense ability to think and to solve problem. This aspect of charisma enhancement is the most important and the most highly achievable by human such as the person-to-be-Chularajmontri. Knowledge is power, no doubt; a highly knowledgeable person tends to be a highly respected and influential person. In fact Muslims value education and knowledge, as may be noticed in the Hadith where the Prophet Muhammad said, “Go for knowledge, even if you have to travel as far as to China” or “The ink of a philosopher is more important than the blood of a martyr” or “He who departs his home to search for knowledge is the person who lives life in the way of Allah.” Also from his opinion, Al Farabi (378-450), a great

Muslim philosopher, supported knowledge as the major constituent of a leader; in the *Civil of City* he mentioned that the leader must be virtuous and knowledgeable in order to develop the humanity and the society into civilization.<sup>236</sup> The above comments suggest that charisma of the Chularajmontri should be created with emphasis on the aspect of scholastics in the person and the institution, especially the Islamic scholastics.

On the part of Thai Muslims, they generally believe that the Chularajmontri position holder should have superb knowledge of religion since the Chularajmontri has a duty to provide advices and recommendations regarding Islamic affairs, like to announce the result of moon observation in deciding important religious days, or to host certain important religious rituals. However, the more important is to consider and make judgments over matters of Islamic provisions. Superb knowledge is an important source of charisma and credibility; and the fact that Muslims generally desire superb knowledge clearly suggests its charisma-creating capacity in Muslim community. If the Chularajmontri is not recognized in his knowledge in religion and Islam, credibility in the institution will be eroded and the image will be tarnished among the Muslims; now some Muslims in some communities even do not recognize moon observation announced by the Chularajmontri. This is a credit crisis for the institution.

The Chularajmontri on the other hand should be well equipped with secular knowledge. Chularajmontri Cham Phromyong once gave his opinion that a Muslim should receive both religious and secular education. The researcher thinks that the Chularajmontri position holder should have secular knowledge above the compulsory education standard of Thailand, bachelor degree to be acceptable at minimum, but much higher standard is

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<sup>236</sup> Shedsharif Hadij, (2009 August-October). "Philosophy of Leadership and Principle of Good Governance in Islam", *Journal Message of Islam*. 30 (3): 45 – 46.

desired. This will provide the Chularajmontri with necessary data and information for the interests of the Muslims and the necessary background for coordinating with the other secular entities, like government agencies, other public and private organizations, and organizations of other religions; after all there are religious spheres and secular spheres co-existing in the world. The researcher suggests that, besides theology and Islamic studies, Chularajmontri-to-be should be well trained in sociology of religion and psychology of religion; as the researcher observes, the latter two disciplines of religion can provide ideological mediation among people of different faiths, providing ways to understanding other religions in an objective way. In addition, knowledge of astronomy and mathematics will be a great bonus for enhancing Chularajmontri's charisma as they are crucial for correct prediction which would always amaze people with awe. This requirement also tallies with the stipulation of the Islamic Administrative Act 1997 (2540) that the Chularajmontri shall be in good relationship with every religion.<sup>237</sup> Furthermore, the current world is the world of science and technology, the world of reason; being equipped with knowledge of sciences will enable the Chularajmontri to use scientific language to explain Islamic teaching to the younger generations and to the non-Muslims both of whom tend to be secular, which proves more effective than using pure Islamic language. After all in fact the best of the best quality of knowledge and wisdom should be required of the Chularajmontri-to-be since the position of Chularajmontri is a lifetime and one single most important position for the Muslims in Thailand, the position holder will be required a lot to accomplish the mission. However having a lot of knowledge in a person is not enough; the knowledge and wisdom must be sustained and advanced systematically in the institution. Independent and critical thinking is crucial in this respect. And Chularajmontri Cham Phromyong further elaborated that there were two elements in education, they were

<sup>237</sup> **Islamic Administrative Act 2504 B.E. (1997).** Category 1 General, article 7 item 5.

thinking and memorizing, and progress did not come from memorizing but from thinking. He also held that Al Qur'an taught people to use wisdom; and he criticized some ulamas that they knew everything from before birth of the earth until the end of the earth but what to do with their current life.<sup>238</sup> Therefore it is highly recommended that the institute of Chularajmontri should groom its scholastic nature by developing the capacity to do research and development.

Nevertheless, the reality is always not the same as desired, in the reality of Thai society the Chularajmontri is facing shortage of budget in supporting academic career of the Office<sup>239</sup>. Due to the shortage of fund, the institute of Chularajmontri is unable to live up to the expectation of both public and private sectors in providing the necessary knowledge regarding the many aspects of Islam and Muslims. Regarding this problem, the researcher recommends that the Chularajmontri should build a network of connection with scholars within and without the country and with the charities that do not conflict with Islamic principle. Through these connections and collaborations, research may be conducted and data may be collected for the purpose of providing trainings or producing printed materials or multimedia materials for both Muslims and non-Muslims so that they better understand Islam. In return, this strategy also reinforces scholastics in the institute of Chularajmontri and its charisma arising from knowledge and wisdom can be routinized and sustained in this institution.

<sup>238</sup> Laisuri, Muhammad (1989). *Op. cit.* (รายงานชีวิต รำลึกลุงแซม พรหมยงค์ อดีตจุฬาราชมนตรีกับมรดกที่มีการสานต่อ), p. 13.

<sup>239</sup> Through interview with Archan Samad Srichareon at Chularajmontri Office in Nong Chonk District, Bangkok on October, 2006.

### 5.2.2 Authority of Chularajmontri in Aspect of Immense Benevolence

Immense benevolence refers to immense loving kindness or immense mercy to all sentient beings, similar to “agape” in Christian term. The Chularajmontri and his Institute’s act of benevolence to both Muslims and non-Muslims alike will effectively enhance his and his Institute’s charisma and his authority arising from charisma in addition to contribution to humanity. Benevolence is an important feature of almost all religions, Islam is no exception. “In the name of God, the constant benevolence and mercy” is what Muslims say to begin important activities. Muslims also say “*Assalamu ‘alaykum, Allah Abdullah abu*” which means “May peace be with you and may God’s blessings be with you all”. These sayings of Muslims provide a trace of what is on their mind regarding their God, Allah, and how much they want Allah to love them. The greatest wish of all Muslims is to enter the Kingdom of God after their lives; and an important one of their wishes in this life is to have peace. One appropriate act of benevolence of the institute of Chularajmontri should be to support the Muslims in fulfilling their wishes for the purpose of fulfilling the duties of a Muslim which are detailed as follows.

1. Duty to Allah is to observe the 6 commands of faith<sup>240</sup> and 5 commands of conduct<sup>241</sup>.
2. Duty to fellow mankind, it is to abstain from things that are dangerous to body, life, and mind; for example, self-torment, suicide, or use of addictive drugs are forbidden.
3. Duty to the society and fellow mankind; the Islamic Constitution states that a human being must pursue interest within one’s scope of allowance without infringing

<sup>240</sup> The 6 commands of faith are 1) faith in the unity of Allah, 2) faith in Malaekah (angel) who brings opportunity from Allah, 3) faith in Qur’an, 4) faith in Allah’s messengers, namely Nabis and Rasul, with the Prophet Muhammad the last one, 5) faith in the final day of the world, 6) faith in the law of determination of good and evil

<sup>241</sup> The 5 commands of conduct are 1) to say the oath that there is no other god but Allah only, 2) to worship Allah (Ashulahd), 3) to fast during Ramadan, 4) to donate to the poor (Zagat), 5) to travel for pilgrimage (haji)



others' rights; for example, cheating, lying stealing, and receiving interest on loan are forbidden.

4. Duty to the environment; since vegetation, animals, and minerals are what mankind receives from God to eat and utilize, Muslims must be responsible to the environment.

The problem for the Chularajmontri is that the Thai Muslims have great difference in fulfilling the duties for becoming a complete Muslim. This implies that they have inequality in entering the Kingdom of God, especially for the marginalized Muslims such as the poverty-stricken Muslims, disabled Muslims, misguided Muslims, uneducated Muslims, and those Muslims in remote areas uninformed of the correct Islamic provisions. Therefore, apart from preaching Islamic doctrine through printed material, radio, and website, the institute of Chularajmontri should have TV programs, or an Islamic TV channel to utilize the wide coverage of TV medium to disseminate correct knowledge regarding Islam to every Muslim equally so that all Muslims will have equal access to knowledge of Islam and they have equal chance to fulfill their Muslim's duties and enter the Kingdom of God. In addition to that, the great and increasing gap between the poor and the rich Muslims is also in an urgent need for the Chularajmontri's attention and assistance. The Chularajmontri should work hard to close the gap between the poor and the rich. For example, the Chularajmontri should encourage rich Muslims to donate to the poor and to remind the Muslims to contribute Zakat to those who are determined by God to receive. He also must remind the Muslims who give Zakat to only relatives and friends or the rich Muslims who go for Hajj many times in their life that it does not mean they will have more merit; instead they should donate to sponsor the Muslims of less fortunes to go for hajj as well. By doing these, not only the Chularajmontri will confirm the benevolence of God,

but also he will contribute good deeds to the society, his and his office's charisma and authority will be enhanced as well.

### **5.2.3 AUTHORITY OF CHULARAJMONTRI IN ASPECT OF GREAT INFLUENCE**

Great influence here means great ability to affect other people, the great ability to have things accomplished at will through other people. For a finite human being, of course it is impossible to have unlimited power to influence others. But having great influence will enhance charisma of the Chularajmontri and greatly empower the Muslims under his guidance. The influence of the Chularajmontri should be directed to supporting the Muslims to attain peace and to enter the Kingdom of God in their next lives.

Nevertheless, in the reality the influence of the Chularajmontri institute as a religious leader is hindered rather than enhanced by the legal and administrative complex of the secular authority to which it is attached without option. The researcher thinks that apart from enhancing the Chularajmontri's influence through knowledge and act of benevolence the legal and administrative environment of the Chularajmontri should be improved to enhance charisma of the institution as a religious authority body in terms of influence. In this dissertation, the researcher proposes that there are 4 aspects of improvement in enhancing the influence of the Chularajmontri as a religious authority institution, namely first in selection of Chularajmontri, second the one single function of Chularajmontri as religious authority body of Islam, third is the office term of the Chularajmontri by supporting life term in office and fourth is the independence of the Chularajmontri by putting it directly under the Office of the Prime Minister in terms of organizational structure of authority. Recommendations in legal and administrative aspects are policywise recommendations aimed to correct the major element that has secularized

the Chularajmontri institute and erodes its religious charisma. The law and the administrative system are the environs and means in and through which the institute is to operate, but legal and administrative aspects are beyond control of the Chularajmontri in averting secularization; therefore the former must be redesigned in a way to favor the latter in grooming religiosity and charismatic authority of the institute by eliminating the various legal and administrative hindrances. This aspect of improvement of law and administrative improvements are detailed as follows.

### 5.2.3.1 In Assuming the Position of Chularajmontri

In coming to the position of Chularajmontri, the current election is not a suitable method; since the election is a process that opens chance to defilement of the religion by way of cartel and partisaning, to mundane favoring and repaying favors, and to interference of politicians who may need to obtain votes from the Muslims. Regarding the issue of the Chularajmontri and politics, it is found, according to an article, that some groups of the Muslims think that the Chularajmontri should jump into the game of politics so as to protect Muslims' interest and to prevent Muslims from being taken advantage of,<sup>242</sup> also in the same article it is written that Islam and politics cannot be separated,<sup>243</sup> but the Chularajmontri should limit its political involvement to only protecting the rights and interest of the Muslims as an advisor to the government not as a politician or people's representative.<sup>244</sup> The author of the article voices his concern that if the Chularajmontri

<sup>242</sup> Tuk-taen-Tum-Khaow. (ตึกแต่นตัมข้าว) (nd.). When Chularajmontri is ready at hand to Politicians in Amnuoy Suwankijboriharn. *Op. cit.* p. 208.

<sup>243</sup> *Ibid.* p. 217.

<sup>244</sup> *Ibid.* p. 220.

gets to the hand of politician the institution will be hopeless as a widely recognized institution.<sup>245</sup>

The aforementioned articles however conclude that the Chularajmontri should stay away from politics since it will not obtain any credibility as a religious figure from people by doing that. The researcher also thinks so as a religious leader the Chularajmontri should be immune from political wind; this also is a way to reinforce the religiosity and charisma of the position. Though Islam and politics are factually inseparable, the Chularajmontri should perceivably stay away from political parties. Furthermore, the Chularajmontri is a religious position; it should be kept politically neutral otherwise the fellow Muslims will be divided, which in turn will erode the institution's leadership. Also it is said that, by the same author of the above articles, political orientation may lead some Muslims to devote themselves to politics rather than religion.<sup>246</sup> Therefore it may be concluded that the Chularajmontri selection process is faulted as it brings secularity into the institution.

The problem now is that while selection should not be adopted, then what method may be used? The Prime Minister Advisory Board in drafting a new Islamic Act has recommended that the National Churoh Council<sup>247</sup> have the authority to select a qualified person to hold the position of Chularajmontri. Though the researcher does not totally agree with the draft, she does see certain advantages over the current Act concerning the matter of selecting the Chularajmontri, as by this way the charisma in the Chularajmontri will be enhanced.

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<sup>245</sup> *Ibid.* p. 217.

<sup>246</sup> *Ibid.* p. 219, "I think that those Muslims who are afraid of losing interest and being taken advantage of should select a representative to help solve the problems."

<sup>247</sup> National Churoh Council is a council of qualified persons responsible in convening and considering Islamic provisions. The council members are 31 in number and consisted of representatives from various agencies; most are Islamic scholars. Further details are available in the Prime Minister Advisory Board's Draft of Islamic Religion Administration year 2008. By Nider Waba

Churoh members are of higher quality due to the fact that they have been selected from the persons already well established in being recognized in morality, religiosity, and knowledge, such as representatives from provincial Islamic committees, representatives from private Islamic schools, representatives from religious teachers from Pondok schools, representatives from Islamic judges, representatives from universities with Islamic study, representatives from private Islamic charities or associations, and representatives from other recognized groups than the abovementioned parties. With such high quality in these persons, it is more difficult if not impossible to defile them with personal mundane interest. Also the operation of the National Churoh Council is more transparent and accountable in comparing with that of provincial Islamic committees that may involve a far bigger amount of people. With few people to investigate, transparency is naturally higher. With such a highly respectable council to select a Chularajmontri-to-be, the chance that the Chularajmontri will be a good and charismatic person is naturally higher. Furthermore the National Churoh Council is open to representatives from other religions.<sup>248</sup> While one important intention of the Islamic Administrative Act is to obtain a Chularajmontri who can lead Muslims alongside in harmony with other religions; having representatives from other religions in the National Churoh Council is positive to that end, and the draft opens such an opportunity. Yet another advantage is that representatives of the Southern Muslims who represent the majority of Thai Muslims may have chance to become a Chularajmontri. Nevertheless, the method of voting for the Chularajmontri is recommended to closed and private in order to sanctify the upcoming Chularajmontri and enhance his charisma.

### 5.2.3.2 Sole Function of Chularajmontri

<sup>248</sup> Nider Waba. et al. **Draft Islamic Administrative Act B.E. 2540**. (nd.) section 2 article 7, p.5. (คณะที่ปรึกษา นายกรัฐมนตรี นิดร์ วาบาและคณะ ร่าง พระราชบัญญัติ การบริหารกิจการศาสนาอิสลาม พ.ศ. 2540 (2008) หมวด ๒ มาตราที่ ๗, หน้า.5)



The Chularajmontri should have but one function as the religious leader of Thai Muslims. Its role must not be a mere minister to the King who is a patron of Islam in Thailand; nor is it the chairperson of the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand, whose function is to give advices to the Ministry of Interior and the Development of Religious Affairs, which was formerly under the Ministry of Education. It must be the leadership institution of Muslims in performing religious duties prescribed in genuine Islamic doctrine. This will rid the institute of criticisms, due to its current dual functions that erode its charismatic authority and reputation as a religious entity, as in the following.

1. The dual functions of the Chularajmontri leads to confusion; namely the Chularajmontri's role as an advisor to the Department of Religious Affairs puts him in an embarrassing situation when he is the chairman of the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand, since the Chularajmontri's advisor responsibility is inferior to that of the Central Islamic Committee<sup>249</sup>.
2. The life-time office term of the Chularajmontri also draws weakening criticism. It is that the Chularajmontri in the hat of religious leader of Thai Muslim in practicing Islam should be entitled to life-time office term; however once in the hat of the Chairman of the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand, the office term should be limited since it is an administrative function that is not related with religious affairs. Nevertheless, the two conflicting functions, one religious and sacred another secular and mundane, are linked to the position of Chularajmontri, resulting in life-time mundane administrative office term which draws constant criticism about the inappropriateness and failure to bring about progress in administration of the Central Islamic Committee.

<sup>249</sup> Amnuoy Suwarnkijboriharn, "Introduction", (nd.) *Op. cit.* pp. 63-64.

This simultaneous secular and religious function of the Chularajmontri is paradoxical in principle and ineffective in practice in the increasingly complicating Thai society, especially in the midst of Muslim desecularization. With the aforementioned reasons, the Chularajmontri should therefore assume only one function of religious leader of Thai Muslims.

### 5.2.3.3 Chularajmontri Institute should be Independent

At present, Chularajmontri institute is operated under the bureaucratic system of the government. One benefit in here is that government budget will be allocated to the institution; but the institution will be part of a giant organization which moves slowly while the current globalization situation requires the Chularajmontri to move fast. Now the Thai society is confronted with many serious problems, especially the serious problem of using ethnicity and religion as means in creating division in the society.

The researcher sees that a modern state such as Thailand in this case is created with secularization theory in mind, as can be seen in religious organizations being marginalized, such as the Chularajmontri in Thailand. In this view, Venerable Phra Phaisarn Wisalo gives a similar opinion regarding Buddhist organization that a pitfall of having a religious organization attached to government bureaucracy is that modern state is so secular that it does not see the significance of religion. He says the government in a modern state is like a self-sustaining machine (spiritless); even though the governor pays attention to religious matters, he or she does so for the sake that the concerned religious matters are parts of the big impersonal machine. Therefore the state involvement in religion is hardly a protection of religion but rather than any other for its own interest.<sup>250</sup> Also Somboon Suksamrarn sees

<sup>250</sup> Venerable Phra Phaisarn Wisalo holds that in the past (before the modern Thai state), Thai kings came to control the monks with an aim of protecting Buddhism. Further details are available in Venerable Phra

the similar point that kingdoms of religion with the political ruler's patronage gives rise to one important relationship, namely the loyalty of monks toward the state manifested in providing co-operation and support<sup>251</sup>. With this kind of relationship between Buddhist institution and the state, the monks are insensitive to the change of the outside world since the government is supposed to take care of the monks; as a result the monks cannot adapt to the changing world and Buddhism is in decline<sup>252</sup> due to losing touch with the reality. If the monks are to be pillar of the society in confronting change, they must be free from state intervention.<sup>253</sup>

From the above opinions regarding Thai Buddhist monk institution, the Chularajmontri institute is in the same position. The Chularajmontri institute is currently under the Department of Religious Affairs of the Ministry of Education; or in short, the Chularajmontri institute is a part of the secular bureaucratic system of Thai government, and is an instrument of the government in administering the country. The stipulation of the duties of the Chularajmontri that he is to provide advices and recommendations to the ministers of Interiors and of Education is a clear example of being an instrument of the secular government, thus debasing this religious institution. Also the Chularajmontri is to perform duties as according to law just as a government official. It creates many hindrances in meeting expectation of the people. In the case of the incidents in Deep-south provinces, the Chularajmontri could do but a little to help resolve the problem, due to lack

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Phaisarn Wisalo (พระไพศาล วิสาโล) Venerable Phra (1999) "Future of Thai Buddhism" in **Vision of Globalization set 11: Fallen Buddhism, Religious Crisis, Money-oriented Era.** (อนาคตของพุทธศาสนาในไทย" วิถีทรรศน์สุดโลกาภิวัตน์ ๑๑ พุทธวิบัติ วิกฤตศาสนาพุทธนาธิปไตย). pp. 41 – 76.

<sup>251</sup> Somboon Suksamrarn (สมบุญ สุขสำราญ), (1984.), **Buddhism and Social and Politic Changes**, p.51

<sup>252</sup> Pipat Pasutharachart (พิพัฒน์ พสุธารชาติ) (2006.), **State and Religion: Essays of Concerning Kingdom, Religion State and Freedom**, 2<sup>nd</sup>. ed. p. 309

<sup>253</sup> Nithi Iaosriwong (นิธิ เอียวศรีวงศ์), (2008) "The Future of Buddhist Monk Organizations" (อนาคตขององค์กรสงฆ์) **Looking into the future: Essays for Directing Thai Society.** (มองอนาคต บทวิเคราะห์เพื่อการปรับเปลี่ยนทิศทางสังคมไทย), pp. 115-151.

of variety of systematic information and lack of credibility in the Chularajmontri among southern Muslims. This situation may owe to the fact that the current Chularajmontri has but little power in the eye of general Muslims.

The Chularajmontri as well as other religious institutions and organizations which have been provided for by law, once created, should be an independent entity, like the Bureau of National Buddhism which is customarily immune from government interference in its operation. Independence in organizational and administrative structure concerning the Chularajmontri provides it with great authority and boosts its charisma. As charisma is the principal source of religious authority, an influential religious leadership organization is often maintained within an aura of holiness which is a unquestionable source of charisma; any secular interference or even perceived interference from secular entity would be considered defilement and thus greatly erode charisma of the organization. Independence, or even perceived independence, from secular interference is therefore compatible with religious organization, such as the institute of Chularajmontri, and will empower it. Independence from secular interference is especially decisive in preventing charisma erosion in the leader of Thai Muslims as the Muslims are methodically religious and they defy going with the flow of secularization even at expense of modern amenity. On the other hand, too much government control always results in inefficiency and inflexibility in operation and in responding to the changing environment; and more significantly it hinders people's liberty and suppresses plurality in the society, which is in fact a badly needed factor in today's world situation of diversity in culture and belief. If the institute of Chularajmontri is independent and authorized without being bound to the slow-moving government bureaucratic system, also if it is to focus on cultural and religious issues; the institution will be efficient and powerful in dealing with religious issues and

may be able to help solve the related problems that the government is not in a position to solve rather than being a mere religious consultant on Islamic affairs to government agencies. Furthermore, making the Chularajmontri also an academic institute can help in enhancing its independence and capability in solving problems of the complicated world today.

In addition, Muslim population in Thailand has greatly increased;<sup>254</sup> and there is an urgent need for an institution to effectively take care of these Muslims in both religious affairs and social welfares. For examples, Chularajmontri should support Muslims' traveling for Haji, education, and morality; provide social welfares and opportunities of Muslim participation in solving their problems in the society; and to promote mutual understanding between Muslims and non-Muslims. With the growth of Muslim society, workload of the Chularajmontri also increases. Therefore in order to increase efficiency and flexibility in operation, institution should have greater independence and power than it has currently. By aiming to mitigate the plight of the Muslims, the Chularajmontri does not only help solve social problems but the institution also benefits from the increasing charisma along the course.

Also, with independence in the institution, the Chularajmontri is recommended to follow the following directions in its operation.

1. To guide the Muslims under the premise of the principle of rule-by-law, Shariah, in the administration

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<sup>254</sup> Comparing the censuses of 1990 and 2000, there were 2,238,787 Muslims and 2,777,542 Muslims respectively, or an increase of 24%. National Statistics Office of Thailand (2000) and "Table 3 Population by Religion, Sex, Area and Region", **Population and Housing Census 2000**. Bangkok: National Statistics Office of Thailand.



2. To build a sustainable and verifiable administrative and political system and economic system
3. To operate with vision of the security in the nation and the people in order to protect the sovereignty from infringement
4. To materialize justice in the society, especially among the Muslims who encounter injustice<sup>255</sup>

As a religious institution, the Chularajmontri should have the authority to impose appropriate penalty on those who violate the religious precepts, like the Muslims who drink liquor, or trade drug, or distort the religious principle for self interest. The Chularajmontri should distribute the common asset fairly to those who have the right for it, instead of giving the zakat to only his relatives and friends as being practiced in the current society. Only with independence will Chularajmontri become a true religious leader who assumes an important role in effectively guiding the society in aspects of morality and religion.

The necessary improvements in law and administration in the Chularajmontri Office is necessary for enhancing charisma of the Chularajmontri in the aspect of power. However, such improvement is assisting in nature since law and administration is in the realm of secular world; it should be cautioned that secular power should not defile the sacred power.

#### **5.2.4 RECOMMENDATIONS IN PERSONAL CONDUCT**

The major problem to be addressed here is what should be done personally in order that the Chularajmontri will become a charismatic person. For those who believe in

<sup>255</sup> Shedsharif Hadij. (2009). **Op.cit.** pp.47- 48.

transmigration as in the Buddhist belief; charisma – popularity, merit, grandeur, and power – comes only through good conduct of the person and through accumulation of merits in many of his/her past lives. In addition, when the religious founders, such as the Lord Buddha, Jesus Christ, or Prophet Muhammad, are taken into consideration; it is found that beside preaching these prophets also practiced what they preached strictly which is the major factor contributing to their being special persons who are widely revered and admired by the people.

In the case of building charisma in the Chularajmontri, there may be several contextual factors to consider, but the most important thing is that the Chularajmontri, leader of the institution, must be well versed of the Islamic doctrine as well as the doctrines of other religions, which is to provide a condition for the Chularajmontri to understand other religions. Also the Chularajmontri should be equipped with secular knowledge so that he can advise and assist the Muslims to lead a happy life in this world. However, it is utmost important that the Chularajmontri should conduct himself strictly according to Islamic code of conducts until he becomes widely admired and revered by the people, with details in the following

#### **5.2.4.1 Personal Conduct of Leader**

The main idea concerning Islamic religious leader is that the person should be chosen by Allah and carry His message. The leader therefore is supposed ideally to be greatly influential, gracefully benevolent, and highly knowledgeable, as he is naturally considered as a representative of Allah. The perfect example of an Islamic leader is of course the Prophet Muhammad. It is said that Allah appoints the Prophet Muhammad to give warning to the peoples of the world and take good care of the Al Qur'an that Allah

confers.<sup>256</sup> The leaders are both religious masters and commoners who Allah trusts and appoints to be leaders.<sup>257</sup> The leader is therefore important to an Islamic community, especially the Muslims live in brotherhood community and Muslims are generally highly socialized rather individualized. Days of their life are full of strict Islamic codes of conduct, and the Muslims need to be guided and educated properly by trusted learned Islamic scholars, who naturally are transformed into community leaders. However, though Islamic leaders are Allah-chosen to be, their leadership is in potentiality in essence and the actuality basically depends on the individuals.

The above ideas regarding Islamic leadership may be applied on the Chularajmontri as the person who is the leader of the Islamic institution of Chularajmontri Office and the leader of Thai Muslims. The problem at hand now is how and what the actuality in the Chularajmontri will be so as to become a person of charisma in Islamic ideology. “The Chularajmontri must be actualized following the example of Prophet Muhammad” may well summarize different opinions of Thai Muslims interviewed regarding this matter. And the personal traits of leadership in Prophet Muhammad may be summarized as follows.

1. A good listener: during a conversation, Prophet Muhammad would silence and listen more than speak; he speaks of only important things.
2. A person who speaks the truth: Prophet Muhammad is very strict in speak the truth; he does not speak untruth nor does he speak nonsense.
3. A person who likes cleanliness and tidiness: He habitually loves cleanliness and tidiness and detests foul odors.
4. A simple person: he does not like luxury life; he lives a simple life and advises people to live a simple life.

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<sup>256</sup> *Ibid.* p. 39.

<sup>257</sup> *Ibid.* p. 47.

5. A generous person: he is the kindest person, he never denies people coming to ask for life necessities from him; generosity is his true nature.
6. A person who works by himself: he does the house by himself; he mends clothes, repairs shoes, does milking, and threshes dough.
7. A helping person: he used to help do other's work, like helping poor widows and the poor work without being conceited or feeling sorry for his lost labor.
8. A humble person: he always lowers his head and is humble; he does not like punctiliousness in dressing himself for the purpose of boasting; his simple attire though with mending stitches is clean; he does not like ornament.
9. A person who honors his guests: he provides good hospitality to the guests.
10. A person who refrains from luxury: he pays attention to eating; he eats only nutritious foods; he never indulges himself in eating; and be it eating or living, he never overdoes it.
11. A person who loves equality: he places equal importance on the rich, the poor, the young, women, the old, and slaves.
12. A person who loves the poor: but he does not want people to beg for donation; he likes working; many people come to beg for his donation, but he advises them to work, like collecting fire woods.
13. A person with Al Qur'an always on his mind: no matter in what state he may be, he would always think of Al Qur'an.<sup>258</sup>

In addition, Islamic philosophers also propose some obligations of leader, namely the leader must be virtuous and knowledgeable. A good example is Al Farabi. Abu Ali Ibn Sina (980 – 1037) once mentioned that a virtuous leader is the one who conduct according

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<sup>258</sup> [www.islamhouse.com](http://www.islamhouse.com) (online)

to the Prophet as example; while Mulla Sodrah (1571 – 1602) opined that a leader must be a person of justice.<sup>259</sup>

In conclusion, the recommendations for the Chularajmontri, both as religious person and religious institution of Islam, primarily surround the idea of developing charisma in the Chularajmontri through proper education and training in the aspect of knowledge, through making merit in manifesting the quality of benevolence, and through improvement in law and administration concerning the Chularajmontri in assisting to enhance charisma of Chularajmontri is the aspect of influence. The reason that charisma is emphasized is that it is the source of power compatible with religiosity; and it is needed by every religious authority body to be successful. On the part of personal conduct, it is recommended that the Chularajmontri, as a Muslim destined by God to take care the fellow Muslims in this world, should take conduct of Prophet Muhammad as the example.

### 5.3 CONCLUSION

Secularization theory, which states that as human progress they will become secularized in the end, is confirmed to be refuted; in fact people are as religious as they have been. There is nothing changed in essence and what is changed is only in the appearance. People may have change in the degree of religiosity but they never will be depleted of their religiosity. Since secularity and religiosity are antithetical to each other, the higher secularity implies lower religiosity and the process of it is called secularization; the lower secularity implies higher religiosity and the process of it is called desecularization. Along the course recent history of human kind, we do have

<sup>259</sup> Shedsharif Hadij. (2009) *Op.cit.* p.46.



secularization, but it does not go on and on; in fact after a period of secularization desecularization follows. Therefore desecularization thesis is confirmed.

The reaction to modernization of Muslims in general today may be used to disprove secularization theory and confirm desecularization thesis. It is remarkable in Islam that Muslims remain relatively more religious around the world. There are movements of Islamic revivalism and Islamic purification, which are not very remarkable in other religions. Muslims today still cherish Islamic religious education for their children apart from formal secular education imposed by the governments; in Thailand the Pondok schools are popular among Muslim kids especially in the Deep-south provinces. Even in the United States, a nation of utmost secularity, the American Muslims are aware of their being Muslims and want to educate their young ones more islamically.<sup>260</sup>

Desecularization is not limited to Muslims only, peoples of other religions also remain religious and desecularize as modernization is going on. In the case of Thai Buddhists, though they conduct their everyday life secularly, at the bottom of their heart they are as religious as they have been; the Dharmmakaya movements, the Santi-Asoke movement, and even the phenomenon of Chattukhram in recent years of Thailand are illustration of that religiosity and desecularization.

In the case of the Chularajmontri Institute, its development in recent history clearly demonstrates secularization theory and desecualrization thesis in action. During the modernization period of Thai history and even now, secularization theory dominates the leading intellectual reality of the Thai society. A religious institution such as the

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<sup>260</sup> Smith, Jane I, (1991) **Islam in America**. p. 127.

Chularajmontri institute is authorized by secular law to perform many secular functions for the benefits of economy, politics, and administration; it is thus secularized ever since. However, religiosity never fades away from human spirit; the Chularajmontri institute has never shed its religious function, which indicates that the religiosity in the Muslims never goes away. In the reality, it is being repressed by secularization and it is so much now that desecularization begins to burst out. The most conspicuous evidence of desecularization, at least in the Muslims, is the fact that the Chularajmontri institute is fading in its influence and important in the eyes of the fellow Muslims as its secularity is increasing with increased secular authority. In other words, in the eyes of the Muslims the greater the secular authority is in the Chularajmontri institute the lower its religious authority will be, as evident by the fact that the institute is being challenged and criticized, which rarely happened before. And this is why this dissertation proposes the Chularajmontri institute to reform itself by increasing religiosity in itself.

On the other hand, the research finds that the current situation of the world may be explained by the concept of secularization and desecularization; and many conflicts today may be explained as clash between secularization and desecularization. The recent past centuries, characterized by modernization with rapid progress in economy and science and technology, are a period of secularization in humanity; but this research suggests that this century is a period of, or at least an early period of, desecularization in humanity. The world today, led by economy and technology powers, is developing in a path of secularization; while another part of the world, especially the Islamic world is heading in direction of desecularization.

This research also finds that among many centers of desecularization in the world communities, Muslims constitute the largest center of desecularization. This finding may be attributed to Islam's doctrine concerning organization of Muslims and its provisions, precepts, and code of conduct. One major observation in comparing Islam with other mainstream world religions, Christianity and Buddhism, is that Islam tends to affect greater religiosity in Muslims than the other two religions. One major reason is that in Islam religious sphere and secular sphere intersect each other, while those in Christianity and Buddhism are relatively separate. The secular life of a Muslim is also his/her religious life; while in Christianity and Buddhism, religious life centers around church or temple and secular life is one's private life not subject to his/her religion. And this may explain why many desecularization movements, such as religious revivalism, are found among Muslims.

In the same tone, Muslims in Thailand are more religious and tend to desecularize more than their non-Muslim counterparts in Thai society. Clash between secularization and desecularization also take places in Thailand, especially in the Deep-south provinces, which is the current conflict between the Thai authority and the Muslims in the Deep-south provinces. Though the conflict in the Deep-south has its own localities; for example, the historical nationalism in Pattani Malay state, the Malay ethnicity and culture; the religiosity of Islam blends seamlessly in the local Malay Muslims' identity. The contents of anti-government slogan and the rationale behind their struggle are predominantly Islamically religious. The Islamic identity of the local Muslims in the Deep-south is an example of living proof of desecularization as religiosity of Islam has been incorporated into the core identity of a culture, for which people are willing to sacrifice their life. The reason that this conflict may be classified as a clash between secularization and

dsecularization is that the Thai government on one part is secular while the Malay Muslims choose to adhere to Islamic religiosity in differentiate themselves from their counterpart. People may argue that the adherence to Islamic identity may be strategic in the struggle, but if the local people are not religious and dsecular this strategy would not have been possible.

The Chularajmontri is the leader of Thai Muslims for more than 400 years. It is the religious leadership institution of Muslims in Thailand. Though the Chularajmontri has been secularized through changes in its role and function along the modernization of Thai society in recent history; the Chularajmontri is indispensable for Thai society as the Thai Muslims need a leader; and due to the largest minority status of Muslims in Thai society the Chularajmontri functions as a coordinating link between the mainstream culture in Thai society and the Muslims.

However, with the Chularajmontri institute secularized with the mainstream culture of Thai society and the Muslim increasingly dsecularized; the leadership of the Chularajmontri is at risk and very fragile among the Thai Muslims. The research finds that the Chularajmontri institute has been weakened by secularization in itself through performing many secular functions and being positioned under secular entities, which consequently leads to erosion of its sacredness. Therefore the Chularajmontri institute needs be revitalized.

The research proposes that since the Chularajmontri is and is supposed to be a genuinely religious authority for Muslims in Thailand it can be revitalized by building charisma in the person holding the institute. Among the three categories of authority, name

rational/legal authority, traditional authority, and charismatic authority, the research suggests that charismatic authority is the most suitable to Chularajmontri as a religious authority, and thus to the institute of Chularajmontri. The framework of charisma building is the three extraordinary characteristics of charismatic figure, namely in knowledge, benevolence, and influence. The rationale behind the framework is theism in Islamic theology, where the Chularajmontri may be perceived or interpreted as the chosen person through him the God takes care of the world; and therefore the Chularajmontri needs to display a bit of the extraordinary qualities that may be perceived as god-bestowed. Also these extraordinary qualities will have great effect in the spirit of people once perceived.

Lastly, the research suggests further study into the concept of charisma and the detailed format of education and training in grooming charisma in a religious leader-to-be. Also the issue of female Muslim leadership is also worth studying.

#### 5.4. Recommendations for Further Research

Many scholars, such as Panithan Wattanayakorn, opine that the reason the government cannot solve the issue in the Deep-south provinces is because instead of adopting strategy “already available” in Thai society the government has chosen to adopt strategies borrowed from others especially the strategies of the super power nations that are based on grounds of different kind. These borrowed strategies are often complex, short-lived and sometimes self-contradictory.<sup>261</sup>

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<sup>261</sup> Chaiwat Satha-anant. (2008) **Imagined Land: State and Solving the Violence of the Deep South of Thailand.** p.35. (Referring to Panithan Wattanayakorn, Roles and Influence of Super Povernation in Thailand)



Based on the above opinion, the Chularajmontri is regarded as an asset already available in the Thai home land. The Chularajmontri is an old institution which accompanies the Thai society for a long time; and it has been maintaining unity in Thai Muslims ever since. The Chularajmontris in the past helped solve many problems concerning Muslims at both national level and international level, an example case is the siege of the Israel embassy. Therefore it is proposed that further researches in different perspectives should be carried out with a hope to push the Chularajmontri to be an effective strategy in solving the issue and bringing back peace to the Thai Society.

In addition, there should be basic research, such as study of attitudes regarding the Chularajmontri of different groups of Muslims together with recommendations for the purpose to improve the Chularajmontri so that it is an institution efficient. Or there should be comparative research, such as Muslim leaders in various Southeast Asian countries in comparison with that of Thailand; the study may be subdivided into subtopics of research, such as the historical background of a Muslim leader, his role and duty, and the road through which he came to be the religious leader, to name some examples. Comparative study will demonstrate the image and characteristics of the Muslim leaders in various countries, from which the similarities and differences to and from the Chularajmontri come into light.

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## APPENDIX

The Names of Chularajmontri between Ayutthaya Periods to the Present Period

Number	Names of Chularajmontri	Period
1.	เชก อะหมัดรัตนราชเชษฐี (Shaikh Ahmadd)	King Prasarthong (1629-1656)
2.	อภัยราชา (Aphajraja)	King Prasarthong and King Narai (1656-1688)
3.	แก้ว (Kaew)	King Narai, King Petraja (1688-1703) And King Sanpeth VIII (1703-1708)
4.	สน (Son)	King Trysaa (1708-1732) King Baromakort (1732-1758)
5.	ใจ (Jai)	King Baromakort
6.	เชน (Chen)	King Uthumporn (1758-1758) King Eakthat (1758-1767) and King Thonburi (1767-1782)
7.	ก้อนแก้ว (Koonkaew)	King Rama I (1782-1809)
8.	อากาหยี (Aagayee)	King Rama I
9.	เถียน (Thyan)	King Rama II (1809-1824) and King Rama III (1824-1851)
10.	นาม (Naam)	King Rama III King Rama IV (1851-1868)
11.	น้อย (Nooj)	King Rama IV
12.	สิน (Sin)	King Rama IV King Rama V (1868-1910)
13.	สัน อะหมัดจุฬา (San Ahmaddchular)	King Rama V (1868-1910) and King Rama VI (1910-1925)
14.	เกษม อะหมัดจุฬา (Kasem Ahmaddchular)	King Rama VI
15.	สอน อะหมัดจุฬา (Sorn Ahmaddchular)	King Rama VII (1925-1935)
16.	แช่ม พรหมยงค์ (Cham Phromyong)	King Rama VIII (1935-1946) and King Rama IX (1946-Present)
17.	ควน สุวรรณศาสน์ (Tuan Suwanasatsana)	King Rama IX
18.	ประเสริฐ มะหะหมัด (Prasert Muhammad)	King Rama IX
19.	สวสดี สุมาลัยศักดิ์ (Sawad Sumalayasak)	King Rama IX
20.	อาซิส พัทธกัณฑ์ (Asis Pitakkumpol)	King Rama IX

## BIBLIOGRAPHY



Ms. Plubplung Kongchana was born at Pitsanulok province, Thailand on September 20<sup>th</sup>, 1946. She studied for her B.Ed. (major history) at Srinakharinwirot University, Bangkok, Thailand in 1970 and continued her M.Ed. (major history) in 1976 and M.A. in Asian Studies at University of the Philippines (UP.) in 1983. Cert. on Research Methodology at Hiroshima University, Japan in 1985 and Cert. on Historical Document Concerning Thailand at Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, Japan in 1990. She has graduated Assumption University in 2010 with a Ph.D. in Religious Studies at Graduate School of Philosophy and Religion.

As of her professional experiences, Ms. Plubplung Kongchana was a full-time assistant professor at the Department of History, Faculty of Social Science, Srinakharinwirot University. She taught history more than 30 years there and she was a history curricular committee member for both undergraduate and graduate levels. In 1988, she was selected by the committee of the Faculty of Social Science to be an outstanding lecturer of the year. Others of her academic contributions are articles, school texts, and various researches. One of her works is “Foreigners as in the Testimony of Khun Luang Wat Pradu-Thong Tham”: (Historical Primary Source of Ayutthaya Period.) which was selected by the committee of the Faculty of Social Science was presented to H.R.H. Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn in 2005. She is also one of the scholars who jointly authored the textbook “Human Security and Peace in Mainland Southeast Asia” for the UNESCO. She has many academic works published both outside and inside Thailand, mostly with a focus on Islamic History. Besides, she is a life member of the Siam Society under Royal Patronage.

As of her endeavors in social services and promotion of culture, Ms. Plubplung Kongchana had taken part in many projects, such as a member of the Committee of Ayutthaya Historical Study Center at Ayutthaya Province, a member of the Committee of Thai-Denmark Long Distance Learning Center at a Thai temple in Copenhagen Denmark; she is also taking part in a research project for supporting intercultural dialogue relations, such as the preparation for taking part in ASEAN Community in 2015.



Ms. Plubplung Kongchana was also an administrator in the position of Assistant to Vice President in the Department of Foreign Relations, Srinakharinwirot University. She also worked in the position of the director of the Institute of Asia Pacific Studies of Srinakharinwirot University. Among many of her positions, she was a general secretary of the Committee of Historical Society under the Patronage of H.R.H. Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn. She was a member of the Committee of Social Science Society of Thailand.



